Saul Kripke’s paradoxical argument in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) has generated an extravagant number of responses. A major debate prompted by this book has focused on the plausibility and role of the supposed normative character of meaning; the argument itself is often taken to rely on the assumption that meaning is irreducibly normative. Following Boghossian (1989), the normativity of meaning has been understood as closely tied to the existence of semantic correctness conditions. After a brief introduction (...) to the background of the debate, this work will focus on whether the normativity of meaning may be better understood as stemming from a different type of correctness, namely linguistic correctness. Linguistic correctness differs from semantic correctness insofar as it is related to conventional, and not truth-functional, meaning. I will begin by clarifying some of the features of linguistic correctness. First, I will outline some reasons why the distinction between linguistic and semantic correctness should be maintained. Then, I will anticipate a possible criticism and argue that linguistic correctness does not belong to the domain of pragmatics, as it is relevant to our understanding of conventional meaning. Finally, I will try to show that linguistic “oughts” are constitutive of meaning. Having established these basic features of linguistic correctness, I will investigate whether the fact that it is constitutive of meaning can vindicate the idea that meaning is robustly, irreducibly normative. By applying arguments from the realm of moral philosophy – within which, too, there have been attempts to show that constitutive facts can give rise to categorical moral norms – I will argue that linguistic correctness cannot give rise to categorical semantic norms. Linguistic correctness may be, nevertheless, a useful tool for explaining some of our intuitions about meaning. (shrink)

Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a (...) word correctly to make a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes). (shrink)

This article addresses the longstanding puzzle of what Cratylus’ silence means. It argues that Plato’s Cratylus goes silent to convey his position regarding the correctness of names, and it does this by demonstrating how Cratylus is silent in imitation of a literary trope for portraying the significance of a character’s silence. The philosophical payoff of this imitation is that, for Cratylus, correctness consists not in saying, but in showing.

In a series of studies children show increasing mastery of irregular plural forms (such as mice) simply by producing erroneous over‐regularized versions of them (such as mouses). We explain this phenomenon in terms of successive approximation in imitation: Children over‐regularize early in acquisition because the representations of frequent, regular plural forms develop more quickly, such that at the earliest stages of production they interfere with children's attempts to imitatively reproduce irregular forms they have heard in the input. As the strength (...) of the representations that determine children's productions settle asymptotically, the early advantage for the frequent regular forms is negated, and children's attempts to imitate the irregular forms they have observed become more likely to succeed (a process that produces the classic U‐shape in children's acquisition of plural inflection). These data show that children can acquire correct linguistic behavior without feedback in a situation where, as a result of philosophical and linguistic analyses, it has often been argued that it is logically impossible for them to do so. (shrink)

In this paper, we will report results of two sets of cross-linguistic studies about truth judgments and correctness judgments by speakers of English and Japanese, which will show a significant influence of a moral-political factor in an utterance on Japanese truth/correctness judgments. Following up Mizumoto (2022), which demonstrated such an effect on Japanese truth judgments and correctness judgments about utterances containing a contrastive conjunction (such as “but”), Study 1 shows the same effect on Japanese correctness (...) judgments about utterances containing a pejorative. Study 2 then shows that a moral-political factor in utterances can affect Japanese truth/correctness judgments about them even if they are simple utterances containing neither a contrastive conjunction nor a pejorative. In conclusion, we will briefly discuss whether this effect is linguistic or psychological, and present three hypotheses: the semantic hypothesis, pragmatic hypothesis, and error theory hypothesis, to account for the data, which we leave open for future studies. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: 10.1007/s11186-021-09436-2.

The original publication of the article contains two formatting errors, the second of which significantly inhibits readability.

This paper proposes an account of linguistic knowledge in terms of knowing-how, starting from Love's seminal distinction between first-order linguistic activity and second-order (or metalinguistic) practices. Metalinguistic practices are argued to be constitutive of linguistic knowledge. Skilful linguistic behaviour is subject to correction based on criterial support provided through metalinguistic practices. Linguistic know-how is knowing-how to provide and to recognise criterial support for first-order linguistic activity. I conclude that participation in first-order linguistic activity (...) requires a critical reflective attitude, which implies that all first-order linguistic activity has a second-order dimension. -/- . (shrink)

In this article we respond to Justin Sytsma's critique of our 2005 article "Analogy and Metaphor Running Amok: An Examination of the Use of Explanatory Devices in Neuroscience" . We address each of Sytsma's major criticisms in turn. We conclude that, not only does Sytsma fail to convincingly demonstrate how our argument fails, he falls headlong into the very conceptual confusions we examine in our original article. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

This is the first installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space prevented the publication of the full essay in present issue of the Journal. The second installment will appear in the next issue, 2021 (1). My overall goal is to outline a strategy for integrating generative linguistics with a broadly pragmatist approach to meaning and communication. Two immensely useful guides in this venture are Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Pietroski’s recent book, Conjoining Meanings, offers (...) an approach to natural-language semantics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst philosophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against extensionalism—the view that meanings are (or determine) truth and satisfaction conditions. Having arrived at the same conclusion by way of Brandom’s defl ationist account of truth and reference, I’ll argue that both theorists have important contributions to make to a broader anti-extensionalist approach to language. What appears here as Part 1 of the essay is largely exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects of Brandom’s normative inferentialism (§1) and Pietroski’s naturalistic semantics (§2). In Part 2 (next issue), I argue that there are many convergences between these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to first appearances, very few points of substantive disagreement between them. If the integration strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear to be sharply contrasting commitments are better seen as interrelated verbal differences that come down to different—but complementary—explanatory goals. The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by discussing how to square Pietroski’s commitment to predicativism with Brandom’s argument that a predicativist language is in principle incapable of expressing ordinary conditionals. (shrink)

The thesis examines a central and controversial question in the philosophy of mind and language: Is meaning normative? Are there rules we must follow for our words to have meaning? ;Philosophers are sharply divided over this question. One side, often associated with Wittgenstein and more recently Kripke, sees meaning as essentially normative. If a sign is to be meaningful, then surely, it is argued, there must be a distinction between the correct and incorrect use of that sign. The other side (...) eschews the appeal to rules. This line of thought goes back to Quine, and has been vigorously defended by Davidson, who argues that linguistic rules are no more essential to speaking a language than the rules of etiquette at a dinner table are to consuming food. ;The dissertation proposes that we approach the question by asking whether there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning. Various common versions of the notion of linguistic incorrectness are considered, including the one appealed to by Saul Kripke in his discussion of Wittgenstein, the suggestion that going against the communicative conventions is making a linguistic error, and Tyler Burge's idea that we err when we violate certain constitutive community norms. Neither of these suggestions, it is argued, supports the idea that rules are essential to meaning. ;But we should not conclude from this, as does Davidson, that we can reject the notion of linguistic incorrectness altogether. If a speaker is to be interpretable there must be certain constraints on her linguistic use, and a plausible construal of these constraints, it is argued, presupposes a notion of linguistic incorrectness. The conclusion is that there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning, although this notion is not to be understood along the ordinary lines. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there’s been a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, normative. Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses of meaningful expressions are semantically correct while disagreeing over whether this entails anything normative. But what is it to say that a use of an expression is semantically correct? On the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say (...) that it doesn’t result in a factual mistake, that is, in saying or thinking something false. On an alternative construal it is instead to say that it doesn’t result in a distinctively linguistic mistake, that is, in misusing the expression. It is natural to think that these two construals of semantic correctness are simply about different things and not in competition with each other. However, this is not the common view. Instead, several philosophers who subscribe to the orthodox construal have argued that the alternative construal of correctness as use in accordance with meaning doesn’t make any sense, partly because there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes (Whiting 2016, Wikforss 2001). In this paper I develop and defend the idea that there’s a distinctively linguistic notion of correctness as use in accordance with meaning and argue that there are clear cases of linguistic mistakes. (shrink)

In this paper, we present results of cross-linguistic studies of Japanese and English knowing how constructions that show radical differences in knowledge-how attributions with large effect sizes. The results suggest that the relevant ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge-how captured by Japanese constructions. We shall argue that such data will open up a gap between otherwise indistinguishable two conceptions of the very topic of knowledge-how, or the debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, namely a debate about the nature (...) of knowledge-how and a debate about the state captured by “know how”, which we call the knowledge-how interpretation and the state interpretation, respectively. Consequently, the results have not only various possible philosophical implications that have not been considered or discussed in the literature but also provide new topics in the theory of knowledge-how, including the question of which interpretation of the topic is correct itself. (shrink)

For Kant and his followers, pure reason can be practical, and its substantive practical command is, broadly speaking, that we treat ourselves and others as worthy of respect as free and equal. If those who have defended the Kantian morality system are correct, this moral imperative will not be authoritative and inescapable simply because we don't know how to coherently reweave our practical commitments so as to leave it out, but because it is presupposed by the possibility of practical reason. (...) On this model, the rational authority of moral dictates would be understood as absolute and universal. ;But what if Kant and his followers have been wrong? What if the search for practical unconditionality turned out to be vain? Kant himself would most likely react to this news by pronouncing that, without a priori necessity, there could be no moral necessity, and without moral necessity, there could be no purity of motive, and without purity of motive, there could be no moral worth, and without moral worth, there could be no legitimate ascriptions of praise and blame. In short, for Kant and his orthodox followers, without unconditionality, the morality system would collapse. ;I will argue that the search for a priori necessity behind moral law is indeed hopeless, but that this does not entail the collapse of the morality system. It does however force us to conceive a new way of accounting for practical normativity in the absence of unconditionality. It also requires that, in order to preserve morality, we find a defensible place for it as a contingent subset of ethics broadly construed. My answer is to provide a new account of morality, and practical normativity in general, against the backdrop of neopragmatism. My hope is to provide an alternative story which preserves the Kantian insight that practical necessity is driven by rational authority, but which does not presuppose unconditionality to explain the latter's force and inescapability. In short I will attempt to show that ethical principles, when considered in linguistic space, need not be a priori necessary to bind individuals in a genuinely authoritative sense. (shrink)

Resumen La lingüística abarca una amplia gama de fenómenos que evolucionan a la misma velocidad que las lenguas lo hacen. Algunos fenómenos lingüísticos como la atrición han sido confundidos con otros fenómenos y han recibido nombres distintos en el transcurso de la historia debido al contacto entre varias lenguas. Por ese motivo, un estudio sobre dicho fenómeno se estima oportuno. Esto engloba la elección de la palabra atrición como traducción de attrition, su definición, las circunstancias que deben producirse para que (...) surja, los tipos de atrición que pueden darse y una comparación de la atrición lingüística con otros fenómenos lingüísticos. Esta exploración concluye con el hecho de que la atrición es el término apropiado, ya que delimita este fenómeno lingüístico que, aunque no es un fenómeno nuevo, sí es cada vez más actual debido a las migraciones y a la globalización. (shrink)

Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martı´ (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalin- 10 guistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within (...) and across cultures has not been established. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson has been a major and influential spokesman for ordinary language philosophy throughout the late twentieth century, studying the relationship between common language and the language of formal logic. This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor corrections to the text, these classic essays remain original and intact. Logico-Linguistic Papers contains Strawson's major essay, 'On Referring', in which he disputed Bertrand Russell's (...) theory of definite descriptions, distinguishing between referring to an entity and asserting its existence. The book contains twelve essays in all, grouped by subject matter. The first five are concerned with the topic of singular reference and predication and the last three are all responses to J.L. Austin's treatment of the topic of truth. Strawson disputes the correspondence theory of truth, maintaining that facts are what statements state. The remaining papers deal with meaning, speech acts, logical truth and Chomsky's views on syntax. (shrink)

'Knowledge' doesn't correctly describe our relation to linguistic rules. It is too thick a notion. On the other hand, 'cognize', without further elaboration, is too thin a notion, which is to say that it is too thin to play a role in a competence theory. One advantage of the term 'knowledge'-and presumably Chomsky's original motivation for using it-is that knowledge would play the right kind of role in a competence theory: Our competence would consist in a body of knowledge (...) which we have and which we may or may not act upon-our performance need not conform to the linguistic rules that we know. Is there a way out of the dilemma? I'm going to make the case that the best way to talk about grammatical rules is simply to say that we have them. That doesn't sound very deep, I know, but saying that we have individual rules leaves room for individual norm guidance in a way that 'cognize' does not. Saying we have a rule like subjacency is also thicker than merely saying we cognize it. Saying I have such a rule invites the interpretation that it is a rule for me-that I am normatively guided by it. The competence theory thus becomes a theory of the rules that we have. Whether we follow those rules is another matter entirely. (shrink)

Marc Hauser, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman’s paper is an excellent contribution to a now resurgent attempt (Dwyer, 1999; Harman, 1999; Mikhail, 2000) to explore and understand moral psychology by way of an analogy with Noam Chomsky’s pathbreaking work in linguistics, famously suggested by John Rawls (1971). And anyone who reads their paper ought to be convinced that research into our innate moral endowment is a plausible and worthwhile research program. I thus begin by agreeing that even if the (...) class='Hi'>linguistic analogy turns out to be weak, it can do titanic work in serving, "as an important guide to empirical research, opening doors to theoretically distinctive questions that, to date, have few answers" (p. XXX). Granting the importance of the empirical investigation of moral judgment generally, and of research designed to probe the linguistic analogy specifically, I will nonetheless argue that there is simply no evidence that there is a specialized moral faculty, no evidence that the stronger version of the linguistic analogy is correct (p. XXX). (shrink)

The notion of linguistic correction with which Augustine of Hippo introduced his Ars pro fratrum mediocritate breuiata seems central to the philosopher's grammatical discussion, not only because of the various examples that Augustine offers about the definitions of barbarism and soloecism at the end of this treatise, but also because the subject of correction and, consequently, of the deviations of language, are also presented in other non-grammatical works: The confessions, De ordine and De doctrina Christiana. In this article, we (...) propose to evaluate the conceptual outlines of the notions of barbarism and solecism in the work of Augustine, considering, on the one hand, the definitions present in the Ars breuiata, and, on the other, the way in which Augustine also presents them in his philosophical work. We propose that the normative orientation contained in the text of ars must be relativised by ethical questions that arise from the comments present in the Confessions, the De ordine and the De doctrina Christiana. (shrink)

This book asks how we—as citizens, immigrants, activists, teachers—can counter the abuse of language in our midst. How can we take back the power of language from those who flaunt that power to silence or erase us and our fellows? In search of answers, Linguistic Disobedience recalls ages and situations that made critiquing, correcting, and caring for language essential for survival. From turn-of-the-twentieth-century Central Europe to the miseries of the Third Reich, from the Movement for Black Lives to the (...) ongoing effort to decolonize African languages, the study and practice of linguistic disobedience have been crucial. But what are we to do today, when reactionary supremacists and authoritarians are screen-testing their own forms of so-called disobedience to quash oppositional social justice movements and their languages? Blending lyric essay with cultural criticism, historical analysis, and applied linguistics, Linguistic Disobedience offers suggestions for a hopeful pathway forward in violent times. (shrink)

The papers in this series of five volumes provide a snapshot of current trends in European Cognitive Science. Each of the volumes deals with problems in cognitive science from a different perspective, covering the interacting disciplines of cognitive psychology, logic and linguistics, human-computer interaction, neuroscience and artificial intelligence respectively. Linguistics is concerned with the structure and use of languages, and logic with the form and correctness of argumentation in ordinary and scientific language. The two fields are presented with respect (...) to their role in cognitive science and artificial intelligence: How are they realised by psychological mechanisms or biological processes on the one hand or programmed or wired in machines on the other. The contributions in this volume give introductions to the state-of-the-art, emphasizing the analysis of complexity and flexibility in logic and language in the framework of classical approaches (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7). At the same time some contributions present a broader perspective in which an integration of the formal structure with the structure of the processing systems might be possible (Chapters 2 & 6). In this context, the differences and the perspectives of the classical approaches on the one hand and of connectionist approaches on the other are compared. (Chapters 1 & 6).contributions present a broader perspective in which an integration of the formal structure with the structure of the processing systems might be possible (Chapters 2 & 6). In this context, the differences and the perspectives of the classical approaches on the one hand and of connectionist approaches on the other are compared. (Chapters 1 & 6). (shrink)

The current study collected orally-delivered autobiographical narratives from a sample of 44 undergraduate students. Participants were asked to produce both deceptive and non-deceptive versions of their narrative to two specific autobiographical question prompts while standing in front of a video camera. Narratives were then analyzed with Coh-Metrix software on 33 indices of linguistic cohesion. Following a Bonferroni correction for the large number of linguistic variables , results indicated that the deceptive narratives contained more explicit action verbs, less (...) class='Hi'>linguistic complexity, and less referential coherence . The results support a theory that, in deceptive narratives, there is greater narrative distance between the self that narrates and the self that is narrated about. This suggests that narrative selves are constituted not as autonomous selves, but are subject to processes that are likely operating on a subconscious level. (shrink)

Theoretical questions concerning language and communication figure prominently throughout the work of the Czech-British social philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner. The article traces the development of Gellner’s linguistic thought from his early, controversial engagements with Ordinary Language Philosophy to his responses to Chomsky’s work in linguistics and his late-career assessments of Wittgenstein and particularly Malinowski whose – subsequently repudiated – view of the fundamental difference between the alleged “primitive” and “scientific” functions of language turns out to play a central (...) explanatory role in Gellner’s renowned theory of nationalism. The key to understanding Gellner’s thinking on language is to grasp both his adherence to a “telementational” model of communication and his scientism. This leads him to embrace the view that modern national cultures are predicated upon an industrial-scientific mode of cognition which both requires and entails a radically distinctive metaphysics of communication, namely one which allows for the conveyance of culture-transcending, “context-free” conceptual content. This, I claim, is a serious error which stems in large part from a misdiagnosis of the cognitive and communicative consequences of literacy and in particular a failure to correctly apprehend what linguist Roy Harris has termed the “autoglottic space” engendered by the availability of writing. (shrink)

We investigate a new paradigm in the context of learning in the limit, namely, learning correction grammars for classes of computably enumerable (c.e.) languages. Knowing a language may feature a representation of it in terms of two grammars. The second grammar is used to make corrections to the first grammar. Such a pair of grammars can be seen as a single description of (or grammar for) the language. We call such grammars correction grammars. Correction grammars capture the observable fact that (...) people do correct their linguistic utterances during their usual linguistic activities. We show that learning correction grammars for classes of c.e. languages in the TxtEx-model (i.e., converging to a single correct correction grammar in the limit) is sometimes more powerful than learning ordinary grammars even in the TxtBe-model (where the learner is allowed to converge to infinitely many syntactically distinct but correct conjectures in the limit). For each n ≥ 0, there is a similar learning advantage, again in learning correction grammars for classes of c.e. languages, but where we compare learning correction grammars that make n + 1 corrections to those that make n corrections. The concept of a correction grammar can be extended into the constructive transfinite, using the idea of counting-down from notations for transfinite constructive ordinals. This transfinite extension can also be conceptualized as being about learning Ershov-descriptions for c.e. languages. For u a notation in Kleene's general system $(O,\, < _o )$ of ordinal notations for constructive ordinals, we introduce the concept of an u-correction grammar, where u is used to bound the number of corrections that the grammar is allowed to make. We prove a general hierarchy result: if u and v are notations for constructive ordinals such that $u\, < _o \,v$ , then there are classes of c.e. languages that can be TxtEx-learned by conjecturing v-correction grammars but not by conjecturing u-correction grammars. Surprisingly, we show that— above "ω-many" corrections—it is not possible to strengthen the hierarchy: TxtEx-learning u-correction grammars of classes of c.e. languages, where u is a notation in O for any ordinal, can be simulated by TxtBe-learning ω-correction grammars, where ω is any notation for the smallest infinite ordinal ω. (shrink)

Using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, this study investigated the preference of learners of English as a foreign language for four types of written corrective feedback, which are often discussed in the literature, on grammatical, lexical, orthographic, and pragmatic errors. In particular, it concerned whether such preference is influenced by two learner variables, namely, foreign language enjoyment and proficiency level. The preference for selective vs. comprehensive WCF was also examined. The participants in the study were 117 University students in a (...) Thai EFL context. Analysis of questionnaire data revealed a tendency for learners to prefer more explicit types of WCF for most error types, irrespective of their proficiency and FLE level. High proficiency level learners rated less explicit WCF types as useful to some degree, whereas their low proficiency level counterparts did not. Similar results were found for the two FLE groups. Besides, the FLE level seemed to play a role in perceiving the value of WCF in terms of scope. The results of follow-up interviews showed that the linguistic features of learners' first language, existing knowledge of the target language, affective feelings, and teacher's role were the main factors contributing to variation in learners' preferences. Possible pedagogical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of those (...) questions would never have been asked which lead to moral philosophy and a metaphysics of the external world. But sense perceptions of the same object vary so that it appears to have contradictory qualities and are sometimes completely deceptive. Nor do illusory differ internally from veridical perceptions. Moreover, perceptual variation and error can be unmasked only by such procedures as looking more carefully, listening harder, trying to touch, asking others, in short by more sense experience. So the senses are, as it were, both accused and judge in these disputes and why should a venal judge be trusted more than the criminal he tries? Such “correction” of one experience by another of the same kind seems no more reliable than the original “error.” Philosophers have found all this very puzzling. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose and justify the cross‐linguistic study of the concept of truth through empirical studies of truth predicates, with results of such studies. We first conceptually explore the possibility of cross‐linguistic disagreement about truth purely due to linguistic norms governing truth predicates, which may imply a kind of pluralism about the concept of truth. We then consider the conditions under which we would be justified in inferring this sort of pluralism from the fact of (...) such cross‐linguistic disagreement. Next, we report results of three studies on the use of English “is true” and Japanese two truth predicates, as well as “is correct” and its Japanese counterpart. We then report another set of studies using a different vignette, where the radical cross‐linguistic difference observed in earlier studies disappeared. These data together suggest that the moral‐political factor in the truth‐bearer (utterance) strongly affects the uses of Japanese truth predicates but not those of English. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the studies and results reported here, and the empirical possibility of what we call lexical alethic pluralism, for debates over relativism, theories of meaning, and the deflationary and inflationary theories of truth. (shrink)

There are more than six thousand human languages, each one unique. For the last five hundred years, people have argued about how important language differences are. This book traces that history and shows how language differences have generally been treated either as of no importance or as all-important, depending on broader approaches taken to human life and knowledge. It was only in the twentieth century, in the work of Franz Boas and his students, that an attempt was made to engage (...) seriously with the reality of language specificities. Since the 1950s, this work has been largely presented as yet another claim that language differences are all-important by cognitive scientists and philosophers who believe that such differences are of no importance. This book seeks to correct this misrepresentation and point to the new directions taken by the Boasians, directions now being recovered in the most recent work in psychology and linguistics. (shrink)

This paper introduces a formal view of the semantics and pragmatics of corrective feedback in dialogues between adults and children. The goal of this research is to give a formal account of language coordination in dialogue, and semantic coordination in particular. Accounting for semantic coordination requires (1) a semantics, i.e. an architecture allowing for dynamic meanings and meaning updates as results of dialogue moves, and (2) a pragmatics, describing the dialogue moves involved in semantic coordination. We illustrate the general approach (...) by applying it to some examples from the literature on corrective feedback, and provide a fairly detailed discussion of one example using TTR (Type Theory with Records) to formalize concepts. TTR provides an analysis of linguistic content which is structured in order to allow modification and similarity metrics, and a framework for describing dialogue moves and resulting updates to linguistic resources. (shrink)

We explored whether children could apply linguistic strategies for lying, i.e., manipulating linguistic content of speech to mislead others. We announced a knowledge-test entailing prizes in the classrooms of a primary school and a middle school. Altogether 79 Chinese children (6-18 years) voluntarily participated in the test: listening to a series of animal sounds before guessing the names of the animals. Meanwhile, behind the participants, a video was playing images that ostensibly corresponded to the sounds being played. In (...) fact, this was not necessarily the case, i.e., some items cannot be solved because the sounds played are not from any animal but machine-synthesized. Participants were instructed not to look back at the video. However, 51 children peeked at the video for the unsolvable items, although the peeking behavior decreased with age. Moreover, when explaining how they correctly guessed the unsolvable items, children as young as six years old were able to apply a linguistic strategy (i.e., "capability attribution") for lying. Besides "capability attribution", Children also applied "fortune attribution" and "topic shift" for lying. Finally, "fortune attribution" and "topic shift" increased with age. Therefore, educators need to be aware that children are able to apply verbal strategies for lying that could involve truthful statements (i.e., "topic shift") or statements that are difficult to be proved as untruthful (i.e., "fortune attribution"). (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects. Husserl believes that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims are subject to error and open to modification. In this article, I develop a self-correcting account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation plays a critical role in both (...) challenging and improving upon the eidetic results in phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that the self-correcting account of eidetic variation 1) is consistent with Husserl’s own formulations of his eidetic methodology and epistemic principles; 2) captures the dual epistemic function of eidetic variation as means for both testing and intuitively validating eidetic claims; and 3) offers methodological support for contemporary attempts to integrate eidetic variation with non-eidetic methods and resources. To substantiate these claims, I first contrast the self-correcting account with the falsificationist interpretations of eidetic variation. Then, I turn to three applications of eidetic variation in order to examine how eidetic phenomenology could draw from real-life deviations, artificial variations, and critical–historical reflection. The goal is to lay the methodological groundwork for a self-correcting and integrative account of eidetic variation and illustrate its usefulness in research practice. (shrink)

This article argues that linguistically endangered minority groups often face endangerment due to structural linguistic injustice that arises from past injustices and ongoing unjust social processes. Language revitalization is often a justified way of reforming unjust social structures. I connect this discussion to another debate, namely, whether historical injustice (and the requirement for its correction) may be superseded. I ask: which changing circumstances might lead to the supersession of structural linguistic injustice? Of the many reasons to reform unjust (...) social structures, I focus on dignity-based concerns. Historically-sensitive dignity-based concerns are relevant for judging whether supersession of structural linguistic injustice has occurred. My view is largely present-oriented, but history still plays a role in deciding the strength of justificatory bases for structural reformation. (shrink)

Wittgenstein mentions “forms of life” only on a limited number of occasions in his writings; however, this concept is at the core of his approach to language, as the vast literature on the subject shows. My aim in this paper is neither to adjudicate which of the many competing interpretations of “forms of life” is correct nor to propose a new one. I start with a methodological take on this notion and test it by applying it to a specific case. (...) In my view, the notion of forms of life is a methodological tool that Wittgenstein uses to draw attention to the embeddedness of language in our lives and practices. This reading, I suggest, allows us to oppose those who want to see in Wittgenstein a conservative thinker, based on his remark on forms of life as “the given” that must be accepted. In particular, it becomes possible to put his notion to use in the study of linguistic and social change. Hence, I propose as an example the case of innovative language games in trans communities. In this context, the notion of forms of life enables us to see with more clarity how linguistic change occurs, which also helps us better understand phenomena such as disagreement, conflict, and hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: 10.1007/s11225-021-09980-z.

This paper proposes a solution to David Miller's Minnesotan-Arizonan demonstration of the language dependence of truthlikeness (Miller 1974), along with Miller's first-order demonstration of the same (Miller 1978). It is assumed, with Peter Urbach, that the implication of these demonstrations is that the very notion of truthlikeness is intrinsically language dependent and thus non-objective. As such, truthlikeness cannot supply a basis for an objective account of scientific progress. I argue that, while Miller is correct in arguing that the number of (...) true atomic sentences of a false theory is language dependent, the number of known sentences (under certain straightforward assumptions) is conserved by translation; degree of knowledge, unlike truthlikeness, is thus a linguistically invariant notion. It is concluded that the objectivity of scientific progress must be grounded on the fact (noted in Cohen 1980) that knowledge, not mere truth, is the aim of science. (shrink)

Background Little is known about teaching medical ethics across cultural and linguistic boundaries. This study examined two successive cohorts of first year medical students in a six year undergraduate MBBS program. Methods The objective was to investigate whether Arabic speaking students studying medicine in an Arabic country would be able to correctly identify some of the principles of Western medical ethical reasoning. This cohort study was conducted on first year students in a six-year undergraduate program studying medicine in English, (...) their second language at a medical school in the Arabian Gulf. The ethics teaching was based on the four-principle approach (autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice) and delivered by a non-Muslim native English speaker with no knowledge of the Arabic language. Although the course was respectful of Arabic culture and tradition, the content excluded an analysis of Islamic medical ethics and focused on Western ethical reasoning. Following two 45-minute interactive seminars, students in groups of 3 or 4 visited a primary health care centre for one morning, sitting in with an attending physician seeing his or her patients in Arabic. Each student submitted a personal report for summative assessment detailing the ethical issues they had observed. Results All 62 students enrolled in these courses participated. Each student acting independently was able to correctly identify a median number of 4 different medical ethical issues (range 2–9) and correctly identify and label accurately a median of 2 different medical ethical issues (range 2–7) There were no significant correlations between their English language skills or general academic ability and the number or accuracy of ethical issues identified. Conclusions This study has demonstrated that these students could identify medical ethical issues based on Western constructs, despite learning in English, their second language, being in the third week of their medical school experience and with minimal instruction. This result was independent of their academic and English language skills suggesting that ethical principles as espoused in the four principal approach may be common to the students' Islamic religious beliefs, allowing them to access complex medical ethical reasoning skills at an early stage in the medical curriculum. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition, focusing on his ability to give a satisfactory account of the more normative dimensions of thought and language use. In doing so, I argue that Hume’s implicit account of these issues is far richer than is normally assumed. In particular, I show that Hume’s account of convention-driven artificial virtues like justice also applies to the proper use of conventional public languages. I then use this connection between Hume’s (...) conception of language and his moral theory to show how he can respond to a number of basic objections to his views. In doing so, I explore the sense in which human cognition is essentially linguistic, and so social, for Hume, as well as many other issues concerning the relationship between Hume’s philosophy of mind and language, his epistemology, and his ethics. (shrink)

In the original publication of an article, the citation of section 3 was missing in the published version. Now the same has been published in this correction.

There is an error in the completeness proof for the {λ, =} part of FOIL-K. The error occurs in Section 4, in the text following the proof of Corollary 4.7, and concerns the definition of the interpretation I on relation symbols. Before this point in the paper, for each object variable v an equivalence class v has been defined, and for each intension variable f a function f has been defined. Then the following definition is given for a relation symbol (...) P : v1, v2, . . . , f1, f2, . . . ∈ I(P )(Γ) just in case there are w1, w2, . . . in d(Γ) with wi ∈ vi such that P (w1, w2, . . . , f1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ. It was pointed out by Torben Brauner that we could have f1 and g1 being the same function, but also have P (w1, w2, . . . , f1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ without having P (w1, w2, . . . , g1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ. Our solution is to modify the definition of the model, rather artificially, so that if f and g are the same function, then f and g are syntactically the same intension variable. This is done as follows. First, arbitrarily choose some object variable w, and its corresponding equivalence class w. For each intension variable f we define a disambiguation world ˆ. (shrink)