Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality is a highly enjoyable and rewarding book. It throws new light on some familiar theories of justice, and shows how the idea that principles of justice are those principles which no one could reasonably reject can yield prescriptions for constitutional design. But I shall argue that Barry's defence of his theory is less robust than he thinks, and more generally that there is reason to suppose that principles of justice are as (...) contestable as conceptions of the good. (shrink)

In Why Not Socialism?, GA Cohen defines socialism as the combined application of two moral principles: the egalitarian principle and the principle of community. The desirability of a social order organized around these two principles is illustrated by the ‘camping trip’ example. After describing the fundamental features of the camping trip scenario at reasonable length, Cohen argues that the desirability of such a social model is nearly self-explanatory, concluding therefore that the most significant challenges to socialism lie in its feasibility. (...) This article argues that the desirability of the camping trip model as an appropriate ideal for society is less obvious than Cohen acknowledges. To argue my point, I shall compare the camping trip with another social practice that is equally small sized and characterized by strong emotional ties among its members, but in which the conditions of what I shall call ‘goal-monism’ and discontinuity in time do not hold, namely, the family. (shrink)

I claim that the revisions John Rawls made to his theory of justice—as seen in his political conception of justice as fairness in the revised edition of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement—result in him being able to secure justice for all persons even in their private lives. Thus, I defend his theory against common communitarian and feminist criticisms, viz the lack of moral community and inability to secure justice for individuals in the (...) private domain. I demonstrate that justice is secured from the categorical requirement that all associational life and moral doctrines must adhere to the constraints of justice, by (what Rawls terms) the indirect application of the first principle of justice. The implications of and necessity for this indirect application are precisely what I interrogate in this thesis. I suggest that this indirect application requires unconditional acknowledgement and internalisation of the values of liberty and equality (political values of the first principle) into all aspects of civil society. I claim that Rawls realised this necessity for the congruence between the moral powers of persons, the spheres of society, and the right and the good and, as such, developed a complementary relation between these three features. Coherence between these three aspects is essential; without coherence, citizens would have a split moral personality, the public and the non-public spheres would be in conflict, and the political values and the moral doctrines of individuals would undermine one another. The significance of this strict coherence is that it can ensure the adequate development of individuals’ capacity for citizenship during the three stages of moral development. This results in citizens being able to form bonds of civic friendship necessary for justice as reciprocity to be realised. Thus, in this thesis, I position my argument against theorists such as Nancy Rosenblum, who argue for a more relaxed congruence between political institutions and civil society, as according to her illiberal forms of associational life can help form the necessary bonds of love and care needed for mutual cooperation in a liberal society. In opposition to this, I claim that strict congruence is necessary; without it, a stable liberal society is not possible as the citizens would not be able to able to respect one another on free, equal, and mutually beneficial terms. I rely on Hochschild’s sociological evidence to demonstrate that civic friendship has not been developed, due to a lack of reciprocity, impacting the negative development of one’s sense of justice. I then illustrate how this lack of reciprocity is amplified by digital and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The significance of this thesis is that I claim, firstly, Rawls’s last revisions and works before his death demonstrate that justice is a collective non-comprehensive good that results by constraining individuals’ associational life and their partial comprehensive doctrines to Rawlsian demands of justice. Thus, Rawls takes seriously the feminist and communitarian critiques he received. Secondly, I claim that this interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be conceptualised in terms of a binary presentation of the priority of the right versus the good debate and, instead, I argue for a reconceptualisation of the priority of the right versus the good as ranges on a continuum of structural relations between the right and the good. (shrink)

In arguments in support of capitalism, the following propositions are sometimes advanced or presupposed: the best life for the individual is one of consumption, understood in a broad sense that includes aesthetic pleasures and entertainment as well as consumption of goods in the ordinary sense; consumption is to be valued because it promotes happiness or welfare, which is the ultimate good; since there are not enough opportunities for consumption to provide satiation for everybody, some principles of distributive justice (...) must be chosen to decide who gets what; the total to be distributed has first to be produced. What is produced depends, among other things, on the motivation and information of the producers. The theory of justice must take account of the fact that different principles of distribution have different effects on motivation and information; economic theory tells us that the motivational and informational consequences of private ownership of the means of production are superior to those of the various forms of collective ownerships. In the traditional controversy over the relative merits of capitalism and economic systems, the focus has been on proposition. In this paper, I consider instead propositions and. Before one can even begin to discuss how values are to be allocated, one must consider what they are – what it is that ought to be valued. I shall argue that at the center of Marxism is a specific conception of the good life as one of active self-realization, rather than passive consumption. (shrink)

Ethics and morality, fundamental concepts in human society, are expected to be upheld by individuals and effectively taught by teachers to new generations. This study delves into the perceptions of preservice teachers regarding ethics and good within the framework of an ethics and morality course in education. It also explores the ethical and unethical behaviors these teachers most commonly encounter in their school experiences. Utilizing a qualitative case study methodology, the research provides an in-depth analysis of ethics, the concept (...) of good, ethical and unethical behaviors within the Turkish context. Through thematic analysis of data collected over various weeks, the findings reveal that participants perceive ethics as actions, individuals, and ideas that embody values such as justice, respect, and honesty. Their decision-making is influenced by diverse ethical filters aligned with normative ethical theories. For instance, an act is deemed ethical if it does not limit freedom and harm others, conforms to societal norms, benefits others, adheres to laws and rules, instills a sense of righteousness, and stems from good intentions. Furthermore, the study identifies six key qualities defining the concept of good: evoking happiness, being beneficial, proper, pure, preferred, and encompassing both moral and ethical dimensions. The experiences of ethical and unethical acts among participants predominantly relate to themes of inequality versus justice, harshness versus love, ineffective versus effective teaching, inconsistency versus role model behaviors, undesired versus desired relationships with school stakeholders, and the breach versus balance between professional and private life. Overall, this research highlights significant aspects of how preservice teachers perceive the concepts of ethics and good along with unethical behaviors, offering valuable insights for teacher education. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for the necessity of the doctrine as (...) well as various conditions of its applicability. For example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the highest good’s systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant’s system. (shrink)

Many Faculties of Education in the UK and elsewhere have ‘social justice’ written into their mission statements. But are they concerned by questions of social justice in education, or has the term become somewhat vacuous and devoid of substantive meaning? The present article subjects recent discourses about social justice in education to scrutiny and finds them wanting in various respects, in particular when juxtaposed with historical accounts of justice by philosophers such as Aristotle or Aquinas. Among (...) the complaints made here is that most educational accounts (a) make do with a ‘negative’ conception of social justice as focused on specific cases of injustices without any positive conception of what social justice means in its entirety, (b) foreground institutional justice at the expense of justice as a moral or civic virtue, (c) fail to connect the identification of justice or injustice to an account of phronesis or practical wisdom for integrating values, (d) shy away from associating social justice with the ‘common good’ and (e) fail to get to grips with some thorny normative questions about the role of justice in the ordering of goods in a hierarchy towards the highest good. Along the way, various remedies are suggested. (shrink)

The organizational justice literature and the family business literature have developed independently, which limits our understanding of fairness and justice in the family business workplace. So far, the concepts of justice and fairness have been used interchangeably in the family business literature, as if objective measures that aim to increase justice in the workplace will automatically translate into fairness perceptions among family business employees. By integrating the organizational justice literature and the family business literature, we (...) first differentiate between the two concepts of justice and fairness and argue that a utilitarian conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions in the family business workplace. Second, we shed light on the importance of incorporating socioemotional goals, particularly those that reveal a bright side of socioemotional wealth, into rules and regulations designed to increase justice in the workplace, which, we argue, contributes to increasing fairness perceptions among employees and to building and maintaining an ethical family business workplace. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed at the end of the paper. (shrink)

칸트가 최고선을 정의하기 위해 활용하는 최상선과 완전선은 공히 덕과 행복을 인과적 관계로 잇는 개념들이다. 전자는 ‘덕을 갖추었다면, 반드시 행복할 자격이 있다’고 말하는 개념이라면, 후자는 더 나아가 ‘덕스러운 자의 행복할 자격이 세계 안에서 정말로 실현될 수 있어야 한다’고 말하는 개념이다. 이를 통해 칸트의 최고선은 궁극적으로 ‘최상선의 실현으로서의 완전선’으로 정의된다. 이렇게 정의된 최고선 개념 안에는 덕스러운 자들이 곤궁하고 비참한 사회는 ‘불의’한 세계이며, ‘행복할 자격’이 있는 자들에게 정말로 ‘행복한 삶의 현존’을 보장해주는 사회가 정의로운 세계라는 것, 그리고 이런 정의로운 사회를 실현하는 것이 윤리적 존재로서의 (...) 우리의 책무라는 수수하지만 강력한 통찰이 담겨 있는 것으로 보인다. 그러나 칸트는 이런 통찰을 본격적으로 전개하는 쪽으로 나아가지 않고, 최고선의 가능성을 보증하기 위해 영혼의 불멸과 신의 현존을 요청하는데 그친다. 이런 도덕-신학적 해법은 지극히 불충분하다. 칸트의 말대로 덕과 행복이 이질적 성분들이며 이 양자의 인과적 종합을 요하는 ‘실천적’ 이념이 최고선이라면, 이 이념은 이 세계 안의 유한한 존재인 우리의 삶을 규정하는 물질적, 경험적 조건들을 고려하고 개선할 때에만 실현 가능할 것이기 때문이다. 그러나 칸트의 ‘순수’ 이성의 실천 철학이 포괄하기를 거부하는 것이 바로 이 조건들이다. (shrink)

In this paper, I will inquire into the basic assumptions underlying Rawls’s argument for the distribution of resources according to the difference principle. Rawls assumes a ‘social division of responsibility’ between society and individual citizens which implies that society need not compensate its members for differences in welfare that are the result of the relative cost of effecting their conception of the good. Rawls’s basic justification for holding people individually responsible for the costs of effecting their conception of the (...) good is that it may be assumed that they are able to revise their ends in light of their relative costs. I will show that this assumption of the revisability of our ends is incompatible with Rawls’s justification of the first principle of justice, which has to assume that people’s conceptions of the good and the ends and aspirations that are based on them are given. Removing this friction from Rawls’s theory leads to a position about the distribution of resources akin to the idea of equal opportunity for welfare developed by writers like G.A. Cohen and Richard Arneson. However, it differs from their versions because it focuses on the importance of people’s ability to form and pursue some determinate conception of the good. I will sketch the outlines of this position and will try to indicate how it could be implemented as a workable conception of justice. (shrink)

The paper examines Amartya Sen’s seminal work Development and Freedom (1999) in relation to his underlying conception of justice and particularly in relation to the tension that arises in the correlation between basic freedom and basic goods. The idea is to address the question as to which of the two elements (basic goods or basic freedoms) takes precedence to the enactment of global justice. The paper advances a particular distinction between a foundational approach and a functional approach when (...) addressing the question of the priority and primacy of any of the two elements and sheds light on a contentious answer, namely, that basic goods are foundationally primary in relation to basic freedoms and that such a primacy does not rule out the functional priority of basic freedoms. (shrink)

Liberal neutrality is assumed to pertain to rival conceptions of the good. The nature of the rivalry between conceptions of the good is pivotal to the coherence, scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. Yet, liberal theorists have said very little about rivalry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by reviewing three conceptions of rivalry: incompatibility rivalry, intra-domain rivalry and state power rivalry. I argue that state power rivalry is the morally relevant conception of rivalry, (...) and that it has significant implications for the scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. I conclude that in the light of state power rivalry, the only feasible liberal neutral state is a very minimal one. (shrink)

The author outlines a conception of toleration as recognition of differences which she argues to be more adequate than current liberal views in order to face issues arising from contemporary pluralism. The liberal conception of toleration as freedom from government's interference in certain areas is appropriate if pluralism is conceived of as a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. By contrast, if pluralism is understood as the plurality of groups and cultures, asymmetrically situated in democratic society, then (...) the issues underlying toleration are seen as the contested claim of minorities for asserting their different identity in the public space. Public toleration of differences is thus viewed as a symbolic public gesture of inclusion of the different identities and their bearers into democratic citizenship on an equal footing as members of minority groups. The argument supporting public toleration is so founded on reason of justice. (shrink)

In the past decade, scholars such as Samuel Freeman, Martin O’Neill, Alan Thomas and others have argued that no matter how widely Rawls’s theory of justice (TJ) was understood as a defence of the welfare state (WS), the socio-economic system Rawls defends and always defended is property-owing democracy (POD). In this article I present the argument that Rawls did not defend POD in TJ. However, while the claim that it was POD the socio-economic system implied by the principle of (...) difference generated heated reactions by defenders of the WS, the argument I raise differs from most of them. In the article I maintain that, for Rawls, principles of justice underdetermine the choice of social systems, and that although this is true of both principles, it is especially true of the difference principle, whose ability to arbitrate between different social and economic policies is limited. I show how the attempt to uniquely determine the set of social and economic policies authorized by the difference principle clashes with what Rawls explicitly states in TJ and contrasts with central aspects of his sociological and political conception of socio-economic decision-making. Although my aim is to show that the difference principle itself does not discriminate among socio-economic systems, this does not preclude that additional reasons can help in narrowing the range of socio-economic systems allowed. With reference to the ideal of social union that Rawls expounds in the third part of TJ, I argue that TJ does, in fact, offer additional reasons to appraise the WS as preferable to POD. I maintain that the centrality Rawls attributes to the social unity of a just society provides the basis for an understanding of Rawls’s position towards POD after TJ. (shrink)

Both practitioners and scholars are increasingly interested in the idea of the human-centered organization. This term first appeared in the late 1950s and has gained attention in the last ten years. Awareness of the need for human-centeredness grew during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which many organizational leaders were compelled to focus on employee health, safety, and well-being. In this paper, we review and synthesize the rather fragmented scholarly and practitioner literature on human-centered organization (HCO) to develop an integrated definition and (...) framework. The 26 sources reviewed in depth indicate that the HCO construct is primarily utilized in two ways. First, human-centered design scholars and practitioners conceive of HCOs as employing human-centered design practices. The second discourse involves the humanistic management and culture literature, which conceives of HCOs as embodying humanistic values and cultures. After reviewing these separate discourses, we synthesize them in an integrated definition as well as framework of HCO. The framework starts from humanistic values such as dignity, well-being, and justice, which are pivotal in creating organizational practices characterized by a common good purpose, positive human experiences on the job, team structures to coordinate work, and participatory tools and approaches. (shrink)

The paper considers the objections to Christianity raised by David Lewis, which accuse Christians of immorality on the grounds of their worshipping a monstrous being who punishes finite evils by the infinite punishment of hell. It distinguishes between the objection that God is a monster because such punishment would be unjust, and the objection that even if damnation is just, God is a monster because he wills or allows the dreadful evil of hell by creating beings that can be justly (...) damned. It asserts that Aquinas’s defence of the traditional Christian doctrine of hell provides an answer to this objection. The traditional doctrine is that those who die having committed serious sins for which they have not repented will be punished by endless mental and physical suffering in hell. Aquinas argues that the endless punishment of the damned is just because the damned endlessly and freely choose evil, and that it is good because the punishment of impenitentsinners, while bad for the sinners, is good absolutely speaking. The basis for his claim that the damned freely choose evil forever is his understanding of practical reason as ultimately motivated by a choice of a particular kind of life to live, and his view that all motivations that are independent of practical reason have a physical basis. The basis for his claim that the punishment of the damned is a good thing absolutely considered is his teleological view of good and evil. The paper defends these bases and their application to the question of damnation. (shrink)

Human rights declarations are instruments used to introduce universal standards of ethics. The UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework (Ruggie, Protect, respect, and remedy: A Framework for business and human rights. UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 2008; Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework. UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, 2011) intends to provide guidance for corporate behavior in regard to human rights. This article applies concepts from the field of organizational justice to the arena (...) of business and human rights for the purpose of operationalizing the UN Framework. This approach facilitates the recognition of gaps between perceptions of justice held by stakeholders versus businesses and/or the State. Such recognition raises the potential for addressing issues that lead to divergent perceptions of justice, thus potentially improving the human rights performance of businesses. The research also shows the potential for complicity of businesses in human rights abuses and exposes a fundamental weakness in the UN Framework, which attempts to draw a sharp distinction between duties of States versus responsibilities of business. We illustrate this approach through analysis of the case of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine in Guatemala; an extractive industry project that affects indigenous communities. (shrink)

This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as ?appropriateness?, ?right?, ?rightness?, even ?justice?) in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive (...) emphasis in justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources, and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods. Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our ethical attention from ?who gets what?? to ?how should we relate to others?? within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God by Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P.Roger W. NuttThe Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God. By Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 270. $99.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-968858-6.The centrality that Christ’s death by crucifixion has in Christian life, doctrine, and culture is scarcely in need of elaboration. Nevertheless, the relation between the (...) will of the Father and the violent and humiliating manner of Christ’s death raises substantive questions concerning the internal coherence of Christian claims about the love, goodness, and justice of God. In The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God, Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., confronts these questions, openly acknowledging their difficulty and seriousness, and provides a philosophically precise and theologically fresh response to the challenges they pose to the credibility of the Christian message.The ten chapters of The Father’s Will are divided into tripartite units that progress in logical sequence from “philosophical prolegomena” (part 1) to “New Testament evidence” (part 2), culminating with a “theological [End Page 317] evaluation” (part 3). The question at the heart of the book is how to reconcile the Christian doctrine that God and evil are incompatible with the theology of the Cross, which seems to require that God’s will is implicated in the evil actions that bring about Christ’s death.The first five chapters (part 1) provide a philosophical analysis of intention (chap. 1), value and obligation (chap. 2), double-effect reasoning (chap. 3), the ethical problems associated with self-sacrifice (chap. 4), and God’s will in relation to the crucifixion (chap. 5). Drawing on his analysis of intention and employing the principle of double effect, Lombardo establishes that it is not necessary to conclude that God wills the evils that are attendant on Christ’s death. “Actions performed by rational intentions,” Lombardo explains, “are not only intended; they are also willed. Rational intending implies rational choice, and rational choice is an act of the will” (32). This understanding of intention and willing, as distinguishable from intentional action, provides a foundation upon which the moral goodness of actions can be determined. “For an action to be good,” Lombardo argues, “it must do more than simply advance our natural inclinations: it must also avoid frustrating them. Only actions that both advance our natural inclinations and avoid frustrating them are morally good” (49). When moral actions have good effects and nonintended bad effects that do not outweigh the good effects—as in cases of self-defense or the use of medicine and medical procedures—these complex actions retain their moral goodness, notwithstanding the bad effects. The reason for this is that the bad effects are not included in the agent’s intention. Lombardo presents the crucifixion of Christ as one of these complex cases in which the bad effects can be separated from the agent’s intention. Chapter 3 explores the reasoning associated with the principle of double effect to clarify how actions implicated in bad or evil effects can be judged to be morally good. Lombardo is hesitant to identify double effect as an isolated principle that is applicable within unique circumstantial cases. Rather, he presents double effect as “merely an algorithm for applying basic concepts to morally ambiguous actions” (72). For example, in addition to affirming that the intended effects of the action are consistent with our natural inclinations, in cases of double-effect reasoning “the action’s positive, intended effects [must] outweigh the action’s negative, nonintended effects” (73). This material, in turn, connects logically with the conclusion of chapter 4 on the ethics of self-sacrifice: “double effect reasoning shows that it can be acceptable, and even heroic, to cause our own death non-intentionally for the sake of some greater good” (79). The last chapter in part 1 applies these distinctions to the problem of God’s will and the moral evil involved in Christ’s crucifixion. Here, the basic dilemma that the book addresses is succinctly restated: “Being all good, God never wants... (shrink)

Marxism as a normative position is critical of liberalism. However, the problems of justice and alienation that Marxism draws attention to can be solved by liberalism without the implementation of a Marxist political project. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis that Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (one of the versions of political liberalism) is a more inclusive and rational method of theorizing about the basic principles of justice than Marxism. By analyzing Elizabeth Anderson's theory of (...) liberal egalitarianism "democratic equality", I show that some of Marxist approaches that (1) do not deny the existence of justice and (2) are concerned with the problem of alienation, can apply the arsenal of the moral theory of political liberalism to solve these problems. I also criticize Rawls's and Nussbaum's theories of political liberalism for their procedural vagueness and non-inclusive theory of justice. I present an outline of my position, which I propose to call «extended political liberalism» (hereafter EPL). EPL is currently represented by two arguments: 1) the paideia argument and 2) the argument of the interdependence of the good and the right. The first allows talking about the actual implementation of basic rights and freedoms only when citizens are aware of them and have the opportunity to change their views regarding the personal conception of the good. This is impossible without qualitative basic education. Also, one of the central concepts of EPL is presented within the framework of Paideia's argument - the interpretation of the political conception of justice. Because of this concept, it makes sense to talk about the possibility of citizens' reflection on the reconciliation of the current political conception with the personal conception of the good. This can also be done through the analysis of other conceptions of the good. The second argument is a continuation of the first, appearing as a theoretical mechanism that allows supplementing the existing political conception in case of serious social changes. In conclusion, if we take into account the advantages of the capabilities approach and my criticism of its weaknesses, then a theoretical position will emerge that is quite acceptable to some representatives of Marxism. Moreover, the latter will not have to give up their basic beliefs. The peculiarity of my concept presented in this text is that it is not so much a critique of Marxism as an analysis of the basic normative judgments of political liberalism, with which some Marxists can agree. With this article, I also want to illustrate the strengths of such a concept and point to its prospects for further attempts to interpret the political conception by other normative positions. (shrink)

The principle of sustainability is generally taken as a good, but what does sustainability really mean? The notion of sustainability has been at the center of global governance debates for more than a decade and many countries across the world include sustainability in their constitutions. This paper argues that in order to understand the concept of sustainability in a constitutional context, we need to turn to the notion of dignity. The paper explores the concepts of sustainability and dignity and (...) their meanings in the framework of climate justice and related questions and by discussing them in the context of Kantian and republican theory. In addition, the paper looks at intriguing court cases on the importance of nation states meeting their climate law duties. The paper concludes by exploring new uses of the sustainability concept. EU constitutional law will serve as a laboratory in testing these questions. (shrink)

In Nietzsche and the Shadow of God, his study of Nietzsche’s integral philosophical corpus, Franck revisits the fundamental concepts of Nietzsche’s thought, from the death of God and the will to power, to the body as the seat of thinking and valuing, and finally to his conception of a post-Christian justice. The work engages Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s destruction of the Platonic-Christian worldview, showing how Heidegger’s hermeneutic overlooked Nietzsche’s powerful confrontation with revelation and justice by working through the (...) Christian body, as set forth in the Epistles of Saint Paul and reread both by Martin Luther and by German Idealism. Franck shows systematically how Nietzsche “transvalued” the metaphysical tenets of the Christian body of believers. In so doing, he provides an unparalleled demonstration of the coherence of Nietzsche’s project and the ways in which the revaluation of values, amor fati, and the trials of eternal recurrence reshape the living self toward a creative existence beyond original sin—indeed, beyond an ethics of “good” versus “evil.” Bergo and Farah’s clear translation introduces this work to an English-speaking audience for the first time. (shrink)

The phenomenon of financialization is multifaceted and can be considered from different points of view. The main purpose of the article is to show how financialization affects the erosion of the common good. To achieve this, various negative sides of financialization are described, referring to the eight principles of the common good: effective use of limited resources, freedom, prosperity, justice, responsibility, solidarity, primacy of interpersonal relations and institutional principle. Further considerations concern the presentation of possible solutions to (...) the problem of financialization. Two perspectives are selected. First, the answer of Catholic social teaching to the phenomenon of financialization, as presented in the form of the Vatican document Oeconomicae et pecuniariae quaestiones from May 2018. Next, one of the main causes of financialization is shown: economic and financial theories, which has become the theoretical foundation for the phenomenon. On this basis, the need for new theoretical solutions based on the institutional approach in the science of economics and finance is discussed. Possible new alternative approaches, including the concept of financial personalism, are also recognized. (shrink)

The question I want to answer is if and how the recognition approach, taken from the works of Axel Honneth, could be an adequate framework for addressing the problems of global justice and poverty. My thesis is that such a globalization of the recognition approach rests on the dialectic of relative and absolute elements of recognition. (1) First, I will discuss the relativism of the recognition approach, that it understands recognition as being relative to a certain society or a (...) set of institutions. The same is true for various forms of disrespect such as denigration or exclusion. The recognition approach is a form of internal reconstructive critique, which does not want to refer to absolute or ahistorical standards. (2) Second, I show that this relative understanding of recognition and disrespect rests on an absolute core of recognition, which transcends any given society. In short, this core is the possibility of undistorted self-realization, which is the main and universal element of a good life. Such an absolute core is necessary for distinguishing between justified and unjustified claims of relative recognition. It also serves as the normative benchmark for any society. (3) Finally, I will discuss the relation of these relative and absolute elements of recognition against the background of global justice. Claims of recognition can refer to this absolute core and demand that intersubjective conditions and social relations should change in order to make undistorted self-realization possible. This is the main point of reference for a recognition-based concept of global justice. (shrink)

Steady progress toward justice is not evident within extant political systems. A good-faith commitment to justice therefore requires oppositional collective action. This paper articulates and defends a moral principle of “progressive solidarity” that guides oppositional political action. Solidarity requires us to work alongside others according to their choice of action, even if this requires doing what we believe unwise or immoral. Progressive solidarity requires deference to the decisions of the least well-off group. Although individual judgment is by (...) no means suspended, solidarity nonetheless challenges moral autonomy. The paper argues that working to alleviate others’ misery is neither necessary nor sufficient for solidarity; rather, solidarity accepts others’ own account of their interests – whether or not their analysis is correct – and contributes to their pursuit of their aims. After explicating the concept of progressive solidarity and contrasting it with sympathy, loyalty, generosity, and identification, the paper defends progressive solidarity in moral, epistemic, and strategic contexts. The final section responds to objections and suggests that the case for solidarity is strengthened by application to the contemporary world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Justice and the General Will:Affirming Rousseau's Ancient OrientationDavid Lay WilliamsThere is much confusion about how to characterize the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His thought has at various times been related to such dissimilar thinkers as Plato and Hobbes. From Plato he is said to have acquired his affinities for community and civic virtue. And one does not have to look too hard to find his praise for the (...) great sage of the Academy: "Plato only purified the heart of man."1 He was often eager to affiliate his ideas with those of antiquity. He yearned for modern society to rekindle the flames of a once-great civilization. "[W]hat keeps us [the moderns] from being men like them [the ancients]? Our prejudices, our base philosophy, and the passions of petty self-interest, concentrated together with egoism in all hearts by inept institutions in which genius never had any share."2 Despite his obvious admiration for the perceived greater ideas of the past, however, Rousseau also expressed some skepticism. James Miller has suggested that he held Plato's theory of the Forms to be unsustainable.3 Allan Bloom has likewise argued that Rousseau's "teaching is not... a revival of those of Plato.... If he admires the practice of antiquity, he does not accept the theory."4This has led many to argue that Rousseau is best understood as student of Thomas Hobbes. Roger D. Masters, for example, has suggested that "Rousseau's principles of political right can... be best described as a reformulation [End Page 383] of Hobbes' conception of the social contract."5 Arthur Melzer also argues, "The purpose of the doctrine Rousseau elaborates in the Social Contract is essentially the same [as Hobbes']."6 This view is argued on the grounds that the General Will is a positive or arbitrary standard, functioning as the primary principle of Rousseau's constructive political program. Yet the vision of Rousseau as a Hobbesian or modernist also merits skepticism. While he employs a social contract, as does Hobbes, he explicitly rejects traditional forms of positivism. "What is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions."7 Whatever one might say about such passages, it at least raises the possibility that Rousseau is no modernist in the Straussian sense of defining Justice as human agreement.Much of what contributes to the conflicting interpretations of Rousseau can be attributed to different understandings of the relative priority and relationship of two central concepts in his writings. One of these is the well-discussed notion of the General Will. The dominant fashion is to read the General Will as a conventional substitute for natural law or transcendent Ideas. According to this reading, the General Will is grounded on nothing more than consent and functions as the first principle of all legitimate political societies. The other term central to Rousseau's program is the far less discussed but equally important concept of Justice. Little has been written on his understanding of Justice and, for that matter, he himself rarely discussed it explicitly. But it, too, could also be considered a primary principle. While it would be foolish to dismiss the importance of the General Will to Rousseau, it would be equally problematic to explore it independently of his Idea of Justice. The question in understanding his work is which of these two principles—the General Will or Justice—is primary or fundamental. If it is the General Will, a case can be made that the Straussians are right, and Rousseau is a positivist. If Justice is prior, on the other hand, then there is reason to believe that he was something much different.I argue that the positivist reading of Rousseau is flawed. Indeed, my thesis is that he is among the greatest and most thorough Platonists of the modern era.8 His rejection of Hobbes is not merely rhetorical. In fact, it represents the [End Page 384] true impetus of his social contract. This contract is designed explicitly to counter Hobbesian positivism. In the same way that Plato responds to Protagoras' positivism with his theory of the Forms, Rousseau responds to Hobbes... (shrink)

This paper argues that the inheritance of wealth must be grounded on reasons other than the defense of the testator’s right to bequeath or that of an heir’s alleged moral right to receive inheritance. It asserts that the accepted approach in anglophone political philosophy about the justice of inheritance along the framework of ‘justice in transfer’ is misguided. Taking _Rest_ land inheritance in Ethiopia as a case study, it defends a system of corporate ownership of land by the (...) descent group with an internal limitation put on the absoluteness of individual titles. Moreover, it submits, inheritance is permissible on reasons that (a) it must relate to preserving equality of opportunity and of a fair playing field, and (b) it ought to be predicated on a more expansive conception of kinship than is customarily accepted in Western societies. As land becomes progressively scarce, the evolution of ownership from private to family and then to corporate ownership signifies a sound interpretation of what it means to leave enough and as good for others to appropriate. (shrink)

This analysis maps the deepening global crisis and the principles of its resolution by life-value analysis and method. Received theories of economics and justice and modern rights doctrines are shown to have no ground in life value and to be incapable of recognizing universal life goods and the rising threats to them. In response to this system failure at theoretical and operational levels, the unifying nature and measure of life value are defined to provide the long-missing basis for understanding (...) the common interest, human rights and social justice—that is, the universal life necessities of humanity across cultures and the evolving civil commons infrastructures to ensure them. In contrast, the treaty-imposed corporate rights system miscalled “globalization” is structured to predate life means and support systems at all levels with no accountability beyond itself. Only the logic of life value, human rights and life-protective law, it is concluded, can comprehend or govern this inherently life-blind and cumulatively eco-genocidal regime. (shrink)

In the founding documents of this country one finds appeals both to the sovereignty of the people and to abstract notions of rights, "justice," and "the common good". These two ideas are evoked almost as if there were no sense on behalf of the framers that these two ideas simultaneously held create a philosophic tension. Yet as history informs us, they are often contradictory in content. This theme was explored by Rousseau in his distinction of the general will (...) versus the will of all. For Rousseau, the answer to political legitimacy was simple: it was found in the general will, the embodiment of transcendent political ideas. ;Rousseau's choice is one which mirrors that of the American founders. And in doing so they have taken a necessary step in law and state formation: the appeal to Platonism. But, ironically, this appeal does not mean that the popular will has no place in the law. In fact, a careful reading of Plato will render precisely the opposite conclusion: that a sound state built upon transcendent ideas must take into account a number of important empirical considerations, perhaps most significant among these being the will of the people. These ideas are not, however, the determinate Forms from the Phaedo, but rather the indeterminate concepts which guide the Athenian Stranger in his construction of the constitution of Magnesia in the Laws. Given this ontological characteristic of the Forms, the author of a state must have a broad understanding of empirical circumstances including human nature, while serving the demands of the universal ideas. In this light, one must realize that the law will be of no service to its highest aspirations unless it can be written in a manner that the people will act in accordance with it But the lawgiver also relies on this body for the articulation of the higher ideas. Thus the people are at once an obstacle to and a conduit of a higher law. To the extent, however, that democratic theory fails to confront its foundations in such a manner, it becomes mired in confusion. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of an important problem - how to build a reliable model of interaction between the state and the individual based on the idea of social justice in modern society. This issue is especially relevant against the background of rapid political and social changes that require the unification of citizens around common values and a vision of the future. Renewal of the ideological foundation, which is the basis of national identity, as well as (...) the formation of a unified outlook on social justice can become a powerful driver of the state’s development.The main goal of the article is to find effective approaches to the modernization of society through the creation of a nationwide concept of social justice, which is able to unite society around common values and contribute to the formation of trust in social institutions. For this, the article refers to the theory of John Rawls «justice as honesty», which has already proven itself in European countries as an effective basis for establishing social harmony. The study also examines two main ethical concepts – «correctness» and «goodness», which complement Rawls’s theory and provide an opportunity to build a more stable ideological foundation for Ukraine.The research methodology includes systemic-analytical, historical, comparative and structural-functional approaches, which allow a comprehensive assessment of how mass attitudes and social attitudes affect the formation of the concept of justice in the country. Sociological methods were also used, which helped to identify shortcomings in the attitude of citizens towards state institutions and to determine the main directions for strengthening public consensus.The results of the study demonstrate that there is a lack of a generally accepted vision of social justice in Ukrainian society, and the lack of a single ideological reference point makes it difficult for citizens to consolidate around national priorities. Sociological surveys indicate a low level of trust in state institutions, which significantly slows down reform processes. Therefore, the implementation of the concept of social justice requires active cooperation between the public and the political elite, efforts to restore trust and build a positive vision of the future.As a result, the author of the article concludes that in order to build a just and prosperous society, it is necessary to update the existing approaches to social policy. Only through the creation of a common ideological field based on justice and an active citizen position, it is possible to achieve sustainable development of the country and ensure the consolidation of the nation. (shrink)

행위의 도덕성을 그 행위가 야기하는 결과적 사태의 가치로 판단하는 결과주의에서 원칙적으로 제시하는 유일한 도덕적 판단 기준은 비개인적 관점에서 바라본 전체 세계의 총합적 가치의 최대화이다. 이에 따라 전체의 이익과 충돌할 때마다 개인은 자신의 이익과 신념, 삶의 기획을 모두 포기하도록 도덕적으로 요구되고, 결과적으로 각 개인의 개별성은 적절하게 존중받을 근거를 잃어버리게 된다. 본 논문에서는 결과주의가 도덕적 이론으로서 지닌 한계를 온전성, 분배 정의, 그리고 교환 정의의 측면에서 살펴본다. 우선 온전성의 측면에서, 자신의 신념과 가치관에 따라 온전한 삶을꾸려가야 할 개인은 결과주의적 원칙 하에 전체의 선을 위해 (...) 필요할 때마다 자신의 이익이나 삶의 기획을 포기하도록 도덕적으로강요되며, 따라서 내적으로 분열된 삶을 살게 된다. 둘째, 분배 정의의 측면에서 결과주의는 개인과 사회의 관계를 왜곡시켜 개인이독립된 개별자가 아니라 전체 사회의 선을 위해 기능하는 부품이되게 하는데, 이러한 ‘전체의 선’은 특히 좋음의 관계적 개념에 근거하여 볼 때 공허하거나 부차적인 것으로 드러날 수 있다. 마지막으로 결과주의는 개인 간의 주고받음의 관계에서 손해와 이익이발생할 때 각 당사자가 자신의 손해를 적절하게 보상받아야 한다는 교환 정의의 원칙을 적절히 수용하지 못하는데, 이 교환 정의의원칙은 각 개인의 개별성의 존중을 위해서 뿐 아니라 공동체의 유지를 위해 반드시 필요한 원리이다. (shrink)

The paper presents the moral conception of Charles Taylor as developed in his fundamental work Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity, in which he tries from the perspective of modernized aristotelism to transform several assumptions of modern moral philosophy. Taylor's conception is based on ontologically rooted human action, putting stress at the same time on the individual freedom and the differences among individuals. From the idea of particular, self-creative beings it follows, that the questions of our moral (...) inclinations can not be answered simply in terms of universality. Each of us has his/her original way of living a good life. Taylor's moral conception stands between a deontologically oriented Kantian ethics with its emphasizing justice and individual rights and an Aristotelian ethics of a theleological self-affirmation with its priority of community and communal good. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of justice frequently suppose that a legitimate state does not coerce people to comply with values or principles that they could reasonably reject. This ideal of legitimacy is thought to imply neutrality on the good: The State should not coerce people to comply with controversial conceptions of the good (which people could reasonably reject). As Ronald Dworkin puts the point, the government's policies should “be neutral on the question of the good life, or (...) of what gives value to life." Liberal neutrality is sometimes described as a generalization of policies of religious tolerance: Just as the state should be neutral with respect to religious questions, so too the state should be neutral with respect to questions about the good life.". (shrink)

Kant’s concept of the highest good proportionately unites virtue and happiness—the supreme goods of, respectively, the systems of freedom and of nature. A middle path between theological and secular interpretations of Kant’s highest good is possible if we disentangle two distinct roles played by God: a causal role in promoting the real unity of the highest good, i.e., its actualization; and a conceptual role in modeling its conceptual unity. The highest good is theological in the first (...) case, but neutral—neither directly theological nor secular—in the second. Reconstructing how Kant envisioned the conceptual unity of the highest good requires taking seriously his repeated reference to God as the highest original good, and to the best world as the highest derived good. If, as Kant thought, a moral God forms a triadic unity comprised of holiness, goodness, and divine justice, perhaps he assumed that the conceptual unity of the derived good is likewise triadic, comprised of virtue, happiness, and a form of justice that is not directly divine but “systemic,” designating the unity of the systems of nature and of freedom. Divine justice, in contrast, constitutes the real unity of the highest good. (shrink)

In this book, Maskivker argues that there ought to be a right not to participate in the paid economy in a new way; not by appealing to notions of fairness to competing conceptions of the good, but rather to a contentious (but defensible) normative ideal, namely, self-realization. In so doing, she joins a venerable tradition in ethical thought, initiated by Aristotle and developed in the work of important eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers including Smith, Hume, and Marx.The book (...) engages on-going debates (in both philosophical and real world political and social policy circles) about the provision of basic income grants, necessary to make the possibility of self-realization real for all. Traditional defenses of unconditional welfare benefits emphasize ideals of state neutrality when they claim that society should not discriminate against preferences for leisure in favor of preferences for work. According to these views, the state ought not to interfere with people’s choices about what constitutes the "good life." In contradistinction, Maskivker offers an innovative argument in defense of a particular ideal of the "good life," namely, life-goals directed at the pursuit of self-realization. However, her understanding of self-realization appeals to modern and contemporary values of freedom and pluralism. In a refreshingly new light, the book strikes a balance between fascinating debates on the conditions of human flourishing on the one hand, and heated discussions about the Welfare State on the other. (shrink)

According to the ‘fact-plus-value’ model of pathology propounded by K. W. M. Fulford, ‘disease’ is a value term that ought to reflect a ‘balance of values’ stemming from patients and doctors and other ‘stakeholders’ in medical nosology. In the present article I take issue with his linguistic-analytical arguments for why pathological status must be relative to such a kind of medico-ethical normativity. Fulford is right to point out that Boorse and other naturalists are compelled to utilize evaluative terminology when they (...) characterize the nature of diseases and biological dysfunctions. But the relevant ‘biofunctional judgements’ are no less factual and empirical for that. While it is indeed evaluative to say that biological dysfunctions involve failures to execute naturally selected functions, such judgments are not bound to entail anything about what is good or bad for us, and what should be treated or not. In the last part of the paper I ruminate briefly on the relationship between ‘biological evaluationism’, on my construal, and descriptions of ‘causal biology’. As I note in my conclusion, a strict bioevaluative concept of disease can be valid for every species on earth, and thus be of particular usefulness in general biological contexts. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze what kind of understanding of justice prevails at the beginning of the 21st century. I will shortly show the evolution of justice, concerning on the ancient and Enlightenment understandings of this concept. I shall attempt to justify the thesis that in the contemporary world the factors that play the most important part in the evaluation of justice are aesthetic ones. The essence of the aesthetic evaluation I will describe by (...) refer to the Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” where he analyses the specific character of the judgments of beauty. I will try to show that the characteristics which Kant ascribed to beauty havebeen transferred by modern philosophy to moral judgments and categories – specially to the judgment concerning justice. Finally I will focus on the contemporary dispute concerning economic human rights – this is a good concrete example for my thesis that today our understanding of justice (or better “social justice”) is based on the aesthetics arguments. (shrink)

The concept of a good life is usually assumed by philosophers to be equivalent to that of well-being, or perhaps of a morally good life, and hence has received little attention as a potentially distinct subject matter. In a series of experiments participants were presented with vignettes involving socially sanctioned wrongdoing toward outgroup members. Findings indicated that, for a large majority, judgments of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life, while having no impact at all (...) on ascriptions of happiness or well-being. Taken together with earlier findings these results suggest that the lay concept of a good life is clearly distinct from those of happiness, well-being, or morality, likely encompassing both morality and well-being, and perhaps other values as well: whatever matters in a person’s life. Importantly, morality appears not to play a fundamental role in either happiness or well-being among the folk. (shrink)

This first part of this article critiques Sridhar Venkatapuram's conception of health as a capability. It argues that Venkatapuram relies on the problematic concept of dignity, implies that those who are unhealthy lack lives worthy of dignity, sets a low bar for health, appeals to metaphysically problematic thresholds, fails to draw clear connections between appealed-to capabilities and health, and downplays the importance/relevance of health functioning. It concludes by questioning whether justice entitlements should pertain to the capability for health (...) class='Hi'>versus health achievements, challenging Venkatapuram's claims about the strength of health entitlements, and demonstrating that the capabilities approach is unnecessary to address social determinants of health. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen argues that John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society as the exclusive subject of social justice is misguided. I argue that two understandings of the notion of basic structure seem to be present in the literature, either in implicit or in explicit terms. According to the first, the basic structure is to be equated with a given set of institutions: if they endorse the right principles of justice, the basic structure of society is (...) just; According to the second, a society has a just basic structure if and only if its institutional web manages to realize the relevant principles of justice as well it can. In, the institutional structure is not a given: different social circumstances call for different institutional solutions in order to achieve a just basic structure overall. The first part of the paper make a case for, and explores some of its normative implications. The second part asks which consequences this understanding may have for the idea of a global basic structure. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the moral concept of harm in the context of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. This paper delineates between two concepts of wrongful harm: interactional versus architectural. It then examines these options with an eye toward developing a satisfactory normative approach for policy. While the interactional view of wrongful harm supports powerful arguments about moral responsibility, it has some clear limitations. This paper makes a case for the architectural view by underlining that (...) it is not only compatible with the features of the Paris Agreement but also supports a distinctive conception of justice. (shrink)

Some critics question new natural law theorists’ conception of the common good of the political community, namely, their interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas and the conclusion that the political common good is primarily instrumental rather than intrinsic and transcendent. Contrary to these objections, the common good of the political community is primarily instrumental. It aims chiefly at securing the conditions for human flourishing. Its unique ability to use the law to bring about justice and peace and (...) promote virtue in individuals may make the common good of the political community critically important. Nevertheless, it is still not an intrinsic aspect of human flourishing. Unlike the family or a religious group, membership in a political community is not an end in itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we establish gastrospaces as a subject of philosophical inquiry and an item for policy agendas. We first explain their political value, as key sites where members of liberal democratic societies can develop the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. Integrating political philosophy with analytic ontology, we then unfold a theoretical framework for gastrospaces: first, we show the limits of the concept of “third (...) place;” second, we lay out the foundations for an ontological model of gastrospaces; third, we introduce five features of gastrospaces that connect their ontology with their political value and with the realization of justice goals. We conclude by briefly illustrating three potential levels of intervention concerning the design, use, and modification of gastrospaces: institutions, keepers, and users. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of justice frequently suppose that a legitimate state does not coerce people to comply with values or principles that they could reasonably reject. This ideal of legitimacy is thought to imply neutrality on the good: The State should not coerce people to comply with controversial conceptions of the good (which people could reasonably reject). As Ronald Dworkin puts the point, the government's policies should “be neutral on the question of the good life, or (...) of what gives value to life." Liberal neutrality is sometimes described as a generalization of policies of religious tolerance: Just as the state should be neutral with respect to religious questions, so too the state should be neutral with respect to questions about the good life.". (shrink)

Despite a growing effort in recent years to theorize epistemic justice as a species of distributive justice from within a Rawlsian framework, there is as yet no well-worked out capabilities-based account. In this paper, we set out to provide one. According to our sufficientarian conception, epistemic justice requires a distribution of capabilities that ensures to all individuals opportunities for minimal epistemic agency, publicly conceived. We argue that this conception has advantages over existing resourcist accounts of distributive epistemic (...) justice inspired by Rawls as well as over Miranda Fricker’s tentative capabilities-based alternative. We contend that epistemic justice concerns a plurality of capabilities for epistemic agency, where the scope and nature of these capabilities is ultimately left open to discernment through public reasoning, but where equal emphasis is placed on contributing as well as retrieving epistemic goods and resources from common pools and on exerting combined capabilities as well as developing internal ones in the first place. (shrink)