Results for 'epistemic foundationalism'

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  1. Epistemic foundationalism.David B. Annis - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (5):345 - 352.
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  2.  71
    Epistemic Foundationalism and the Replaceability of Ordinary Language.Alan H. Goldman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):136-154.
  3. Logical and epistemic foundationalism about grounding: The triviality of facts and principles.Robert Jubb - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (4):337-353.
    In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen ’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘ Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly (...)
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  4. Political philosophy after the collapse of classical, epistemic foundationalism.Paul R. DeHart - 2014 - In Paul R. DeHart & Carson Holloway, Reason, Revelation, and the Civic Order: Political Philosophy and the Claims of Faith. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
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  5. Epistemic norms and the Sellarsian dilemma for foundationalism.Joseph Cruz - manuscript
    Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement (Bonjour, 1999; Dancy, 1989; Haack, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999). Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a belief, one (...)
     
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  6.  80
    Foundationalism and epistemic rationality.John Heil - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188.
    Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms of (...)
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  7. Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility.Robert Audi - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that (...)
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  8. Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  9.  28
    Gorgias as Philosopher of Being: Epistemic Foundationalism in Sophistic Thought.Frank D. Walters - 1994 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 27 (2):143-155.
  10. (1 other version)Foundationalism, epistemic principles, and the cartesian circle.James Van Cleve - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):55-91.
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  11.  19
    Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism.Steven L. Porter - 2006 - Lexington Books.
    Against various detractors , this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. In contrast with Laurence BonJour and borrowing from John McDowell, the essential argument is that conceptualized perpetual experience provides a non-doxastic foundation for perceptual beliefs about physical objects.
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  12. Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support.Daniel Howard-SnyderEJ Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person’s belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Traditional Foundationalism says that, first, if a human being has a nonbasic belief, then, at bottom, it owes its justification to at least one basic belief, and second, there are basic beliefs. (...)
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  13.  21
    The Foundationalist Justification of Epistemic Principles.Fr Remedios - 1990 - Philosophical Inquiry 12 (1-2):44-58.
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  14.  59
    Epistemic justification foundationalism and coherentism.Elnora Gondim - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (163):223-241.
    RESUMO O artigo de E. Gettier, "É Conhecimento Crença Verdadeira Justificada?" mudou o curso da epistemologia ao analisar a questão da verdade justificada pertinente ao conhecimento proposicional e detectar uma falha na definição tradicional de conhecimento, dando origem a diferentes comentários. Várias teorias sobre o assunto são discutidas, sendo as mais utilizadas aquelas que enfatizam o fundacionismo e o coerentismo em seu caráter internalista. ABSTRACT E. Gettier's article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" changed the course of epistemology by analyzing the (...)
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  15. Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress.José L. Zalabardo - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.
    I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to (...)
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  16. (1 other version)Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic Mental States.Bence Nanay - 2005 - In René van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood, Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 4--41.
     
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  17.  31
    Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic.Nanay Bence - 2005 - In René van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood, Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 41.
  18. Foundationalism and epistemic dependence.Robert Audi - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
  19. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a (...)
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  20.  26
    Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism.Michael Raymond DePaul (ed.) - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the (...)
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  21.  57
    (1 other version)Reliabilism, foundationalism, and naturalized epistemic justification theory.Jane Duran - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
  22. Foundationalism and arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
    Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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  23. Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison, The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum. pp. 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There (...)
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  24. Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Ram Neta, Current Controversies In Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 73-94.
    This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that (...) and access internalism form a coherent and well-motivated package. (shrink)
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  25. Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.John Turri - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
    Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
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  26.  55
    Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism.Richard Fumerton, John L. Pollock, Alvin Plantinga & Laurence BonJour - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the (...)
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  27. Johna L. Austina krytyka fundamentalizmu w świetle eksternalizmu epistemologicznego (John L. Austin's criticism of foundationalism in the light of epistemic externalism).Tomasz Szubart - 2011 - Principia 54:107-132.
    W epistemologii aż do XX wieku, najbardziej rozpowszechniony pogląd dotyczący wiedzy głosił, że musi ona posiadać niepodważalne podstawy, w przeciwnym wypadku w jej uzasadnianiu popadlibyśmy w regres w nieskończoność. Takie stanowisko zostało nazwane fundamentalizmem i spotkało się z szeroką krytyką. W latach siedemdziesiątych w teorii poznania powstał nowy kierunek – eksternalizm. Jego twórcy odeszli od tradycyjnego rozumienia wiedzy i odrzucili podstawowe założenia przyjmowane przez fundamentalistów jak i niektórych z ich krytyków. Ciekawą krytykę fundamentalizmu zaprezentował John Langshaw Austin, który dominował na (...)
     
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  28. Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception.Christian Coseru - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, (...)
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  29.  22
    BonJour’s Internalist Foundationalism and Epistemic Virtues.Koray Karaca - 2023 - Filozofia 78 (2):77-85.
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  30. The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 117-144.
    My aim in this paper is to explore the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism and attempt a resolution. I will begin by considering the origin of the issue in the famous epistemic regress problem. Next I will explore the central foundationalist idea and the most central objections that have been raised against foundationalist views. This will lead to a consideration of the main contours of the coherentist alternative, and eventually to a discussion of objections to coherentism – including (...)
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  31. Probability without certainty: foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach debate.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C. I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie (...)
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  32.  60
    Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - In Frederick D. Aquino & William J. Abraham, The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 253-73.
    Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to (...)
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  33. Aristotle's Foundationalism.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2016 - Dissertatio 44:187-211.
    For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the (...)
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  34. The Epistemic Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 1996 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation occurring between a belief and a reason when the reason is the reason for which the belief is held. It marks the distinction between a belief's being justifiable for a person, and the person's being justified in holding the belief. As such, it is an essential component of any complete theory of epistemic justification. ;I survey and evaluate all theories of the basing relation that I am aware of published between 1965 (...)
     
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  35. Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can (...)
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  36. Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief.Thomas D. Senor - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476.
    In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for (...)
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  37. Foundationalism, coherentism, and the levels gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
    A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In (...)
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  38. Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure.Patrick Bondy - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):335-348.
    Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in (...)
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  39.  13
    Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism.René van Woudenberg & Ronald Meester - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):221-231.
    This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic (...)
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  40. A Myth resurgent: classical foundationalism and the new Sellarsian critique.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4155-4169.
    One important strand of Sellars’s attack on classical foundationalism from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is his thesis about the priority of is-talk over looks-talk. This thesis has been criticized extensively in recent years, and classical foundationalism has found several contemporary defenders. I revisit Sellars’s thesis and argue that is-talk is epistemically prior to looks-talk in a way that undermines classical foundationalism. The classical foundationalist claims that epistemic foundations are constituted by the agent’s set of (...)
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  41.  25
    The Foundationalism-Coherentism Debate in Light of the Post-Wittgensteinian Ontological Enlightenment.Murat Bac - 2017 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 18 (2):141-157.
    The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence BonJour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the (...)
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  42. Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign.John Greco - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):105-112.
    Sosa's work on epistemic circularity has significance beyond his own brand of virtue epistemology, with its characteristic distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. On the contrary, it demonstrates the necessity of embracing foundationalism and externalism in epistemology, while at the same time answering various charges (some perennial) against epistemology in general. This paper distinguishes six kinds of epistemic circularity that are discussed in Sosa's work: two virtuous, two vicious, and two benign. This framework is used to reconstruct (...)
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  43. Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, (...)
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  44.  61
    Prospects for skeptical foundationalism.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
    Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.
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  45.  73
    Relativism and Foundationalism.Michael Krausz - 1984 - The Monist 67 (3):395-404.
    Various issues are characteristically associated with discussions about relativism. The first concerns defining relativism—which is not an easy matter, since there seems to be no clear and well established usage to which one might appeal. Some stipulation is required, though this need not be arbitrary. One may proceed by distinguishing relativism from its putative contrast: absolutism, although defining this latter notion is as difficult as defining the former. Absolutism, however, at least, holds that the truth or the truth value of (...)
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  46. Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
    This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby (...)
  47. Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):743-756.
    My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory (...)
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  48.  97
    Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1751-1769.
    Predictive processing accounts of perception assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism (...)
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  49. Epistemic Entitlement.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of (...)
     
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  50. A role for abstractionism in a direct realist foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of (...)
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