Prospects for skeptical foundationalism

Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590 (2007)
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Abstract

Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.

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10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00513.x

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Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

Il pelo e l'uovo.Giovanni Boniolo - 2008 - Jura Gentium 5 (S1):10-17.

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References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.

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