Only in recent years have developmental psychologists begun advocating and exploring dual-process theories and their applicability to cognitive development. In this paper, a dual-process model of developments in two processing systems—an “analytic” and an “experiential” system—is discussed. We emphasise the importance of “metacognitive intercession” and developments in this ability to override experiential processing. In each of two studies of sunk cost decisions, age-related developments in normative decisions were observed, as were declines in the use of a “waste not” (...) heuristic. In the second study, children and adolescents were presented with arguments for normative and non-normative sunk cost decisions. Following argument evaluation, participants were re-presented the original problems and a set of novel, transfer problems. Results indicated that post-argument improvements were most apparent during adolescence. Age-related improvements were most noticeable on the transfer problems. In general, the findings suggest that the ability to metacognitively intercede (i.e., reflect on arguments; inhibit experientially produced responses) emerges towards middle adolescence. However, even by the end of adolescence, in the absence of significant contextual cues and motivation, this ability is infrequently utilised. (shrink)

In the era of eLearning 4.0, many researchers have suggested that multimodal input helps to enhance second language vocabulary learning. However, previous studies on the effects of multimodal teaching have failed to yield definitive conclusions. Furthermore, only few studies on the multimodal input of vocabulary learning have aimed at junior high school students and have focused on explicit vocabulary instruction in class. To explore the effects of multimodal input on English as a foreign language learners’ vocabulary learning and summarize effective (...) methods, this study adopts a mixed-method approach. Based on dual coding theory and cognitive load theory, the teaching materials in this study were designed using the resources provided by the multimodal corpus iWeb and other websites. A total of 60 junior high school students who learned EFL and had a similar English proficiency level were divided into an experimental group and a control group. Target words were selected through questionnaire I. During the experiment, the CG learned from monomodal materials while the EG received multimodal input, and an immediate post-test was delivered to the two groups. Questionnaire II was distributed in the EG, and five students of the EG were randomly selected for an interview. One week later, a delayed post-test was conducted on the EG and CG. The results showed that the EG performed better in the post-test but did worse than the CG in the delayed post-test. The results of the questionnaire and the interview suggest that students held both positive and negative attitudes toward the multimodal input approach in vocabulary learning. The study concludes with some implications for choosing a multimodal input approach in vocabulary learning, along with a number of suggestions on how to optimize its positive influence and minimize its negative effects. (shrink)

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn claimed that theory choice is a conversion experience and depends upon the personality or psychology of the individual scientist making the choice. Critics charged Kuhn with an irrational and a relativistic position concerning theory choice, arguing he advocated a subjective instead of an objective approach to how scientists choose one theory over another and thereby undercut epistemic accounts for the generation of scientific knowledge. In response to critics Kuhn insisted that his (...) class='Hi'>approach, although subjective, was still rational in that the criteria—composed of epistemic values—determining theory choice operate both objectively and subjectively. Recent work in cognitive neuropsychology, particularly in the dual-process theory of cognition, supports Kuhn’s notion of theory choice. In this paper, I initially discuss Kuhn’s approach to theory choice, along with criticism of it and his response to the criticism, followed by an examination of the dual-process theory of cognition. I then explore the application of dual-process theory to Kuhn’s notion of theory choice, especially in terms of a historical case study from the biomedical sciences. I finally discuss briefly the implications of the dual-process theory for contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis (...) of conceptual structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation. (shrink)

Psychological understanding is a required capacity for moral competence in the sense that understanding the intentions, beliefs, and interests of others is a critical input for evaluating the responsibilities involved in their behaviors and understanding, in turn, how to interact with them to achieve our purposes. For its part, interaction with others is at the heart of both capacities, since both are essential and closely related components of human social life. My aim in this paper, in relation to both assumptions, (...) will be to highlight a structural similarity between ordinary psychological cognition and moral cognition, showing as certain differentiated types of explanations on one domain and the other allows to identify a theoretical framework consistent that, in turn, it can account for the relationships between the two. For this, I will refer first, synthetically, to the _Social Intuitionist Model_ (MIS) of J. Haidt (2001), as it exemplifies a non-classical and dual approach to moral cognition in which moral intuitions play a more basic role than reasons. In the field of psychological cognition, I will refer with more detail to _the interactive or second-person approach_, enriched by the dual approach to cognition, in particular by the proposals on implicit or “minimal” varieties of mental attribution. In this context, I will identify the so-called _expressive behaviors: _their nature and role in human behavior and interactions, and their significance as the evidential basis for psychological understanding. They constitute the primary objects of psychological intuitions. I hope to show that expressive signals are “readable” through the intuitive abilities that detect them and understand their psychological significance in efficient ways. Having exposed the theoretical affinities between the MIS and the interactive-dual approach, I will emphasize that, just as for the first, moral intuitions come first, and reasons later, also for the interactive-dual approach of psychological understanding, psychological intuitions come first, and reasons later. (shrink)

The article proposes a universal dual-axis intelligent systems assessment scale. The scale considers the properties of intelligent systems within the environmental context, which develops over time. In contrast to the frequent consideration of the “mind” of artificial intelligent systems on a scale from “weak” to “strong”, we highlight the modulating influences of anticipatory ability on their “brute force”. In addition, the complexity, the ”weight“ of the cognitive task and the ability to critically assess it beforehand determine the actual set (...) of cognitive tools, the use of which provides the best result in these conditions. In fact, the presence of ”common sense“ options is what connects the ability to solve a problem with the correct use of such an ability itself. The degree of ”correctness“ and ”adequacy“ is determined by the combination of a suitable solution with the temporal characteristics of the event, phenomenon, object or subject under study. The proposed approach can be applied in the evaluation of various intelligent agents in different contexts including AI and humans performing complex domain-specific tasks with high uncertainty. (shrink)

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that (...) the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes. What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory. (shrink)

It has been argued that dual process theories are not consistent with Oaksford and Chater’s probabilistic approach to human reasoning (Oaksford and Chater in Psychol Rev 101:608–631, 1994 , 2007 ; Oaksford et al. 2000 ), which has been characterised as a “single-level probabilistic treatment[s]” (Evans 2007 ). In this paper, it is argued that this characterisation conflates levels of computational explanation. The probabilistic approach is a computational level theory which is consistent with theories of general cognitive (...) architecture that invoke a WM system and an LTM system. That is, it is a single function dual process theory which is consistent with dual process theories like Evans’ ( 2007 ) that use probability logic (Adams 1998 ) as an account of analytic processes. This approach contrasts with dual process theories which propose an analytic system that respects standard binary truth functional logic (Heit and Rotello in J Exp Psychol Learn 36:805–812, 2010 ; Klauer et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn 36:298–323, 2010 ; Rips in Psychol Sci 12:29–134, 2001 , 2002 ; Stanovich in Behav Brain Sci 23:645–726, 2000 , 2011 ). The problems noted for this latter approach by both Evans Psychol Bull 128:978–996, ( 2002 , 2007 ) and Oaksford and Chater (Mind Lang 6:1–38, 1991 , 1998 , 2007 ) due to the defeasibility of everyday reasoning are rehearsed. Oaksford and Chater’s ( 2010 ) dual systems implementation of their probabilistic approach is then outlined and its implications discussed. In particular, the nature of cognitive decoupling operations are discussed and a Panglossian probabilistic position developed that can explain both modal and non-modal responses and correlations with IQ in reasoning tasks. It is concluded that a single function probabilistic approach is as compatible with the evidence supporting a dual systems theory. (shrink)

Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack, we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition – simultaneous contradictory beliefs – does not recommend dual systems, and that the single system approach is more plausible.

Norman presents intriguing arguments in support of a mapping between ecological and constructivist visual cognition, on the one hand, onto the dorsal ventral dual route processing hypothesis, on the other hand. Unfortunately, his account is incompatible with developmental data on the functional emergence of the dorsal and ventral routes. We argue that it is essential for theories of adult visual cognition to take constraints from development seriously.

Dual-process models of cognition suggest that there are two types of thought: autonomous Type 1 processes and working memory dependent Type 2 processes that support hypothetical thinking. Models of creative thinking also distinguish between two sets of thinking processes: those involved in the generation of ideas and those involved with their refinement, evaluation, and/or selection. Here we review dual-process models in both these literatures and delineate the similarities and differences. Both generative creative processing and evaluative creative processing (...) involve elements that have been attributed to each of the dual processes of cognition. We explore the notion that creative thinking may rest upon the nature of a shifting process between Type 1 and Type 2 dual processes. We suggest that a synthesis of the evidence bases on dual-process models of cognition and of creative thinking, together with developing time-based approaches to explore the shifting process, could better inform the development of i.. (shrink)

The focus of the paper is on Rein Vihalemm’s novel approach to science called practical realism. From the perspective of Vihalemm, science is not only theoretical but first and foremost a practical activity. This kind of approach puts chemistry rather than physics into the position of a typical science as chemistry has a dual character resting on both constructive-hypothetico-deductive and classifying-historico-descriptive types of cognition. Chemists deal with finding out the laws of nature like the physicists. However, (...) in addition to this they deal with substances or stuff that is rather an activity typical to natural history. The analysis of the dual character of chemistry brings about the need to analyse philosophically the reasons why physics has held the position of the only science proper so far. The comparative analysis of physics and chemistry at the basis of practical realism suggests that it is chemistry rather than physics that should hold a special position among sciences. Perhaps we should exchange ϕ-science for χ-science. (shrink)

This anthology offers a unique collection of contributions focusing on the discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within the field of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that in cognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective, associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinction recently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rational approaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment. The increasing interest in these theories raises questions concerning their (...) general impact on social contexts. The anthology aims at presenting stepping-stones of an analysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, the authors discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethics and empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of established terminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moral psychology. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical interpretation to numerical cognition based on dual process theories and heuristics. It shows how investigations in cognitive science can shed light on issues traditionally raised by philosophers of mathematics. The analysis will also help readers to better understand the relationship between current neuroscientific research and the philosophical reflection on mathematics. The author seeks to explain the acquisition of mathematical concepts. To accomplish this, he needs to answer two questions. How can the concepts of (...) approximate numerosity become an object of thought that is so accessible to our consciousness? How are these concepts refined and specified in such a way as to become numbers? Unfortunately, there is currently no model that can truly demonstrate the role of language in the development of numerical skills starting from approximate pre-verbal skills. However, the author details a solution to this problem: dual process theories. It is an approach widely used by theorists focusing on reasoning, decision making, social cognition, and consciousness. Here, he applies this approach to the studies on mathematical knowledge. He details the results brought about by psychological and neuroscientific studies conducted on numerical cognition by key neuroscientists. In the process, he develops the foundations of a new, potential philosophical explanation on mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

If successive, brief visual images are exposed for recognition or for psychophysical ratings, various effects and phenomena of fast dynamics of conscious perception such as mutual masking, metacontrast, proactive enhancement of contrast, proactive speed-up of the latency of subjective visual experience, the Fröhlich Effect, the Tandem Effect, attentional facilitation by visuospatial precuing, and some others have been found. The theory proposed to deal with these phenomena proceeds from the assumption that two types of brain processes are necessary in order to (...) consciously recognize visual stimuli: fast, specific processes of encoding that allocate and reactivate the stimulus representation which is based on the activity of selected cortical neurons and relatively slower processes of facilitation of the activity of this specific representation that are mediated by the excitatory modulation of the EPSPs of those selected cortical neurons by the ascending input from nonspecific thalamus. Theperceptual retouchconstruct is proposed in order to characterize and analyze the interaction of and . The neurophysiological characteristics of this bifunctional system of afference help to put forward several predictions that are found to be consistent with the empirical regularities of the above-described perceptual-attentional phenomena. These data form a body of converging evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the perceptual retouch approach. (shrink)

Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of (...) domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) reviews a recent debate regarding the soundness of dual process models to begin with. Section (3) is about dual process accounts of moral judgment specifically. The last three sections then survey attempts to go beyond a simplistic automatic/controlled (“type 2”) distinction in conceptualizing implicit moral cognition. Recently, three main theoretical approaches have emerged, which all revolve around the questions whether type 2 processing can successfully penetrate implicit moral cognition. First, rational learning approaches highlight how episodes of moral learning can feed back into and shape our moral intuitions (4). Second, so-called triple process models suggest that automatic cognitive outputs can under certain circumstances be reined in by reflective cognition (5). Finally, recent evidence shows that moral reasoning is not as impotent as earlier developments in empirical moral psychology claimed to demonstrate (6). (shrink)

Typical approaches to resolving the sorites paradox attempt to show, in one way or another, that the sorites argument is not paradoxical after all. However, if one can show that the sorites is not really paradoxical, the task remains of explaining why it appears to be a paradox. Our approach begins by addressing the appearance of paradox and then explores what this means for the paradox itself. We examine the sorites from the perspective of the various brain systems that (...) are intuitively comfortable with the key features of the premises of the sorites argument. We suggest that the explicit and implicit cognitive systems are separately responsible for the initial plausibility of the categorical and inductive premises. The appearance of paradox is a function of our brain’s architecture and arises from the conflicting interactions of neurologically distinct systems. (shrink)

With the help of the current experiment, we wanted to learn more about the impact of visually demanding vs. cognitively demanding secondary tasks on the attention allocation of older pedestrians during the phase of traffic perception within the process of road crossing. For this purpose, we used two different road crossing tasks as well as two different secondary tasks. The road crossing “stop task” was a signal detection task, where an approaching car had to be detected. The road crossing “go (...) task” was a dynamic visual search task, where the resolution of a busy road situation had to be identified. The visual secondary task was a static visual search task and the cognitive secondary task was a 1-back task. One younger group and one older group of participants completed the tasks as single vs. dual-tasks in all possible combinations. Performance was measured through errors and response time; in addition, the subjective workload was assessed via NASA-TLX. Analyses show that the visual secondary task reduces performance in the road crossing more strongly than the cognitive task, while the visual task itself is less impaired by the road crossing tasks than is the cognitive task. Overall, performance diminishes from single to dual-task completion. Results further indicate age effects in terms of increased errors and response time for older compared to younger participants. In addition to these age effects, age-specific dual-task effects emerge for response time in the go task along with the visual task as well as for response time in the cognitive task along with the go task. Subjective workload is higher in the dual-task conditions than in the single tasks. Findings are discussed with regard to theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

Background: Walking while performing a secondary task walking) increases cognitive workload in young adults. To date, few studies have used neurophysiological measures in combination to subjective measures to assess cognitive workload during a walking task. This combined approach can provide more insights into the amount of cognitive resources in relation with the perceived mental effort involving in a walking task.Research Question: The objective was to examine cognitive workload in young adults during walking conditions varying in complexity.Methods: Twenty-five young adults (...) performed four conditions: usual walking, simple DT walking, complex DT walking and standing while subtracting. During the walking task, mean speed, cadence, stride time, stride length, and their respective coefficient of variation were recorded. Cognitive workload will be measured through changes in oxy- and deoxy-hemoglobin during walking in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and perceived mental demand score from NASA-TLX questionnaire.Results: In young adults, ΔHbO2 in the DLPFC increased from usual walking to both DT walking conditions and standing while subtracting condition. ΔHbO2 did not differ between the simple and complex DT and between the complex DT and standing while subtracting condition. Perceived mental demand gradually increased with walking task complexity. As expected, all mean values of gait parameters were altered according to task complexity. CV of speed, cadence and stride time were significantly higher during DT walking conditions than during usual walking whereas CV of stride length was only higher during complex DT walking than during usual walking.Significance: Young adults had greater cognitive workload in the two DT walking conditions compared to usual walking. However, only the mental demand score from NASA-TLX questionnaire discriminated simple from complex DT walking. Subjective measure provides complementary information to objective one on changes in cognitive workload during challenging walking tasks in young adults. These results may be useful to improve our understanding of cognitive workload during walking. (shrink)

In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate :354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality. On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an epistemic rather than an (...) ontological gap. Considering the recent advances in neuroscience, however, the reductionist approaches have become replete, which attempt to reduce consciousness and subjectivity to neurobiological accounts. On this view, consciousness mirrors the brain mechanisms, and the self is formulated as an illusory product or construct of neuronal processes. Thomas Fuchs, who is committed to embodied and enactive approaches toward cognition, in Ecology of the Brain, espouses an enactive-ecological perspective concerning the problem of the explanatory gap. He develops an account of human’s life in its dual aspects of the living body and lived body which, on the one hand, defies the ontological dualism and, on the other hand, avoids drifting towards any form of reductionism. Often, the ontologically monistic approaches to the explanatory gap have inclined to a form of reductionism because they conceive consciousness as either identical with its physiological substrate or caused by it, where in both cases, consciousness is claimed to be explainable within the framework of physicalism. Fuchs, however, defends an ontological monism which remains irreconcilable with reductionism. In his account of dual aspects, there is no interaction or impact between the sphere of subjectivity and nature; however, these two aspects imply one another. In this essay, I will develop the philosophical justification of the above reformulation of the mind–body problem and employing the analogy of light will canvass the paradoxical relationship between dual aspects in a phenomenological framework. (shrink)

I draw parallels and contrasts between dual-system and modular approaches to cognition, the latter standing to inherit the same problems De Neys identifies regarding the former. Despite these two literatures rarely coming into contact, I provide one example of how he might gain theoretical leverage on the details of his “non-exclusivity” claim by paying closer attention to the modularity debate.

This paper reflects on Dietrich Dörner's observation that participants in complex dynamic control tasks exhibit a "tendency to economize", that is, they tend to minimize cognitive effort. I interpret this observation in terms of a dual processing approach and explore if the reluctance to adopt Type 2 processing could be rooted in biological energy saving. There is evidence that the energy available for the cortex at any point in time is quite limited. Therefore, effortful thinking comes at the (...) cost of neglecting other cortical functions. The proposed dual processing approach to complex problem solving is explored in an experiment where we varied cognitive load by means of a secondary task in order to make Type 1 or Type 2 processing more likely. Results show that cognitive load had no effect on target achievement. Even in the single task condition, many participants prefer Type 1 processing, confirming Dörner's observation. (shrink)

BackgroundDistorted gambling-related cognitions are tightly related to gambling problems, and are one of the main targets of treatment for disordered gambling, but their etiology remains uncertain. Although folk wisdom and some theoretical approaches have linked them to lower domain-general reasoning abilities, evidence regarding that relationship remains unconvincing.MethodIn the present cross-sectional study, the relationship between probabilistic/abstract reasoning, as measured by the Berlin Numeracy Test, and the Matrices Test, respectively, and the five dimensions of the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale, was tested in a (...) sample of 77 patients with gambling disorder and 58 individuals without gambling problems.Results and interpretationNeither BNT nor matrices scores were significantly related to gambling-related cognitions, according to frequentist analyses, performed both considering and disregarding group in the models. Correlation Bayesian analyses largely supported the null hypothesis, i.e., the absence of relationships between the measures of interest. This pattern or results reinforces the idea that distorted cognitions do not originate in a general lack of understanding of probability or low fluid intelligence, but probably result from motivated reasoning. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack propose a two-system account of temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic proposals where cognitive systems are putatively independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a minimum, involve a difference in the nature of the representations upon which each system operates, and a difference in the computations they carry out. In this comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's proposal does not meet the minimal requirements and.

Based on the notion that time, space, and number are part of a generalized magnitude system, we assume that the dual-systems approach to temporal cognition also applies to numerical cognition. Referring to theoretical models of the development of numerical concepts, we propose that children's early skills in processing numbers can be described analogously to temporal updating and temporal reasoning.

The attempts to mitigate the unprecedented health, economic, and social disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are largely dependent on establishing compliance to behavioral guidelines and rules that reduce the risk of infection. Here, by conducting an online survey that tested participants’ knowledge about the disease and measured demographic, attitudinal, and cognitive variables, we identify predictors of self-reported social distancing and hygiene behavior. To investigate the cognitive processes underlying health-prevention behavior in the pandemic, we co-opted the dual-process model of (...) thinking to measure participants’ propensities for automatic and intuitive thinking vs. controlled and reflective thinking. Self-reports of 17 precautionary behaviors, including regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing a face mask, served as a dependent measure. The results of hierarchical regressions showed that age, risk-taking propensity, and concern about the pandemic predicted adoption of precautionary behavior. Variance in cognitive processes also predicted precautionary behavior: participants with higher scores for controlled thinking (measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test) reported less adherence to specific guidelines, as did respondents with a poor understanding of the infection and transmission mechanism of the COVID-19 virus. The predictive power of this model was comparable to an approach (Theory of Planned Behavior) based on attitudes to health behavior. Given these results, we propose the inclusion of measures of cognitive reflection and mental model variables in predictive models of compliance, and future studies of precautionary behavior to establish how cognitive variables are linked with people’s information processing and social norms. (shrink)

Proponents of the dual-process theory claim that two distinct types of mental faculties or minds are responsible for human cognition. The first is evolutionarily old and not unique to humans but shared with other organisms. Type-1’s key feature is autonomy from cognitive capacities; hence, it does not require working memory. Type-2 is evolutionarily recent and thought to be uniquely human. Its key feature is reflective cognitive-decoupling of Type-1 processes, if warranted; and it requires working memory. Critics, however, argue (...) that one mind is sufficient to account for human cognition and propose a unimodel theory of cognition. The debate over these theories depends upon metaphysical notions concerning the nature of cognitive capacities and processes; and, how to investigate and explain them. In this paper, I explore these notions in terms of analyzing the metaphysical presuppositions of dualism and monism, and then the methodological approaches of holism and reductionism, as well as the ontological categories of organicism and physicalism, which are often unspecified and/or unexamined in the cognition debate. Clarification of these metaphysical notions and consideration of others is important for progressing towards the debate’s resolution. To that end, a plurimodel theory of cognition—based on a metaphysical presupposition and a methodological approach of pluralism and pragmatism, respectively, as well as on an ontological category of dynamical system—is introduced and discussed. (shrink)

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) was born from dissatisfaction with traditional interpretative accounts of religious symbolism and with the doctrine of the primacy of texts. The theories, methods, and findings of the cognitive sciences provide means for escaping the interpretative circling the former entails and for addressing the myriad nontextual religious phenomena for which the latter is ill‐suited. Whatever else each affirms, all of the pioneering theorists in CSR agree that religions involve cultural arrangements that engage ordinary cognitive systems, (...) which are in place on the basis of considerations having nothing to do with religion or with one another, and are exercised in religious contexts as a byproduct of their normal functioning. Religions engage evolved, domain‐specific cognitive systems for handling problems fundamental to human survival that operate readily, unreflectively, and mostly below the level of consciousness. This information‐processing includes automatically and effortlessly pursuing any of a vast complement of default inferences appropriate to materials from the many domains in question. Such unconscious inferences about intuitive ontology figure centrally in religious representations, which typically involve but a single violation of the concomitant assumptions, rendering those representations minimally counterintuitive (MCI). MCI representations approximate a cognitive optimum, since they are attention‐grabbing, memorable, and inferentially rich. Subsequent theorists have variously argued on the basis of either natural or cultural selection at either the genetic, individual, or group level that some aspects of religious cognition are adaptive, if not outright adaptations. Their principal candidates for adaptive cognitive dispositions and cultural arrangements are ones that enable cooperation in large groups. Cultural group selectionists maintain that, in addition to the content biases that the byproduct view stresses, religions also exploit context biases resulting in characteristic features of honest signals and credibility‐enhancing displays (CREDs), which, in turn, foster cooperation and commitment to (only some) superhuman agents. Big Gods appear to be especially well suited to enhancing cooperation in big groups. CSR has inspired considerable noteworthy experimental research, which, over the past 15 years, has increasingly reflected the three principal influences in cognitive science generally during that time, viz., evolutionary considerations, an interest in experience, and the new brain‐imaging technologies. (shrink)

Cognitive technology is an umbrella term sometimes used to designate the realm of technologies that assist, augment or simulate cognitive processes or that can be used for the achievement of cognitive aims. This technological macro-domain encompasses both devices that directly interface the human brain as well as external systems that use artificial intelligence to simulate or assist (aspects of) human cognition. As they hold the promise of assisting and augmenting human cognitive capabilities both individually and collectively, cognitive technologies could (...) produce, in the next decades, a significant effect on human cultural evolution. At the same time, due to their dual-use potential, they are vulnerable to being coopted by State and non-State actors for non-benign purposes (e.g. cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare and mass surveillance) or in manners that violate democratic values and principles. Therefore, it is the responsibility of technology governance bodies to align the future of cognitive technology with democratic principles such as individual freedom, avoidance of centralized, equality of opportunity and open development. This paper provides a preliminary description of an approach to the democratization of cognitive technologies based on six normative ethical principles: avoidance of centralized control, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, user-centeredness and convergence. This approach is designed to universalize and evenly distribute the potential benefits of cognitive technology and mitigate the risk that such emerging technological trend could be coopted by State or non-State actors in ways that are inconsistent with the principles of liberal democracy or detrimental to individuals and groups. (shrink)

This commentary construes the relation between the two systems of temporal updating and temporal reasoning as a bifurcation and tracks it across three time scales: phylogeny, ontogeny, and microgeny. In taking a dynamic systems approach, flexibility, as mentioned by Hoerl & McCormack, is revealed as the key characteristic of human temporal cognition.

Thanks to advances in machine learning in recent years the ability of AI agents to act independently of human oversight, respond to their environment, and interact with other machines has significantly increased, and is one step closer to human-like performance. For this reason, we can observe contemporary researchers’ efforts towards modeling agency in artificial systems. In this light, the aim of this paper is to develop a dual-process approach to the problem of AI agency perception, and to discuss (...) possible triggers of various agency perceptions. The article discusses the agency attribution phenomenon, based on which the argument for the dual-process nature of agency perception is developed. Two distinct types of thinking involved in human reasoning on AI agency are suggested: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one is fast, automatic, routine, and often unconscious; the second is a slower, controlled, more conscious one. These two distinct types of processing can yield differing and sometimes conflicting results for human cognition and interaction. The preliminary philosophical findings may contribute to further investigations in philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology and could also be empirically tested in HCI and UX studies. (shrink)

This dissertation is devoted to dual-process theories, widely discussed in the recent literature in cognitive science. The author argues for a significantly modified version of the account suggested by Samuels (2009), replacing the distinction between ‘Systems’ with a distinction between ‘Types of processes,’ which allows a critique of both the (only) modularist accounts and the accounts describing a deep difference between two systems each having their specificities (functional, phenomenological and neurological). In the account of dual-process theories developed here, (...) the distinction between ‘Types of processes’ is considered, a priori, only as a heuristic distinction allowing to better understand the mind and to explain some of its properties. The main idea defended in this dissertation is that cognitive processes should be distinguished by their position in a multidimensional conceptual space allowing researchers to consider all of the characteristics and peculiarities attributed to a process, which is preferable to accounts forcing the process into either ‘System’ or either ‘Type’ identified in the most influential approaches (cf. Evans, 2008). Once this research program is in place, it will become possible to revise the concepts used and the categories defined to ground anew some of the notions we find in the literature (‘module,’ ‘System 1 / 2,’ etc.). The argument is made in three steps: -/- 1) The first chapter aims at a clarification of the notion of ‘module’ commonly used in cognitive science. Against the accounts aiming at a weakening of the notion in order to classify all of the mind’s processes as modular, the author – following most notably Faucher and Poirier (2009) and Samuels (2006) – casts doubt on how this notion is used by many influential authors, particularly in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). -/- 2) The objective of the second chapter is to present, examine and criticize many dual-process theories and to suggest that no theory currently discussed is adequate to describe the architecture of mind. The accounts, especially influent or representative, suggested by Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), by Evans (2008; 2009), by Lieberman (2007; 2009) and by Carruthers (2006; 2009), are examined. -/- 3) In the third chapter, the author criticizes the framework developed by Samuels (2009) before developing his own account of dual-process theories and discussing some of its advantages. (shrink)

Dual-task paradigms encompass a broad range of approaches to measure cognitive load in instructional settings. As a common characteristic, an additional task is implemented alongside a learning task to capture the individual’s unengaged cognitive capacities during the learning process. Measures to determine these capacities are, for instance, reaction times and interval errors on the additional task, while the performance on the learning task is to be maintained. Opposite to retrospectively applied subjective ratings, the continuous assessment within a dual-task (...) paradigm allows to simultaneously monitor changes in the performance related to previously defined tasks. Following the Cognitive Load Theory, these changes in performance correspond to cognitive changes related to the establishment of permanently existing knowledge structures. Yet the current state of research indicates a clear lack of standardization of dual-task paradigms over study settings and task procedures. Typically, dual-task designs are adapted uniquely for each study, albeit with some similarities across different settings and task procedures. These similarities range from the type of modality to the frequency used for the additional task. This results in a lack of validity and comparability between studies due to arbitrarily chosen patterns of frequency without a sound scientific base, potentially confounding variables, or undecided adaptation potentials for future studies. In this paper, the lack of validity and comparability between dual-task settings will be presented, the current taxonomies compared and the future steps for a better standardization and implementation discussed. (shrink)

A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by (...) two kinds of process: intuitive-affective processes and domain-general reasoning. When produced by the first kind of process, motivation and judgment tend to align. When produced by the second kind, motivation and judgment might not align. Since the first kind of process is the most common pathway of normative belief formation, normative judgments are typically accompanied by aligning motivation. This proposal enables cognitivists to explain the intimate link between normative judgment and motivation, thereby removing the major obstacle to interpreting normative statements truth-conditionally. (shrink)

My dissertation establishes the basis for a systematic outlook on the role language plays in human cognition. It is an investigation based on a cognitive conception of language, as opposed to communicative conceptions, viz. those that suppose that language plays no role in cognition. I focus, in Chapter 2, on three paradigmatic theories adopting this perspective, each offering different views on how language contributes to or changes cognition. -/- In Chapter 3, I criticize current views held by (...) dual-process theorists, and I develop a picture of the complex interaction between language and cognition that I deem more plausible by using resources from the literature on the evolution of the faculty of language. Rather than trying to find one general explanation for all cognitive processes, I take seriously the idea that our mind is composed of many subsystems, and that language can interact and modify each in different ways. There is no reason offered in the empirical literature—besides maybe parsimony—that suggest that language has to interact in the same ways with all cognitive processes. Yet, this is seemingly taken for granted, especially within dual-process approaches. -/- On my view, it is a central requirement for a theory of the role of language in cognition to explain how language might have effects, at once, on and within various parts of cognition. In Chapter 4, I explore how this framework can modify how we think about some experiments in psychology, specifically in research on categorization. My idea is that language, once it evolved, changed how some cognitive capacities worked and interacted with each other, but did so in more than one or two ways. Cognitive systems are changed in very different ways—sometimes the transformation is very subtle, such as our way of forming categories by using how similar objects are, while other times it is deep and changes the very way the system works. (shrink)

In this paper we suggest that differing approaches to the science of social cognition mirror the arguments between radical embodied and traditional approaches to cognition. We contrast the use in social cognition of theoretical inference and mental simulation mechanisms with approaches emphasizing a direct perception of others’ mental states. We build from a recent integrative framework unifying these divergent perspectives through the use of dual-process theory and supporting social neuroscience research. Our elaboration considers two complementary notions (...) of direct perception: one primarily stemming from ecological psychology and the other from enactive cognition theory. We use this as the foundation from which to offer an account of the informational basis for social information and assert a set of research propositions to further the science of social cognition. In doing so, we point out how perception of the minds of others can be supported in some cases by lawful information, supporting direct perception of social affordances and perhaps, mental states, and in other cases by cues that support indirect perceptual inference. Our goal is to extend accounts of social cognition by integrating advances across disciplines to provide a multi-level and multi-theoretic description that can advance this field and offer a means through which to reconcile radical embodied and traditional approaches to cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

The extended dual-aspect monism framework of consciousness, based on neuroscience, consists of five components: (1) dual-aspect primal entities; (2) neural-Darwinism: co-evolution and co-development of subjective experiences (SEs) and associated neural-nets from the mental aspect (that carries the SEs/proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed and unexpressed form) and the material aspect (mass, charge, spin and space-time) of fundamental entities (elementary particles), respectively and co-tuning via sensorimotor interaction; (3) matching and selection processes: interaction of two modes, namely, (a) the non-tilde mode that (...) is the material and mental aspect of cognition (memory and attention) related feedback signals in a neural-network, which is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; and (b) the tilde mode that is the material and mental aspect of the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and internal endogenous input, which is the nearest future approaching towards present and is a entropy-reversed representation of non-tilde mode; (4) the segregation and integration of information, and (5) the necessary ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above threshold level, and neural-net PEs). This framework leads to structural and functional coherence between the mind and the brain, bridges the explanatory gap (the gap between SEs and their neural-correlates), and leads to our mundane subjective experiences. This extended dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework (Vimal, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) could be the fundamental basis of various religions and philosophies. This is a Western perspective. On the other hand, Eastern perspectives emphasize the practical methods for achieving altered experience at samadhi state. An important corollary of these methods (such as yogic method) is the sublimation of negative aspects of seven groups of self-protective energy system (desire, anger, ego, greed, attachment, jealousy, and selfish-love) into their positive aspects. Their negative aspects create war and suffering, whereas their positive aspects advance science and technology, family values, peace, and happiness. Here, the Western perspective framework is extended to include the concepts of the sublimation process to encompass Eastern perspectives. The four elements (war, suffering, peace, and happiness) are ubiquitous in both space and time because they are essential contributors to the variations for natural selection in our evolutionary system. The sublimation process optimizes the system: minimizes war and suffering, maximizes peace and happiness, and enhances family values and individual progress. This is consistent with both Eastern and Western perspectives. (shrink)

Though labor-force participation of women has considerably increased in industrialized societies and many households are now dual-earner, the gender imbalance in household division of labor persists. Moreover, the consensus amongst men and women is that such distributions are fair, resulting in normalization and further perpetuation of inequalities. We provide a multidisciplinary explanation, focusing on the economic, cultural and cognitive processes underlying the perpetuation of inequalities within households. The article begins with a broad, economic approach that details the role (...) of outside options and how they impact available decisions across different subsistence communities. We then discuss the role of cultural narratives and norms in shaping internalized structures of inequality. Finally, we unify these perspectives by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms that underpin self-perception and motivated assessments of fairness within households. We end with a brief discussion on the policy significance and avenues of future work. (shrink)

I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm that (...) both aim at. Instead, I unify them through their cognitive foundations. Because Type 1 and Type 2 cognition are complementary, reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. Thereby, this dual-process theory of epistemic virtue gives a naturalised account of virtues as well as an explanation of how reliabilism and responsibilism relate. This approach offers a solution for both the generality problem and the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology; additionally it preserves the epistemological autonomy of each virtue type. (shrink)

Drawing on a ritual approach to microsociology, I explain how and why aesthetic and moral practices inform each other and evolve as they do. I continue to develop a theory of aesthetic engagement, specifying how it generates the emotional sensibilities that inform moral practices. Examining aesthetic engagement and emotional sensibilities focuses our theoretical attention on our capacity to find our moral bearings, even in unfamiliar or challenging conditions. To develop this perspective, I draw on Bargheer’s Moral Entanglements and a (...) volume on bird watching’s therapeutic value, Bird Therapy. These two works provide insight into the micro-emotional dynamics through which nature-based practices generate aesthetic power. I conclude by discussing the implications of aesthetic and moral practices for theorizing cognition and culture. In particular, I argue that an aesthetic practice approach to perceiving and knowing about the world does not fit neatly into the dual processing frameworks currently popular in Cultural Sociology. (shrink)

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject–object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahāmudrā, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only (...) very few attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject–object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject–object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely,Mahāmudrāpractice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices. (shrink)

In this paper we present an interdisciplinary approach that concerns the problem of argument acceptance in an agronomy setting. We propose a computational cognitive model for argument acceptance based on the dual model system in cognitive psychology. We apply it in an agronomy setting within a French national project on durum wheat.

Dual aspect theory has conceptual advantages over alternative mind-body notions, but difficulties of its own. The nature of the underlying psychophysical ground, for one, remains problematic either in terms of the principle of complementarity or if mind and matter are taken to be aspects of something like energy, movement, or information. Moreover, for a dual aspect theory to be plausible it should avoid the four perils of all mind-body theories: epiphenomenalism, reductionism, gross panpsychism, and the problems of emergence. (...) An alternative dual aspect theory, patterned process theory, is introduced and defended in neurological and individuality terms. The concept is grounded in a brain model of hierarchies wherein consciousness is conceived to be a cognitive aspect of the highest emergent brain inter-module activity, which is situated in the context of a living organism coping with a changing environment. The notion of individuals as psychophysical units unfolding as patterned processes is shown to constitute an integrative approach to brain, consciousness, and behavior that can avoid the conceptual perils and meet the ontological requirements of dual aspect reality and thereby advance the foundations of an integrative mind-body science. (shrink)

In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational (...) level of analysis. Moreover, we propose that, within the new paradigm, these levels of analysis reflect on each other. Bayesianism suggests a specific theoretical understanding of dual processing. Just as importantly, the duality in processing carries over to duality in function; although both types of processes compute degrees of belief, they generate different functions. (shrink)

In 1969, John McCarthy and Pat Hayes uncovered a problem that has haunted the field of artificial intelligence ever since--the frame problem. The problem arises when logic is used to describe the effects of actions and events. Put simply, it is the problem of representing what remains unchanged as a result of an action or event. Many researchers in artificial intelligence believe that its solution is vital to the realization of the field's goals. Solving the Frame Problem presents the various (...) approaches to the frame problem that have been proposed over the years. The author presents the material chronologically--as an unfolding story rather than as a body of theory to be learned by rote. There are lessons to be learned even from the dead ends researchers have pursued, for they deepen our understanding of the issues surrounding the frame problem. In the book's concluding chapters, the author offers his own work on event calculus, which he claims comes very close to a complete solution to the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence series. (shrink)

The distinction between such differing approaches to cognition as connectionism and rule-based models is paralleled by a distinction between two basic modes of cognition postulated in the so-called dual-process theories. Integrating these theories with insights from hybrid systems might help solve the dilemma of combining the demands of evolutionary plausibility and computational universality. No single approach alone can achieve this.

We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more (...) primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of our everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterising two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman contends that ideational complexity can stymie social-scientific understanding and prevent the reliable predictive knowledge required of a well-functioning technocracy. However, even this somewhat pessimistic outlook may understate the problem. Ideational complexity has both cognitive and phenomenal dimensions, each of which poses unique dilemmas. Further, due to its methodological individualism, Friedman’s vision may neglect emergent layers of knowledge produced through social interaction, creating yet another source of unknowns. Given these two factors, social science should (...) embrace a pluralism regarding levels of analysis. This would recognize the multifaceted limitations on social-science knowledge production, furthering epistemic humility about the potential role of social science in technocratic policymaking. (shrink)