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  1. Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.Paul Rehren & Charlie Blunden - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):351-369.
    An important question about moral progress is what causes it. One of the most popular proposed mechanisms is moral reasoning: moral progress often happens because lots of people reason their way to improved moral beliefs. Authors who defend moral reasoning as a cause of moral progress have relied on two broad lines of argument: the general and the specific line. The general line presents evidence that moral reasoning is in general a powerful mechanism of moral belief change, while the specific (...)
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  2. Moral progress: Recent developments.Hanno Sauer, Charlie Blunden, Cecilie Eriksen & Paul Rehren - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12769.
    Societies change over time. Chattel slavery and foot-binding have been abolished, democracy has become increasingly widespread, gay rights have become established in some countries, and the animal rights movement continues to gain momentum. Do these changes count as moral progress? Is there such a thing? If so, how should we understand it? These questions have been receiving increasing attention from philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and sociologists in recent decades. This survey provides a systematic account of recent developments in the understanding of (...)
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  3. Moral framing effects within subjects.Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):611-636.
    Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study (...)
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  4.  63
    How Stable are Moral Judgments?Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1377-1403.
    Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, (...)
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  5.  38
    Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of freedom.Claire Simmons, Paul Rehren, John-Dylan Haynes & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103318.
  6.  12
    Has philosophy become more ‘Scientific’? A citation analysis.Paul Rehren & Till Armbruster - 2025 - Synthese 205 (1):1-19.
    Many philosophers agree that philosophical inquiry has become more reliant on scientific research in recent decades. Some go so far as to speak of a methodological revolution. However, there is almost no systematic evidence about when, where and in what way these changes took place—if indeed, they did. To change this, we made use of citation analysis. We collected a large corpus of 9954 articles published in three high-profile generalist philosophy journals (_Noûs_; _Philosophical Studies_; _Synthese_) since 1971. We then extracted (...)
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    The Problems of Empirically-Informed Arguments for and against Retributivism.Valerij Zisman & Paul Rehren - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers and social scientists have argued in favor of or against retributive theories of criminal punishment based on empirical findings about folk punitive judgment and decision-making. In this paper, we will argue that these arguments do not succeed. We will raise two objections. First, there are serious gaps between the empirical findings these authors cite and the descriptive premises these findings are meant to support. Second, in many cases, the existing research does not support (...)
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  8.  74
    Another Brick in the Wall? Moral Education, Social Learning, and Moral Progress.Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):25-40.
    Many believe that moral education can cause moral progress. At first glance, this makes sense. A major goal of moral education is the improvement of the moral beliefs, values and behaviors of young people. Most would also consider all of these improvements to be important instances of moral progress. Moreover, moral education is a form of social learning, and there are good reasons to think that social learning processes shape episodes of progressive moral change. Despite this, we argue that instead (...)
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  9.  47
    Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 105-114.
    Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) (...)
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