The controversy surrounding the status of dialectics in Marxist thought has failed to take the full measure of the persistent influence of ontological dualism and its corollary, dualistic social ontology. Yet an explicit critique of dualism is essential to materialist dialectics and to a Marxist-socialist theory and pedagogy that discloses the specific role of capitalist social relations in impeding human progress. A dialectical-monistic ontology associated with Marx's "new" (historical) materialism requires systematic conceptual elaboration, as illuminated by a dialecticalontological triad (...) embracing "the natural," "the social" and "conscious activity." The usefulness of this triad is illustrated by exploring how dialectical-monistic and dualistic ontologies stimulate very different ways of understanding a key question in social theory: the concept of economic value. (shrink)

‘Postmodern’ is a concept now deposited in the word banks of both highbrow cinephilesand lowbrow arbiters of popular filmic taste. How these two groups of critics deploy theterm, however, widely differs. Critiquing Wes Anderson’s The Life Aquatic with SteveZissou , for instance, Entertainment Weekly’s Owen Glieberman writes: ‘Once again,[Anderson] creates a hermetic, glassed-in movie world of postmodern anachronisms thatcharms and distances in equal measure’ . Characteristic of most reviewers of LifeAquatic, Glieberman uses ‘postmodern’ in a purely aesthetic sense. Although this (...) apoliticaluse of the term is endemic to the business of popular film criticism, part of the reasoncritics deployed ‘postmodern’ bereft of all cultural and political connotations in the case ofLife Aquatic can be chalked up to the film itself. Any overtly political meaning in the film ismediated by what Todd Gilchrist calls the film’s ‘fantastic, just-left-of-realityuniverse.’ Anderson’s idiosyncratic filmmaking style – his penchant for what Josh Bell calls‘empty collections of quirks’ and ‘irrelevant eccentricities’ which prize ‘false clevernessover story and content’ – exacerbates the problem of politicizing Life Aquatic’spostmodernism . A growing cult of the author begets the faciledismissal or deification of Life Aquatic based on tenuously apolitical criteria. (shrink)

In the discussions regarding the philosophical system and the essence of Marxism, ontological theory is a very important issue. At the moment, there are three basic sets of opinions on this problem, namely, the opinion that Marxism, in fact, does not consist of any ontological theory , the opinion that Marxist ontology is a theory of practical ontology, and the opinion that it is a dialectical materialist theory of material monism. The latter two acknowledge that Marxist philosophy does (...) involve an ontological theory. The following article, proceeding on this premise, will focus on whether the ontological theory in Marxist philosophy is a theory of practical ontology or a dialectical materialist theory of material monism. I would like to propose a number of topics for concrete discussion surrounding this general issue. (shrink)

In the twentieth century pluralism became a common ideology of originally different idealistic philosophical schools, which logically led them to unite in the philosophy of postmodernism. At the end of the twentieth century pluralism become identified with political democracy. In Russia, the doctrine of recognition of equality of many independent ideologies as a basis of democracy has become the most popular in interpretation of K. Jaspers, K. Popper, and P. Feyerabend. The article demonstrates the ideological and methodological inconsistency of pluralism; (...) it shows that only the monism based on the concept of dialectical determinism may reveal objective grounds of democracy. Application of dialectical materialist conception of determinism to the disclosure of system of determinacy of society development reveals the unity of reason and no causal types of determination of this development. Therefore, the objective basis of democracy is not ‘a plurality of factors‘, but subordinated and coordinated system of determinants that define the objective tendency of society to non-State form of government. (shrink)

Polanyi’s vision of the cosmic process as undergirded by a logic of emergence common to both the mental life of human beings and the processes of non-human nature can be vindicated if one is prepared to make certain adjustments in the notion of morphogenetic fields with an active center or organizing principle. Given the author’s field-oriented interpretation of Whiteheadian societies, it should be possible to think of entelechies or final causes in developmental rather than strictly Aristotelian terms. That is, the (...) “common element of form” or organizing principle of a Whiteheadian society depends for its own existence on the spontaneous activity of previous sets of actual occasions and yet serves as the ongoing principle of formal and final causality for the present set of actual occasions and still others to follow it. In Aristotelian language, matter and form thus dialectically condition one another and neither is ontologically superior to the other. (shrink)

I show that Socrates' mature philosophy must be read as a reaction to and fulfillment of Parmenidean monism. I take my departure from Parmenides' assertion in the dialogue that participation must be a true account, as he says, for otherwise dialogue would be rendered impossible. I claim that the Socratic account can only achieve its proper truth once it appreciates the grounding Eleatic insight that the effort to name Being is riddled with aporias, which Socrates learns on his own (...) terms through the dialectical "training" in unity demonstrated in the dialogue. I show that Socrates here gains the resources to see ideas as hypotheses, securing the knowledge of his own ignorance as a science of sorts by which he learns to abide by the limits, failures, and breakdowns of human understanding within a rigorously "scientific" context. The Parmenides is thus to be located at the stage of philosophical education where mathematical training gives way to dialectics, and subsequently prepares the philosopher's return to the "cave" as described in the Republic. Practice in the dialectically inspired art of epistemological collapse later gives Socrates the power to help his interlocutors confront the limits of their own knowledge and become open to freedom through the work of self-examination. (shrink)

Physicalism is standardly construed as a form of monism, on which all concrete phenomena fall under one fundamental type. It is natural to think that monism, and therefore physicalism, is committed to a supervenience claim. Monism is true only if all phenomena supervene on a certain fundamental type of phenomena. Physicalism, as a form of monism, specifies that these fundamental phenomena are physical. But some argue that physicalism might be true even if the world is disorderly, (...) i.e., not ordered by supervenience relations in the way commonly supposed (Montero in J Philos 110:92–110, 2013; Leuenberger in Inquiry 57:151–174, 2014; Montero and Brown in Topoi 37(3):523–532, 2018; Zhong in Philos Stud 178(5):1529–1544, 2021). Unless these authors intend to challenge the claim that physicalism is a type of monism—a claim so central to the dialectic in philosophy of mind that rejecting it risks changing the subject—they are committed to challenging a supervenience requirement for monism. We argue that monism entails that there are substantial supervenience relations among concrete phenomena: relations that would not obtain in a disorderly world. Our argument thus has implications for debates about physicalism and supervenience, and sheds light on an under-discussed issue: what is implied by classifying a theory in the philosophy of mind as a form of monism? We also argue that physicalism’s commitment to monism creates problems for _via negativa_ physicalism, on which the physical is characterized negatively. (shrink)

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground (...) our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness. (shrink)

For some years now, Hans Kueng has been advocating use of the dialectical method to make peace among the world religions. In this paper I try first to locate his Hegelian understanding of this method within its long and complex historical development. I then inquire about its value as an ecumenical tool by investigating some of its underlying assumptions about the subjective/objective, literary/figurative, monistic/pluralistic nature of religious truth. Along the way, doubts are raised about the likelihood or desirability of (...) its bringing the various religions any closer together than have earlier absolutist and syncretistic approaches to ecumenism. (shrink)

In this paper James’s pluralism is examined in light of his critiques of ‘intellectualism’ and monistic idealism in order to elucidate his relationship to Hegel. Contrary to the strong anti-Hegelianism found throughout the writings of James, Hegel’s dialectic and speculative logic are able to give a rational account of the continuity of objects and relations within experience that James struggled to articulate in A Pluralistic Universe. Neither James nor Hegel is an absolute pluralist or monist due to the interdependence of (...) the concepts of unity and plurality, aptly described by Hegel in his Logic, and alluded to by James in various places throughout his work. Thus, the ambiguity of the nature of James’s pluralism previously noted by scholars is explained, and the relevance of Hegel and dialectic for pragmatist theory is elucidated. (shrink)

The work will be structured in three sections. The first of them analyzes how the different specialists in Spinozian work have studied the Dutch corpus in a dialectical way. This type of interpretation will be emphasized here not only in regard to Spinoza's own ontology, but also to his political philosophy. Secondly, this article investigates the way in which Spinozian ontology can be studied, proposing that, rather than making use of a dialectical method of Hegelian roots, it is (...) rather possible to undertake the study of Spinoza's main philosophical concepts. that are linked to the essence from the notion of sublimation, a notion that, as we will see, is closely related to the monism of Spinoza's philosophy. Finally, the way in which this sublimation procedure can also be applied to the concepts of the Dutchman that specifically refer to the political aspect of his thought is analyzed. (shrink)

In this revision of his doctoral dissertation at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Menahem Rosen aims to furnish the conception of dialectic which underlies Hegel’s logical-scientific thought with the contemporary intelligibility which he considers it to lack. Six topics define the chapters of this ambitious reconstruction of dialectic as “basically a logic of ambiguity and paradox” : identity, difference, and contradiction; the beginning of philosophy; its end; matter and nature; language; and dialectical explanation. Specifically, Rosen aims “to prune” the (...) Wissenschaft der Logik and so win “Hegel the dialectician” for the analysis of “human reality qua social, cultural and historical reality,” in distinction from “natural reality qua physical, chemical or biological reality,” by exhibiting the incompatibility of “Hegel the ‘spiritual monist’” with the dualism which actually informs his own method and prevents its totalization. Speculative logic may provide the guidelines of a revised theory of subjectivity, but it does not deliver a metaphysics of the absolute, either as the final unity of thinking and being or even as that of thinking itself. If it is initially unclear exactly what is meant by the declaration that as Hegel’s successors “we are in a privileged position to add to his work, without showing thereby any genuine wisdom”, the issue becomes somewhat more certain through the assurance that “in the face of principles, reality is always right, even at the price of a certain lack of coherence”. The justification of objective reality before the principles of thought is supposed to follow from the inevitable disruption of conceptual order by its ineradicable empirical element. (shrink)

Contends that Hegel's reconstruction of valid logic leads to a conception of indirect proof and syllogisms. Clarification of the concept of indirect proof; Reference to previous papers on the subject; Indirect proof as the natural form of deduction.

Among controversies about philosophy that are also philosophical problems the most complex and difficult to solve is that about philosophy and the history of philosophy. On one hand there is Wittgenstein claiming that history is irrelevant to philosophy. On the other hand, there is Gilson claiming that history is not only relevant but necessary to philosophy.

The concept of resistance has always been central to the reception of Hegel's philosophy. The prevalent image of Hegel's system, which continues to influence the scholarship to this day, is that of an absolutist, monist metaphysics which overcomes all resistance, sublating or assimilating all differences into a single organic 'Whole'. For that reason, the reception of Hegel has always been marked by the question of how to resist Hegel: how to think that which remains outside of or other to the (...) totalizing system of dialectics. In recent years the work of scholars such as Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek, Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda has brought considerable nuance to this debate. A new reading of Hegel has emerged which challenges the idea that there is no place for difference, otherness or resistance in Hegel, both by refusing to reduce Hegel's complex philosophy to a straightforward systematic narrative and by highlighting particular moments within Hegel's philosophy which seem to counteract the traditional understanding of dialectics. This book brings together established and new voices in this field in order to show that the notion of resistance is central to this revaluation of Hegel. (shrink)

The historical origin of the concept of ‘intentionality’, as is well-known, is very remote, dating back to the age of scholastic philosophy. In the epistemological theories worked out by medieval thinkers, from Thomas Aquinas up to the latest minor exponents of the nominalistic trend, the concept of ‘intentio’ is very often to be found, there playing a role of undoubtedly primary importance. Sometimes it means the universal ‘concept’ abstracted by the human understanding from sense datum; sometimes, instead, both the act (...) through which human intelligence directs itself towards the object of its cognition, the material ‘thing’, and the reflective act by virtue of which it refers to its subjective representation of the external ‘res’. In any case, it evidently turns out to be a fundamental function of any knowing whatsoever. (shrink)

To overcome the paradoxical situation in which the modern subject finds itself, on conceptualizing nature in such a way that its very presence in nature becomes inconceivable, modernity supplied at least four alternatives: a) the first is to defend dualism ; b) the second option is to support a monism of nature ; c) the third alternative is to defend a monism of subjectivity ; d) the fourth and last alternative is to support a dialectical monism. (...) It is well known that, of these four alternatives to the self-interpretation crisis of modern subjectivity, the first ultimately had a more lasting influence on the philosophical scene, marking, point to point, this last breath of modernity that some call post-modern and flowing into the present situation of “hyperincommensurability” between subjectivity and nature diagnosed by Bruno Latour. The crisis of subjectivity thus becomes a crisis of philosophy, which ends a hostage to the syndrome of the house taken. (shrink)

Priority Monism, as defined by Jonathan Schaffer, has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete objects are parts; the cosmos is basic—there is no object upon which the cosmos depends, ontologically; ontological dependence is a primitive and unanalysable relation. In a recent attack, Lowe has offered a series of arguments to show that Monism fails. He offers up four tranches of (...) argument, with different focuses. These focal points are: being a concrete object; aggregation and dependence; analyses of ontological dependence; Schaffer’s no-overlap principle. These are all technical notions, but each figures at the heart of a cluster of arguments that Lowe puts forward. To respond, I work through each tranche of argument in turn. Before that, in the first section, I offer a cursory statement of Monism, as Schaffer presents it in his 2010 paper, Monism: The Priority of the Whole. I then respond to each of Lowe’s criticisms in turn, deploying material from Schaffer’s 2009 paper Spacetime: the One Substance, as well as various pieces of conceptual machinery from Lowe’s own works to deflect Lowe’s attacks. In the process of defending Monism from Lowe, I end up offering some subtle refinements to Schaffer’s view and explain how the resulting ‘hybrid’ view fares in the wider dialectic. (shrink)

We propose in this article some new elements for the interpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine, concerning in particular the role of the opposition of contraries as generator of harmony, that results from Fragments 8DK and 51DK. This interpretation is based on the conceptual tool of matrices of concepts. After having described the basic elements that govern the latter, we set out to define in this conceptual framework the notions of opposition and contrary, as well as of harmony. This allows us to (...) give an interpretation and also a justification of Heraclitus' specific doctrine, according to which the opposition of contraries generates harmony. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi MorisatoLance H. Gracy (bio)Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond. By Takeshi Morisato. England: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. Pp. viii + 269. Hardcover $116.00, isbn 978-1-350-09251-8.Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi Morisato is an informative and (...) insightful read on metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and relevant areas of interest. Morisato's stated objective in the introduction is (a) to investigate the possibility of comparative philosophy through William Desmond's metaxological way of thinking, and (b) to examine how the "absolute dialectic" in Tanabe Hajime's metanoesis can help us understand the relationship between one framework of thinking and another (p. 16). Morisato's book proceeds in five parts. Part One orients the reader to the scope of the project through an overview of comparative philosophy and its methodological frameworks--namely, the metaxological methodology of William Desmond, which deals importantly with the (modern) predicament of religion as expressed in the "transcendental univocity" of the Kantian system; and the metanoetic methodology of Tanabe Hajime, which deals importantly with the issue of "rational progress" in Hegelian dialectic. Yet each intellectual framework deals with both Kant's and Hegel's systems. Part Two addresses what the problem of religion in Kantian and Hegelian philosophy is in more detail. Part Three, "Metaxology and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," and Part Four, "Metanoetics and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," offer a more detailed account concerning how Desmond's and Tanabe's philosophies tackle conceptual problems in modern philosophy of religion. Morisato's conclusion follows from these along with an endnotes section, bibliography, and index.According to Morisato, overcoming the problem of comparative philosophy--i.e., the "philosophical problem of comparing two systems of thinking rooted in different cultural and intellectual contexts" (p. 22)--means, at least in part, clarifying the extent to which philosophers of different culturalintellectual contexts and backgrounds share, as "kindred spirits" or as "intellectual companions," a consonance of thought regarding their philosophical perspectives. Desmond and Tanabe represent just such a pair, whose consonance of thought, expressed by Morisato en passant and expressed more definitively in the conclusion, is unified in a struggle against hegemonic structures in the [End Page 1] philosophy of religion, specifically those of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of religion. William Desmond (1951–present) is a Catholic philosopher who currently holds the David R. Cook Chair in Philosophy at Villanova University. He has worked extensively on metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and German idealism. Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) was a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto school and is perhaps most well-known for his Philosophy as Metanoetics. Morisato does a commendable job elucidating issues in modern systems of religion, which have undoubtedly been influenced by Kant's and Hegel's systems. As it concerns Kant, contemporary philosophy of religion still struggles with the claims of transcendental idealism, particularly its reduction of religious belief to mere postulates of practical reason. And as it concerns Hegel, what seems to be an unending, "progressive" self-return of dialectical monism has deeply influenced the way, and manner, in which religious adherents deal with societal views of the individual and individuals' views of society. By this token, Morisato's attempt to get beyond the so-called "extirpation" of the source of religious truth as the "creative power behind our understanding of reality and our existence" is refreshing, to say the least (p. 46). In what follows, I offer a relatively brief overview of Morisato's book and conclude with a reflection on the text.Morisato's critique of the Kantian and Hegelian systems begins with the argument that Kantian transcendental univocity implies that reason's autonomy, as dictates of the moral law as absolute duties, not only precedes divine legislation, but becomes one with it or else is reduced to it. In other words, for Kant, the rational-moral universal is divine law. However, reason's autonomy fails to comprehend the divine origination of finite particulars due to... (shrink)

This article treats Stalin's contributions todialectical and historical materialism. It argues that the latterfound his theses of the `enormous' role of ideas, and of theexistence of social phenomena that do not belong either to thebasis or to the superstructure, in Georgij Plekhanov's `monism'.Nevertheless, Stalin did add some new points of his own.Furthermore, his adopting Plekhanov's monism also helps usunderstand the apparent contradiction between Stalin's emphasison non-economic and non-class factors in human history and hisrejection of `idealist' rudiments in dialectics.

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed (...) is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata. (shrink)

Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. In Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker's arguments have (...) drawn powerful criticisms from pluralists such as Alan Thomas, Phillip Montague and Philip Stratton-Lake. Against these critics, I argue that Hooker's monism enjoys certain practical advantages associated with the simplicity of a single basic principle. These advantages are often overlooked because they appear primarily in cases of second-order deliberation, in which one must decide whether our basic moral duties support a certain derivative duty. I argue that these advantages of monism over pluralism are analogous to the advantages that generalists claim over moral particularism. Because pluralists are generalists, I conclude that they are in an awkward dialectical position to dismiss Hooker's monism for the reasons they usually offer. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive (...) third”) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.” . (shrink)

This paper aims to find, in Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking, a definition of the virtual which aligns with the latest advancements in digital technology while avoiding a reduction to the digital realm or a stark opposition to reality. The virtual is considered as a crucial characteristic in Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology, especially in The Visible and the Invisible, where a “virtual focus” or “virtual center” of the flesh is introduced. The argument posits that Merleau-Ponty’s monism of the flesh results in a (...) dynamic view of virtuality, with significant ontological implications that reshape the relationship between the digital and the analogue. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the virtual is defined by several key features: it applies to a monist perspective on reality, to a dynamic relationality between dialectic poles, and to the fabric of reality. This interpretation of the virtual implies a divergence from the digital, as virtuality belongs to the whole spectrum of reality. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive (...) third”) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.”. (shrink)

Dialectical study of the monistic (Advaita) approach in Hindu Vedanta philosophy and the Nyaya school of Hindu philosophy as advocated by Śaṅkaramiśra, 15th century Indic philosopher.

Dietzgen's philosophy is monistic in nature. This study is focused on the question in what way Dietzgen treats the relation between unity and diversity as an epistemological and ontological issue. How does Dietzgen formulate the unity of all that exists, and what is the place and the role of the process of gaining knowledge in this formulation? These questions serve as stepping stones to the central question: What is the position of Dieagen's thinking with regard to the philosophy of Feuerbach, (...) and that of Marx and Engels? This is an important question in the light of the history of the labour movement. In the early years of this century, Dietzgen's work became a subject of discussion. Some said that Dietzgen had nothing to add to Feuerbach's philosophy; others regarded him as the perfect Marxist philosopher. This discussion has not ended. The present study seeks to clarify the positions in this discussion by means of an analysis of Dietzgen's philosophy itself. This raises the additional questions of it's relation to Kant's epistemological theory, to scientific and Darwinist-oriented materialism, and to Dietzgen's ethical ideas and criticism of religion. (shrink)

I present an argument for panpsychism: the thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are conscious. The argument takes a Hegelian dialectical form. Panpsychism emerges as a synthesis of the thesis of materalism and the antithesis of dualism. In particular, the key premises of the causal argument for materialism and the conceivability argument for dualism are all accommodated by a certain version of panpsychism. This synthesis has its own antithesis in turn: panprotopsychism, the thesis (...) that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious, also accommodates the key premises. Panpsychism and panprotopsychism are synthesized under Russellian monism, and then face an antithesis, the combination problem. The question of whether there is a new synthesis remains open. (shrink)

Explaining the Cosmos is a major reinterpretation of Greek scientific thought before Socrates. Focusing on the scientific tradition of philosophy, Daniel Graham argues that Presocratic philosophy is not a mere patchwork of different schools and styles of thought. Rather, there is a discernible and unified Ionian tradition that dominates Presocratic debates. Graham rejects the common interpretation of the early Ionians as "material monists" and also the view of the later Ionians as desperately trying to save scientific philosophy from Parmenides' criticisms. (...) In Graham's view, Parmenides plays a constructive role in shaping the scientific debates of the fifth century BC. Accordingly, the history of Presocratic philosophy can be seen not as a series of dialectical failures, but rather as a series of theoretical advances that led to empirical discoveries. Indeed, the Ionian tradition can be seen as the origin of the scientific conception of the world that we still hold today. (shrink)

There are at least two different aspects of our rational evaluation of agents’ doxastic attitudes. First, we evaluate these attitudes according to whether they are supported by one’s evidence (substantive rationality). Second, we evaluate these attitudes according to how well they cohere with one another (structural rationality). In previous work, I’ve argued that substantive and structural rationality really are distinct, sui generis, kinds of rationality – call this view ‘dualism’, as opposed to ‘monism’, about rationality – by arguing that (...) the requirements of substantive and structural rationality can come into conflict. In this paper, I push the dialectic on this issue forward in two main ways. First, I argue that the most promising ways of resisting the diagnosis of my cases as conflicts still end up undermining monism in different ways. Second, supposing for the sake of argument that we should understand the cases as conflicts, I address the question of what we should do when such conflicts arise. I argue that, at least in a prominent kind of conflict case, the coherence requirements take precedence over the evidential requirements. (shrink)

This thesis argues that Dame Iris Murdoch’s writings portray a dialectical picture of morality that invites the reader to acknowledge the presence of evil and reflect upon the necessarily ‘opposing forces’ of good and evil. Murdoch’s engagement with both historical and contemporary discussions of evil is traced through close reading of both her published texts, including fiction and philosophy, and her unpublished and recently published texts and resources, including annotations, interviews and letters. These close readings are focused on the (...) theological, psychological and literary aspects of the contemporary problem of evil. The perspectives offered within this study all transcend the focus on goodness invited by Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, thus challenging the biased perspective of scholars of the late-twentieth century who sought to elevate Murdoch’s good characters by drawing equations between her moral philosophy and her fiction. This study begins, first, by demonstrating how Murdoch’s writings engage with the problem of evil, with the theological attempt to reconcile goodness with the presence of evil and suffering in the world, by drawing on her allusions to the Book of Job and to the writings of Simone Weil and Dame Julian of Norwich, all of which assert the necessary presence of evil and suffering in the moral life. Second, I interrogate the inconsistencies between Murdoch’s fictional and philosophical pictures of evil to illustrate how her fictional and philosophical engagement with Saint Paul’s writings reveals that she adopted the same dialectical picture of morality for which she critiqued Jung in her moral philosophy. For her, Jung’s picture of morality merges aspects of dualism and monism, both of which, traditionally speaking, offer two countervailing ways in which to picture the moral life, where evil represents, respectively, either an independent moral force separate from the good or a failure to carry out the moral iii ideals of goodness. Third, I identify and develop a link between contemporary moral, psychological and sociological discourses on psychopathy and the evil characters, both male and female, within Murdoch’s novels: not only do her antagonists and demons, often called ‘enchanter’ figures by scholars, echo the psychopath’s moral psychology, but so too do her saintly figures. Such an ambiguous picture resonates with contemporary interpretations of psychopathy, such as those offered by Robert D. Hare, Kevin Dutton, or Simon Baron- Cohen, which highlight the complex role of compassion, empathy and emotion on the individual’s moral awareness, whether they are saintly or psychopathic. In the final chapter, I argue that Murdoch’s dialectical picture of morality is indebted to Blake, whose The Songs of Innocence and of Experience and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell illustrates the necessity of the ‘contrary’ pairs of innocence and experience, reason and passion, and good and evil. While Murdoch may praise goodness, her complex engagement with evil reveals a dialectical task for the moral agent in which they have to appreciate the complexity of the moral life, with its inherently ambiguous mixtures of emotion and rationality, the saintly and the psychopathic, and goodness and evil. (shrink)

The publication examines the problems of the philosophical foundations of elections, the concept of physicalism, where consciousness-body is studied, which in the philosophy of consciousness has a decisive fact. In modern philosophy of elections, the philosophical aspect is considered - consciousness and the monistic-ontological thesis - physicalism, which allows us to explain the fact that everything that exists is physical or appeared as a derivative of the physical. The concept of physicalism is a position in the philosophy of mind. Consciousness (...) in physicalism exists without an independent ontological status, then it is derivative and connected with the human brain and is also connected with methodological naturalism. The social psychological theory of voter behavior and the theory of rational political choice attempt to explain voting behavior. It can be assumed that such a concept of synthesis of the experience of studying the immature practice of elections and already established theoretical thoughts about them could be a model of behavior of voters and candidates. This could be the dialectic of freedom and necessity of the philosophy of the rational communication model.The philosophy of the rational communication approach considers the following sequential images: a communicative person, a logical person, a rhetorical and dialogical, dialectical person. There are also three levels of development of the electoral process - logical, rhetorical (subject-object) and dialogical (subject-subject). The philosophical approach views rationality as a dynamic system consisting of logical, rhetorical and dialogical levels. In studies of the politics of legal philosophy, the problem of electoral behavior occupies an important place. These studies examine the consciousness and behavior of the electorate, which are important to the electoral process of electoral philosophy. (shrink)

We are now in a position to examine the claim that Pavlovian physiology and Marxist-Leninist philosophy form two complementary systems.There is certainly a similarity between the Leninist theory of reflection and Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity. Both present so-called psychic phenomena as a reaction of the organism to the stimuli of the outer world and both insist that this reflection is not a passive reception of impressions but is an active response on the part of the organism.Again both systems (...) are monist; they are united in excluding the possibility of having recourse to a non-material substance as the basis for psychic phenomena. But for Pavlov this exclusion is a scientific axiom while for Marxism-Leninism it is founded on philosophical materialism. However, the most important difference between Pavlov's theories and Marxism-Leninism on this point is that Pavlov's approach to psychic is fundamentally mechanistic and reductionist whereas that of Marxism-Leninism is dialectical and consequently anti-reductionist and anti-mechanist. Soviet psychology is, in consequence, founded partly on a mechanist system which is not materialist in the full sense of the word, and partly on a materialist system which is definitely not mechanist. From this point of view there is a definite discrepancy between the two traditions on which Soviet psychology is founded and which goes a long way towards explaining many of the inconsistencies in Soviet psychological theory. (shrink)

The subject of this study is materialism, understood in the broadest sense of this concept: both as a philosophical doctrine and as a way of life corresponding to a certain worldview position. The aim is to clarify the objective role of this worldview position in various fields of human activity. At the center of the research is the question of the essence of materialistic ideas about the world hiding behind the sensually given reality to man. The study consists of two (...) parts, published in separate articles. The first part is devoted to the origins of the materialistic worldview and the main question of philosophy, and in this, its second part, the question of the philosophical problems of non-classical physics is considered, the root of these problems is revealed, a comparative worldview analysis of the basic concepts of classical and non-classical physics is carried out and the overall result of the research is summarized. The methodology of this research is the principle of materialistic monism, according to which absolutely all phenomena of the human-cognizable world can be based only on something material, "influencing". The general conclusions of this study are as follows: the roots of the materialistic worldview go back to the origins of life, to such a condition of successful vital activity of living beings, which is inherently ideological; this condition, called by the author the Main Question of Life, is the historical forerunner of the Main Question of Philosophy; the worldview position, equivalent to the materialistic solution of the OVF, is inherent in the vital activity of absolutely all living beings; all people in their daily and practical activities are born materialists. In addition, this study clarifies the idea of the essence of materialistic teaching; shows the exclusivity of the materialistic worldview as the only true worldview; provides a refined definition of the concept of matter; proves the need to shift the "center of gravity" of modern materialistic teaching from dialectics to the principle of materialistic monism; formulates the missing requirement for scientific theories to ensure their ideological viability; shows the ideological inconsistency the main ideas of the new, non-classical physics. (shrink)