Defamation law is a long-standing research focus. Previous studies on defamation law have pointed out the importance of balancing two fundamental issues in law, namely, protection of reputation and freedom of speech. The present corpus-based legal study, using ConcGram 1.0 as the analytical tool, examined the phraseological profile of reported cases on defamation in Hong Kong in order to find out the types of defense and the approach to meaning in the defamation case law in Hong (...) Kong. Regarding defenses to a defamation claim, the results show that fair comment, qualified privilege, and justification are the most prevalent types, that unintentional defamation is not used at all, and that there has been a noticeable shift from fair comment to honest comment. As for the approach to meaning, the ordinary and natural approach is found to be a pivotal means of solving the threshold problem in defamation cases, that is, whether the words involved are defamatory or not. (shrink)

Defamation is the act of damaging another’s reputation. According to recent legal research, defamation laws may be improperly used in many ways. Some of these uses profoundly affect the historian’s work: first, when defamation laws protect reputations of states or nations as such; second, when they prevent legitimate criticism of officials; and, third, when they protect the reputations of deceased persons. The present essay offers two tests of these three abuses in legal cases where historians were defendants. (...) The first test, a short worldwide survey, confirms the occurrence of all three abuses; the second test from nine western European countries) the occurrence of the third abuse. Both tests touch on problems central to the historical profession: living versus deceased persons; facts versus opinions; legal versus historical truth; the relationship between human dignity, reputation, and privacy; the role of politicians, veterans, and Holocaust deniers as complainants; the problem of amnestied crimes. The second test—the results of which are based on verdicts, commentaries, and press articles, and presented in a synoptic table—looks closely into the complainants’ and defendants’ profiles, the allegedly defamatory statements themselves, and the verdicts. All statements deemed defamatory were about such contemporary events as World War II and colonial wars. Both tests amount to two conclusions. The first one is about historians’ professional rights and obligations: historians should make true, but privacy-sensitive or potentially offending, statements only when the public interest is served; otherwise, they should have a right to silence. The second conclusion concerns defamation itself: defamation cases and threats to sue in defamation have a chilling effect on the historical debate; they are often but barely veiled attempts at censorship. (shrink)

This Article addresses the question of what limits, if any, freedom of speech would place on holding authors liable for the reputational damage they cause with fiction. By “freedom of speech” I am not referring to the First Amendment but rather to one conception of the moral idea underlying it. According to this conception, the limits that freedom of speech places on the scope of authors’ liability for causing false and defamatory beliefs are whatever limits are necessary to adequately protect (...) our interests as potential authors and audiences, and whose costs are acceptable in terms of other interests. To apply this conception, it will be necessary to identify our interests as potential authors of and audiences for fiction about real people, and to assess how these interests would be affected by different limits. Ultimately, I will argue that freedom of speech is consistent with holding authors liable for reputational damage caused by their violations of fiction’s “veracity rules” and for reputational damage caused by mistakes that their target audience would be expected to make. But liability for beliefs that are traceable to mistakes that only an author’s incidental audience would be expected to make is, I will argue, prohibitedby freedom of speech, so long as the costs of that protection remain acceptable. (shrink)

In the paper, the author deals with the history of attempts to defame integrative bioethics by a group of Croatian philosophers and incidental media appearances in which the tendency was to slander the long-standing research concept of the Zagreb bioethics school. In the introduction, a historical overview of the basic qualitative and quantitative results of integrative bioethics in the Croatian and European context is given. This is followed by an analysis of the context of defamation of integrative bioethics and (...) the actors of defamation, separated according to “scientific” and media content. Finally, the attempt to compromise and profane integrative bioethics is interpreted as part of the destrolution phenomenon, the theory of post-communist chaos and the production of fake envy. (shrink)

Although the reputation of Englands first queen regnant, Mary Tudor had remained substantially unchanged in the intervening centuries, there were always some defenders of that Catholic queen among the historians of Victorian England. It is worth noting, however, that such revisionism made little if any impact on the schoolroom history textbooks, where Marys reputation remained much as John Foxe had defined it. Such anxiety as there was about attempts to restore something of Marys reputation were made more problematic by the (...) increasing number and increasingly visible presence of a comprehensive Catholic hierarchy in the nineteenth century, and by high-profile converts to the Catholic faith and papal authority. The pre-eminent historians of the later Victorian era consistently remained more favourable to the reign of Elizabeth, seen as the destroyer,of an effective Catholic church in England. (shrink)

Being on a 40 city 24x7 book tour for War Against the Weak . I am writing this from an airplane, and I regret my brevity. Catching up on some email from a few weeks back I have now come across your remarks and those of your like minded friends defending Spencer.

The current UN policy regarding free speech presents a philosophical dilemma between accepting the free speech provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and exceptions carved out for hatred, hostility, and religious defamation. The Declaration should be understood to imply viewpoint neutrality and the exceptions for defamation are not viewpoint neutral. If the UN were to adopt J. S. Mill’s crucial distinctions between expression and performative speech, content and context, and mental states and the acts motivated by (...) them, it would be clear that hatred, hostility, and defamation cannot be exceptions to viewpoint neutral free speech. If the heart of free speech is freedom especially for the thought we hate, then the UN should abandon its exceptions or abandon appeals to free speech. However, I will offer a strong reason that it should not do the latter. (shrink)

This paper examines the ‘doctrine of reportage’—a particular application of the Reynolds qualified privilege defence to defamation recognized by the House of Lords in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd. The doctrine of reportage provides protection for the neutral reporting (republication) of defamatory allegations made by others in the context of a dispute or controversy of public interest. It is argued in this paper, however, that this emerging defence is doctrinally distinct from the privilege recognized in Reynolds and that its (...) jurisprudential basis needs to be reconsidered. Moreover, the development of the defence under the guise of Reynolds privilege has led to confusion, both by courts and by commentators, as to its potential breadth. It is suggested that the public interest justifications underpinning the reportage defence need to be explicitly re-examined by the courts in order to define its proper scope. Following an examination of these public interest justifications, it is argued that a broad interpretation of the defence should be rejected. (shrink)

The present article concerns itself with the relationship between defamation and negligence in the protection of the interest in reputation. The bijection between defamation and reputation is typically thought of as perfect: defamation only protects reputation, while reputation is only protected by defamation. This article shows, however, that neither limb of the proposition is true; furthermore, there is no principled ground why they should be. In particular, there is no reason why the tort of negligence could (...) not prima facie extend the scope of its protection to reputation. It might seem that the fact that negligence, as a tort, requires by construction culpa, whereas defamation appears to rely on either more or less than that as a standard of liability, would prove an insuperable stumbling-block in the way of this suggestion. The hurdle, however, is not nearly as formidable as it might appear at first, because, as this article documents, negligence has for more than a century been acting as a magnet on the law of defamation, surreptitiously bringing its standard of liability increasingly close to negligence-culpa. (shrink)

I have practiced psychotherapy, family therapy, and hypnotherapy for over 25 years without a single board complaint or lawsuit by a client. For over 3 years, however, a group of proponents of the false memory syndrome (FMS) hypothesis, including members, officials, and supporters of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, Inc., have waged a multimodal campaign of harassment and defamation directed against me, my clinical clients, my staff, my family, and others connected to me. I have neither treated these harassers (...) or their families nor had any professional or personal dealings with any of them; I am not related in any way to the disclosures of memories of sexual abuse in these families. Nonetheless, this group disrupts my professional and personal life and threatens to drive me out of business. In this article, I describe practicing psychotherapy under a state of siege and place the campaign against me in the context of a much broader effort in the FMS movement to denigrate, defame, and harass clinicians, lecturers, writers, and researchers identified with the abuse and trauma treatment communities. (shrink)

The interpretation and the indirect reporting of a speaker’s communicative intentions lie at the crossroad between pragmatics, argumentation theory, and forensic linguistics. Since the leading case Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., in the United States the legal problem of determining the truth of a quotation is essentially equated with the correctness of its indirect reporting, i.e. the representation of the speaker’s intentions. For this reason, indirect reports are treated as interpretations of what the speaker intends to communicate. Theoretical considerations, (...) aimed at establishing the pragmatic meaning of an utterance and differentiating between presumptive and non-presumptive interpretation, are thus interwoven with the practical legal need of distinguishing a correct indirect report from an indirect one or a misquotation. An incorrect report or a misquotation has the dialectical effect of attributing to the misquoted party commitments that he never held, which the latter needs to rebut. This shifting of the burden of persuasion can be increased by using strategically the conflict between the presumptive interpretation of an utterance and the non-presumptive one, i.e. the different types of pragmatic ambiguity. When an interpreter is confronted with an utterance taken out of its dialogical context, his interpretative process is not guided by the actual context or intention, but rather the most frequent or prototypical dialogical setting or the most typical individual purpose that it could have served to achieve. This presumptive reconstruction can be used to provide a prima facie case that the other party needs to reject. The stronger the interpretative presumptions a speaker needs to rebut, the more effective the misquotation strategy. The conflict between the systematic and the presumptive process of interpretation can be represented as an argumentative mechanism of reconstruction of the individual intention, which allows one to assess the reasonableness of the interpretative reasoning. (shrink)

Sitting at the nexus of unchanging constitutional rights, constantly evolving social norms, and tensions between federal and state justice systems, defamation law in the US is exceedingly complex. In this work, I focus on a single conceptual and practical problem amidst this network: the fact-opinion distinction. This distinction—developed largely as a result of US Supreme Court decisions _Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc._ and _Milkovich v. Lorraine Journal Co._—states that, while opinions are protected under the First Amendment so long as (...) they do not imply “provably false” information, facts, if false, may always be actionable in a lawsuit for defamation. Thus, the judicial decision of whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or opinion is influential in determining whether a claim may move forward. In spite of the significance of this distinction, legal precedent and academic literature shows that there are no generally agreed upon characteristics to organize statements into these two categories. Using the framework of Appraisal Analysis (Martin and White, The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005), I examine a corpus of previously adjudicated defamatory language to answer the question: _how does expression of stance differ between judicially-determined statements of opinion and fact in defamation cases?_ This analysis reveals that judicially-determined opinions express more markers of attitude and expanding engagement than their factual counterparts. Ultimately, I argue that this research may be directly applied to the analysis of allegedly defamatory language in the US, and, in being so applied, may play a role in adding robustness to existing analytical procedures regarding the distinction between fact and opinion in defamation law in the US. (shrink)

The analysis of courtroom trials has attracted considerable scholarly attention. However, studies performing SFL analysis of legal texts and speeches are rare. The up-to-date published studies handled criminal cases; yet, there is a lack of SFL studies examining civil cases like divorce and defamation. The present qualitative study utilized systemic functional multimodal discourse analysis (SF-MDA) of the 2022 defamation trial sued by Johnny Depp’s lawyer (the plaintiff) against Amber Heard (the defendant). The SF-MDA of the transitivity system aimed (...) to examine and compare the experiential meaning in the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant. The study aimed to answer the following research questions: (1) what are the differences in the plaintiff’s and defendant’s use of experiential meanings? (2) how can transitivity and multimodality aid in the experiential communicative meanings and the arrival of the final verdict in the courtroom? and (3) what were the language tactics that were manifested throughout the analysis? The plaintiff utilized material processes with the highest frequency, followed by relational and mental processes. However, the defendant made excessive use of the relational processes followed by mental and material processes. The speech of the plaintiff included more circumstances than the defendant. Some of the language techniques, used by the plaintiff and the defendant were detected. (shrink)

The defence of qualified privilege emerged in the 1760s in cases involving domestic servants suing their masters for bad references. Its function was to reverse the burden of proof of malice—transferring it from the defendant to the plaintiff—and it was based on the ‘occasion’ of speaking. The evidence suggests that this meant ‘cause’, but later cases interpreted it as meaning ‘situation’ and appeared to hold that there must be a duty or interest in both the publisher and publishee in order (...) for the defence to be raised. This interpretation proved controversial because it denied a defence when the defendant mistakenly believed that he had a duty or interest. In the 1890s it was finally settled that a duty or interest in both publisher and publishee was an essential requirement of the defence; perhaps this was due to parallel developments relating to similar concepts in the torts of deceit and negligence. (shrink)

Knowledge of sins of speech derives from knowledge of God and from knowledge of created nature as teleological, rational, social and communicative. Speech is directed to God and neighbours; it is causal and irrevocable; good speech demonstrates integrity, good intent, justice and moderation. Sinful speech arises from wicked intention and damages both speaker and hearer. Blasphemy opposes vocal confession of God with disparagement of his excellence. Defamation opposes justice by speaking against the neighbour’s good reputation. In the Christian community, (...) the speech of regenerate creatures is under repair, as thanksgiving to God and edification of neighbours are established by the moving power of the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

This article explores recent developments inthe regulation of Internet speech, inparticular, injurious or defamatory speech andthe impact the attempts at regulation arehaving on the `body' in the sense of theindividual person who speaks through the mediumof the Internet and upon those harmed by thatspeech. The article proceeds in threesections. First, a brief history of the legalattempts to regulate defamatory Internet speechin the United States is presented; a shortcomparative discussion of defamation law in theUK and Australia is included. As discussedbelow, (...) this regulation has altered thetraditional legal paradigm of responsibilityand, as a result, creates potential problems forthe future of unrestricted and even anonymousspeech on the Internet. Second, an ethicalassessment is made of the defamatory speechenvironment in order to determine which actorshave moral responsibility for the harm causedby defamatory speech. This moral assessment iscompared to the developing and anticipatedlegal paradigm to identify possible conformityof moral and legal tenants or to recognize theconflict between morality and law in assigningresponsibility to defamatory actors. Thisassessment then concludes with possiblesuggestions for changes in the legal climategoverning the regulation of defamatory speechon the Internet, as well as prediction of theresult should the legal climate continue todevelop on its present course. This is not tosuggest that all law, or even the law ofdefamation, be structured to reflect thesubjectivity of a moral construct, but since itis the authors position that the legalassignment of liability in online settings ismisaligned, this reflection can serve asbeginning reassessment of that assignment. (shrink)

Is it permissible for the state to censor or suppress conspiracy theories, even within liberal democracies? According to a number of political and legal theorists, it is. In this paper, I will argue that the state may sometimes censor conspiracy theories, but it should be permitted to do so only after very strict conditions have been met. I shall first offer some brief thoughts about the definition of ‘conspiracy theory’. I will then critique one existing attempt to address this issue (...) – namely Cíbik and Hardoš’s public reason approach. Next, I shall outline my own proposal. I will argue that we should sometimes consider conspiracy theorising to be a form of discriminatory speech against vulnerable individuals and groups, and we can consider it to be a form of defamation in these cases. Consequently, the state may sometimes be permitted to enact civil laws to sanction such theorising. Finally, I will outline some of the conditions that should be met before state censorship can be considered. (shrink)

Background There are legal protections for nurse researchers at public universities who employ community-based participatory research (CBPR) in research about social or health inequities. Dissemination of CBPR research data by researchers or participants may divulge unjust laws and create an imperative for university involvement. Research Question What are United States-based legal dissemination protections for CBPR health equity nurse researchers? Research Design Three case examples employing CBPR are examined: 1) a mixed methods study with participants reporting illegal discrimination in a municipal (...) initiative about capacity building in community-based organizations serving children; 2) a visual methods study exposing potential clean air law violations in environmental justice research; and 3) a study examining workload violations and illegal discrimination among hotel workers. Participants and Research Context The cases involved participants from protected social class backgrounds. The research is described with respect to: background, funding, research purpose, and research team; research participants’ power and legal vulnerability; dissemination of relevant research information balancing vulnerability and power; research dissemination issues; potential legal issues involved; and laws researchers may use. Ethical Considerations IRB approval was obtained for the studies. Using a social justice ethical framework, studies highlight actual or potential legal aspects of data dissemination in the context of gathering data about injustice. Findings Legal protections for research data dissemination, whistleblower protection, research advancement protection, anti-harassment protection, false claims, defamation, and visual data liabilities are described. Conclusion Knowledge of legal research data dissemination protections is an essential competency for nurse researchers invested in uplifting social justice. (shrink)

Introduction -- Defamation Criteria: Fact or Value? -- The Elusive Distinction between Fact and Opinion -- Defamation and Freedom of Expression -- Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion: A Unifying Prescription -- Introduction -- Socialist Positivism -- Critical Legal Positivism -- Feminist Positivism -- Alternative Dispute Resolution -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

Should defaming the name of God be of concern even for those who do not have faith in Him? With Gregory Reichberg and Farzad Mahootian.

Should defaming the name of God be of concern even for those who do not have faith in Him? With Gregory Reichberg and Farzad Mahootian.

This article focuses upon defamation law in Australia and its struggles to adjust to the digital landscape, to illustrate the broader challenges involved in the governance and regulation of data associations. In many instances, online publication will be treated by the courts in a similar fashion to traditional forms of publication. What is more contentious is the question of who, if anyone, should bear the responsibility for digital forms of defamatory publication which result not from an individual author’s activity (...) online but rather from algorithmic associations. This article seeks, in part, to analyse this question, by reference to the Australian case law and associated scholarship regarding search engine liability. Reflecting on the tensions involved here offers us a fresh perspective on defamation law through the conceptual lens of data associations. Here the focus of the article shifts to explore some wider questions posed for defamation law by big data. Defamation law may come to play a significant role in emerging frameworks for algorithmic accountability, but these developments also call into question many of its traditional concepts and assumptions. It may be time to think differently about defamation and to consider its interrelationship with privacy, speech and data protection more fully. As a result, I conclude that the courts and policymakers need to engage more deeply and explicitly with the rationale for the protection of reputation and that more thought needs to be given to changing conceptions of reputation in the context of data associations. (shrink)

Although Kant’s final work in moral philosophy,Die Metaphysik der Sitten, currently attracts much scholarly attention, there is still a lot to explore. This article is an attempt to get to grips with a particular, often neglected passage of theRechtslehre, namely §35. Here Kant defends the view that not only can a person’s good reputation can be tarnished after his death, but also that this constitutes a violation of this dead person’s property. Here I will not be able to fully clarify (...) what Kant means when he holds that persons can be harmed after their death, but I will put Kant’s view in a few perspectives. (shrink)

A number of companies including Google and BMW are currently working on the development of autonomous cars. But if fully autonomous cars are going to drive on our roads, it must be decided who is to be held responsible in case of accidents. This involves not only legal questions, but also moral ones. The first question discussed is whether we should try to design the tort liability for car manufacturers in a way that will help along the development and improvement (...) of autonomous vehicles. In particular, Patrick Lin’s concern that any security gain derived from the introduction of autonomous cars would constitute a trade-off in human lives will be addressed. The second question is whether it would be morally permissible to impose liability on the user based on a duty to pay attention to the road and traffic and to intervene when necessary to avoid accidents. Doubts about the moral legitimacy of such a scheme are based on the notion that it is a form of defamation if a person is held to blame for causing the death of another by his inattention if he never had a real chance to intervene. Therefore, the legitimacy of such an approach would depend on the user having an actual chance to do so. The last option discussed in this paper is a system in which a person using an autonomous vehicle has no duty of interfering, but is still held responsible for possible accidents. Two ways of doing so are discussed, but only one is judged morally feasible. (shrink)

The schoolyard wisdom about “sticks and stones” does not take one very far: insults do not take the form only of words, in truth even words have effects, and in the end the popular as well as the standard legal distinctions between speech and conduct are at least as problematic as they are helpful. To think clearly about how much we should put up with those who would put us down, it is necessary to explore the nature and place of (...) insult in our lives. What kind of injury is an insult? Is its infliction determined by the insulter or the insulted? What does it reveal of the character of each and of the character of society and its conventions? What is its role in social and legal life (from play to jokes to ritual to war and from blasphemy to defamation to hate speech)? Philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytic, and legal approaches to the questions are emphasized. Whether intentional or unintentional, the assertions and assumptions of dominance in insults make them a serious and essential form of power play. Is to understand all to forgive all? (shrink)

This paper presents three cases of research ethics violations in the social sciences and humanities that involved major educational institutions in Vietnam. The violations share two common points: the use of sophistry by the accused perpetrators and their sympathisers, and the relative ease with which they succeeded unpunished. The strategies the violators used to avoid punishment could be summarised as: (i) relying on people not paying enough attention when asked to do something relatively quickly, (ii) asking for the benefit of (...) the doubt, (iii) redefining the meaning of ethics, and (iv) defaming the whistleblowers and showing how fighting ethics violations is too costly, slow and, in the end, worthless. We offer suggestions to improve transparency: investment in translation and education about codes of conduct in Vietnam; investment in research ethics and integrity; the use of open online resources and platforms; and educating Vietnamese researchers about international standards. (shrink)

In authoritarian states, the discourse on freedom of speech, conducted by those opposed to non-democratic governments, focuses on the core aspects of this freedom: on a right to criticize the government, a right to advocate theories arid ideologies contrary to government-imposed orthodoxy, a right to demand institutional reforms, changes in politics, resignation of the incompetent and the corrupt from positions of authority. The claims for freedom of speech focus on those exercises of freedom that are most fundamental and most beneficial (...) to citizens - and which are denied to them by the government. But in a by-and large democratic polity, where these fundamental benefits of freedom of speech are generally enjoyed by the citizens, the public and scholarly discourse on freedom of speech hovers about the peripheries of that freedom; the focus is on its outer boundaries rather than at the central territory of freedom of speech. Those borderline cases, in which people who are otherwise genuinely committed to the core aspects of freedom of speech may sincerely disagree, include pornography, racist hate speech and religious bigoted expressions, defamation of politicians and of private persons, contempt of court, incitement to violence, disclosure of military or commercial secrets, advertising of merchandise such as alcohol or cigarettes or of services and entertainment such as gambling and prostitution. (shrink)

I have experienced the tribulations of fate.Victories and defeats, revolutions and restorations.Inflations and deflations, bombings,Defamations, broken regimes and broken pipes,Hunger and cold, internment and solitary confinement.Through it all I have passed,And through me it all has passed.I am acquainted with the abundant varieties of terror,The terror from above and the terror from below,Terror on the land and terror from the air,Terror legal and extra-legal,Brown, red and checkered terror,And worst of all, the terror none dares to name.I am acquainted with them (...) all and know their grip. (shrink)

The problem of establishing the best interpretation of a speech act is of fundamental importance in argumentation and communication in general. A party in a dialogue can interpret another’s or his own speech acts in the most convenient ways to achieve his dialogical goals. In defamation law this phenomenon becomes particularly important, as the dialogical effects of a communicative move may result in legal consequences. The purpose of this paper is to combine the instruments provided by argumentation theory with (...) the advances in pragmatics in order to propose an argumentative approach to meaning reconstruction. This theoretical proposal will be applied to and tested against defamation cases at common law. Interpretation is represented as based on a hierarchy of interpretative presumptions. On this view, the development of the logical form of an utterance is regarded as the result of an abductive pattern of reasoning in which various types of presumptions are confronted and the weakest ones are excluded. Conflicts of interpretations and equivocation become essentially interwoven with the dialectical problem of fulfilling the burden of defeating a presumption. The interpreter has a burden of explaining why a given presumption is subject to default, assuming that the speaker is reasonable and acting based on a set of shared expectations. (shrink)

Max Stirner’s The Unique and Its Property (1844) is the first ruthless critique of modern society. In All Things are Nothing to Me, Jacob Blumenfeld reconstructs the unique philosophy of Max Stirner (1806–1856), a figure that strongly influenced—for better or worse—Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Emma Goldman as well as numerous anarchists, feminists, surrealists, illegalists, existentialists, fascists, libertarians, dadaists, situationists, insurrectionists and nihilists of the last two centuries. -/- Misunderstood, dismissed, and defamed, Stirner’s work is considered by some to be the (...) worst book ever written. It combines the worst elements of philosophy, politics, history, psychology, and morality, and ties it all together with simple tautologies, fancy rhetoric, and militant declarations. That is the glory of Max Stirner’s unique footprint in the history of philosophy. -/- Jacob Blumenfeld wanted to exhume this dead tome along with its dead philosopher, but discovered instead that, rather than deceased, their spirits are alive and quite well, floating in our presence. All Things are Nothing to Me is a forensic investigation into how Stirner has stayed alive throughout time. (shrink)

Soon after the 2013 military coup, state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses have begun to shake Egyptian society. The regime of president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has attempted to rationalize them, claiming that this is the only path to save the most populous Middle Eastern country from civil unrest, terrorism, and economic decay. Al-Sisi, the former army chief during the 2013 coup, initially portrayed his ascendency to power as the only way to restore security and end the threat of terrorism. Egypt’s (...) generals have also recognized that they cannot rely only on the promise of restoring security to justify ending of the democratic opening and their heavy-handed ruling techniques. Therefore, they have also been using a web of alternative narratives to justify their approach and have been spreading these narratives using security-controlled public and private media institutions. Conspiracy theories, defamation campaigns, and hate speech against voices of dissent have assumed central positions... (shrink)

This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to emphasize the genuineness and importance of peaceful coexistence values among religions and cultures in Islamic civilization. It specifically focuses on the interaction with others, living together, acknowledging, respecting, and collaborating with them in different aspects of shared humanity. This research examines the language of extremism by studying and analyzing it, seeing it as the primary obstacle to the principles of civic coexistence and tolerance. The research findings indicate that the key factor that sets (...) apart the principles of peaceful coexistence among individuals, irrespective of their religious and racial backgrounds, and that necessitates the acceptance of others in Islamic ideology, is the perception of such acceptance as legitimate obligations. An individual is recognized as a Muslim only when they openly acknowledge their adherence to the Islamic faith. Through the analysis of holy writings and the Prophet's biography, the researcher concludes that any radical and divisive rhetoric that promotes the rejection of peaceful coexistence cannot be regarded as Islamic speech, and does not accurately reflect Islam and Muslims. Instead, it is an extreme rhetoric that only represents its advocates, a rhetoric that Islam disavows, just as it disavows other forms of hate speech. The research urges the official religious authorities in Arab and Islamic countries to take on the legitimate, ethical, and scientific duty of freeing religious matters from ideological manipulation and restoring the correct approach to interpreting religious texts, while avoiding extremist ideological exploitation. This proposal advocates for the promotion of harmony, resolution of misunderstandings, fostering love and unity, prevention of excommunication, defamation, and conflict. It suggests the establishment of educational programs focused on promoting peace and coexistence values, as well as encouraging research in the field of tolerance education and acceptance of others. The objective is to cultivate an intellectual atmosphere in our universities that prioritizes wisdom, reason, logic, and evidence over emotional slogans. This will result in universities producing graduates who possess values of tolerance and coexistence, equipped to challenge and dismantle hateful and extremist ideologies by exposing their flaws and removing the religious facade from their harmful ideas. (shrink)

Political Correctness or Virtue Terror?Discussing the different meanings of the concept of political correctness, the author argues that it is a part of a profound change in culture within Western democracies that has led to a differentiation and deepening of human and fundamental rights. At the same time, it is shown that political correct-ness was adopted by the political right and used as a fight against this differentiation of human and fundamental rights in the Western liberal democracies, in order to (...) defame them by linking the corre-sponding prohibitions of discrimination and equality measures with virtue terror. (shrink)

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools produce hallucinations exposing developers and users to a myriad of liabilities in courts. Given the absence of strict laws and regulations structuring how Generative AI content interact with potential allegations of defamation, libel, and slander, judges and attorneys are left with the semiotics of the fragmented articles and rules in each system attempting to settle such cases. The endless interpretations of written and non-verbal signs in the law across the world constitutes a new realm (...) for legal semiotics in the area of Generative AI and defamation. The present analysis examines existing civil liability articles in the Jordanian code to shed light on the litigation and defenses afforded in the defamation realm with respect to Generative AI content. The key finding is that like other countries, civil codes in Jordan are outdated concerning Generative AI content opening a plethora of liability scenarios in libel or slander cases. More importantly, the exercise of semiotic interpretation generates several defenses salvaging users and developers under strict sets of conditions. In sum, new amendments and updated legislative frameworks are needed to protect the healthy development of Generative AI while preserving citizens from damaging defamation, libel, and slander. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere he speaks (...) about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction... in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position. (shrink)

The article deals with problems of incommensurability and meaning change in thecontext of scientific dynamics. Its main topic is a proposal made by Putnam basedon his version of the principle of charity. It is shown that this proposal does not workas a general principle for the understanding of theory change, for it leads in some cases to an unconvincing interpretation of now discarded theories and is even uncharitable. So it could be polemically described as a kind of defamation ('üle (...) Nachrede') of these theories. This will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first one sketches the development of economic value theory, while the second deals with the development of the concept of probability. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an interpretation of Kant’s conception of free speech. Free speech is understood as the kind of speech that is constitutive of interaction respectful of everybody’s right to freedom, and it requires what we with John Rawls may call ‘public reason’. Public reason so understood refers to how the public authority must reason in order to properly specify the political relation between citizens. My main aim is to give us some reasons for taking a renewed interest (...) in Kant’s conception of free speech, including his account public reason. Kant’s position provides resources for dealing with many of the legal and political problems we currently struggle to analyze under this heading, such as the proper distinction between the sphere of justice and the sphere of ethics, hate speech, freedom of speech, defamation, and the public guarantee of reliable media and universal education. (shrink)

October 1917 provides an example with renewed relevance for today. The Bolshevik coup eliminated working-class and other popular organizations and imposed harsh state rule. The total destruction of nascent socialist elements has since been interpreted as a victory for socialism. For the West, the purpose was to defame socialism; for the Bolsheviks, to extract what gain they could from the moral force of the hopes they were demolishing. Authentic socialist ideals have been unable to withstand this two-pronged assault.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fighting Words:Turnus at Bay in the Latin Council (Aeneid 11.234–446)Elaine FanthamUntil the publication of Philip Hardie's important new discussion "Fame and Defamation in the Aeneid: The Council of Latins" (1998), Virgil's extended treatment of the Latin council had passed a generation of relative neglect—neglect all the more surprising because the debate occupies a quarter of the eleventh book.1 But then the book itself is generally treated as a (...) lowering of tension, a diversion of focus from the heroic business of male combat to an exchange of rhetoric and the ancillary exploits of the woman warrior Camilla. And despite his long– standing interest in Virgil's Iliad (e.g., 1984), K. W. Gransden's recent commentary on book 11 (1991) shows little interest in Virgil's sophisticated narrative technique.Virgil's writing in this book is no less serious than in its neighbors, and deserves further scrutiny. The Camilla narrative has begun to receive its due, but the rhetoric of the extended council, which includes Turnus' longest speech and the second longest formal speech in the Aeneid, has usually been passed over as alien to the concerns of epic.2This is certainly not Hardie's approach, though it is motivated in part by the same negative attitude toward rhetoric. For him the debate is primarily a starting point for a more far–reaching inquiry into the [End Page 259] ways in which Virgil uses the secondary narrative of speakers to project dissonant versions of events the audience has already experienced, and, by thus casting doubt on their credibility, extends a further shadow of doubt over the narrative enterprise. He states his aim as "to resituate the place of rhetoric within the Aeneid, with especial reference to the most elaborate and most formal exchanges between human actors in the poem. The focus of... discussion is not so much on the formal markers of a rhetorical manner, as on the relationship between the truth–functions of rhetoric and of a supposedly authoritative epic voice" (1998, 243).Now Hardie would probably accept a definition of rhetoric fairly close to "speech designed to persuade." But his reading of the episode shows a mistrust not simply of its most clearly dishonest speaker, but of the entire debate. He opens with Virgil's summary, Illi haec inter se dubiis de rebus agebant / certantes (445–46). Yet insofar as the sphere of rhetoric (as opposed to logic) is, as Aristotle declares, what is debatable, the uncertainty or insecurity of the Latins' circumstances hardly entitles Hardie to damn the entire council as "hot air... just so much rhetoric" (244). It seems that despite his magnificent understanding of epic, Hardie has no sympathy for rhetoric.3 For him "rhetoric" is only the abuse of eloquence. He equates it with public speeches invalidated by the speaker's misreading of circumstances, by distortion of the speaker's own experience,4 by misjudgment swayed by emotion,5 or by misrepresentation to deceive the audience—whereas the only error of several of these speakers is human ignorance of the divinely ordained consequences. Not only Latinus, "careful to provide the optimal conditions for a faithful account by the envoys," but the honest Venulus and right–minded Diomedes are discredited along with Drances, as if no valid speech were possible in a political context. [End Page 260]Hardie has many acute and rewarding comments on the debate, but his major critical contribution lies outside it, reaching even beyond the framework of the Aeneid. The more restricted approach I originally adopted toward the Latin debate, while composing earlier drafts of this essay, does not seem to have lost its usefulness: it is even possible that Hardie's long–sighted vision has produced a distortion that needs to be corrected by a study with a shorter focus. As in the subtle intertextual study by Burke (1978), my point of departure here is the effect of Drances' speech not only on the behavior of Turnus, but on the audience's or reader's reception of Turnus' reply and assessment of his character.6To start, then, let us briefly review the form and content of the council, paying special... (shrink)