The minimax theorem of matrix game theory is examined from a constructive point of view. It is then shown that the existence of solutions for matrix games cannot be proved constructively, but that a 2-by-2 game with at most one solution has a constructible solution.

Universal Game Theory - The theory that all of life is a game played by consciousness’es, (Living Beings). The board is a dream like structure of the universe. The progression is through an active process of intent witnessing, and passive meditation. Which releases the tension in the nerves of the body and leads to selfless actions, moral goodness, and eventually the finish, Enlightenment. Just like a wounded creature only cares about it’s own self. Man in tensionthrough (...) self-centered thought only thinks about his own predicaments. Even if he is thinking about others it is only through his own objectionable view from his false-created center. The enemy or deterrents in the game is the conditioning created by society for ambition, greed, control and general brain washing to give theindividual a false sense of identity, the ego. This is achieved by Religion; tradition, culture, education, reasoning, linear thought, and the creation of time. Leaving him/her in constant anxiety about millions of future contingencies. Through witnessing one realizes the whole futility of one dimensional thought which only leads to more and more thought. Simple or constructed elaborately, thought being time, a human construction. The final step of the Universal Game Theory is understanding the whole process of thought and the eventual revelation of Enlightenment, Bliss, ecstasy. Which the person then understands that he/she is the creator of the life/dream with which they are in. That point being a sexual ecstasy similar to what happens in death to men. i.e. Human males release semenwhen they die, having a sexual ecstasy at their last breath. (shrink)

This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to (...) construct conventions of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970). (shrink)

We now move to the demonstration of the left-to-right direction of the equivalence result. Let us assume that there is a winning $$\mathbf {P}$$ P -strategy in the dialogical game for $$\varphi $$ φ.

Our power of guessing corresponds to a bird's musical and aeronautical powers.There still remains one more economic consideration in reference to a hypothesis; namely, that it may give a good "leave," as the billiard players say.There is a game called "Twenty Questions," in which one party thinks of something well known to the other, who may then ask at most twenty questions answerable by yes or no, after which he has a right to make three guesses. … The principle (...) of pragmatism is applicable here.One of the more intriguing lines of thought in the writings of Peirce stems from a number of brief statements that seem to be game-theoretic in nature. Often they appear to be constructed to support or illustrate a broader... (shrink)

Expect for formal contracts, there are informally unwritten psychological contracts in the relationship between buyer and supplier for construction projects. The PC can affect the construction project performance and even cause project failure, but its process and formation are complex and not comprehensive in existing researches. This paper analyzes the PC between buyer and supplier by using evolutionary game and repeated game to tackle this gap. The results show the following: the goodwill and interest have an important impact (...) on PC fulfillment. The PC is vulnerable; for example, once either one fails to perform PC, the other will also destroy PC, and then the construction project will enter a vicious circle. In the process of repeated game, the effect of goodwill will gradually disappear, and the interest will play a major role. If the project performance is only linked to one participant, it will lead to breach from another player. Some measures may help both sides to complete PC, such as making both sides profitable, increasing the emphasis on business reputation, and improving the relevance of construction projects performance. (shrink)

Without the active participation of enterprises and front-line workers, it is difficult for the government to perform effective supervision to ensure behavioral safety among front-line workers. To overcome inadequate government supervision and information attenuation caused by vertical management mode and limited resources, and to change passive supervision into active control with the proactive participation of enterprises and workers, this paper combines the entity responsibility mechanism and the third-party participation mechanism based on government supervision to analyze the decision-making process of government (...) and enterprises on safety behavior supervision. An evolutionary game model was established to describe the decision-making interactions between the government and construction enterprises under the two mechanisms, and a simulation was performed to illustrate the factors influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. The results show that both mechanisms have a positive effect on government supervision, and the third-party participation mechanism was found to be working better. The implementation of the two mechanisms is influenced by punishment, subsidy, and cost, and it has different sensitivities to the three influencing factors. This study provides a theoretical framework for enhancing the government supervision mechanism, and the decision-making between the government and construction enterprises enhances the management form and guides their actual supervision practices. (shrink)

John Maynard Smith was the founder of evolutionary game theory. He has also been the major influence on the direction of this field, which now pervades behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. In its original formulation the theory had three components: a set of strategies, a payoff structure, and a concept of evolutionary stability. These three key components are still the basis of the theory, but what is assumed about each component is often different to the original (...) assumptions. We review modern approaches to these components. We emphasis that if a game is considered in isolation, and arbitrary payoffs are assumed, then the payoffs may not be consistent with other components of the system which are not modelled. Modelling the whole system, including not only the focal game, but also the future behaviour of the players and the behaviour of other population members, allows a consistent model to be constructed. We illustrate this in the case of two models of parental care, showing how linking a focal game to other aspects of the system alters what is predicted. (shrink)

Mathematical game theory has been embraced by a variety of scholars: social scientists, biologists, linguists, and now, increasingly, logicians. This volume illustrates the recent advances of game theory in the field. Logicians benefit from things like game theory's ability to explain informational independence between connectives; meanwhile, game theorists have even begun to benefit from logical epistemic analyses of game states. In concert with such pioneering work, this volume also present surprising developments in (...) classical fields, including first-order logic and set theory. (shrink)

This article considers the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users to be a system for correcting false information, and it considers the problem of correcting false information that arises in the aftermath of major emergencies. We use optimal control theory and differential game theory to construct differential game models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, and subsidized decision-making. The solutions to these models and their numerical simulations show that the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users exercise cost-subsidized (...) decision-making instead of decentralized decision-making. The equilibrium strategies, local optimal benefits, and overall optimal benefits of the system achieve Pareto improvement. Given the goal of maximizing the benefits to the system under centralized decision-making, the equilibrium results are Pareto-optimal. The research here provides a theoretical basis for dealing with the mechanism of correcting false information arising from major emergencies, and our conclusions provide methodological support for the government to effectively deal with such scenarios. (shrink)

Are the recent findings of Behavioural Game Theory (BGT) on unselfish behaviours relevant for the progress of game theory? Is the methodology of BGT, centred around the attempt to study theoretically players’ utility functions in the light of the feedback that experimental evidence can produce on the theory, a satisfactory one? Or is the creation of various types of ‘social preferences’ just wasteful tinkering? This article compares BGT with the methodology of Rational Game (...) class='Hi'>Theory (RGT). BGT is viewed as a more promising and constructive approach, with regard to the relationship between experimental data and theoretical modelling. However, I also argue that today RGT and BGT are closer to one another than often thought. (shrink)

The Brandenburger–Keisler paradox is a self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which can be viewed as a two-person version of Russell’s Paradox. Yablo’s Paradox, according to its author, is a non-self referential paradox, which created a significant impact. This paper gives a Yabloesque, non-self-referential paradox for infinitary players within the context of epistemic game theory. The new paradox advances both the Brandenburger–Keisler and Yablo results. Additionally, the paper constructs a paraconsistent model satisfying the paradoxical statement.

This paper develops a formal model of the subtle meaning differences that exist between grammatical alternatives in socially conditioned variation and how these variants can be used by speakers as resources for constructing personal linguistic styles. More specifically, this paper introduces a new formal system, called social meaning games, which allows for the unification of variationist sociolinguistics and game-theoretic pragmatics, two fields that have had very little interaction in the past. Although remarks have been made concerning the possible usefulness (...) of game-theoretic tools in the analysis of certain kinds of socially conditioned linguistic phenomena :645–668, 1977; Dror et al. in Lang Linguist Compass 7:561–579, 2013; in Lang Linguist Compass 8:230–242, 2014; Clark in Meaningful games: Exploring language with game theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014, among others), a general framework uniting game-theoretic pragmatics and quantitative sociolinguistics has yet to be developed. This paper constructs such a framework through giving a formalization of the Third Wave approach to the meaning of variation using signalling games and a probabilistic approach to speaker/listener beliefs of the kind commonly used in the Bayesian game-theoretic pragmatics framework :3–44, 2016, for recent overviews). (shrink)

Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply claims about (...) tendencies and also the view that economics, when successful, necessarily follows this method. When economics licenses successful policy interventions, as it did in the case of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, its method is not to study tendencies but rather to study the phenomenon as a whole. Key Words: economic models • tendencies • economic experiments • policy making • John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

In the process of cultural dissemination, the dissemination of false information will have a negative impact on the entire environment. In this case, it is an effective method to regulate the behavior of cultural dissemination participants. Based on the community network structure and the improved classic network communication model, this paper constructs the susceptible-infected-recovered model for the grassroots communication of engineering safety culture and discusses the law of grassroots transmission of engineering safety culture. The communication process is simulated, and it (...) is concluded that a good engineering safety culture will be the first to be covered by low-level engineering safety culture in the process of dissemination. With a modularity coefficient of 0.5 as the boundary, it will affect the scale of good safety culture in different directions; the dissemination infection rate of low-level engineering safety culture changes in the same direction with the speed and scale of transmission; the maximum transmission scale of low-level engineering safety culture does not decrease with the increase of the initial value of the susceptible state. When the initial value of the immune state is 15%, the low-level safety culture scale is the lowest value of 0.135, which is the low initial value of employees with low-level engineering safety culture and is more conducive to control its maximum spread. It also puts forward management recommendations for the subjects and objects of the grassroots dissemination of engineering safety culture. This paper transforms cultural communication into an evolutionary game model, uses a game tree to describe it, and analyzes that the model has a Nash equilibrium point by adding a penalty function to the income matrix. This model can encourage cultural communication participants to take honest behaviors, effectively restrain the transmission of false information, and promote a virtuous circle of cultural communication. (shrink)

This book synthesizes the game-theoretic modeling of decision-making processes and an ancient moral requirement, called the Golden Rule of ethics (GR). This rule states, "Behave to others as you would like them to behave to you." The GR is one of the oldest, most widespread and specific moral requirements that appear in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The book constructs and justifies mathematical models of dynamic socio-economic processes and phenomena that reveal the mechanism of the GR and are (...) based on the concept of Berge equilibrium. The GR can be naturally used for resolving or balancing conflicts, and its "altruistic character" obviously excludes wars, blood-letting, and armed clashes. The previous book of the authors, The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics, covers the static case of the GR. In this book, the dynamic case of the GR is investigated using the altruistic concept of Berge equilibrium and three factors as follows: a) a modification of N.N. Krasovskii's mathematical formalization of differential positional games (DPGs), in view of the counterexamples given by A.I. Subbotin and A.F. Kononenko; b) the method of guiding control, proposed by N.N. Krasovskii; c) the Germeier convolution of the payoff functions of different players. Additionally, the book features exercises, problems, and solution tips collected together in Appendix 1, as well as new approaches to conflict resolution as presented in Appendices 2-4. The book will be of use to undergraduate and graduate students and experts in the field of decision-making in complex control and management systems, as well as anyone interested in game theory and applications. (shrink)

Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between like the Newcomb paradox and like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the (...) orthodox theory of rationality do significantly better in disposition games than those who subscribe to revisionist theories like David Gauthier's, while revisionist agents do marginally better in behaviour games. I argue that because of agents' ability to manipulate their own weakness of will, orthodox agents do better at all of these games than has previously been thought. And, by elucidating the distinction between behaviour games and disposition games, I uncover the virtues that underlie the success of each theory of rationality. (shrink)

Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based (...) upon a well-defined notion of being good enough, and does accommodate group as well as individual interests through the use of conditional preference relationships, whereby a decision maker is able to adjust its preferences as a function of the preferences, and not just the options, of others. This new theory is offered as an alternative paradigm to construct artificial societies that are capable of complex behavior that goes beyond exclusive self interest. (shrink)

In the vertex pursuit game of cops and robbers on finite graphs, the cop has a winning strategy if and only if the graph admits a dominating order. Such graphs are called constructible in the graph theory literature. This equivalence breaks down for infinite graphs, and variants of the game have been proposed to reestablish partial connections between constructibility and being cop-win. We answer an open question of Lehner about one of these variants by giving examples of (...) weak cop-win graphs which are not constructible. We show that the index set of computable constructible graphs is Π11 hard and the index set of computable constructible locally finite graphs is Π40 hard. Finally, we give an example of a computable constructible graph for which every dominating order computes 0″. (shrink)

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article constructs a quartet evolutionary game model for debt restructuring with the participation of asset management companies; studies the interactive mechanism of complex behaviors among the government, banks, asset management companies, and enterprises; and analyzes the stability of the strategies of each game subject. It also analyzes the stability of the equilibrium points in the system and finds the stable points that maximize the interests of each subject. Research shows (...) that the government chooses to give specific support, banks choose debt-to-equity swaps, asset management companies choose to provide liquidity, and enterprises choose to work hard, which can better promote the debt restructuring process. Finally, using Matlab2018 software to analyze the impact of each essential element in the debt restructuring on the stability of system evolution, the research results provide a basis for the successful debt restructuring of the enterprises. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to support some of Gasparyan’s ideas and to reformulate them in a more constructive way in terms of both formalized hermeneutical procedures and networks and in the light of game-theory approaches.

We study how equivalent nonisomorphic models an unsuperstable theory can have. We measure the equivalence by Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games. This paper continues the work started in $[HT]$.

False information is always produced after the outbreak of major emergencies. Taking this into consideration, this paper discusses the behavior of multiple parties in relation to false information dissemination after major emergencies. First, a game model is constructed, using relevant knowledge of evolutionary game theory, between three parties: regulatory institutions, opinion leaders, and ordinary Internet users. Second, the model equations are solved, and the evolutionary stability strategies of each game party under different circumstances are analyzed. Third, (...) a numerical simulation is applied to the evolutionary trends under different strategy combinations with varying parameters. The results show that the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is positively correlated with the degree of punishment imposed by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release false information, the reward provided by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release positive information, the degree of participation and satisfaction gained by Internet users in adopting positive information, the richness of authentic content released by opinion leaders, and the psychological identification of Internet users with opinion leaders. Meanwhile, the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is negatively correlated with investigation and evidence collection costs borne by opinion leaders who release positive information, the additional income for opinion leaders who have false information adopted by Internet users, the costs of Internet users’ time and energy when they adopt information released by opinion leaders, and the costs of independently judging the accuracy of information by Internet users. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse in the framework of constructive mathematics (BISH) the validity of Farkas' lemma and related propositions, namely the Fredholm alternative for solvability of systems of linear equations, optimality criteria in linear programming, Stiemke's lemma and the Superhedging Duality from mathematical finance, and von Neumann's minimax theorem with application to constructive game theory.

Benchmark theory , introduced by Ralph Wedgwood, departs from decision theories of pure expectation maximization like evidential decision theory and causal decision theory and instead ranks actions according to the desirability of an outcome they produce in some state of affairs compared to a standard—a benchmark—for that state of affairs. Wedgwood motivates BT through what he terms Gandalf’s principle, that the merits of an action in a given state should be evaluated relative only to the performances of (...) other actions in that state, and not to their performances in other states. Although BT succeeds in selecting intuitively rational actions in a number of cases—including some in which EDT or CDT seem to go wrong—it places constraints on rational decision-making that either lack motivation or are untenable. Specifically, I argue that as it stands BT is committed both to endorsing and rejecting the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Furthermore its requirement that weakly dominated actions be excluded from consideration of rational action lacks motivation and threatens to collide with traditional game theory. In the final section of the paper, I construct a counterexample to BT. (shrink)

The Lovász local lemma (LLL) is a technique from combinatorics for proving existential results. There are many different versions of the LLL. One of them, the lefthanded local lemma, is particularly well suited for applications to two player games. There are also constructive and computable versions of the LLL. The chief object of this thesis is to prove an effective version of the lefthanded local lemma and to apply it to effectivise constructions of non-repetitive sequences.The second goal of this (...) thesis is to categorize some classes of cohesive powers. We completely describe both the isomorphism types of cohesive powers of equivalence structures and injection structures, as well as clarify the relationship between these cohesive powers and their original structures. We also describe the finite condensation of cohesive powers of computable copies of the integers as a linear order by cohesive sets whose complement are computably enumerable.Finally, we investigate the possibility of decomposing problems in the Weihrauch degrees into a product of first order part and second order part. We give a preliminary result in this direction.Abstract prepared by Daniel Mourad.E-mail: [email protected]: https://daniel-mourad.scholar.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2530/2023/06/ThesisFinalWithRevisio ns-2.pdf. (shrink)

The reach-avoid game theory is an ideal tool to handle the conflicts among intelligent agents and has been previously studied assuming full state information and no time limits on the players in the past decades. In this article, we extend the problem by requiring the defender to detect the attacker and adding maximum operation time constraints to the attacker. The attacker aims to reach the target region without being captured or reaching its time limit. The defender can employ (...) strategies to intercept the attacker only when the attacker is detected. A geometric method is proposed to solve this game qualitatively. By analyzing the geometric property of the Apollonian circle and the detection range, we give the barrier under the condition that the attacker is initially detected and the attacker’s shortest route which guarantees its arrival at the target region when it is initially outside the detection range. Then, a barrier that separates the game space into two respective winning regions of the players is constructed based on the shortest route and the time limit of the attacker. The main contributions of this work are that this paper provides the first attempt to introduce the abovementioned two concepts simultaneously, which makes the game more practical, and we provide the complete solution of the game in all possible situations. (shrink)

A body of work proposes that social-norm change can be explained in terms of game theory. These game theoretic models, however, don't fully account for how and why utterances are used to change social norms. This paper describes the problem and some of the solution elements. There are three existing, relevant, game-based models. The first is a game theoretic model of social norm change (Bicchieri, 2005, 2016). This accounts for how individuals make decisions to adhere (...) to or violate norms, based on empirical expectations of how others will behave. The second is the idea of a conversational game (Lewis, 1979) and its extensions. This posits that speech acts are accommodated in a conversation to make what is said correct play. This feature can explain how some speech acts, such as slurring utterances, change the dynamics of a conversation. The third is a theory of pragmatic inference, known as Rational Speech Act theory (Goodman and Frank, 2016). This is a computational theory of pragmatics, of how listeners interpret utterances and how speakers construct utterances that can be understood. This paper proposes, without setting out the full formal model, that elements of these three theories need to be incorporated together into a game theoretic model of how utterances change long-term social norms. (shrink)

We present here some modifications of tense logic based on intensionally treated game-theoretic concepts. They are intended for construction of formal models with description of intensional acts. Formal characteristic of intensional acts – subject, modus and contents; general scheme – MODUS, where x1, . . . , xm – names of subjects and A1, . . . , An – propositional description. For example: “x1 persuaded x2 that A1 is better than A2”. For the examination of formal structures, making (...) use of time logic, we should notice that an intensional act is an event identical in time with other non-intensional acts. (shrink)

There are many social psychological theories regarding the nature of prejudice, but only one major theory of prejudice reduction: under the right circumstances, prejudice between groups will be reduced with increased contact. On the one hand, the contact hypothesis has a range of empirical support and has been a major force in social change. On the other hand, there are practical and ethical obstacles to any large-scale controlled test of the hypothesis in which relevant variables can be manipulated. Here (...) we construct a spatialized model that tests the core hypothesis in a large array of game-theoretic agents. Robust results offer a new kind of support for the contact hypothesis: results in simulation do accord with a hypothesis of reduced prejudice with increased contact. The spatialized game-theoretic model also suggests a deeper explanation for at least some of the social psychological phenomena at issue. (shrink)

Without violating the spirit of Game-Theoretical semantics, its results can be re-worked in Martin-Löf''s Constructive Type Theory by interpreting games as types of Myself''s winning strategies. The philosophical ideas behind Game-Theoretical Semantics in fact highly recommend restricting strategies to effective ones, which is the only controversial step in our interpretation. What is gained, then, is a direct connection between linguistic semantics and computer programming.

Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker's ability to be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple decision-makers. To construct (...) a reliable measure of strategic ability, that we propose to call ``Strategic Quotient'' (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and where, therefore, the individual score obtained depends on the distribution of choices of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors (two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about the four identified factors. (shrink)

Social evolution theory conventionally takes an externalist explanatory stance, treating observed cooperation as explanandum and the positive assortment of cooperative behaviour as explanans. We ask how the circumstances bringing about this positive assortment arose in the first place. Rather than merely push the explanatory problem back a step, we move from an externalist to an interactionist explanatory stance, in the spirit of Lewontin and the Niche Construction theorists. We develop a theory of ‘social niche construction’ in which we (...) consider biological entities to be both the subject and object of their own social evolution. Some important cases of the evolution of cooperation have the side-effect of causing changes in the hierarchical level at which the evolutionary process acts. This is because the traits that act to align the fitness interests of particles in a collective can also act to diminish the extent to which those particles are bearers of heritable fitness variance, while augmenting the extent to which collectives of such particles are bearers of heritable fitness variance. In this way, we can explain upward transitions in the hierarchical level at which the Darwinian machine operates in terms of particle-level selection, even though the outcome of the process is a collective-level selection regime. Our theory avoids the logical and metaphysical paradoxes faced by other attempts to explain evolutionary transitions. (shrink)

Abstract We examine the construction of electromagnetism in its current form, and in an alternative form, from a point of view that combines a minimal realism with strict rational demands. We begin by discussing the requests of reason when constructing a theory and next, we follow the historical development as presented in the record of original publications, the underlying epistemology (often explained by the authors) and the mathematical constructions. The historical construction develops along socio-political disputes (mainly, the reunification of (...) Germany and the second industrial revolution), epistemic disputes (at least two demarcations of science in conflict) and several theories of electromagnetism. Such disputes resulted in the militant adoption of the ether by some, a position that expanded in parallel with the expansion of Prussia. This way of thinking was facilitated by the earlier adoption of a standpoint that required, as a condition for understanding, the use of physical hypothesis in the form of analogies; an attitude that is antithetic to Newton's “hypotheses non fingo”. While the material ether was finally abandoned, the epistemology survived in the form of “substantialism” and a metaphysical ether: the space. The militants of the ether attributed certainties regarding the ether to Faraday and Maxwell, when they only expressed doubts and curiosity. Thus, the official story is not the real history. This was achieved by the operation of detaching Maxwell's electromagnetism from its construction and introducing a new game of formulae and interpretations. Large and important parts of Maxwell work are today not known, as for example, the rules for the transformation of the electromagnetic potentials between moving systems. When experiments showed that all the theories based in the material ether were incorrect, a new interpretation was offered: Special Relativity (SR). At the end of the transformation period a pragmatic view of science, well adapted to the industrial society, had emerged, as well as a new protagonist: the theoretical physicist. The rival theory of delayed action at distance initiated under the influence of Gauss was forgotten in the midst of the intellectual warfare. The theory is indistinguishable in formulae from Maxwell's and its earlier versions are the departing point of Maxwell for the construction of his equations. We show in a mathematical appendix that such (relational) theory can incorporate Lorentz' contributions as well as Maxwell's transformations and C. Neumann's action, without resource to the ether. Demarcation criteria was further changed at the end of the period making room for habits and intuitions. When these intuited criteria are examined by critical reason (seeking for the fundaments) they can be sharpened with the use of the Non Arbitrariness Principle, which throws light over the arbitrariness in the construction of SR. Under a fully rational view SR is not acceptable, it requires to adopt a less demanding epistemology that detaches the concept from the conception, such as Einstein's own view in this respect, inherited from Hertz. In conclusion: we have shown in this relevant exercise how the reality we accept depends on earlier, irrational, decisions that are not offered for examination but rather are inherited from the culture. (shrink)

Recently there has been an unexpected rebirth of Turing's imitation game in the context of commercial demand. To meet the new requirements the following is a minimal list of what must be simulated. Real chat utterances are concerned with associative exchange of mental images. They are constrained by contextual relevance rather than by logical or linguistic laws. Time-bounds do not allow real-time construction of reasoned arguments, but only the retrieval of stock lines and rebuttals, assembled Lego-like on the fly. (...) A human agent has a place of birth, age, sex, nationality, job, family, friends, partners, hobbies etc., in short a profile. Included in the profile is a consistent personality, which emerges from expression of likes, dislikes, pet theories, humour, stock arguments, superstions, hopes, fears, aspirations etc. On meeting again with the same conversational partner, a human agent is expected to recall not only the profile, but also the gist of previous chats, as well as what has passed in the present conversation so far. A human agent typically has at each stage a main goal, of fact-provision, fact elicitation, wooing, selling, "conning" etc. A human agent also remains ever-ready to maintain or re-establish rapport by switching from goal mode to chat mode. Implementation of this last feature in a scriptable conversational agent will be illustrated. (shrink)

Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a (...) swap robust simple voting game. Each possible hierarchy can be induced by a weighted voting game and we provide a constructive proof of this result. In particular, the strict hierarchy is always achievable as long as there are at least five players. (shrink)

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, a new Cold War is being waged in our societies. During the Cold War a theoretical model of man was developed by economists and the military, an egotistical being interested only in his own benefit and in duping his opponents to achieve his ends: a modern homo oeconomicus. After his career in the Cold War ended, he was not scrapped but adapted to the needs of the twenty-first century. He became the (...) ringmaster of a new era of information capitalism. He sought to read, control and influence thoughts; to predict, price and eliminate risks. Today stock-market trading is guided by him. He uses computer algorithms and Big Data to build up detailed pictures of our preferences and then suggest and sell goods to us. The model has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are no longer the masters of our own fate. The Game of Life runs without us. Schirrmacher traces the progress of this extreme rationalization of social life from the Cold War games of the 1950s Rand Corporation to the stock-market trading techniques that brought about the financial crash of 2008, showing how these developments were interwoven with the rise of game theory, rational choice theory and neoliberal economics. The state and politics increasingly submitted themselves to the logic of computerized game theory and an economistic view of the world, evading real decision-making in the process. In this brave new world individuals, alone in front of their computers, may think they are constructing a reality of their own choosing, but in fact they are being manipulated all along by others who are setting the rules of the game. This international bestseller by one of Germanys most distinguished journalists is a powerful indictment of a way of thinking that has become pervasive and threatens to undermine not only parliaments and constitutions but also the sovereignty of the individual to be the person he or she wants to be. (shrink)

By introducing the theory of social co-governance into the field of e-commerce intellectual property protection, this paper builds an evolutionary game model among the government, e-commerce platforms, and rights holders, and studies the conditions under the stakeholders form a stable equilibrium state under different constraints. Combined with numerical simulation, the influence of individual factors and factor combinations on the system stability is analyzed. Results shows that: Strictly controlling the action costs and response costs of all parties can enhance (...) their willingness to actively deal with infringement issues; reasonable adjustment of the reward and punishment measures of government supervisory agencies can produce sufficient reverse shock and positive guidance to platform and operators; penalties should be imposed on government supervisory agencies that are not sufficiently supervised; strengthen the construction of the social environment for intellectual property protection, improve the social benefits of actively responding to infringement issues, and increase the sense of acquisition by the government, platforms and rights holders. And it provides certain positive references and suggestions for the government to formulate relevant policies. (shrink)

As a form of the informal economy, countries around the world have different policies towards street vendors. This paper constructs a law enforcement game model composed of the Chengguan, street vendors, and urban residents in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying with different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. Through the gradual stability analysis of the equilibrium point, the stable (...) strategy of the evolutionary game can be calculated. It is found that the flexible law enforcement behavior of urban management departments plays an important leading role in urban street governance. Flexible law enforcement not only requires macro policy arrangements but also tests the executive wisdom of street bureaucrats. (shrink)

In this book, German philosopher Julian Nida-Rümelin presents a theory of practical reason that is objectivist, or rather realist, as an alternative to the widespread subjectivism in the theory of rationality. This theory has pragmatic traits that can be read as a constructive counterpart to Nida-Rümelin's critique of consequentialism whilst embedding its conception of rationality in the conceptual framework of decision and game theory.

In his previous work, the author has introduced the axiom schema of inductive dichotomy, a weak variant of the axiom schema of inductive definition, and used this schema for elementary ) positive operators to separate open and clopen determinacies for those games in which two players make choices from infinitely many alternatives in various circumstances. Among the studies on variants of inductive definitions for bounded ) positive operators, the present article investigates inductive dichotomy for these operators, and applies it to (...) constructive investigations of variants of determinacy statements for those games in which the players make choices from only finitely many alternatives. As a result, three formulations of open determinacy, that are all classically equivalent with each other, are equivalent to three different semi-classical principles, namely Markov’s Principle, Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience and Limited Principle of Omniscience, over a suitable constructive base theory that proves clopen determinacy. Open and clopen determinacies for these games are thus separated. Some basic results on variants of inductive definitions for \ positive operators will also be given. (shrink)

China’s E-commerce market is very active. Despite the impact of COVID-19, the market has ushered in major development opportunities. Alongside, the level of intellectual property protection in China is constantly improving. However, there are relatively few studies on intellectual property protection in the field of E-commerce. This study introduces the theory of social cogovernance and explores the construction of China’s E-commerce intellectual property protection system with the participation of collective organizations. Evolutionary game method is applied to model construction. (...) Through numerical simulation, the study analyzes the evolution of E-commerce platform and collective organization strategic choice. The results depict that improving the open space provided by E-commerce platforms for collective organizations and strengthening their public service capabilities can promote the construction of social cogovernance systems. The establishment of reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms can increase cooperation enthusiasm. We also discuss the theoretical and practical implications for governments, E-commerce platforms, and collective organizations, to improve the level of intellectual property protection in E-commerce. This study can provide suggestions for China’s E-commerce intellectual property protection, improve the overall level of intellectual property protection in China, and provide a reference for global E-commerce intellectual property protection. (shrink)

During Jacques Derrida’s earlier phases, his stylistique acts out (in the sense of “performs”) the same project evident in his semantic. Derridean stylistic practice and thematics both undertake the project of deconstructing entitative thinking. Anglophonic philosophers often ignore (or cannot detect) his stylistic games, which are often Talmudic or unique to French. Derrida did not have a Buddhist agenda, but two of my past books, both well-received, show that Derridean deconstruction intersects with Mādhyamikan deconstruction of the self-identical. (Intersection does not (...) imply “common ground” because lines have no width.) This article demonstrates Derridean/buddhist intersections through (1) themes undoing themselves, (2) image motifs undoing themselves, (3) ambiguous referents dissolving Proper Names, (4) the “Uncanny” deconstructing logic, (5) enumeration undoing ontology, and (6) homophones and homographs unsettling correspondence theory. Finally, Derrida’s “free-floating syllables,” “floating graphic traits,” “palindromes,” and “scrambled words” are shown to dissolve entitative constructs. (shrink)

The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by 'provable', (...) 'self-evident', and 'justifiable'. I also construct in modal operator logic a paradox involving reflexive empirical reasoning. Unlike the paradox of the Liar, the paradox of reflexive reasoning does not depend on self-reference. ;I consider various solutions to the Liar paradox and evaluate how well these solutions cope with the paradox of reflexive reasoning. I then formalize the solution to the paradoxes which I favor: the indexical-hierarchical approach, first sketched out by Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge. In this solution, occurrences of the predicate 'true' in sentence-tokens are contextually relativized to levels of a hierarchy. Drawing also on some brief remarks of Bertrand Russell and Charles Parsons, I develop an account of the kind of schematic generality needed for this theory to be statable. ;Finally, I demonstrate that the principles shown to be paradoxical are in fact presupposed by contemporary game theorists in their reliance on the notion of common knowledge or, more precisely, mutual belief. I create novel analyses of and corresponding solutions to several recalcitrant puzzles within game theory, including the "chain-store paradox". (shrink)

A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are non-achievable in simple games. Moreover, it is (...) also proved that all achievable hierarchies are already obtainable in the class of weakly linear games. Our results prove that given an arbitrary complete pre-ordering defined on a finite set with more than five elements, it is possible to construct a simple game such that the pre-ordering induced by the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices coincides with the given pre-ordering. (shrink)