This paper is about David Gauthier’s concept of constrained maximization. Attending to his most detailed and careful account, I try to say how constrained maximization works, and how it might be changed to work better. In section I, that detailed account is quoted along with amplifying passages. Difficulties of interpretation are explained in section II. An articulation, a spelling out, of Gauthier's account is offered in section III to deal with these difficulties. Next, in section IV, (...) constrained maximization thus articulated is tested on several choice problems and shown to be seriously wanting. It appears that there are prisoners’ dilemmas in which constrained maximizers would not cooperate to mutual advantage, but would interact sub-optimally just as straight-maximizers would. ‘Coordination problems’ are described with which constrained maximizers might, especially if transparent to one another, not be able to cope–problems in which they might not be able to make up their minds to do anything at all. And I prove that there are prisoners’ dilemmas that, though possible for real agents and for straight maximizers, are not possible for constrained maximizers, so that agents’ internalising dispositions of constrained maximization could not be of help in connection with such possibly impending dilemmas. Taking constrained maximization as it stands, there are many problems for which it does not afford the ‘moral solutions’ with which Gauthier would have it replace Hobbesian political ones. After displaying these shortcomings of constrained maximization as presently designed, I sketch, in section V, possible revisions that would reduce them, stressing that these revisions would not be cost-free. Whether finishing the job of fixing up and making precise constrained maximization would be worth the considerable trouble it would involve lies beyond the issues taken up in this paper. So, of course, do substantive comparisons of constrained maximization, perfected and made precise, and straight maximization. (shrink)

Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented inMorals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of accidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the rationality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be argued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of individuals who are themselves not rational (...) actors but simple rule-followers. A proper analysis of the strategic choice situation involving two rational actors who confront each other shows that constrained maximization as the choice of both actors can only result under very demanding assumptions. (shrink)

By his definition of them, David Gauthier's co-operative constrained maximizers are not necessarily unsharing and disposed to exclude straight maximizers from benefits of their co-operation. Here is Gauthier's full and exact account, his official account, of constrained maximization.

InMorals By Agreement, David Gauthier concludes that under certain conditions it is rational for an agent to be disposed to choose in accordance with a fair cooperative scheme rather than to choose the course of action that maximizes his utility. This is only one of a number of important claims advanced in that book. In particular, he also propounds a distinctive view concerning what counts as a fair cooperative arrangement. The thesis concerning the rationality of adopting a cooperative disposition is, (...) however, logically independent of his substantive view of a fair cooperative scheme and is itself central to the project as a whole. Gauthier's concern is to establish that certain moral principles are those that fully rational, self-interested persons would agree to take as regulative of their dealings with one another – that a contractarian approach, in this sense, can provide an adequate basis for a theory of morality. (shrink)

One of the most important issues in moral philosophy is whether morality can be justified by rationality. The purpose of this study is to examine Gauthier’s moral theory, focusing on the disposition of constrained maximization, which is the main thrust of his project to justify morality rationally. First of all, I shall investigate Gauthier’s assumption and condition for the rationality of the disposition of constrained maximization so as to disclose that the disposition of constrained (...) class='Hi'>maximization is not necessarily chosen by rational agents. Then I shall explore his other arguments including ones for the reinterpretation of rationality and the self-critical reflection of rational beings, which can be considered as his further efforts to make the disposition of constrained maximization a rational choice. By exploring them, I shall attempt to indicate that those arguments are not valid so long as he clings to the maximizing conception of rationality and thereby this conception of rationality itself is not enough to provide morality with a basis. (shrink)

David Gauthier stages a competition between two arguments, each of which purports to decide once for all transparent agents which is best, being a straight or being a constrained maximizer. The first argument, which he criticizes and rejects, is for the greater utility, on a certain weak assumption, of straight maximization for all transparent agents. The second, which he endorses, is for the greater utility on the same weak assumption of constrained maximization for all transparent agents.In (...) Section I, Gauthier’s account of constrained maximization is presented, and his use in the two arguments of the idea of choosing a disposition to choose actions is noted. Section II is about the unfortunate argument that Gauthier criticizes. This argument is flawed in ways additional to those he notices, but a less ambitious form of reasoning can, for individuals whose probabilities and values are right, be good for the greater expected utility of straight maximization. Section III takes up the argument that Gauthier endorses and maintains that it is wrong in a way specific to it as well as in ways closely related to all of the first argument’s noted flaws. An Appendix features a three-person prisoners’ dilemma and includes demonstrations of principal conclusions reached in the body of this paper. (shrink)

In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in (...) utility theory might be. Third, I argue that no matter how we answer this question, expected utility theory cannot provide the reason why a moral disposition like constrained maximization is to be preferred to its rivals. (shrink)

Justice requires that one act on a fair optimizing strategy when one can—that is, a strategy that will yield an outcome that satisfies the standards set by minimax relative concession and optimality. We now address the problem raised by Hobbes's Foole—be it ever so rational to agree to minimax relative concession, is compliance with it rational, as opposed to directly maximizing one's own utility? We distinguish a straightforward maximizer, who is disposed always to maximize his own utility, from a (...) class='Hi'>constrained maximizer, who is disposed to refrain from utility maximization in favour of fair optimality, and show that persons with the latter disposition can expect to do better so long as there is a significant proportion of them in the population and reasonably able to identify one another and to avoid misidentifying straightforward maximizers. We argue that this shows the rationality both of constrained maximization as a disposition and of the choices constrained maximizers make. We claim that a population of constrained maximizers would be rationally stable, and compare this to Robert Trivers's claim that a population of reciprocal altruists would be genetically stable. (shrink)

David Gauthier in his article, Maximization constrained: the rationality of cooperation, tries to defend of the joint strategy in situations which no outcome is both equilibrium and optimal. Prisoner’s Dilemma is the most familiar example of these situations. He first starts with some quotes by Hobbes in Leviathan; Hobbes, in chapter 15 discusses an objection by someone is called Foole, and then will reject his view. In response to Foole, Hobbes presents two strategies (i.e. joint and individual) and (...) two kinds of agents in such problems including Prisoner’s Dilemma – i.e. straightforward maximizer (SM) and constrained maximizer(CM). Then he considers two arguments respectively for SM and CM, and he will show that why in an ideal and transparent situation, the first argument fails and the second one would be the only valid argument. likewise, in the following part of his article, he considers more realistic situations with translucency and he concludes that under some conditions, joint strategy would be still the rational decision. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues may be interpreted in a number of ways. One interpretation sees Plato's concept of The Good as a precursor of maximization theory, a modern behavioral theory. Plato identifies goodness with an ideal pattern of people's overt choices under the constraints of everyday life. Correspondingly, maximization theory sees goodness (in terms of "value") as a quantifiable function of overt, constrained choices of an animal. In both conceptions goodness may be increased by expanding the temporal extent over (...) which a behavioral pattern is integrated. (shrink)

This chapter argues that, under certain conditions, forming an intention makes an action rational which would otherwise not have been rational, since intentions (together with beliefs) in and of themselves provide deductive reasons for further intentions and actions, an argument which builds on previous work by R M Hare, Michael Bratman and others, It also provides an articulation and defense of the concept of "minimally constrained maximization" as a unified general solution to the well-known paradoxes of rationality, including (...) the paradox of deterrence and the prisoner's dilemma. (shrink)

This essay is arranged in three sections. In the first I consider interaction problems that can frustrate maximizers. My object here is to add to the kind of case discussed by Gauthier, another in which maximizers would not do well. In the next section I set out conditions under which ‘straight’ or ordinary maximizers could avoid their problems as surely and as easily as could Gauthier's ‘constrained’ maximizers. And in the last section I comment on the relative merits of (...) straight and ‘constrained’ maximization. Attention here is paid first to the suggestion that straight maximizers in view of their problems would choose not to be straight maximizers, would indeed choose to be ‘constrained’ maximizers, and that this shows that there is something wrong with straight maximization. Rejecting this inference, I turn in conclusion to the idea that it follows from the ‘incompleteness’ of straight maximization, from the fact that it is not always possible, that there is something wrong with it. This inference too is rejected. (shrink)

This paper examines structural barriers to the adoption of climate change mitigation practices and the evolution of a climate change ethic among American farmers. It examines how seed corn contracts in Michigan constrain the choices of farmers and allow farmers to rationalize the over-application of fertilizer and associated water pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Seed corn contracts use a competitive “tournament” system where farmers are rewarded for maximizing yields. Interviews and a focus group were used to understand fertilizer over-application and (...) barriers to participating in a climate change mitigation program. Results indicate that farmers agree that they over-apply fertilizer but would be unlikely to participate in a mitigation program due to their contracts and lack of support from seed corn companies. Because only a few companies control access to the seed corn market, farmers feel they have few choices. Farmers rationalized their practices as their only option given the competitive nature of their contracts and blamed other sources of pollution. Despite increasing efforts to educate farmers about climate change, structural barriers will continue to constrain participation in mitigation efforts and the development of a climate change ethic. (shrink)

The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. Different versions of this theory generate different versions (...) of Lockeanism; moreover, a plausible version of epistemic utility theory meshes with natural language considerations, yielding a new Lockean picture that helps to model and explain the role of beliefs in inquiry and conversation. Your beliefs are your best guesses in response to the epistemic priorities of your context. Upshot: we have a new approach to the epistemology and semantics of belief. And it has teeth. It implies that the role of beliefs is fundamentally different than many have thought, and in fact supports a metaphysical reduction of belief to credence. (shrink)

The richer you are, the less equally rich or richer people. The richest is only one (=unique). Maximization of richness or leisure (=classic utility), maximizes the uniqueness (=improbability) that can be maximized also by: extreme sport, suicide, tattoo, count of views... The richest seem unique as the poorest, but the rich can easily become poor, while the poor can hardly get rich. So the aim of maximization reflects IQ and options. Few options increase irrationality, regardless of IQ. I (...) also present the law of values' equality, Utility of Suicide, motivation to support the better, and overview the economics as such. Presented as PhD thesis at CERGE-EI, 2000, exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, 2013, presented at conferences in Santorini 2016, Daejon 2016, Adelaide 2016. (shrink)

Duncan MacIntosh has argued that David Gauthier's notion of a constrained maximization disposition faces a dilemma. For if such a disposition is revocable, it is no longer rational come the time to act on it, and so acting on it is not (as Gauthier argues) rational; but if it is not revocable, acting on it is not voluntary. This paper is a response to MacIntosh's dilemma. I introduce an account of rational intention of a type which has become (...) increasingly and independently prominent in the literature, and argue that, on this account, rational and voluntary constraint is possible. (shrink)

This paper discusses David Gauthier’s attempt to refine the theory underlying constrained maximization so that it ceases to have a certain implication that he regards as objectionable. It argues that the refinement Gauthier introduces may be initially appealing, but actually does his theory more harm than good.

Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to the problems. (...) On this theory, it is rational to treat something different as the aim when doing so would advance the original aim. I argue that the idea that this would be irrational bad faith entails contradictions and so is false, as must be theories saying that rationally we must always treat as the aim the bringing about of objectively good states of affairs or obeying a universalizable moral code. (Note: the published version differs somewhat from the version on the website of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law; please quote from the published version.). (shrink)

In the book Valuing Health, Daniel Hausman sets out a normative framework for assessing social policy, which he calls restricted consequentialism. For the restricted consequentialist, government policy-making not only is, but ought to be, largely siloed in individual government departments. Each department has its own goal linked to a fundamental public value, which it should pursue in a maximizing way. I argue that, first, Hausman’s argument appears to be internally inconsistent: his case for thinking that health policy should default to (...) a form of maximization is plausible only if a much narrower vision of the goals of policy is adopted than Hausman thinks appropriate in the case of education. Secondly, it turns out that none of Hausman’s analysis helps us with the crucial question of how maximization should be constrained by other values—a question that even on Hausman’s account looks to be crucial, and that will be even more important if adopt a broader perspective on the purposes of health policy than Hausman allows. (shrink)

David Gauthier claims that it can be rational to co-operate in a prisoner's dilemma if one has adopted a disposition constraining one's self from maximizing one's individual expected utility, i.e., a constrained maximizer disposition. But I claim cooperation cannot be both voluntary and constrained. In resolving this tension I ask what constrained maximizer dispositions might be. One possibility is that they are rationally acquired, irrevocable psychological mechanisms which determine but do not rationalize cooperation. Another possibility is that (...) they are rationally acquired preference-functions rationalizing cooperation as maximizing. I argue that if they are the first thing, then their adoption fails to make co-operation rational even if, as Gauthier also claims, actions are rational if they express rational dispositions. I then suggest that taking constrained maximizer dispositions to be things of the second sort would result in them being able to make co-operation rational, and that so-taking them therefore serves the bulk and spirit of Gauthier's larger claims, which I reconstruct accordingly. (shrink)

Stochasticity and ambiguity are two aspects of uncertainty in economic problems. In the case of investments in risky assets, this uncertainty is manifested in the uncertainty of future returns. On the contrary, the complexity of the economic phenomenon itself and the ambiguity inherent in human thinking and judgment are characterized by indistinct boundaries. For the same problem, research from different perspectives can often provide us with more comprehensive and systematic information. Currently, the expected value of return or the variance representing (...) risk is still used as a rational investment criterion for both single-stage portfolios and multistage portfolios. However, in general, the greater the expected return of an investor, the greater the risk he should take. Different investors have different requirements for profitability, but regardless of their expected return, they always hope to find a set of portfolios that maximize the probability of achieving the expected rate of return. In this paper, after analyzing the development of portfolio investment theory research, we take fuzzy information processing as the entry point and systematically discuss the theory and methods of fuzzy modeling of portfolio investment decision-making from the perspective of fuzziness around the portfolio investment decision-making process. The results of the empirical analysis show that the existence of basis constraints affects investors’ investment strategies as well as their final returns, but there is a limit to the influence of basis constraints on portfolio performance, and investors can obtain optimal investment returns by selecting a reasonable number of securities to form a portfolio based on the characteristics of different securities. (shrink)

Market economics can overreach and reduce all human activities to market-governed activities. More than a market-inspired explanation for human activities, it offers a normative account of how all goods and services should be distributed by private parties negotiating mutually agreeable terms. This paper argues that market values and practices are constrained by other fundamental values and practices. Liberal values are generally consistent with, though they are not reducible to, market values. Democratic and egalitarian values often contrast with market values. (...) The distribution of market benefits should accommodate those democratic and egalitarian values which constitute a polity's core commitments (and those core commitments need to be reasserted regularly). Indeed, market stability depends upon a general distribution of its benefits. Incentives to productive activity entail inequalities, but the terms of those inequalities are subject to review. Internal refinements to specific markets can reduce inequalities by promoting the fairness of market operations and by increasing the number of effective participants. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and (...) rational decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is not (...) acting at all, never mind rationally. Thus, neither author has shown that co-operation is rational action in a pd. (shrink)

This paper reviews six attempts to give cooperative solutions to Prisoners Dilemmas: symmetry (agents are in identical situations, so should choose the same way, so should both choose cooperation because that’s better for each), mechanism (each agent should delegate the decision to a machine which will choose cooperation for them provided the other does likewise), inducement (the agents should make a side bet which pays off only upon both cooperating), resolution (each agent should resolve to cooperate, then act on the (...) resolution), alternative principle (rationality requires not dominance reasoning and so defecting, but constrained maximization or resolution compliance or “sophisticated” choosing, and so cooperation), and preference revision (each agent should acquire conditional preferences to cooperate, then cooperate provided the other agent has acquired similar preferences). It distinguishes one-stage from two-stage games, as well as endogenously available solutions (ones available to agents in the circumstances of the game merely due to the nature of rationality) from solutions requiring exogenous devices. It contrasts Edward McClennen’s endogenous solution, which is some combination of resolution and alternative principle solution, with David Gauthier’s endogenous alternative principle solution. It argues that all have problems, ones best solved by the endogenous preference revision solution defended by Duncan MacIntosh. (shrink)

Abstract I challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. I show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality.

A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...) to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality than current debate suggests. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that David Gauthier’s answer to the Why be moral? question fails. My argument concedes the possibility of constrained maximization in all the senses Gauthier intends and does not rely on the claim that it is better to masquerade as a constrained maximizer than to be one. Instead, I argue that once a constrained maximizer in the guise of "economic man" is transformed through an affective commitment to morality into a constrained (...) maximizer in the guise of the "liberal individual," then a purely rational justification for morality must become invisible to the latter. If I can show this, then I can show that rational justification can have no motivational power for the "liberal individual" and that Gauthier fails to answer the problem of moral motivation. (shrink)

Kevin Sauvé has recently argued in this journal that David Gauthier's conception of ‘morals by agreement’ is inimical to the development of long-term productive investment and sustainable levels of resource exploitation. According to Sauvé, this is because society is confronted with an intergenerational interaction problem whose strategic equilibrium is suboptimal. However, unlike the ‘contemporaneous Prisoner's Dilemma’ that Gauthier analyzes, the intergenerational version cannot be solved by an appeal to constrained maximization. As a result, Sauvé claims, Gauthier cannot effectively (...) address the question of intergenerational justice.The portion of Sauvé's argument that concerns me is the following:Gauthier solves the contemporaneous Prisoner's Dilemma by ensuring that each person will cooperate only if all others cooperate, and indeed his conception of morality is aimed at ensuring that all individuals incur the costs as well as the benefits of social cooperation. But the contemporaneous solution cannot be applied to the Intergenerational Dilemma: if each generation will save for the next only if the previous generations have also saved, none will ever save. (shrink)

This article revisits the standard results of demand theory when the preference relation is a continuous preorder that admits an equicontinuous multi-utility representation. We study the consumer problem as the constrained maximization of a continuous vector-valued utility mapping, and show how to rederive those results. In particular, we provide a link between the literature on vector optimization and the analysis of the consumer problem under incomplete preferences.

If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to (...) omit any specification of the mechanism through which this might be accomplished, serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of the argument that he offers in support of adopting constrained maximization. (shrink)

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier convinced many of us—including Peter Danielson, author of Artificial Morality, the latest successor to MA—that morality can best be understood as a set of intramental, strategic responses to patterns of otherwise dilemmatic, game-theory-reducible interactivity. More particularly, Gauthier and Danielson are of a mind that: characteristic of our interactive circumstances are the Prisoner's Dilemma and its cognates; these are circumstances in which our pre-moral, straightforward maximizing disposition fares considerably worse than “constrained maximization” —the (...) latter being the dispositional essence of morality—and it should not surprise us, therefore, that selective pressure has rendered most of us just so morally disposed. In short, what Danielson calls the “fundamental” justification for morality—that is, one “that does not appeal to any of the concepts of [morality itself]” —is that: conventional wisdom notwithstanding, nice guys—though, adds Danielson, not necessarily the nicest guys—finish first! (shrink)

This thesis studies some philosophical and ethical issues that economic design raises. Chapter 1 gives an overview of economic design and argues that a crossfertilisation between philosophy and economic design is possible and insightful for both sides. Chapter 2 examines the implications of mechanism design for theories of rationality. I show that non-classical theories, such as constrained maximization and team reasoning, are at odds with the constraint of incentive compatibility. This poses a problem for non-classical theories, which proponents (...) of these theories have not addressed to date. Chapter 3 proposes a general epistemology of economic engineering, which is motivated by a novel case study, viz. the reform of a matching market for medical practitioners. My account makes use of causal graphs to explain how models allow encoding counterfactual information about how market outcomes change if the design of the market changes. The second part of the thesis examines ethical issues. In Chapter 4, I apply tools from matching theory to gain insights into the distribution of refugees, such as among countries of the European Union. There is an ethical trade-off between the fairness of matchings and their efficiency, and I argue that in this context, fairness is the morally weightier criterion. Chapter 5 deals with the ethics of kidney exchange. Against critics, I give two arguments for the implementation of kidney exchange programmes. The first argument is that they are instrumental in meeting a moral obligation, namely to donate effectively. The second is that kidney exchange may increase the motivation for altruistic donations, because the donation of one kidney may trigger > 1 life savings. The final chapter identifies questions for future research and it closes with some thoughts about the future trajectory of economic design. (shrink)

I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more (...) viable contrast concerns whether actions and deliberative procedures are properly evaluated on the whole or, instead, through time. (shrink)

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement is an impressive — indeed, daunting — exercise in contractarian moral and political philosophy. The primary purpose of his treatise is to explicate practical rationality as constrained maximization and morality as compliance with these constraints. Gauthier offers an account of which constraints on straightforward utility maximization each rational individual will be prepared to accept and comply with on the condition that other individuals also will accept and comply with them as well as (...) an explanation of why compliance with those constraints counts as morality. However, although Morals by Agreement is in the great tradition of Hobbesian moral and political theorizing, Gauthier's morality by agreement does not begin with the Hobbesian state of nature. Gauthier does not start by envisioning a Hobbesian war of all against all which has been generated by rational individuals, each pursuing his own maximum utility, and then asking what constraints on this no-holds-barred utility maximization would be mutually advantageous and therefore mutually rational. (shrink)

Presents an overview of the book, introducing the problem of showing the rationality of moral constraints, and the conception of rationality as maximization, which on the face of it seems incompatible with any form of constraint. We argue, however, that moral theory is part of the theory of rational choice, arising from the structure of interaction, in which persons recognize a role for agreed mutual constraint in bringing about fair mutual advantage. We contrast the maximizing conception of rationality with (...) the universalistic conception accepted by many philosophers, and our appeal to rational choice with the quite different appeals proposed by John Harsanyi and John Rawls. We introduce five key conceptions central to our theory: the idea of a morally free zone, the principle of minimax relative concession as the basis of justice, constrained maximization, the proviso, and the Archimedean point from which an individual can move the moral world. Finally, we raise questions about the scope of moral relationships and their place in an ideal human life. (shrink)

We appeal to Bernard Suits's Grasshopper to support the thesis that what has intrinsic value in human life is engagement in activities that have instrumental value. The implication of this view is that scarcity in the form of human fulfilment is necessary for human life to have point, and so is the humanly necessary evil. Participation with others to diminish scarcity has necessary instrumental value, and, we argue, for that reason has intrinsic value. A morality of agreement is the foundation (...) of welcome participation, and so, despite its imposition of constraints, necessary to valuing participation and extending that value to one's fellow participants. We then turn to the character of an essentially just society, and show that it is a society not of ‘economic men’ but of liberal individuals, autonomous beings free to choose their own goals and their affective ties with others, and willingly maintaining the moral and social conditions that make this autonomy possible. We note certain doubts about the possibility of creating an essentially just society, but conclude with Nietzsche's account of human beings as having ‘the right to make promises’ to ‘stand as their own guarantors’, and identify this with the ability to interact with one's fellows and the world in a new and distinctive way, which we have called ‘constrained maximization’. (shrink)

Since the 1940s Americans and Britons have come to enjoy an era of rising material abundance. Yet this has been accompanied by a range of social and personal disorders, including family breakdown, addiction, mental instability, crime, obesity, inequality, economic insecurity, and declining trust.Avner Offer argues that well-being has lagged behind affluence in these societies, because they present an environment in which consistent choices are difficult to achieve over different time ranges and in which the capacity for personal and social commitment (...) is undermined by the flow of novelty. His approach draws on economics and social science, makes use of the latest cognitive research, and provides a detailed and reasoned critique of modern consumer society, especially the assumption that freedom of choice necessarily maximizes individual and social well-being.The book falls into three parts. Part one analyses the ways in which economic resources map on to human welfare, why choice is so intractable, and how commitment to people and institutions is sustained. It argues that choice is constrained by prior obligation and reciprocity. The second section then applies these conceptual arguments to comparative empirical studies of advertising, of eating and obesity, and of the production and acquisition of appliances and automobiles. Finally, in part three, Offer investigates social and personal relations in the USA and Britain, including inter-personal regard, the rewards and reversals of status, the social and psychological costs of inequality, and the challenges posed to heterosexual love and to parenthood by the rise of affluence. (shrink)

Previous theory and research on bounded rationality has emphasized how limited cognitive resources constrain people from making utility maximizing choices. This paper expands the concept of bounded rationality to consider how people’s rationality may be constrained by their internalization of a qualitatively distinct standard for sound judgment, which is commonly labeled reasonableness. In contrast to rationality, the standard of reasonableness provides guidance for making choices in situations that involve balancing incommensurable values and interests or reconciling conflicting points-of-view. We review (...) recent evidence showing that laypeople readily recognize the distinctions between rationality and reasonableness and thus are able to utilize these as distinct standards to inform their everyday decision-making. The fact that people appear to have internalized rationality and reasonableness as distinct standards of sound judgment supports the notion that people’s pursuit of rationality may be bounded by their determination to also be reasonable. (shrink)

This study examines the social impacts of labor-related corporate social responsibility policies or corporate codes of conduct on upholding labor standards through a case study of CSR discourses and codes implementation of Reebok - a leading branded company enjoying a high-profiled image for its human rights achievement - in a large Taiwanese-invested athletic footwear factory located in South China. I find although implementation of Reebok labor-related codes has resulted in a "race to ethical and legal minimum" labor standards when notoriously (...) inhumane and seriously illegal labor rights abuses were curbed, Chinese workers were forced to work harder and faster but, earned less payment and the employee-elected trade union installed through codes implementation operated more like a "company union" rather than an autonomous workers' organization representing worker' interests. In order to explain the paradoxical effects of Reebok labor-related codes on labor standards, I argue the result is determined by both structural forces and agency-related factors embedded in industrial, national and local contexts. To put it shortly, I find the effectiveness of Reebok labor-related codes is constrained not only by unsolved tension between Reebok's impetus for profit maximization and commitment to workers' human rights, but also by hard-nosed competition realities at marketplace, and Chinese government's insufficient protection of labor rights. Despite drawing merely from a single case study, these findings illuminate key determinants inhibiting the effectiveness of labor-related CSR policies or codes in upholding labor standards, and hence two possible way-outs of the deadlock: sharing cost for improving labor standards among key players in global supply chain; and combining regulatory power of voluntary codes and compulsory state legislations. (shrink)

How developing a more expansive, non-formal conception of reason produces richer ethical understandings of human situations, explored and illustrated with many real examples. In Re-Reasoning Ethics, Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker enhance and empower ethics by adopting a non-formal paradigm of rational deliberation as intelligent problem-solving and a complementary non-formal paradigm of ethical deliberation as problem-solving design to promote human flourishing. The non-formal conception of reason produces broader and richer ethical understandings of human situations, not the simple, constrained depictions (...) provided by moral theories and their logical applications in medical ethics and bioethics. Instead, it delivers and vindicates the moral judgment that complex, contextual, and dynamic situations require. Hoffmaster and Hooker demonstrate how this more expansive rationality operates with examples, first in science and then in ethics. Non-formal reason brings rationality not just to the empirical world of science but also to the empirical realities of human lives. Among the many real cases they present is that of how women at risk of having children with genetic conditions decide whether to try to become pregnant. These women do not apply the formal principle of maximizing expected utility (as advised by genetic counselors) and instead imagine scenarios of what their lives could be like with an affected child and assess whether they could accept the worst of these scenarios. Hoffmaster and Hooker explain how moral compromise and a liberated, extended, and enriched reflective equilibrium expand and augment rational ethical deliberation and how that deliberation can rationally design ethical practices, institutions, and policies. (shrink)

Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. (...) However, instead of attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the computational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical implementation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have motivated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA. (shrink)

Pathological gambling (PG) is a kind of ‘ideal puzzle’ for the economic model of the consumer. The pathological gambler takes pains to engage in activity that transparently has negative expected returns if utility varies positively with money. She also, typically, spends further resources on commitment devices designed to interfere with her gambling. These properties together describe an agent that is a kind of perfect foil for the rationally maximizing consumer. Recently, aspects of the neuropathology underlying the strange economic agency of (...) the pathological gambler are becoming understood. Thus PG is an ideal test bed phenomenon for working out relationships between economic modeling based on constrained optimization of utility and the new neuroscience of behavior. (shrink)

An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon the aim of the conversation taking place, (...) the conversational record, which includes such features as common ground and salience relations among objects, and any proffered illocution calling for a reply. In accounting for this third dimension a partial characterization is provided of the speech acts of assertion and interrogation in terms of their role in constraining the progress of the conversation in which they occur. (shrink)