No Place to Hide: Campbell's and Danielson's Solutions to Gauthier's Coherence Problem

Dialogue 35 (2):235-240 (1996)
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Abstract

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier convinced many of us—including Peter Danielson, author of Artificial Morality, the latest successor to MA—that morality can best be understood as a set of intramental, strategic responses to patterns of otherwise dilemmatic, game-theory-reducible interactivity. More particularly, Gauthier and Danielson are of a mind that: characteristic of our interactive circumstances are the Prisoner's Dilemma and its cognates; these are circumstances in which our pre-moral, straightforward maximizing disposition fares considerably worse than “constrained maximization” —the latter being the dispositional essence of morality—and it should not surprise us, therefore, that selective pressure has rendered most of us just so morally disposed. In short, what Danielson calls the “fundamental” justification for morality—that is, one “that does not appeal to any of the concepts of [morality itself]” —is that: conventional wisdom notwithstanding, nice guys—though, adds Danielson, not necessarily the nicest guys—finish first!

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Paul Viminitz
University of Lethbridge

References found in this work

Background for the Uninitiated.Richmond Campbell - 1985 - In Richmond Campbell & Lanning Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. pp. 3-41.

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