Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...) their accounts. Against Klein, I use dissociation cases to argue that possession of ‘imperative content’ cannot wholly constitute pain. Against them both, I further claim that possession of such content cannot even constitute pain’s unpleasant, motivational aspect. For, even if it were possible to specify the relevant imperative content—which is far from clear—the idea of a command cannot bear the explanatory weight Klein and Hall place on it. (shrink)

This chapter explores the possibility of identifying core moral claims with the states of mind which are called bodily imperatives—e.g. the ‘make it stop’ state of mind which is plausibly an aspect of, if not identical with, severe pain states and states such as severe thirst, hunger, sleeplessness, humiliation, terror, and torment. The chapter combines this idea with another, that the desire-like, conative, or ‘world-guiding’ states of mind which make normative claims on agents need not belong to the agent (...) on whom the claim is made, on a broadly Humean or desire-based view in metaethics. On the view defended, any subject’s bodily imperatives can make moral claims on any moral agent. The case is made that bodily imperatives are a good candidate for constituting the core moral claims or basic imperatives of morality, which all others are either built from, or at least constrained by. (shrink)

The existing literature treats of several investigations with a certain bearing on the question which is roughly indicated by the title “Imperatives and Logic.” Some of those investigations, however, are entirely outside the scope of the present work.Mally sets himself the task of developing a “Logik des Willens” constituting a parallel to the usual logic, the “Logik des Denkens". In order to emphasize its independence, the author also calls this “Logik des Willens” “Deontik”, and he conceives it as being (...) based on the “Wesensgesetze” of will in the same way as the usual logic is conceived as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of thought. The author develops a formalistic deductive system on the basis of 5 axioms of demands, including the axiom that there is at least one fact which is unconditionally demanded, and through a lengthy series of theorems he arrives at the sentence that what is unconditionally demanded is identical with what is actually the case: “was sein soll, ist Tatsache”. Similarly, the author develops a system of axioms for “right” volition, including the axiom that right volition is non-contradictory. (shrink)

Latin is one of the best documented and most extensively studied of any language: nearly every area has been subject to continued and intense scrutiny, with ideas from recent subfields of linguistics providing a fresh look at some old topics. The Latin future imperative, the form that conveys commands for non-immediate execution, constitutes precisely such a topic in Latin linguistics: from the Roman Imperial period on, students have demarcated the usages, syntax and context-specific features associated with this form; more recently, (...) scholars have applied ideas from various linguistic subfields to achieve new insights. Given that the –toimperative is so well understood, it might come as a surprise to find that some matters pertaining to it are still debated. This paper will address four such contested areas: first, its register ; second, the form's politeness ; third, the temporal scope of the –toimperative ; and fourth, the sensitivity of the form to social factors, that is, to the identity of the speaker and the addressee. (shrink)

Affective valence is increasingly thought to be the common currency underlying all forms of intuitive, non-discursive decision making, in both humans and other animals. And it is thought to constitute the good or bad (pleasant or unpleasant) aspects of all desires, emotions, and moods. This article contrasts two theories of valence. According to one, valence is an experience-directed imperative (‘more of this!’ or ‘less of this!’); according to the other, valence is a representation of adaptive value or disvalue. The latter (...) is shown to provide the better account. (shrink)

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an (...) action, is that it issues from the person''s constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant''s categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution. (shrink)

My dissertation presents a comprehensive rethinking of the Kantian imperative, articulating it on the basis of what I call originary sense. Calling primarily upon the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-François Lyotard, I show (1) that sense constitutes the ontologically most basic dimension of our worldly being and (2) that the way in which this sense happens is determinative for our experience of the ethical imperative. By originary sense I mean to name something that is neither sensible sense (...) (sensation) nor intelligible sense (meaning), but rather a kind of unity of these two that is ontologically anterior to their separation. In the first chapter I follow Merleau-Ponty’s argument in Phenomenology of Perception that sensible sense and intelligible sense belong originarily together at the level of the lived body. We are able to intend the meaning of worldly situations (Husserl’s Sinngebung) only insofar as we are responsive in an embodied way to the imperatives that are given in the sensible itself. The intelligible lawfulness so characteristic of the Kantian imperative is thus shown to be grounded in a more fundamental unity of intelligible and sensible sense. The second chapter follows Merleau-Ponty’s later works, especially The Prose of the World and The Visible and the Invisible, showing how the sensibility that is inseparable from the imperative introduces important limitations to the universalizing tendencies of Kant’s moral philosophy, drawing us back to the irreducible situatedness of ethical situations. In the third chapter I turn to the very different articulation of sense given by Gilles Deleuze, primarily in his Logic of Sense. I show there that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological conception of sense does not allow us to think the singularity of the imperative, the fact that the ethical command weighs on a me that cannot be grasped in terms of the generalities of my public identity. This singularity corresponds broadly to the idea of dignity in Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that Deleuze, who conceptualizes sense as an event, gives us the resources to think singularity and to understand what it entails for our ethical practice. Finally, I attempt in the fourth chapter to think these two sides of the imperative—its demand for universality and its emphasis on singularity and dignity— together in the idea of libidinal sense. Calling on Jean-François Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy and, to a lesser extent, on Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, I show that these two apparently incompatible requirements of the imperative have a common source in the event of libidinal investment (cathexis). In thus locating the source of the imperative in originary, libidinal sense, I hope both to shed some light on the irreducible complexity of our ethical being and to present a more humane, less moralizing version of the imperative than is typically articulated in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...) -- Kant on the hypothetical imperative -- Against particularistic willing -- Deciding and predicting -- Autonomy and efficacy -- The function of action -- The possibility of agency -- Non-rational action -- Action -- Attribution -- The psychology of action -- Expulsion from the garden : the transition to humanity -- Instinct, emotion, intelligence, and reason -- The parts of the soul -- Inside or outside -- Pull yourself together -- The constitutional model -- Models of the soul -- The city and the soul -- Platonic virtues -- Justice : substantive, procedural, and platonic -- Kant and the constitutional model -- Defective action -- The problem of bad action -- Being governed by the wrong law -- Or five bad constitutions -- Conceptions of evil -- Degrees of action -- Integrity and interaction -- Deciding to be bad -- The ordinary cases -- Dealing with the disunified -- Kant's theory of interaction -- My reasons -- Deciding to treat someone as an end in himself -- Interacting with yourself -- How to be a person -- What's left of me? (shrink)

The theory of imperatives is philosophically relevant since in building it — some of the long standing problems need to be addressed, and presumably some new ones are waiting to be discovered. The relevance of the theory of imperatives for philosophical research is remarkable, but usually recognized only within the field of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, the emphasis can be put on problems of theoretical philosophy. Proper understanding of imperatives is likely to raise doubts about some of our (...) deeply entrenched and tacit presumptions. In philosophy of language it is the presumption that declaratives provide the paradigm for sentence form; in philosophy of science it is the belief that theory construction is independent from the language practice, in logic it is the conviction that logical meaning relations are constituted out of logical terminology, in ontology it is the view that language use is free from ontological commitments. The list is not exhaustive; it includes only those presumptions that this paper concerns. (shrink)

How has the globalization of technology contributed to the globalization of the war against the Enlightenment liberal humanism of Western civilization—in particular, to the globalization of the war between religion and science—and with what problematic moral, cultural, and spiritual consequences? Liberal-humanist and Heideggerian perspectives on this issue are considered. The latter is chosen because it constitutes an enduring philosophical and political challenge to liberal humanism. For Heidegger, liberal humanism, far from providing a solution to the problems of global technology, is (...) an inherent part of the problem. A case in point is liberal democracy’s use of technology to produce and purvey a humanly degrading mass culture which it also uses technology to export abroad, in effect, to globalize. The author sets forth a defense of liberal humanism against these criticisms. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that an implication of the so-called ‘death of metaphysics’ is the imbrication of the normative and descriptive understandings of morality. This imbrication gives rise to a paradox, which amounts to the desire to refute both a priori moral justifications, and ‘the tyranny of the real’ or the socialisation and relativisation of our moral assertions and positions. I investigate three responses to this paradox, namely the pragmatic response, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive response, and the ante-philosophical response, which (...) is based on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. The reason for focusing on these three philosophical positions is that they all espouse an immanent view of morality. Through means of this analysis, I attempt to highlight the following implications of an immanently-defined moral position: the constitutive, as opposed to the pedagogical or prescriptive, nature of philosophy; the increasing focus on the performative force of doing philosophy and the importance of philosophical skill; the problematic nature of the distinctions between philosophy, moral theory, and applied ethics, and therefore also between the nature and function of morality; and the status of philosophy and moral theory as one type of praxis amongst many, rather than the definitive voice on praxis. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy is often treated as a closed system, without reference to how it was written or how Kant arrived at its familiar form, the critique. In fact, the style of the critique seems so artless that readers think of it as an unfortunate by-product—a style of stylelessness. In _Constituting Critique_, Willi Goetschel shows how this apparent gracelessness was deliberately achieved by Kant through a series of writing experiments. By providing an account of the process that culminated in his three (...) _Critiques_, this book offers a new perspective on Kant’s philosophical thought and practice. _Constituting Critique_ traces the stages in Kant’s development to reveal how he redefined philosophy as a critical task. Following the philosopher through the experiments of his early essays, Goetschel demonstrates how Kant tests, challenges, and transforms the philosophical essay in his pursuit of a new self-reflective literary genre. From these experiments, critique emerges as the philosophical form for the critical project of the Enlightenment. The imperatives of its transcendental style, Goetschel contends, not only constitute and inform the critical moment of Kant’s philosophical praxis, but also have an enduring place in post-Kantian philosophy and literature. By situating the _Critiques_ within the context of Kant’s early essays, this work will redirect the attention of Kant scholars to the origins of their form. It will also encourage contemporary critical theorists to reconsider their own practice through an engagement with its source in Kant. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to study the acts and intentions which set up for the subject, and for the community of subjects, a set of values and disvalues which impose themselves as valid upon everyone, and which everyone must tend to prescribe, or to warn against, for everyone. The acts which set up a formal apophantic and ontology have been studied by Husserl in his Formal and Transcendental Logic , but he has not set out a comparable theory (...) of the acts which set up a universally valid system of values and disvalues. He has not done so because he does not believe in such a system, because his thought goes no further than the values set up for and felt to hold in a given group or society. It is my view that there is an ineluctable progress from these relativistic group-values to a set of values and disvalues holding for everyone, and that moreover in their relation to everyone, and that these values and disvalues have definite and undeniable shapes and locations, even if these shapes also have somewhat nebulous contours. The views I am expounding on this occasion are not new: they are fully set out in my Values and Intentions and my Axiological Ethics and in other writings. Ideas, however, require restatement at intervals, with a suitable change of idiom and emphasis. And I feel my views on this topic to have a claim to truth simply because, quite differently from my views on other topics, and despite constant reflection, they have hardly changed over the last two decades. The inspiration for these views was only in part Husserlian, as I do not think that the emotional and the axiological are really Husserl's strong suit. Strangely enough, that dry thinker Meinong would seem to have had a much richer emotional life and the ability to frame a theory to fit it, than the much easier and at times effusive thinker Husserl. Meinong's 1917 Austrian Imperial Academy treatise, On Emotional Presentation , recently translated for the Northwestern Phenomenology series, is a much more systematic investigation of the presuppositions of value-theory than any writing of a professed phenomenologist. What I have to say will build considerably on Meinong, always a major influence in my thought. But I have also been much influenced in my approaches to value-theory by the transcendental methods of Kant. Kant, I think, could very well have worked out a transcendental deduction of the heads of value and disvalue, a deduction much more illuminating than the dogmatic intuitionism of Scheler and Hartmann, instead of producing the arid triad of categorical imperatives that were all that he actually deduced. Imperatives, I consider, are secondary structures in value-constitution: the primary structures are the ultimate objects of necessary, rational pursuit and avoidance which Kant wrongly thought of as involving heteronomy and a corruption of pure form by matter. There is, I shall argue, nothing more free from extraneous, pathological material than the objects of the pursuits and avoidances in question. (shrink)

Dans la perspective de Gilbert Durand, cette étude traite de la conception de la création en général et, en particulier, de la création littéraire. Dans un premier temps, elle met l’accent sur le rôle de la création artistique en valorisant l’impératif de l’œuvre, puis, dans un second temps, sur celui de la création littéraire. Le but est de réfléchir sur la création et aussi sur son propre contenu, constitué de sens et de significations, du point de vue de l’imaginaire. La (...) méthodologie est basée sur le couple compréhension-explication de l’œuvre de l’auteur. En conclusion, il est important de souligner que la conception de la création durandienne s’exprime à travers l’impératif de l’œuvre, du lointain et de la fonction fantastique de l’imaginaire. The present study deals, from the perspective of Gilbert Durand, with the conception of creation, in general, and of the literary creation, in particular. At first, it focuses on the role of artistic creation by valuing the imperative of the work while, in a second moment, it focuses on the literary creation. The objective is to reflect on the creation and its own content, constituted of senses and meanings, from the perspective of the imaginary. The methodology is based on the explanation-understanding binomial and on the author’s work. As a conclusion, it is important to underline that the conception of Durandian creation is told through the imperative of the work, the Remote and the fantastic function of the imaginary. (shrink)

This article presents a normative‐theoretical account of democratic legitimacy that meets the challenge of moral and cultural pluralism in a way that takes the avoidance of oppression and violence to be a fundamental imperative. The discourse‐theoretical perspective of jürgen Habermas reveals that reasoned agreement among citizens is the only alternative to political oppression. Pace Habermas, however, the legitimacy of even basic constitutional principles does not require us to agree with one another for the same reasons. While we can affirm (...) such principles for a wide range of different reasons, the process of achieving reasoned agreements on contentious issues draws us together as citizens in loyalty to a particular, historical set of political institutions. The reasoned commitment to our constitution that we come to share in this ongoing process acts as an identity‐forming bond that allows us to live in peace with deep moral and cultural differences. (shrink)

In ‘The End of Law’, Bill Scheuerman illustrates the ways normativity, context and decision interlace, putting the lie to Carl Schmitt’s claim that decision is pure will. In doing so, Scheuerman gestures toward a truth about the alchemical nature of constitutions. Like decisions, I argue, constitutions are alchemical mechanisms for actualizing norms and normativizing facts. They accomplish this in part through mediating between dynamic (individual and political) selves before and after the moment of decision or coming-into-force. Schmitt’s error – or (...) perhaps his strategy – is to make static this dynamic process of political self-formation. Viewed as static, it is more difficult to discern the process of normativizing facts and concretizing norms. I show how contemporary populist authoritarians are particularly skilled at harnessing this strategy. Populist authoritarians often use constitutional change to consolidate not just power but constructed identity. They are able to do so because constitutions provide this strategy of dynamic identity formation, which, by generating new normative imperatives, in turn shores up legitimacy. (shrink)

Characters in Richard II utter a number of neglected, yet philosophically interesting imperative conditionals. Based on a close reading of these examples, I provide a tripartite typology of imperative conditionals. The type 1 constitute the class of standard imperative conditionals; the type 2 implicate that the antecedent is false; and the type 3 implicate that the command in the consequent is to be complied with. I show how the type 2 and type 3 conditionals can be identified, and explain when (...) and why the speakers utter them. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy is often treated as a closed system, without reference to how it was written or how Kant arrived at its familiar form, the critique. In fact, the style of the critique seems so artless that readers think of it as an unfortunate by-product—a style of stylelessness. In _Constituting Critique_, Willi Goetschel shows how this apparent gracelessness was deliberately achieved by Kant through a series of writing experiments. By providing an account of the process that culminated in his three (...) _Critiques_, this book offers a new perspective on Kant’s philosophical thought and practice. _Constituting Critique_ traces the stages in Kant’s development to reveal how he redefined philosophy as a critical task. Following the philosopher through the experiments of his early essays, Goetschel demonstrates how Kant tests, challenges, and transforms the philosophical essay in his pursuit of a new self-reflective literary genre. From these experiments, critique emerges as the philosophical form for the critical project of the Enlightenment. The imperatives of its transcendental style, Goetschel contends, not only constitute and inform the critical moment of Kant’s philosophical praxis, but also have an enduring place in post-Kantian philosophy and literature. By situating the _Critiques_ within the context of Kant’s early essays, this work will redirect the attention of Kant scholars to the origins of their form. It will also encourage contemporary critical theorists to reconsider their own practice through an engagement with its source in Kant. (shrink)

This essay proposes that the human quest for meaning, self-realization, and self-transcendence via the moral "ought" as the proper end, purpose, or goal for man constitutes the teleological imperative. This pan-human quest for universal touchstones for values and truths should thus be the focus of both moral education and cultural renewal. Central to this quest is a re-conceptualization of virtue ethics as radically transcending the social construction of reality. Virtue may he fully understood only within the larger parameters of natural (...) right or natural law, which posit an underlying moral order in Creation, independently of and preceding, human perception and cognition. The right ordering of the human soul or self reflects the larger cosmological order of the universe, and its fulfillment in the Golden Rule or the Tao, the Judeo-Christian traditions expressed in the Decalogue, and the New Testament's call for charity. (shrink)

Resumen: Antes de emprender el análisis lógico de las normas jurídicas constitucionales, o de las normas en general, es preciso intentar resolver una cuestión previa que afecta a la posibilidad de existencia de una lógica de las normas: el dilema de Jørgensen. Nuestra propuesta de solución de este dilema es la siguiente: las normas son expresiones performativas. Al mismo tiempo, las expresiones performativas son enunciados que tienen valor de verdad. Además, las normas jurídicas son enunciados del tipo “A dice p”, (...) lo que explica que puedan existir normas verdaderas y, al mismo tiempo, contradictorias entre sí. Abstract: Before embarking on the logical analysis of constitutional legal norms or norms in general, it is necessary to try to resolve a previous question that affects the possibility of the existence of a logic of norms: the Jørgensen’s dilemma.Our proposed solution to this dilemma is as follows: norms are performative utterances. At the same time, performative utterances are statements that have truth value. In addition, the legal norms are statements of type “A says p”, which explains that there may be true norms and, at the same time, contradictory to each other. (shrink)

This article is based in a critical recognition of the determinate influence of Mary Daly's feminist ethical and theological reflection, particularly as found in her earlier work, on the development of Christian feminist theologies. It argues that the content and form of Daly's rejection of traditional religion constitute a clear alignment of feminist commitment with rejection of traditional religion that is fundamentally problematic for those advocating the possibilities of creative and liberative feminist Christian encounters. The rejection of traditional religion is (...) posited as an imperative of feminist consciousness, and as a testimony to feminist realisation. Such is the impact of Daly's critical articulation of the incompatibility of feminism and Christianity; she has influenced a dominant discourse about whether it is possible to be a Christian and a feminist. (shrink)

According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although (...) imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of both sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either. (shrink)

This paper articulates an account of imperatives that sensibly supports the idea of a logic of imperative inferences. We rebuke common objections to the very possibility of such a logic, from a perspective based on recent linguistic work on the morphosyntax of imperatives. Specifically, we develop the notion that the content of an imperative sentence includes both a force operator alongside an imperational content to which the force applies. We further argue that this account of the content of (...) imperatives constitutes a plausible and flexible framework to develop a logic of imperative by examining a number of reconstructions of this idea using semantical analogs of widespread modal semantics. After studying the performance of those approaches, we conclude that progress in imperative logic has been hindered by the failure to adopt conflict-tolerant and resource-sensitive semantics, but suggest that such considerations can be incorporated in this flexible framework. Finally, we also propose a simple account of the difference between operators applying to the content of imperatives and imperative operators, in a way that sheds light on some of the issues underlying the usual antinomies. (shrink)

In this incisive and thought-provoking book, Francois Venter illuminates the issues arising from the fact that the current language of constitutional law is strongly premised on a particular worldview rooted in the history of the states around the North Atlantic Ocean. Highlighting how this terminological hegemony is being challenged from various directions, Venter explores the problem that all constitutional comparatists face: that they all must use the same words to express different meanings. Offering a compact but comprehensive (...) class='Hi'>constitutional history, Venter investigates the ways in which the standard vocabulary does not fit comfortably in many contemporary constitutional orders, as well as examining how its cogency is increasingly being questioned. Chapters contextualize comparative constitutional methods to demonstrate how the language choices made by comparatists are shaped by their own perspectives, arguing that careful explanation of the meanings attached to constitutional terms is imperative in order to be persuasive or even understood. Tackling the foundational elements of the field, this book will be a critical read for constitutional scholars across the globe. It will also be of interest to high-level practitioners of constitutional law and political scientists for its investigation of terminology that is crucial to their work. (shrink)

In this chapter, the authors trace the epistemic challenge initiated by colonialism as part of its civilizing and modernizing missions, and the epistemological violence that undermined Africa’s knowledge systems. The chapter argues that the anticolonial and decolonization efforts have been more programmatic without pushing the boundary of decolonizing the epistemic basis of colonialism. The chapter then contends that decolonizing resistance can best be captured in the form of a reversed epistemic process that not only excavates Africa’s knowledge forms, Africanizes other (...) available knowledges, but more importantly generates an epistemological framework that establishes and reinforces a combative alternative Afrocentric mythology that subverts the existing Eurocentric mythology. Such an alternative myth constitutes a new vision of the African continent and all it can achieve outside of the grip of Eurocentric epistemic hegemony. (shrink)

The book is comprised of three components. The first component analyses the creative contribution to the theory of imperatives and norms provided by 20th-century Polish researchers. The second component summarizes their reflections and considerations. The third component is an anthology of the classic writings of Polish authors of the time; it constitutes an illustration of the first part and indicates that their research covered practically the whole scope of this theory. Author Jacek Jadacki (born 1946) is professor at Warsaw (...) University. His scholarly production includes approximately hundred works spanning almost every domain in philosophy: from logic, through ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics, to the history of these disciplines. Among his more than twenty books are Possible Ontologies (with Zdzislaw Augustynek; 1993), From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School (2003), and Polish Analytical Philosophy (2009). His pupils include such well-known figures of modern Polish thought as Anna Brozek, Mariusz Grygianiec, Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, and Mieszko Talasiewicz. (shrink)

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)

The primacy in modern medical ethics of the principle of respect for autonomy has led to the widespread assumption that it is unethical to change someone’s beliefs, because doing so would constitute coercion or paternalism., In this Viewpoint we suggest that persuasion is not necessarily paternalistic and is an essential component of modern medical practice.

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been appropriate in the context (...) when it originated — namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

I should say a preliminary word about the method I am adopting in this article, mainly to point out that there is nothing whatever remarkable about it. I take myself to be approaching the Politics in accordance with the interpretative canons standard in mainstream historical and Aristotelian scholarship. Compare the study of Aristotle's metaphysics. Everyone would grant that before we start considering whether hule or indeed any other Aristotelian concept anticipates or maps onto some modern notion of matter in any (...) interesting or important way, it is imperative to acquire a full understanding of the way the idea functions within the whole matrix of concepts, analyses, and theses which make up Aristotle's physics and metaphysics. I am simply pursuing the same method with respect to that matrix of concepts in Aristotle's political philosophy within which Miller hopes to locate an anticipation of the idea of rights. My references to the work of John Pocock in section V have suggested to some readers that I am espousing a form of historical or cultural or Kuhnian relativism which rules Miller's project out of court ab initio. The only form of relativism to which I think this essay commits me is the methodological relativism that I have just described. (shrink)

Rawls theorizes principles of justice as defining a ‘pact of reconciliation’ between diverse conceptions of the good. What does fulfillment of this pact entail when reasonable pluralism is recognized as having an environmental dimension? Fair acknowledgment of the plurality of citizens’ relationships with the natural world challenges the neutrality of aims conventionally used to justify ecocide, including the promotion of economic growth and development. This paper explores how ecocide constitutes a violation of equal basic liberties and state neutrality as per (...) Rawlsian political liberalism. It further considers hard cases in which ecocide is enacted for meeting citizens’ basic needs. (shrink)

The European Union is strategically committed to the development of nanotechnology and its industrial exploitation. However, nanotechnology also has the potential to disrupt human health and the environment. The EU claims to be committed to the safe and responsible development of nanotechnology. In this sense, the EU has become the first governing body in the world to develop nanospecific regulations, largely due to legislative action taken by the European Parliament, which has compensated for the European Commission’s reluctance to develop special (...) regulations for nanomaterials. Nevertheless, divergences aside, political bodies in the EU assume that nanotechnology development is controllable and take for granted that both the massive industrial use of nanomaterials and a high level of environmental and health protection are compatible. However, experiences such as the European controversy over agri-food biotechnology, which somewhat delegitimized the regulatory authority of the EU over technological safety and acceptability, arguably show that controllability assumptions are contestable on the grounds of alternative socio-economic and cultural preferences and values. Recently developed inclusive governance models on safety and innovation, such as “Responsible Research and Innovation”, widely claim that a diversity of considerations and issues are integrated into R&D processes. Even so, the possibility of more radically alternative constitutions of socio-technical safety seems to be seriously limited by the current ideology of innovation and economic imperatives of the global, knowledge-based, capitalist economy. (shrink)

The anthology Dharma: The Categorial ImperativeThe choice of using ‘the categorial imperative’ over the standard ‘the categorical imperative’ has not been supported with reason in the anthology, notwithstanding its mentioning of Kant. consists of a brief introduction and 18 essays which were presented in an international conference of the same title in 1997, with the purpose to provide an alternative interpretation of the concept ‘dharma’ while taking into view the influence of Western notion of religion and treating it as an (...) epistemological , and not as a moral, concept. Here, dharma has been understood as a category, as an intellectual exercise, for ‘viewing’ Indian reality.The fundamental question is this: what constitutes the concept of dharma in the context of our changing forms of life? I.e., What aspects of dharma upon which Western influence are to be noted? Some aspects of the constitutive elements of dharma, as identified by the contributors of .. (shrink)

The vague idea of likening soccer to religion, specifically in watching soccer as a fan, is widespread spread in both everyday life media and academia. The slightly muddled discourse can be clarified by focusing on two variations, differentiating between sport in religion and sport as religion. Concentrating on sport as a form of religious activity and experience, it seems obvious that one’s theoretical framework here connects Durkheim’s elevation of formerly profane objects to a Sacred with concepts of individualization and secularization. (...) Yet, taking a critical look from the perspective of Luckmann’s theory of invisible or private religion, religion ought to be more narrowly conceived as a specific experience of transcendency. Employing Berger, it is plausible to employ a different rationale, leading to the conclusion that fandom constitutes a mimicry-religion. Mimicry-religion adheres to the inclination of the Self to understand his or her experience as religious for the need of a nomos, a legitimization of social institutionalizations. (shrink)

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been appropriate in the context (...) when it originated — namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Board oversight of community benefit constitutes an ethical imperative for nonprofit health care organizations. By "ethical imperative" we mean a health care organization's duty to fulfill value-based obligations that transcend compliance requirements in order to be consistent with its basic sense of purpose. We consider three points here: the existence of a distinctively ethical imperative for board oversight, the fact that the imperative is organizational in nature, and practical ways to fulfill its obligations. To explain the meaning of ethical imperative, (...) offer analytical clarification, and provide evidence-based guidelines we adopt an organizational ethics paradigm. Because community benefit for tax-exempt .. (shrink)

Should we try to live in the present? Such is the imperative of modernity, Jed Rubenfeld writes in this important and original work of political theory. Since Jefferson proclaimed that 'the earth belongs to the living', since Freud announced that mental health requires people to 'get free of their past', since Nietzsche declared that the happy man is the man who 'leaps into the moment', modernity has directed its inhabitants to live in the present, as if there alone could they (...) find happiness, authenticity, and above all freedom. But this imperative, Rubenfeld argues, rests on a profoundly inadequate, deforming picture of the relationship between freedom and time. Instead, Rubenfeld suggests, human freedom, indeed human being itself, necessarily extends into both past and future; self-government consists of giving our lives meaning and purpose over time. From this conception of self-government, Rubenfeld derives a new theory of constitutional law's place in democracy. Democracy, he writes, is not a matter of governance by the present 'will of the people'; it is a matter of a nation's laying down and living up to enduring political and legal commitments. Constitutionalism is not coun. (shrink)

O presente trabalho versa sobre a constituição da noção de memória na teoria freudiana. Para tanto, utilizamos, de modo primordial, as elaborações desenvolvidas no Projeto para uma psicologia científica. Objetivamos ressaltar que Freud subverte a problemática acerca do conceito de memória, concedendo a essa ideia um caráter criativo que se diferencia da simples representação de um objeto contido na realidade material. Em Freud, a memória excede o que se compreende comumente como evocação, ou seja, a lembrança não se restringe à (...) retomada de uma percepção. Se a memória é considerada como sendo o próprio psiquismo, é a sua relação com a pulsão e, posteriormente, com a noção de a posteriori que possibilita a efetivação de uma memória própria à Psicanálise. Desse modo, explicitamos que a memória em Freud é tanto um imperativo da pulsão quanto o desdobramento dos efeitos de uma temporalidade psíquica. Mesmo que parta de uma construção teórica estritamente associada às ciências naturais, um exame mais detido a respeito das formulações desse período nos ajuda a compreender a maneira como ele arquiteta uma teoria que, pelo menos a princípio, tinha como objetivo último esclarecer a problemática concernente à noção de memória.The present work deals with the constitution of the notion of memory in Freudian theory, primarily making use of the elaboration developed in the Project for a scientific psychology. We aim to point out that Freud subverts the problem of the concept of memory, giving this idea a creative character that differs from the mere representation of an object contained in material reality. In Freud, memory goes beyond what is commonly understood as evocation, i.e., memory is not restricted to a recovery of perception. If memory is considered to be the psyche itself, it is its relationship with drive and later with the notion of Nachträglich that enables the realization of memory appropriate to psychoanalysis itself. Thus, we make it explicit that memory in Freud is both an imperative of drive and of the unfolding of the effects of a psychic temporality. Even though Freud departs from a strictly theoretical construction associated with the natural sciences, a closer examination of his formulations from this period helps us understand how he constructs a theory that, at least at first, had the ultimate goal of clarifying issues regarding the notion of memory. (shrink)

This comparative essay about two kinds of interpersonal-centric humanism is dedicated to the memory of professor Janusz Kuczyński and his conception of dialogical universalism as a metaphilosophy, and shows Immanuel Kant’s thought as a ceaseless source of inspiration for all anti-conservatives and universalists. Kant’s philosophy gave man an unforgettable sense of freedom, because it not only posed the imperative of building a pan-human community of all rational beings, but also revealed the above-natural sense of the human species’ imposition of purposefulness (...) upon itself, and the realisation of this purposefulness in the form of a republican federation of free states dedicated to co-creating eternal peace. Kantian ethics did not reach beyond the obligations people had towards one another, hence it was functionally anthropological and uninfluenced by religion, which re-situated philosophy with regard to scientific cognition and religious experience, giving rise to a metaphysics of anthropological responsibility for the condition of the spiritual freedom this ethic propounded. Kant revealed the existence of a metaphysical difference in the sphere of being—between the determinism of nature and the moral kingdom of freedom—without direct reference to the transcendental source of these two essentially different worlds. Kant was the first to set morality rooted in the autonomy and unanimous will of all rational beings—or true humanity—against legal and religious legalism. Kant laid weight on the processual character of man’s self-education to social life through the sense of commitment to self-improvement for the benefit of the solidary co-existence of all rational beings that he developed in himself as a rational being. Thus created freedom is founded on the selflesness of goodness and represents a new quality of being that only manifests itself and evolves in community, interpersonalcentrically. It is a universalistic approach capable of gradually neutralising the human inclination towards radical evil.My attempt to compare these two interpersonalcentric humanism conceptions aims to add some substance to this very delicate element in Kuczyński’s universalism as a metaphilosophy construct. (shrink)

Recognition of the status of family in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania mandates the state authorities to care and provide for the family, to ensure the family members’ constitutional rights, and to ensure respect for family life. Such duties fall on both, the legislative and executive authorities. However, the enforcement of constitutional imperatives is not straightforward. One reason for this is that the Constitution does not contain any legal definition of ‘family’ or ‘family members’. Nor (...) does the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania reveal the content of these notions. This, in turn, allows for various interpretations as to the scope of duties of state authorities and state attitude towards the family in general. In this context, the article aims to present approaches to the legal concept of family in Lithuanian legal doctrine, positive law and court practice. First, the article analyses the constitutional background of the concept of family and presents an overview of the ongoing political debate concerning this concept. Second, we analyse Lithuanian legal doctrine, scanty as it may be on this issue. Third, we examine the legislative specifics and the case law developed by the country’s highest judicial bodies with regard to the legal definition of ‘family’ and ‘family members’ in order to assess their impact on the state family policy in general. (shrink)

The article focuses on re-evaluating Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by initially highlighting its seemingly negative function within the Critique of Pure Reason as a mere regulative form for cognition and experience. The Dialectic, however, does not only have such a negative-regulative function but also its very own positive and founding character for cognition that even is present in the supposedly most immediate forms of intuition. In exploring this positive side of the Transcendental Dialectic it becomes clear that it manifests itself as (...) a bridge between the so-called theoretical and practical reason inasmuch as it fills in their gap within Kant’s philosophy. From the practical side, the Dialectic is manifest as an action full of purposiveness, maxims, and imperatives within cognition, from a theoretical side it assumes the form of syllogistic inference, which is the adequate and acting theoretical form of practical reason. Therefore, the unity of reason is shown in presenting its inner gap as a dialectical misunderstanding that Kant not only highlights in the Transcendental Dialectic but also tends to leave unsolved mostly. Nevertheless, the Dialectic can be shown as the a priori synthetic act of unifying reason, if investigated in the context of Kant’s complete critical endeavour. (shrink)

The following examination explores the relationship between ethics, writing, finitude, spacing and sharing as they are presented in Nancy’s ‘The Free Voice of Man’ and ‘The Inoperative Community’ and in Derrida’s ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’ and ‘Rams’. The interconnection between these events of being cannot be easily untangled since each moment is radically implicated with the others, defying both foundation and chronology. We are in a realm in which being must rather be understood as a series of singular ruptures (...) or interruptions that precisely and radically turns away from any sense of grounding or order. The discussion of being that follows is contextualized by the notion that there is a discursively inaccessible imperative to all philosophical discourses that ultimately implicates being in and as writing, finitude and spacing. This project thus exposes the manner in which being is fundamentally intertwined with the exhaustion of the philosophical endeavour. (shrink)

This article recognizes that linguistic prejudice (with its associated cultural biases) is a reality in any multilingual country, including South Africa. Prejudice is inherently human and the article suggests that it can be both positive and negative. In the case of the Senzo Meyiwa murder trial the article suggests that the linguistic prejudice experienced by witnesses and legal practitioners was largely negative. Even though the South African Constitution suggests an empowering multilingual environment where there are now twelve official languages, in (...) contrast to this, the article takes as a point of departure the monolingual language of record policy that has been in place in the South African legal system since 2017. This is contrary to the constitutional imperatives. It is argued that this policy negatively impacts witnesses and legal practitioners and that the Meyiwa trial is a case in point. It is found that in this trial there is linguistic prejudice (practiced by the presiding judge) where there are linguistic or cultural voids related to communicative inequality and where the speaker does not have sufficient English vocabulary to proceed. It is concluded that the interpretation process also has its challenges and that ideally the use of African languages as languages of record in courts could only aid the delivery of social justice and the implementation of language rights in a multilingual and multicultural country such as South Africa. (shrink)

The existing ethico-legal regulation of adolescent children's participation in health research in South Africa is currently unclear. The article interrogates the existing framework governing children's consent to research participation, with specific emphasis on discrepancies in consent norms in law and ethical guidelines. Against the backdrop of the constitutional directive that requires that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child, the article assesses whether sufficient consideration is given to children's evolving maturity and capacities (...) when consent to their participation in health research is sought. The article provides specific recommendations and proposes a legislative change to consent provisions in the National Health Act 61 of 2003 in order to address the existing lacunae and to align the framework with constitutional imperatives and international fundamental rights considerations. (shrink)

The tendencies of the development of the Lithuanian criminal procedure within the recent twenty years, after Lithuania has regained its independence, are analyzed in the present article. The main factors which influence lawmaking in the sphere of criminal procedure as well as in the application of the criminal procedure norms are discussed. The constitutional imperatives and the human rights, fixed in international and the European Union agreements as the main factors determining the evolution of the law of criminal (...) procedure are reviewed. It is stated that earlier, while amending or supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure, the utmost attention used to the drawn to the legal tradition of the state, whereas the legal norms of the modern criminal procedure must be subordinated to the principles fixed in the Constitution. After having briefly reviewed the main tendencies of the development of criminal procedure, i.e. the constitutionalization and internationalizationeuropeization, the following conclusion is drawn: the mentioned tendencies have been producing a significant impact on the evolution of the Lithuanian criminal procedure after the restoration of independence and accession to the international treaties. However, the systemic and critical viewpoint towards the impact of the European Union law on the national law of criminal procedure is still missing. (shrink)

"Rene Descartes is often called the 'Father of Modern Philosophy.' The profound controversies that his doctrines have engendered are alone sufficient to establish his eminence. Yet if he is to be paid a due respect, it is necessary to understand him on his own terms- to distinguish his doctrines from myriad notions labeled 'Cartesian.' The quest for certainty may be a constitutional imperative for every philosopher; in the case of Descartes it was an acknowledged passion. Thus there is no (...) more fitting approach to him than to study seriously his claims to having attained certainty regarding what he took to be the questions of metaphysics, namely, the questions of the existence of God and of the nature of the human mind."--The Preface. (shrink)

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in (...) the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful. (shrink)

Kosgaard claims that selves/agents self-constitute during actions by relying on principles such as Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This intellectualist approach neglects the body. Merleau-Ponty considers the “lived body” and its perceptual world as the source of the unity of action, an approach that I extrapolate to all biological organisms.

Imperative and declarative pointing are distinct kinds of communicative acts that rely on different cognitive capacities in the speakers. Declarative pointing is an important precursor to language, seen from both an evolutionary and a developmental perspective. Declarative pointing is functionally independent of affective intersubjectivity, yet it is intimately related to it in development. It is argued that declarative pointing once evolved because it allows for the mutual evaluation of joint objects of attention. Interaffectivity and joint attention to a distal object (...) together constitute the prerequisites for using declarative pointing for the purpose of evaluation. Mutual evaluation has the benefits of enhancing co-operation and allowing for vicarious learning. It also makes possible the non-linguistic, active interrogation of others about their attitudes to jointly attended objects. (shrink)

Is technology value-free or is it value-laden? How does technology affect human autonomy? These questions, viewed within the context of medicine, are the focus of attention in this article. The central argument is that we need neither to subscribe to the value-neutrality dictum nor to the all-encompassing value-ladenness thesis to explain the pertinent position of technology in medicine. Technology is constitutive of and strongly implicated in difficult questions of value. This, however, does not mean that technology is identical to (or (...) neutral to) these value-laden questions. Technology poses issues of value, but only some of these relate to technology qua technology. Hence, it makes a difference whether we discuss general questions of value posed by technology or whether we discuss the value-ladenness of technology. Admitting technological value-ladenness does not imply that we are subject to a technological imperative that reduces our autonomy, on the contrary, it explains how technology increases our responsibility. This is particularly prominent in medicine. (shrink)