Offering a systematic analysis of texts produced between the court of Burgundy in the 1470s and the court of the Austrian Habsburgs in the early 1700s, this book traces the development of the idea of successful and competent political behaviour as seen through the eyes of court historians between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries.

This is a qualitative descriptive study of how competency to take care of oneself and one's financial affairs was evaluated in New York City during the years 1989-1991 by the Human Resources Administration's Visiting Psychiatric Service . Most VPS clients are indigent senior citizens. A visit by VPS can result in forced institutionalization or lost control over one's finances. Data were collected from interviews with key informants , written materials about VPS, court cases and a report summarizing a recent City (...) Council investigation of VPS. Major problems concerning how VPS operated were found. VPS conducted competency evaluations in such a way that some people's rights may have been suspended inappropriately and others may not have been given the type of intervention they needed. These problems appear to stem from several interlocking factors: VPS operates with very little public exposure of its work. Most clients served had in essence little recourse to respond through legal channels to VPS recommendations that may have been based on faulty evaluations. In most cases the court approved the actions recommended by VPS. This study highlights dangers of the system and the need to change the way that competency is evaluated. (shrink)

Courting competency: nursing and the politics of performance in practiceNurses have long anguished over how best to assess performance in clinical practice. The ‘competency’ movement appears to have provided a solution to this problem. In this paper I undertake a ‘radical hermeneutic’ interrogation of the cultural text of clinical practice doubled with a poststructuralist interpretation of the literal text of the Australian competency project. Through this work I attempt to expose some of the deeply embedded assumptions that underwrite the competency (...) movement and amplify the problems posed by an uncritical appropriation of competency based training and assessment in nursing education. (shrink)

Mental health clinicians and evaluators of a person's mental health for legal purposes must address highly nuanced and possibly conflicting goals that arise in their work. Forensic Neuropsychiatric Ethics reviews real-life dilemmas facing practitioners who work in the field of mental health. The first two chapters ground the reader in the modern history and evolution of forensic ethics. Subsequent chapters provide practical direction on a range of important topics, including maintaining robust professionalism, writing an ethical report, testifying ethically, participating in (...) capital cases, managing bias and subjectivity, incorporating testing into one's opinion, and working in leadership roles. Other topics include providing informed consent; violating confidentiality; considering advance directives and physician assistance in dying; fulfilling the Tarasoff duty to protect; ethical considerations related to assisted outpatient treatment; the assessment and potential removal of firearms; the termination of pregnancy and decisional capacity; recognition of structural and implicit bias in violence risk assessments; and implications for the use of neuroscience and artificial intelligence in the courtroom. The book is written for all clinicians, forensic evaluators, educators, administrators, lawyers, and judges. (shrink)

In this essay, I continue Nicholas Wolterstorff’s work of developing a rights-based theory of ethics called eirenéism, which maintains the good life only occurs when justice—as a moral state of affairs where agents enjoy the goods to which they have a right—is achieved. As a result, justice is eirenē (the Greek word for peace). In the process of developing eirenéism I explain how eirenē differs from other conceptions of peace, and I offer several interpretive arguments for how best to understand (...) eirenéism in relation to better-known competing ethical theories, like utilitarianism, virtue ethics, duty ethics, and care ethics. (shrink)

A practising lawyer is not always aware of the fact that case decisions are more determined by legal doctrine – attitudes of authoritative lawyers and scientific legal discussion of other forms – than by changes in positive law. Regulations of specific case decisions are directly reliant on the ideas and statements of legal discussions – as one of the factors influencing the decisions of the courts. During the twenty years of independence, the form, content and argumentation of the Lithuanian (...) court judgments has fundamentally changed, especially with regard to the understanding of the courts (the judiciary) in terms of how unrestrained they are when interpreting a legal text and making decisions. The judicial discretion to interpret a legal text is treated diversely in various legal traditions and within the scope of the western legal tradition itself. In common law countries, the competence of a judge to deviate from a legal text or to create their own legal framework is treated with much greater understanding. In civil law tradition, the attempts of judges to take over the functions of the legislature are usually considered more critically. Even the representatives of comparative law emphasise that judges in civil law tradition countries tend to call the creation of legal rules differently – mostly as interpretation of the law. The discussion on the power of judges to create law through its interpretation has been taking place everywhere and at all times. Judicial discretion in decision-making is not due to individual factors such as era, social structure, cultural background, but is determined by some other factors that are not easy to identify. The interpretative activity of the courts is also influenced by the prevailing doctrinal regulations of judicial activity. It is the changes of the Lithuanian legal doctrines that could have encouraged the courts to determine the scope of their activity in the direction of its growth. After the restoration of independence, the Lithuanian legal community began an active discussion on whether legal positivism was the correct form of legal understanding. Studies appeared, in which legal positivism was seen exclusively negatively, reminding that it was specifically this legal concept that had eliminated values from law and was likely to be blamed for the ills of humanity such as the Holocaust or genocide. Numerous publications emerged calling judges to be active and reminding them to check every rule of law in accordance with its consistency with the principles of law and to disapply any rule of law that did not meet this requirement. Almost universally, lawyers (and especially the courts) were encouraged to move from mechanical (a priori improper) application of the law to the creative (a priori the best and aspirational) one. The courts were encouraged: they started to freely interpret legal rules, under which the legislature established their competence; although court judgments have become more reasoned, this did not prevent them from applying speculative or ambivalent arguments; criticism could be expressed to courts due to lengthy processes that are, objectively looking, not required, and for low activity in exercising their powers to prevent abuse of law. Respect for the legislature directly responsible for creating legal rules and taking care of legal protection, judicial recognition that a court should deviate from the legal text or otherwise create new rules only when it is objectively inevitable, and lawyers’ societal openness to discussion on various issues – these can become conceptual prerequisites for higher confidence in the courts. (shrink)

The article aims at resolving the issue whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to resolve disputes between Member States, stemming from provisions of an international treaty, a party to which is the EU. This problem is especially relevant in cases when a mixed international agreement envisages independent institutions of dispute resolution. The position of the CJEU is expressed in the (...) case of Mox Plant. The European Commission applied to the CJEU against Ireland, because it considered that Ireland, which started an arbitration procedure against United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 344 of the TFEU. The EU is also a Contracting Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore according to the consistence case practice of the Court, the provisions of the Convention that fall under the competence of the Union constitute an indivisible part of the EU legal system. Only in such case when a provision of a treaty is attributed to exclusive competence of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the CJEU regarding that provision can be negated. Thus, when deciding on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in principle, a problem of attribution of the EU and Member States’ competences arises. (shrink)

From the point of the EU law, the CJEU has the exclusive competence to interpret the EU legal norms and decide upon validity of the legal acts adopted by the EU institutions because it is the most effective method to ensure the unilateral interpretation of the EU law and to prevent its fragmentation. Thus, it can be presumed that all disputes between the Member States regarding the EU law must be solved by the CJEU. The paper aims at finding (...) the answer to the question whether international courts under the international law must refuse their jurisdiction in cases where disputes of the Member States relate with the EU law. With the view of this aim, arguments arising from the international law (for instance, prohibition of intervening into affairs of another legal system, prohibition of abuse of laws), on the basis of which an international court should decline its jurisdiction, and applicability of such arguments to the situation discussed is assessed and an independent approach is formulated. (shrink)

The judiciary is a key policy actor that is involved in deciding health rights and policy by intervening in the policy process through a variety of judicial mechanisms, yet the appropriate extent of its involvement remains contentious. Taking the competence objection seriously requires understanding it as an epistemic problem about how courts assess empirical and scientific evidence in order to competently adjudicate controversial health claims. This paper examines recent advances in social epistemology to develop insights for the epistemic (...) competence of the judiciary from a system‐oriented approach. I outline three epistemic features that set the judiciary and the judicial decision‐making process apart from other types of decision‐makers in health policy: the distribution of epistemic power, the epistemic authority of a justified believer, and the principle of disinterestedness. Finally, I relate these insights back to the judicial decision‐making process with a specific focus on recent court decisions in health rights and health policy in Chile. (shrink)

German legislation demands that decisions about the treatment of mentally incompetent patients require an ‘informed consent’. If this was not given by the patient him-/herself before he/she became incompetent, it has to be sought by the physician from a guardian, who has to be formally legitimized before. Additionally this surrogate has to seek the permission of a Court of Guardianship (Vormundschaftsgericht), if he/she intends to consent to interventions, which pose significant risks to the health or the life of the person (...) under his/her care. This includes ‘end-of-life decisions’. Deviations from this procedure are only allowed in acute emergencies or cases of ‘medical futility’. On the basis of epidemiological and demographical data it can be shown that the vast majority of surrogate decisions on incompetent patients in Germany is not covered by legally valid consent. Moreover, the data suggests that if consent were to be requested according to the legal regulations, both the legal and medical system could realistically never cope with the practical consequences of this. Additionally, empiric research has revealed serious deficits concerning medical ‘end of life-decisions’ and practical performance in palliative care. As a consequence a multidisciplinary discussion has developed in Germany about the reform of present legislation with respect to key-issues like• the assessment of mental competence• the options for exercising patient self-determination via advance directives and durable powers of attorney• the improvement of palliative care facilities,• the clarification of formal procedures for surrogate decision-making in health care and towards the end of life• and the possibilities and their limitations of controlling these decision-making processes ‘externally’ (e.g., by Guardianship Courts or committees).The authors discuss those proposals, which clearly dominate the present debate: They all aim to comply with the scientific basis of German law, jurisdiction and the European traditions of philosophy of health care and bioethics. (shrink)

The article discusses the certain features of the constitutional doctrine of human rights developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania which were influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the role of the European Convention on Human Rights as a legal source in the system of sources of constitutional law. The intersection of the jurisprudences, which came into being due to different assessments of the legal regulation in cases where the same legal act was recognized by (...) the Constitutional Court being in compliance with the Constitution and the European Court of Human Rights recognized that the application of the said act was a cause of the violation of a certain person’s rights protected by the Convention (or vice versa) is one of the most important questions and raises many theoretical and practical problems. Different assessment of the legal acts made by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to their compliance with the Conventionshould not be regarded as such an essential circumstance which could lead to possible repeated review of such legal act at the Constitutional Court, such intersection of the jurisprudences, should be solved by ordinary courts while following the doctrine that in cases where legal acts contain the legal regulation which competes with that established in the international treaty, the international treaty should be applied. (shrink)

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this purpose (...) the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. (shrink)

Courts are increasingly obliged to adjudicate upon challenges to allocative decisions in healthcare, but their involvement continues to be regarded with unease, imperilling the legitimacy of the judicial role in this context. A central reason for this is that judges are perceived to lack sufficient expertise to determine allocative questions. This article critically appraises the claim of lack of judicial expertise through an examination of the various components of a limit-setting decision. It is argued that the inexpertise argument is (...) weak when compared with other rationales for judicial restraint, such as the procedural unsuitability and lack of constitutional competence of courts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ought We to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence?Paul S. Appelbaum* (bio)AbstractThe preceding commentary by Louis Charland suggests that traditional cognitive views of decision-making competence err in not taking into account patients’ emotional capacities. Examined closely, however, Charland’s argument fails to escape the cognitive bias that he condemns. However, there may be stronger arguments for broadening the focus of competence assessment to include emotional (...) capacities, centering on the ways in which emotions aid humans in processing information. Before emotional capacities are added to the list of functions essential for decisional competence, though, the feasibility and utility of such a reorientation must be demonstrated.To what extent ought persons’ capacities to experience emotion be taken into account when determining whether they should be deemed competent to make their own decisions? In the previous article, Louis Charland (1998) argues that traditional models of decision-making competence—of which the MacArthur Competence Treatment Study is a typical example—are mistaken in focusing narrowly on persons’ cognitive abilities to the neglect of emotional factors. In contrast, he suggests, constructs of competence ought explicitly to require a capacity to experience emotions, which he believes is central to meaningful decision making, before deeming persons competent.Charland, as he acknowledges, is not the first to suggest that the presence of some degree of emotional capacity is a necessary element of competence, but his argument is among the most elaborate to date and is certainly worth closer examination. Looked at carefully, however, Charland’s argument does not make quite the case for the determination of emotional capacity in competence assessment that he claims for it. Indeed, as I demonstrate below, Charland may share the same “pernicious [End Page 377] cognitive bias” that he ascribes to more traditional approaches. However, despite what I identify as the problems in Charland’s argument, others have raised more disturbing questions about the lack of attention to emotional issues in competence assessment. Thus, I am not ready to reject entirely the possibility that determinations of decisional competence ought to consider emotional factors. I conclude by outlining the questions that remain to be answered to identify more clearly the potential benefits of such an approach.The Construct of Decision-Making CompetenceSome preliminary comments about the nature of the dominant construct of decision-making competence may provide a useful frame for my response to Charland’s paper. Contemporary ideas of competence are tied inextricably to the ideal of self-determination in modern Western societies. Such societies are committed to respect for individual choice, both as a good in its own right and on the grounds that each person knows best what choices will maximize his or her own welfare. In general, therefore, states will not intervene to prevent persons from acting on their decisions, even when the choices they make—like the decision to smoke or to refuse potentially life-saving medical care—may objectively be thought to be detrimental to them.In some cases, however, the presumption that people will act in their own interests, as well as the notion that there is something intrinsically valuable in respecting their choices, fails (Buchanan and Brock 1989). When people’s minds are so disordered that they cannot be said to be making meaningful choices, other values come into play. Such people are called “incompetent.” When persons reach that point, the state’s interest in protecting its citizens becomes primary and someone else must make decisions on their behalf. Note that the size of this group must be sharply limited, lest a liberal society’s commitment to self-determination be undermined: There is no more profound infringement of the rights of citizens than the determination that they are incompetent. Thus, the criteria for incompetence must be selected in a deliberately narrow fashion—alternately, one might say that the standards for competence are made intentionally broad—so that all but a tiny percentage of citizens will be permitted to make decisions on their own.In the Anglo-American world, the process of formulating criteria of competence by and large has been left to the common law courts. Over the course of centuries they have identified the capacities that are, in... (shrink)

On June 16, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a defendant facing serious criminal charges is appropriate in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only in limited circumstances. The treatment must be medically appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and necessary to significantly further important government interests, after taking account of less-intrusive alternatives.Charles Sell, a former dentist, had a long history of (...) mental illness. He had been hospitalized twice, in 1982 and 1984, after expressing paranoid ideas to law enforcement officials. In May 1997, Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering. He was released on bail after a magistrate determined that he was currently competent to stand trial. (shrink)

This contribution considers the case law of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and focuses on the extent to which the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can regulate the tobacco, alcohol, and food industries in a manner compatible with their ECHR obligations. After briefly presenting the two key cases dealing specifically with tobacco advertising, this contribution considers the main factors that the ECtHR takes into account when balancing competing concerns, and in particular freedom of commercial (...) expression and public health protection. It concludes that none of these factors is absolute, as the Court considers the strength of each one of them on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, it is clear from its case law that States have a wide margin of appreciation to regulate marketing practices that are inimical to public health and the prevention of non-communicable diseases more specifically, to the extent that even extensive advertising restrictions can be compatible with Article 10 of the ECHR. (shrink)

This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. First, we explain the regulatory framework for the medical treatment of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, including the development of the welfare (...) jurisdiction under Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). We then provide an overview of the Re Imogen decision, and discuss the balancing exercise involved in determining a child’s best interests in the medical treatment context. We challenge the Family Court’s conclusion that, in relation to a dispute about diagnosis or treatment, a finding that the child or adolescent is Gillick competent to consent to treatment is not determinative, and the Family Court must determine the dispute. We argue that this conclusion represents an unjustified incursion into the right of Gillick competent transgender children and adolescents to make decisions about their own bodies and identities, and that the protective role of parents and the Family Court cannot justify interfering with their bodily autonomy in this context. Finally, we propose an alternative regulatory framework that removes the Family Court from the medical treatment process for gender dysphoria in circumstances of dispute between a parent and their Gillick competent child. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature of administrative judiciary through Decision No (10) of 2013 which stipulates considering administrative courts a part of regular courts and the effect of this decision on the scope of referral due to lack of jurisdiction, specifically, referral between civil courts and administrative courts. This paper found, through evaluating the decision of the constitutional court, that the considerations this decision was based on are invalid and according to the provisions of the constitution (...) and the regular Court Establishment Law, the administrative judiciary is merely a judicial entity independent from regular courts and could not be a part thereof. However, despite the necessity of abiding to the decision of the constitutional court, we concluded that it has no effect on deciding inadmissibility of referral due to lack of jurisdiction between regular and administrative courts. Although case law, prior to issuing the decision of the constitutional court, considered that the basis of inadmissibility is that the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedure Law is limited to regular courts, which administrative courts are not a part thereof; considering that there are other justifications to decide inadmissibility of referral between civil courts and administrative courts, most importantly the difference of judicial procedures followed before each of these courts. Thus, in this paper we provided several recommendations, most importantly, the necessity of interference of the constitutional legislator by explicitly stipulating to consider administrative judiciary as an independent judicial entity. As well, to amend the provision of Article (112) of the Civil Procedures Law by explicitly stipulating not to include referral due to lack of functional competence. (shrink)

Notwithstanding constant “crises of confidence,” a high number of international disputes lay at the docket of the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In the word of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, states are turning to the ICJ for the peaceful settlement of their disputes. The option provided by the Charter of the United Nations in limiting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to certain categories of disputes, clearly contributes to convening a greater number of states to accept this international jurisdiction, (...) resolve their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. Not surprisingly, only a few declarations provided in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court do not contain any reservation as to the limits of the Court’s competence. Interwar Lithuania contributed heavily to the strengthening of international justice. It was amongst the first members of the League of Nations to recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice and remained its faithful supporter until the very end of the Court’s activities. International justice provided at least titular security guarantees for the young nation. This faith of the Lithuanian government in relying on international justice was rewarded in full. The Lithuanian State defended its legitimate place amongst the independent nations and successfully stood up for its interests in all three cases before the Permanent Court. (shrink)

Les juridictions consulaires constituaient d’anciennes juridictions d’exception françaises, créées aux Temps modernes. Les juridictions d’exception – qui avaient une attribution de compétence spécialement déterminée – étaient nombreuses sous l’Ancien Régime, mais les juridictions consulaires ont été les seules à survivre à la Révolution, qui les a rebaptisées en «tribunaux de commerce». En effet, il s’agissait de juridictions originales par leur origine (elles ont été créées sous l’impulsion des marchands et négociants qui voulaient soustraire la connaissance de leurs litiges aux juridictions (...) royales de droit commun), leur composition (les juges consulaires étaient des marchands et négociants élus par leurs pairs), leur fonctionnement (rapides et gratuites, elles se différenciaient des juridictions royales de droit commun, dont la procédure était notoirement lourde et chère, les juges étant en partie rémunérés par les plaideurs) et le droit appliqué (le droit commercial, né d’usages créés par la pratique et qui n’avait été que partiellement codifié par l’ordonnance de 1673). (shrink)

This article reviews the medieval law background of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the state as it has been exercised over incompetent persons who formerly were competent adults, concluding that the fiduciary standard implied in the statute De Prerogative Regis (1324), which is the basis for modern guardianship status, requires that the court and guardian adopt an attitude of respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though they were to be accountable to the person himself, were he to recover (...) his faculties and become competent once more. This ficuciary responsibility, originating in the device of the "use" or trust employed for the management of the estates of lunatics, contrasts with the self-interested feudal guardianship used for the custody of "natural fools" or "idiots", who were under paternalistic arrangements. The article argues that because the determination of legal incompetence and the consequent transfer of custody of the person and property of an incompetent person to the state would result in a drastic forfeiture of liberty and property interests were it not for the fiduciary obligation owed by the state to the incompetent, the state is under an obligation to exercise its fiduciary duties in good faith and may not impose states policies or advance state interests of its own in the supervision of the affairs of incompetent persons, apart from interests arising legitimately out of the state's institutional interest in providing competent administration for the benefit of the incompetents themselves. Keywords: concept of the person, Cruzan, feudalism, guardianship, incompetent person, parens patriae CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Shifts in the national cultural identity of the US have been reflected in shifts in the US’ dominant constitutional narratives. For the United States, “inter-legality” has been less a matter of dealing with alternative non-state legal narratives than of contending with constantly arising and competing narratives about the “correct” nature of the “official” legal order of the state. The US Supreme Court has claimed to have the “last word” in resolving these arguments but because that Court is so often sharply (...) divided and because the Court membership and the nature of its “last words” changes so often, where a significant element of the society seeks to advance its ideas and interests, it will often do so in legal and constitutional terms. As the national culture undergoes changes, a competing constitutional narrative may gain ground and even ultimately prevail, at least for a time, and achieve Supreme Court “endorsement” for its claims. (shrink)

In this article the influence of scientific attitudes of Prof. Mykolas Romeris upon modern administrative justice of Lithuania is investigated by historic and comparative aspects. In the first part of article the Professor’s ideas, stated in the fundamental monograph “Administrative Court”, published in Kaunas, in 1928, about the foundation of the Administrative court are reviewed. Here are also pointed out Prof. M. Romeris’ principal,alternative and critical notes concerning the draft of the Law of Administrative Court, made by the Seimas (Parliament) (...) Committee on April 1940. As due to historical circumstances of that time the Law was not passed, in the second part of this article the author proposes the analysis of which ideas of Prof. M. Romeris and to what ambit they were reflected in the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Proceedings of Administrative Cases enacted in 1999, and improved in 2000. The conclusion is made that in this case almost all principle attitudes of Prof. M. Romeris on the organizing the Administrative court and its competence were realized in this Law. It is also stated that the Law mentioned also embedded some other norms, e.g. the possibility to settle a dispute in a pretrial way in Administrative Disputes Commissions. (shrink)

The subject of this study are the argumentation strategies applied by the Polish and German apex courts competent in criminal matters, namely the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Justice, respectively. The investigation encompasses a total of 200 rulings issued by the criminal panels of these bodies. Particular focus was put on examining which arguments both courts apply to solve interpretation problems, and secondly, how these courts systematize the interpretation process. Methodologically, the examination utilizes, inter alia, (...) the principles of qualitative research, without neglecting the legal dogmatic perspective. A crucial theoretical foundation underlying this study is the distinction between formalistic and substantive legal cultures. The examination reveals that neither the Polish nor the German legal culture is purely formalistic or value-oriented. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Poland shows greater affinity for formalistic arguments, whereas the substantive interpretation methods are more widespread in the judicature of the German Federal Court of Justice. In particular, the Polish Court prefers the linguistic interpretation, whereas the German Court favours the purposive approach. (shrink)

The transformation of health-care delivery from fee-for-service medicine to managed care represents a fundamental philosophical shift away from the prevailing medical ethos that the needs of the individual patient take precedence over competing social values, such as reducing health-care costs. In managed care, financial incentives to reduce health-care utilization may result in denying an individual’s claim for medical services.Litigation challenging managed care’s resource allocation decisions often presents the need to resolve conflicting social policy goals, such as the tension between an (...) individual patient’s access to health care and a managed care organization’s need to restrain costs. Conflicts may arise when a patient’s desire for unconstrained health care clashes with a provider’s and an insurer’s cost containment strategies. In turn, cost containment strategies may raise questions about restrictions on physician autonomy and conflicts among stakeholders for control over resource allocation decisions. (shrink)

Both developing and developed countries face an increasing mismatch between what patients expect to receive from healthcare and what the public healthcare systems can afford to provide. Where there has been a growing recognition of the entitlement to receive healthcare, the frustrated expectations with regards to the level of provision has led to lawsuits challenging the denial of funding for health treatments by public health systems. This book analyses the impact of courts and litigation on the way health systems (...) set priorities and make rationing decisions. In particular, it focuses on how the judicial protection of the right to healthcare can impact the institutionalization, functioning and centrality of Health Technology Assessment (HTA) for decisions about the funding of treatment. Based on the case study of three jurisdictions - Brazil, Colombia, and England - it shows that courts can be a key driver for the institutionalization of HTA. These case studies show the paradoxes of judicial control, which can promote accountability and impair it, demand administrative competence and undermine bureaucratic capacities. The case studies offer a nuanced and evidence-informed understanding of these paradoxes in the context of health care by showing how the judicial control of priority-setting decisions in health care can be used to require and control an explicit scheme for health technology assessment, but can also limit and circumvent it. (shrink)

Decisions made so far by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany have always been characterized by their writing and content, even down to details, precision, accuracy, professional legal style of writing, always clear in the elaboration and adjudication of cases from its competence, but surprisingly, in our country, only a few have paid attention to the German Court in a scientific context, which can be seen from the only few materials we possess in the Albanian language. The purpose of (...) this paper is to provide an overview of this Court, so that the comparative aspects can be made, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages, in case of dictating the state need for reform of the Constitutional Courts. Those who have institutionalized this constitutional institution know its value in the system of constitutional justice, which performs it in terms of protection of constitutions, its principles and value, and most importantly in the protection of freedoms and rights of human beings and citizens. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, to this date, has conveyed the efficiency of the protection of the German legal order, the serious approach and law interpretation, for the protection of freedoms and human rights, which ranks this court into a high level among all other powers in the German law system. The author, in the following paper, gives an overview of this Court starting with its history, organization and functioning, which today undoubtedly constitutes one of the most important constitutional courts in the world. (shrink)

This article presents an argument for the return to the original meaning of the concept value. This is achieved by revisiting the genealogy of the concept and by placing in perspective and questioning the common parlance thereof in contemporary legal discourse. The approach is decidedly against the often casual way in which courts and commentators treat the concept, seemingly as concretisation, validation, exegesis or reinforcement of fundamental norms, but without paying attention to its original meaning and use. It is (...) submitted that we confine our talk of values to the products of valuation, that is, the taste, the will, the esteem and/or perspective of some individual or group. Yet, it is not suggested that we completely discard the use of values discourse in law, the goal is rather to restate the inherent relativity of values language in legal discourse. This will bring necessary order to the current conceptual disarray and will foster mutual understanding and alliance. (shrink)

Since 9/11 the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court) has raised anew the question of the relationship between religion and public education. In its reasoning, the European Court has had to consider competing normative accounts of the secular, either to accept or deny claims to religious liberty within Europe's public education system. This article argues that the trajectory on which the term 'secularism' had been used by the European Court pointed increasingly towards secular fundamentalism. This study is located (...) at the cutting edge of religion, education and the law and builds on previous work in the field (Arthur, 1998, 2008). It examines, through extensive research of legal cases, the most important developments of the usage of secular and secular education in modern discourse and explores the background to these concepts. Unless otherwise stated, religion in this article shall refer to the Christian tradition because Christianity has been the historical context for the development of the concept of 'secular' in Europe. The paper outlines three models of secular education before moving on to scrutinise how the European Court has understood and evaluated various legal cases before it on the interaction between secular States, public education and notions of religious symbolism and influence. The paper will discuss the significance of the European Court's reasoning and decisions for public education within a secular State context and offer some conclusions on the implications of these decisions. It examines the legal principles that underpin the European Court's supervision of the State's role in the provision of education. It focuses on the chimeric goal of neutrality and highlights the risks attached to the use of an ideological conception of secularism that could lead potentially to the complete removal of the religious as a vital cultural and intellectual dimension of public education. (shrink)

The function of law and of constitutional law is to make determinate what we ought to do. And in constitutional law, that is true of both structural provisions and rights provisions. It is not the function of constitutions to establish our real moral rights. We possess those independently of the constitution, which cannot affect them. And all organs of government are bound morally if not legally by those rights. I have taken no position on the relative competence of legislatures (...) and courts to ascertain the content of real moral rights, and it is possible that the judiciary is well-equipped to be our wise Platonic guardians. However, if the game is interpretation, all that can be interpreted are authored rules, and what those rules mean can only be what their authors meant by them. Anything else is reauthoring—that is, creating new rules. There is no “living tree” constitutional interpretation. The only “living trees” are the judges. So you’d better hope that they are well cultivated. And you may conclude that a bit of pruning is in order. (shrink)

Science is sometimes depicted, both in scholarly and lay accounts, as a consensual and orderly progression in the direction of truth; at other times, it is portrayed as an arena in which lone geniuses struggle against rivals and authorities to impose unconventional interpretations of reality. The paper introduces the concept of ‘order-conflict dichotomy’ to stabilize the content of these definitions. It then shows, through an in-depth analysis of the Irving trial, an English libel suit involving historical knowledge about World War (...) II and the Holocaust, how these definitions can be used as rhetorical devices to promote professional and situational goals. Six couples of opposing sub-definitions of science are identified by analyzing court records. As a tentative hypothesis derived from the case, it is argued that the conception of science actors deploy in this kind of controversies reflect the overall structure of the market for knowledge about nature and society rather than disciplinary culture. (shrink)

Gender dysphoria is a clinically significant incongruence between expressed gender and assigned gender, with rapidly growing prevalence among children. The UK High Court recently conducted a judicial review regarding the service provision at a youth-focussed gender identity clinic in Tavistock. The high court adjudged it ‘highly unlikely’ that under-13s, and ‘doubtful’ that 14–15 years old, can be competent to consent to puberty blocker therapy for GD. They based their reasoning on the limited evidence regarding efficacy, the likelihood of progressing to (...) cross-sex hormone therapy and the ‘life-changing consequences’ of puberty blockers. In this article, I offer two concurrent arguments to dispute their reasoning. First, I argue that minors can be competent to consent to puberty blockers for GD, because the decision to undergo puberty blocker therapy is no more complex or far-reaching than other medical decisions that we accept a child should be able to make. Second, I argue that—irrespective of competence—such legal restriction for all children fundamentally contradicts the central ethical tenet of child healthcare: best interests. For these two reasons, the high court should not restrict access to puberty blockers for competent GD children. (shrink)

In two decisions delivered inFebruary and March 2001, the German FederalConstitutional Court voided the maritalagreements struck between a man and a pregnantwoman on the grounds that they were the productof an inequality of bargaining power betweenthe parties. These findings, involving anapplication of the fundamental rightsprovisions of the German Basic Law to privateagreements, demonstrate the creeping competenceof the F.C.C. into the sphere of contractualrelations and an ongoing questioning ofthe traditional public/private law divide. Exploring some of the implications of applyingpublic values and (...) constitutional reviewstandards to private agreements, this notecontextualises the decisions within the debateupon competing (and ultimately colliding)social systems of the family and the market. (shrink)

This paper considers Canada’s young offenders in the context from which they enter the youth criminal courtroom. To determine how youth criminal justice courts violate the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act, this analysis relates said context to several phenomena, including legal linguistics, oral language competency, literacy, communicative competency, non-verbal communication, the physical structure of youth courtrooms, and legal translation. As a result of the standards of procedural communication upheld by the Canadian criminal justice system, young people’s rights, including the (...) right to be respected regardless of cultural, ethnic, or linguistic differences, the right to be heard and to participate in proceedings, the right to be sentenced meaningfully, the right to privacy, and the right to be tried in a timely manner are abused in the youth criminal courtroom. Although insufficient structures of procedural communication cause these issues and are beyond the control of counsel, defense counsel are often blamed for their effects. Legal professionals must make important adjustments such as altering the formal speech required in youth criminal courtrooms, employing legal professionals with the role of translating legal jargon to young people in the courtroom, and closing youth courtrooms off from the public to reduce the YCJA violations occurring in youth criminal justice court. These adjustments are ultimately the responsibility of the Canadian criminal justice system. (shrink)

This article examines the standard of disclosure, set by law, of risks of treatment and alternative procedures that should normally be disclosed to patients. Therapeutic privilege has been recognized by the courts as an exception to this standard of disclosure. It provides a justification for withholding such information from competent patients in the interests of patient welfare. The article explores whether this justification is either legally or ethically defensible. In assessing patient welfare, the health care professional is required to (...) consider the patient's overall best interests - but this is not limited to an assessment of medical best interests. It is contended that the health care professional is neither qualified nor justified in making such a judgement, as the law recognizes that a competent adult patient determines her own best interests. This is not possible without sufficient information of risks to inform the decision. (shrink)

The current environment of business and financial corruption in Spain has increased in recent years. In order to reduce the scope of this problem, the Spanish Criminal Code has introduced codes of conduct and ethics to encourage a new culture of respecting laws for companies and employees. An Educational Innovation Group at the University of Extremadura has proposed a cross-sectional model to study ethics, in an effort to address concerns about the consequences of illegal acts in society and companies. Students (...) in Business, Finance and Accounting are required to practice ethical decision-making through court judgments in order to develop “ethical competences”. These competences are included in the European Higher Education Area and the Official University Education in Spain, specifically in the Royal Decree 1393/2007, of 29 October through cross-sectional competences within the academic programmes. The results of the study show that a high percentage of students validate this methodology as a way of improving ethical decision-making skills at University that will be applied to future business practices. (shrink)

The jurists of classical Islamic Law defined the interior forum as a limit to the religious validity of the sentences of Muslim judges , because these have neither access to God's knowledge nor to the individual believer’s conscience and motivations. They can base their decisions solely on exterior appearances and can, therefore, neither be sure that their judgments correspond to the facts nor to the intentions and memories of the individuals concerned. This holds especially true for questions of belief and (...) unbelief. From the eighth to the nineteenth century, the norms of Islamic law were the result of learned debates among independent jurists and their schools of law. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was integrated into the codes enacted by the competent institutions of the national states and lost its normative authority in most spheres of the modern state law. It remained dominant only in personal statute law, i.e. the rules concerning marriage and divorce, family and succession. From the early seventies of the twentieth century, opposition against the neglect of religious norms in modern state law was centered on the demand for the “codification of Islamic law” . Its leaders were jurists trained in modern law faculties, who wanted to insert the norms of classical Islamic Law into the codes of the national state with which they are familiar. The ethical debates of classical Islamic law, obviously, did not lend themselves easily to such an approach.The jurists movement for the codification of Islamic law gained in momentum during the eighties when, in a number of states, it succeeded in assuring for the classical apostasy rules a place in the modern criminal codes. In other states, such as Egypt, the highest courts opened the way for apostasy trials. The analysis of one apostasy judgment of the highest Egyptian court shows that the court understands belief and apostasy as objective facts that can be separated from the person who professes or denies them. It is on this question that my lecture focuses. The court effectively claims the role of the highest instance in questions of belief and unbelief. Belief and apostasy thus become depersonalized objective facts without any relation to the intentions of the individuals concerned. The court’s sentence does not refer to the believer’s own interior forum : the concept seems to be irrelevant to the judges. Their definition of apostasy serves to control the ideas that can legitimately be discussed in the public sphere. It denies bold reinterpretations of Islam, but also a number of political persuasions and theories, the right of access to the public space and assigns them the private sphere as their legitimate abode. A new concept of private and public is thus developed in the detailed reasoning by which the court justifies its judgment.There is, to my understanding, nothing in the religion of Islam that renders such a stance necessary. Other courts, in Egypt, develop other ideas of the principles of Islamic normativity and in other Arab states go so far as to develop a concept of privacy that would forbid the debates discussed in this lecture. It seems important to underline that the use of classical elements in the court’s judgment does not conceal the fact that the ethical criteria of classical Muslim law find little place in this jurisdiction that represents a special version of modern legal positivism. (shrink)

When a physician employment relationship terminates, the physician–patient relationship may also be terminated by enforcement of a covenant not to compete, which typically forces the physician to leave the geographic area for a period of time. This gives rise to several ethical dilemmas. The public interest is compromised when enforcement of these covenants contributes to the shortage of physicians in the community, and individual patients are harmed when their physicians are no longer available. The authors undertook a unique study to (...) explore physician perspectives concerning the ethics of banning a physician from practice and the impact of the ban on both the physician and the physician’s patients. The results identified harmful effects that have not been raised in prior scholarly articles or reported court opinions. After reviewing the legal background of covenants not to compete, this paper presents the results of that study and concludes that resorting to the legal system for enforcement of covenants not to compete is not always the ethical course of action. (shrink)

The main subject of the present research is the enforcement of the European Union law in the domestic legal order. This topic was chosen considering the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and especially its declaration No. 17 on primacy of EU law. This article will explain the meaning of primacy of the European Union law and the resulting problems in some EU Member States, as well as possible solutions (...) to tackle the problems. The primacy of the European Union law over the national law was recognised as one of the constitutive principles of the European Union. The article includes relevant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that deal with the rules concerning the legal requirements of the primacy of the European Union law in the EU primary law. The European Court of Justice has developed the meaning of the principle of primacy, which means that the European Union law should take precedence over national law (even over constitutional provisions) and should there be any conflicts between EU law and national law, every national court is obliged to apply the law of the European Union. The main issue of this article is analysing the principle of primacy of the European Union law over the Lithuanian law. (shrink)

In mid-2019, the controversy regarding South African runner Caster Semenya’s eligibility to participate in competitions against other female runners culminated in a Court of Arbitration for Sport judgement. Semenya possessed high endogenous testosterone levels (arguably a performance advantage), secondary to a disorder of sexual development. In this commentary, Aristotelean teleology is used to defend the existence of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as discrete categories. It is argued that once the athlete’s sex is established, they should be allowed to compete in the (...) category of their sex without obligatory medical treatment. Indeed, other athletes who possess advantageous genetic or phenotypic traits that fall outside of the human norm have been allowed to compete as humans without restraint. In both cases, if an athlete possesses the essential attributes of being a human or being male or female they should be permitted to compete in those respective categories; athletes’ eligibilities should not be based upon accidental attributes. (shrink)

The interrogation of Meletus in the Apology at 24c4–28al is not infrequently seen as a typical case of all that is intellectually and artistically dissatisfying in Plato's practice of the genre of philosophical dialogue: not only are we presented with a philosopher who makes some claim to being committed to setting a particularly stringent standard for honesty in argumentation making sophistical arguments, but we are presented also with a cardboard interlocutor who is forced by the hand of Plato to acquiesce (...) to those arguments in a fashion that is completely dissatisfying to the reader. The best anyone seems to do to save Plato from these charges of artistic incompetence and intellectual dishonesty is to appeal to such a level of historical accuracy for the text that the stupidity of Meletus' responses can be attributed to the stupidity of Meletus himself, or to point out features of the political and legal situation that might prevent Meletus from answering the questions by drawing on his true motivation—which is presumably more coherent. Taylor says of this passage: The humour of the situation is that the prosecutor cannot venture to say what he means by either of his charges without betraying the fact that, owing to the ‘amnesty’, the matters complained of are outside of the competency of the court… Hence, when Meletus is pressed to explain what he means, he has to take refuge in puerile nonsense. (shrink)

Drawing upon original manuscripts and The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, this collection represents the latest scholarship on Bentham's late and mature thought on constitutional law. The contributions cover a diverse range of major topics, from official aptitude or competency to the interests of women, and explore Bentham's writings on courts, codification, and cosmopolitanism. Together, its chapters challenge the received notion, based on early jurisprudential writings, that Bentham's constitutional thought is authoritarian, and show that Bentham, as a constitutional theorist, (...) offers a distinctive liberal perspective. Freeing Bentham's theories from their long sentences and unfamiliar terminology, these essays make accessible Bentham's subtle and important ideas on liberal democracy. By shining a light on Bentham's mature thought, this volume offers a refreshingly comprehensive, detailed, and authentic account of Bentham's theory of democracy. (shrink)

Reason Curve, Jury Competence, and the English Criminal Justice System, a cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary book, seeks to stimulate discussion and extend the debate in the area of criminal trials in light of the absence of an articulated explanation for a verdict. The book traces the history and development of the jury, from the Carolingian kings, its advancement in the English Courts following papal intervention, the impact of the Magna Carta, to its general use, current curtailment in England and (...) Wales, and re-emergence in Continental Europe. Central to the book's submission is the dictum that the jurors' franchise to deliver a cryptic verdict is 'a matter between them and their conscience... (shrink)

The browser wars case is a useful springboard for considering the principle of positive competition and the proper regulation of platform technologies. There are lessons to be culled about policy, the application of antitrust law, and the parameters of fair competition. We argue that despite Microsofts opportunistic exploitation of its proprietary code, policy makers should resist the temptation to mandate an open source code model. Vigilant anti-trust enforcement is a preferable alternative. But courts must refrain from using antitrust law (...) to favor small innovators or to constrain the economic protections inherent in intellectual property rights, since those rights are still needed to encourage innovation. On the other hand, despite the exigencies of competition, platform leaders should respect the norm of fair competition and refrain from the impulse to tilt the platform in their favor. Preservation of robust intellectual property rights, deft application of antitrust statutes, and principled competition represent the best prescription for social wealth in the New Economy. (shrink)

Over the past few years, universities in Lithuania have make changes to the legal study programs—obligatory subject Criminology moved to list of alternative optional subjects. Therefore, is increasing the number of new lawyers, who have not studied criminology, which thinking about criminals, crime victims, crime, its causes and successful impact on crime, is based on stereotype understanding of a few centuries ago. However, the new lawyers, being professionals, pre-trial investigators, advocates, prosecutors, judges play a crucial role in criminal proceedings, to (...) decide the fate of people, how to use public resources for crime control and prevention. They will make speeches during the hearing in courts savour of their complete incomprehension of processes speaking about. Purpose of the article is to assess what criminological competencies are important to lawyers today, what are the possible consequences for the Lithuanian society if lawyers do not acquire these competencies. There are used the methods of analysis, aggregation, comparison and others. (shrink)

In 2017, Italy passed a law that provides for a systematic discipline on informed consent, advance directives, and advance care planning. It ranges from decisions contextual to clinical necessity through the tool of consent/refusal to decisions anticipating future events through the tools of shared care planning and advance directives. Nothing is said in the law regarding the issue of physician assisted suicide. Following the DJ Fabo case, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of article 580 of the criminal (...) code in the part in which it does not exclude the punishment of those who facilitate the suicide when the decision has been freely and autonomously made by a person kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, the source of physical or psychological suffering that he/she considers intolerable, but fully capable of making free and conscious decisions. Such conditions and methods of execution must be verified by a public structure of the national health service, after consulting the territorially competent ethics committee. This statement admits, within strict and regulated bounds, physician assisted suicide, so widening the range of end-of-life decisions for Italian patients. Future application and critical topics will be called into question by the Italian legislator. (shrink)

Responds to critical claims that constitutionalising the right to an adequate environment would not be prudent due to difficulties making it justiciable and difficulties that could make success on the merits unlikely in cases appealing to it. Shows these difficulties are not insurmountable and do not arise from the inherent nature of rights or of environmental problems. What surmounting them does involve, though, is ensuring that courts have the requisite institutional and constitutional competence, which critics consider to be, (...) respectively, unfeasible and undesirable. It is shown that there is no serious obstacle to the development of the requisite institutional competence, which, if necessary, can be achieved through the establishment of specialist environmental courts. As for questions of courts’ legitimate constitutional competence, these arise not only for environmental rights, but for fundamental rights more generally. Also points out that litigation is not the only, or most significant, purpose in constitutionalising the right. (shrink)

Typology of perpetrators of domestic violence The objective of the research conducted by the author was to obtain an answer to the question: could we distinguish different types of intrafamily violence perpetrators considering a specified profile of personality factors and temperament traits and how domestic violence perpetrators cope with stressful situations? The research was conducted on a group of 325 men who were convicted pursuant to article 207§1 & 2 of harassment over family members. In terms of a gender the (...) group was homogenous. On the basis of the literature on the subject, the following personality traits of violence perpetrators were categorised: locus of control, self-acceptance, aggressiveness, hostility, intelligent quotient and temperament traits. The following research techniques were employed in the study: the Wechsler Intelligence Scale, Berger's Self-Acceptance Scale, the Delta Questionnaire by R. Drwal, the SABD Questionnaire - Buss-Durkee, Formal Characteristics of Behaviour - Temperament Inventory by J. Strelau, the WCQ questionnaire by R.S. Lazarus and S. Folkman, a categorised interview and an analysis of court records. As a result of the analysis conducted on a group of the studied sample of violence perpetrators, four subgroups, differing in terms of selected personality traits, were specified. They are reactively aggressive perpetrators, perpetrators of low preventive competences, psychopathic and retaliatory perpetrators and perpetrators with a big adaptive potential. Further on, four distinguished groups have been characterised in terms of stress-coping strategies, and psychological processes of coping with stress proceeded differently in the research group. (shrink)

This point of view compares the issue of informed patient consent primarily as it operates in Australia and the United Kingdom. It affords an overview, also, of the applicable law in the United States and Canada. It particularly focuses on the legal test to be applied to patient consent as established in the Bolam case in the United Kingdom. The case, following its approval by the House of Lords, holds that the negligent standard in patient consent situations is to be (...) determined, in cases of dispute, in accordance with standards as viewed by a proper body of competent medical practitioners. By contrast, the law in the United States is premised on the notion of the fundamental right of patients to determine what should or should not be done with their own bodies. In Australia the Bolam test has been rejected by the High Court of Australia following earlier decisions in the State Supreme Courts. The Australian courts did not accept that the setting of standards by the medical profession was an acceptable way of determining the entitlements of a patient who has suffered harm. The author places this discussion in the context of greater community awareness of medical procedures, the heightened accountability of professionals and the increasing practice of having a substantial patient input into medical decisions. He also suggests that the differing social and professional attitudes to authority and fundamental rights to be found between Australia and the United Kingdom have influenced the outcome of the cases in the higher courts of both countries. He suggests that the Bolam test is an illustration of the tendency of authority in the United Kingdom to believe that 'Nanny know best'. (shrink)