This article reviews the medieval law background of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the state as it has been exercised over incompetent persons who formerly were competent adults, concluding that the fiduciary standard implied in the statute De Prerogative Regis (1324), which is the basis for modern guardianship status, requires that the court and guardian adopt an attitude of respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though they were to be accountable to the person himself, were he to recover (...) his faculties and become competent once more. This ficuciary responsibility, originating in the device of the "use" or trust employed for the management of the estates of lunatics, contrasts with the self-interested feudal guardianship used for the custody of "natural fools" or "idiots", who were under paternalistic arrangements. The article argues that because the determination of legal incompetence and the consequent transfer of custody of the person and property of an incompetent person to the state would result in a drastic forfeiture of liberty and property interests were it not for the fiduciary obligation owed by the state to the incompetent, the state is under an obligation to exercise its fiduciary duties in good faith and may not impose states policies or advance state interests of its own in the supervision of the affairs of incompetent persons, apart from interests arising legitimately out of the state's institutional interest in providing competent administration for the benefit of the incompetents themselves. Keywords: concept of the person, Cruzan, feudalism, guardianship, incompetent person, parens patriae CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Different legal expert systems may be incompatible with each other: A user in characterizing the same situation by answering the questions presented in a consultation can be led to contradictory inferences. Such systems can be “synthesized” to help users avoid such contradictions by alerting them that other relevant systems are available to be consulted as they are responding to questions. An example of potentially incompatible, related legal expert systems is presented here ‐ ones for the New Jersey murder statute and (...) the celebrated Quinlan case, along with one way of synthesizing them to avoid such incompatibility. (shrink)

Three claims are widely held and individually plausible, but jointly inconsistent: (1) Negative actions (intentional omissions, refrainments, etc.) are genuine actions; (2) All actions are events; (3) Some, and perhaps all, negative actions aren't events, but absences thereof (when I omit to raise my arm, no omission-event occurs; what happens is just that no arm-raising occurs). Drawing on resources from metaphysics and the philosophy of language, I argue that (3) is false. Negative actions are events, just as ordinary actions are. (...) Moreover, each token negative action is identical to a token positive event, so we can adopt this realist view of negative actions without adding metaphysically negative entities (absences, negative states of affairs) to our ontology. (shrink)

It is typically assumed that actions are events, but there is a growing consensus that negative actions, like omissions and refrainments, are not events, but absences thereof. If so, then we must either deny the obvious, that we can exercise our agency by omitting and refrainment, or give up on event-based theories of agency. I trace the consensus to the assumption that negative action sentences are negative-existentials, and argue that this is false. The best analysis of negative action sentences treats (...) them as quantifying over omissions and refrainments, conceived of as events. (shrink)

Ethics for Journalists critically explores many of the dilemmas that journalists face in their work and supports journalists in good ethical decision-making. From building trust, to combatting disinformation, to minimizing harm to vulnerable people through responsible suicide reporting, this book provides substantial analysis of key contemporary ethical debates and offers guidance on how to address them. Revised and updated throughout, this third edition covers: the influence of press freedom and misinformation on trust; the novel ethical challenges presented by social media; (...) the need for diversity of sources and in the newsroom, specifically relating to gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and disability; issues around vulnerable people-reporting traumatic events, bereaved people, suicide and privacy; health journalism and reporting a pandemic; the impact of regulation on professional standards. Taking an accessible and engaging approach, including expert reflections on personal and professional experience, Ethics for Journalists provides a wealth of insight for those in journalism, from students and trainees to specialist correspondents and experienced editors. (shrink)

Much of the existing philosophical literature on BDSM focuses on questions about the ethics of BDSM. But there is an underlying question here regarding the nature of BDSM, one which remains largely unaddressed. In this paper, I take that metaphysical question to be prior to the normative one. In other words: it will be important to have a clear view of what BDSM is before we go on to evaluate it. -/- This is a paper about the nature of BDSM (...) and BDSM activities: what they are like, what makes them unique, and the ways in which these activities might be valuable. Here, I work from the philosophical literature on games to analyze structured erotic encounters (or “scenes”) in BDSM. In the first half of the paper, I argue that BDSM scenes are games, and that understanding them in this way yields important insights into the roles of agency, autonomy, and value in BDSM. In the second half of the paper, I map points of connection between this view of scenes-as-games and the existing literature on BDSM in sexual ethics, in order to illuminate the ways in which a moral evaluation of BDSM scenes might proceed from this analysis. (shrink)

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con- reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory (...) role not played by pro- reasons. Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con- reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con- reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic. (shrink)

It is often assumed that, while ordinary actions are events, ‘negative actions’ are absences of events. I claim that a negative action is an ordinary, ‘positive’ event that plays a certain role. I argue that my approach can answer standard objections to the identity of negative actions and positive events.

I claim that a whole is identical to its parts. Many find this claim incredible: it seems that a whole and its parts must be distinct, for the whole is one thing while its parts are many things. Byeong-uk Yi has developed a version of this argument which exploits the resources of plural logic. Yi provides logical analyses of the predicates ‘one’ and ‘many’ which seem to show that nothing can satisfy them both. But there are two senses of the (...) word ‘one’. One of these senses is not captured by Yi’s analysis, and in this sense of the word, it is logically possible for many things to be one. Moreover, we should only believe that a whole is one thing in this sense, not that it is one thing in the sense Yi has analysed. Thus, we can identify wholes with their parts without contradiction. (shrink)

Metaphysicians of various stripes claim that a single object can have more than one exact location in space or time – e.g. endurantists claim that an object persists by being ‘all there’ at different moments in time. Antony Eagle has developed a formal theory of location which is prima facie consistent with multi-location, but Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi argue that the theory is unattractive to multi-location theorists on other grounds. I examine their charge that Eagle’s theory won’t allow an (...) endurantist to account for certain cases of mereological change. I argue that the charge sticks, but not for the reasons Costa and Calosi think. Along the way, I explore an issue which is underexplored in their paper, namely, how an endurantist might modify Eagle’s theory to incorporate a parthood relation which obtains, not absolutely, but only relative to times. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that Composition Entails Identity (CEI): that is, a whole is identical to all of its parts, taken together. CEI seems to be inconsistent, since it seems to require that the parts of a whole possess incompatible number properties (for instance, being one thing and being many things). I show that these number properties are, in fact, compatible.

Saba Bazargan-Forward (2022, Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability), conceives of agency as divided into two functions: a deliberative function (deciding what to do) and an executive function (acting on that decision). He claims that these two functions can distributed across multiple agents, and that this has important moral consequences: if you outsource the executive function to me, then the practical reasons you take there to be, for A-ing, are relevant to whether I can permissibly A and to how my A-ing reflects (...) on my character. However, the natural way of understanding the 'divided agency' model --- i.e. that in cases of divided agency the executor literally acts on the deliberator's reasons --- is problematic and doesn't seem to reflect Bazargan-Forward's considered view, while his considered view doesn't seem to support his moral judgments, either about the permissibility of the executor's behaviour or of their character. I suggest an alternative to Bazargan-Forward's 'divided agency' model and consider what moral judgments it supports. (shrink)

It’s generally assumed that, if an agent x acts by ϕ-ing, then there occurs an event which is x’s ϕ-ing. But what about when an agent tries to do something? Are there such things as attempts? The standard answer is ‘Yes’. But in a series of articles, and now a book, David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the answer is ‘No’: what happens when x tries to ϕ isn’t that an attempt occurs; rather, what happens is simply that a certain subjunctive (...) conditional fact obtains; x tries to ϕ just in case, had all the necessary conditions for success obtained, x would have intentionally ϕ-ed. I defend the existence of attempts. Following Ruben, I frame the issue in terms of the logical form of trying sentences. Against Ruben’s view that such sentences express subjunctive conditionals, I argue that they express existential quantifications over attempts qua events. Thus, trying sentences are true only if attempts qua events exist. (shrink)

According to ‘composition as identity’, a composite object is identical to all its parts taken together. Thus, a plurality of composite objects is identical to the plurality of those objects’ parts. This has the consequence that, e.g., the bricks which compose a brick wall are identical to the atoms which compose those bricks, and hence that the plurality of bricks must include each of those atoms. This consequence of CAI is in direct conflict with the standard analysis of plural definite (...) descriptions. According to that analysis, the denotation of ‘the bricks’ can include only bricks. It seems, then, that if CAI is true, ‘the bricks’ doesn’t denote anything; more generally, if CAI is true, there are fewer pluralities than we ordinarily think. I respond to this argument by developing an alternative analysis of plural descriptions which allows the denotation of ‘the bricks’ to include non-bricks. Thus, we can accept CAI, while still believing in all the pluralities we could want. As a bonus, my approach to plural descriptions and plural comprehension blocks recent arguments to the effect that CAI entails compositional nihilism. (shrink)

What does it take for a property to be a social property? This question is different from questions about what it takes for a property to be socially constructed. That is: it is one thing to be social, it is another to be socially constructed. Compared to questions about social construction, this question about sociality has received relatively little attention in social metaphysics. Here, I work from a very specific set of observations which arise from the social metaphysics literature to (...) uncover a sufficient condition on sociality for properties, a condition which I argue all non-social properties fail to satisfy. (shrink)

Intuitively, collective nouns are pseudo-singular: a collection of things (a pair of people, a flock of birds, etc.) just is the things that make ‘it’ up. But certain facts about natural language seem to count against this view. In short, distributive predicates and numerals interact with collective nouns in ways that they seemingly shouldn’t if those nouns are pseudo-singular. We call this set of issues ‘the distribution problem’. To solve it, we propose a modification to cover-based semantics. On this semantics, (...) the interpretation of distributive predicates and numerals depends on a cover, where the choice of cover is strongly semantically constrained by the noun with which they interact. (shrink)

Unlike gender inequality, racial inequality primarily accumulates across generations. In this article, Dembroff and Payton argue that transracial identification undermines collective reckoning with that injustice.

Quine says that ontology is about what there is, suggesting that to be ontologically committed to Fs is to be committed to accepting a sentence which existentially quantifies over Fs. Kit Fine argues that this gets the logical form of some ontological theses wrong. Fine is right that some ontological theses cannot be rendered simply as ‘There are Fs’. But the root of the problem has yet to be recognized, either by Fine or by his critics. Sometimes to adopt an (...) ontological thesis is not merely to commit yourself to there being at least one F; it is to take a stand on which Fs there are. Once we recognize the ‘particularity’ of these ontological theses, we can adequately express them within the confines of a Quinean approach to ontology and ontological commitment. (shrink)

According to Composition as Identity, a whole is distinct from each of its parts individually, but identical to all of them taken together. It is sometimes claimed that, if you accept CAI, then your belief in a whole is ‘ontologically innocent’ with respect to your belief in its parts. This claim is false. But the defender of CAI can claim a different advantage for her view. Following Agustín Rayo, I distinguish ontology from plethology. I then show that CAI allows us (...) to introduce an interesting notion of ‘plethological innocence’ which would otherwise collapse into the notion of ‘ontological innocence’, and that CAI renders belief in composite objects plethologically innocent. (shrink)

Palmer defends the ‘Constitution View’ of omissions. According to this view, every omission is constituted by, though not identical to, some positive event. I argue that Palmer’s version of this view can’t do all the work he wants it to do. First, it can’t provide an answer to the ontological question to which he addresses himself: ‘What kind of thing is an omission?’ Second, it doesn’t give us the resources to determine which positive events serve as the ultimate constituters of (...) omissions which seem to occur over long periods of time ; at least, not without embracing consequences Palmer wishes to avoid. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the nature of saintly or heroic acts, which, according to J.O. Urmson, exist as a fourth, less traditional category of moral actions. According to this division, heroic acts are those, which have positive moral value, but cannot be demanded of an individual as their duty; however, this paper argues that Urmson is mistaken in his claim that a consequentialist ethical framework is the most capable of accounting for heroic acts. Furthermore, this paper claims that an Aristotelian (...) account is the most appropriate ethical theory to consider, which could better countenance the existence of heroic acts. (shrink)

Many natural languages include plural terms, i.e., terms which denote many individuals at once. Are there also superplural terms, i.e., terms which denote many pluralities of individuals at once? Some philosophers say ‘Yes’, citing a range of sentence-types which apparently can’t be analyzed in a first-order plural logic, but which can be analyzed in a superplural one. We argue that all the data presented in favor of the superplural can, in fact, be analyzed using only first-order resources. The key is (...) to add to ordinary plural logic a new notion of a generalized cover. A generalized cover reflects how interlocutors in a conversation may divide a salient plurality into many subpluralities, which can then be involved in reference and predication. With generalized covers in place, all the apparently troublesome sentences can be easily handled. Our approach can also be extended to account, not only for linguistic data which seem to favor the superplural, but also for other phenomena involving plurals. The result is a unified approach to natural language plurals on which superplurals are analyzed away. (shrink)

Some stories of moral exemplars motivate us to emulate their admirable attitudes and behaviors, but why do some exemplars motivate us more than others? We systematically studied how motivation to emulate is influenced by the similarity between a reader and an exemplar in social or cultural background (Relatability) and how personally costly or demanding the exemplar’s actions are (Attainability). Study 1 found that university students reported more inspiration and related feelings after reading true stories about the good deeds of a (...) recent fellow alum, compared to a famous moral exemplar from decades past. Study 2A developed a battery of short moral exemplar stories that more systematically varied Relatability and Attainability, along with a set of non-moral exemplar stories for comparison. Studies 2B and 2C examined the path from the story type to relatively low stakes altruism (donating to charity and intentions to volunteer) through perceived attainability and relatability, as well as elevation and pleasantness. Together, our studies suggest that it is primarily the relatability of the moral exemplars, not the attainability of their actions, that inspires more prosocial motivation, at least regarding acts that help others at a relatively low cost to oneself. (shrink)

Increasingly, medical records are being stored in computer databases that allow for efficiencies in providing treatment and in the processing of clinical and financial services. Computerization of medical records has also diminished patient privacy and, in particular, has increased the potential for misuse, especially in the form of nonconsensual secondary use of personally identifiable records. Organizations that store and use medical records have had to establish security measures, prompted partially by an inconsistent patchwork of legal standards that vary from state (...) to state. There is widespread appreciation among policy makers regarding the need for legal reform. The Health Information and Portability Accountability Act of 1996 mandated that the Administration develop regulations regarding the control of medical records. The Administration has offered regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services. Survey data reveal what healthcare professionals who have access to sensitive medical records believe are the greatest threats to patients' privacy. The overlap between Administration proposals and the responses of healthcare professionals is striking. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

A review of Jonathan Payton's excellent book, Negative Actions (CUP).

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands (...) such scrutiny. (shrink)

Deflationists about negative actions say that omissions and refrainments do not exist; Neo-Davidsonians say that they do. In this paper, I defend Deflationism against Payton’s (2021) claim that it fails to account for the purported fact that negative actions are perceptible, and that Neo-Davidsonianism is preferable because it succeeds in doing so. I argue that, insofar we are engaging in arguments from perception, they actually tell against Neo-Davidsonianism.

Deflationists about negative actions say that omissions and refrainments do not exist; Neo-Davidsonians say that they do. In this paper, I defend Deflationism against Payton’s (2021) claim that it fails to account for the purported fact that negative actions are perceptible, and that Neo-Davidsonianism is preferable because it succeeds in doing so. I argue that, insofar we are engaging in arguments from perception, they actually tell against Neo-Davidsonianism.

Starting with my (1988) and largely continued by David Ruben’s instructive (2013a), a lively debate has occurred over how one is to analyze the concepts of true succession and membership of a tradition in order to identify the source of the intractability typically found in disputes in which two groups each claim that it, but not its rival, is in the tradition of some earlier group. This debate was initially between myself (2013a, 2013b) and Ruben (2013b, 2013c) but later involved (...) Samuel Lebens (2013a, 2013b), Jonathan Payton (2013a, 2013b), Martin Beckstein (2014a, 2014b) and Ruben (2013d, 2014a, 2014b). The time seems ripe to summarize the main lines of the debate to try to draw some lessons from it as we go along and then indicate possible further lines of inquiry. (shrink)