In this paper I argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations. Using the poker game analogy is imprudent, its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business, and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor-management negotiations. I propose and defend a model of ideal family decision-making as a superior model to the poker game.

This essay tells the story of the development of two of the most significant and controversial entitlement programs in twentieth-century U.S. history—collective bargaining and affirmative action. It focuses on the nexus between them—how New Deal empowerment of labor unions contributed to racial discrimination, and thus fed the Great Society race-based programs of affirmative action. The evolving relationship between the courts and the bureaucracies is emphasized, particularly how the judiciary went from an obstacle to an enabler of the entitlement (...) state. (shrink)

In this paper I explain the present adversarial collective bargaining process (ACB) and then critique it on legal and ethical grounds. A new methodology, that I describe as the collaborative collective bargaining process (CCB), will then be explained and similarly critiqued. I argue that replacing the present ACB model with the CCB model will result in better long-term results for all parties concerned. This is because the ACB model is comparable, in many respects, to the adversarial (...) process used in court litigation. It is a combat model based on power. ACB makes the battle lines clear, and it grants victory to the more convincing display of power, but it leaves casualties. Indeed it cannot operate except upon the casualties of the opposing party, and those casualties are the basis for ever-renewed combat. Tactics employed in ACB to achieve victory include deception, lying and the abandonment of truth as a moral value. I argue that, in sharp contrast, CCB can foster an environment which encourages candor and truthfulness. By following the CCB model, the parties can avoid the negative and self-defeating elements of ACB and can work together toward mutually beneficial goals by the use of an ethically defensible approach to labor negotiations. (shrink)

이 논문은 우리 사회의 경제적 현실에서 아주 중대한 문제로 떠오른 노사협상에 관한 문제, 특히 고용인들이 선출한 대표자 집단과 고용주가 임명한 경영자 집단 사이에 이루어지는 단체교섭에 관한 문제를 조명하고 있다. 이에 따라 먼저 이 논문은 현행 단체교섭 형태의 윤리적 심각성을 파악하고 있다. 노사 양 측 사이의 뿌리 깊은 불신으로 인해 서로를 무너뜨리기 위한 온갖 술수와 모략으로 점철되는 단체교섭의 문제점을 파악하고 있다. 그리고 이 논문은 이러한 현행 단체교섭을 서로에 대한 힘만 과시하면서 대부분 합의에 실패하고 마는, 그래서 극단적으로 감정의 골만 깊어지는 ‘적대적 단체교섭’으로 (...) 규정하고 있다. 이런 까닭에 이 논문은 이런 문제들의 근본적인 이유가 서로에 대한 뿌리 깊은 불신이라고 보고, 이를 해소시키기 위한 윤리적 방안으로서 상호 신뢰 수립의 원칙을 제시하고 있다. 그리고 이러한 신뢰 수립의 원칙을 통해 현행 단체교섭의 결정적 난점들을 수정할 수 있는 ‘협력적 단체교섭’으로의 전환이 이루어져야 한다는 점을 역설하고 있다. 협력적 단체교섭으로의 전환에 대한 윤리적 당위를 요청하면서, 이를 위해 이 논문은 노사가 서로 협력하는 단체교섭의 실제 형태를 다섯 단계로 묘사하고 있다. 다섯 단계의 주요 과정들은 현행의 적대적 단체교섭과 달리, 정직성, 공평성, 공개성 등을 기초로 한 합리적인 협상 모델임이 드러나도록 했다. 그리고 그에 따라 예상해볼 수 있는 협력적인 단체교섭 모델의 윤리적 장점들도 드러나도록 했다. (shrink)

The article reveals the existence of a greater sensitivity than in the past towards equality. Nevertheless, equality policies have failed to rise above the limits imposed by a culture that sees the male prevail in industrial relations. Both domestic law and European legislation have in uenced collective bargaining in Italy as regards equal opportunities. The presence of women in bargaining, in equal opportunities committees and in study groups has led to success regarding a core of issues such (...) as sexual harassment, positive action, working hours and parental leave and has favoured a positive praxis both for equality and bargaining between which there is positive synergy. The article discusses the problems which hinder a general acceptance of equality bargaining and a bargaining model that places the female worker among the subjects to be represented. (shrink)

The article examines gender equality in collective bargaining and looks at the extent to which gender and equal opportunities issues have been mainstreamed in industrial relations systems in Italy where, despite the existence of old and new legislation on gender equality, there are persistently low levels of female employment and the precarious workforce is made up predominantly of women. The central question addressed in the article is whether the injection of a gender mainstreaming approach in the Italian (...) class='Hi'>collective bargaining system, combined with legislative measures, may improve the situation of women in the context of both public and private spheres. In particular, the article looks at whether gender mainstreaming has the potential to pave the way towards an ethos of substantive equality at the workplace, whereby women enter the workforce on equal terms and men are in a position to share the dual responsibilities of paid and unpaid work. The article maintains that gender mainstreaming may fulfil its transformative potential as a catalyst for changing both the conceptual and analytical tools which the law deploys, provided it is envisaged as a three-fold strategy involving simultaneous processes of deconstruction, replacement and inclusive measures, together with deliberative forms of democracy and the imposition of a statutory positive duty on public authorities to mainstream equality. (shrink)

(2012). Resistance! Do Teachers Dare to Strike and Insist Upon Collective Bargaining in this Neoliberal Age? Educational Studies: Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 499-500.

When Leland Miles arrived as the University of Bridgeport's new president in 1974, the institution had substantial financial problems, declining enrollments, and a newly unionized faculty. This essay is a first-person account of his efforts to work with an immature union and his attempt to save the Liberal Arts at a time of growing student demand for professional degrees.

My commentary calls attention to what makes Mr. Bowie's paper well worth intensive consideration. In my brief evaluation, however, I only lay out three incoherent elements of his proposed family model of labor-management relations.I argue that complete job security is not compatible with complete freedom to change firms; that, in practice, such security for all employees is not compatible with the shifting demand of our economic system, and that the model includes two kinds of spouse relationships — one affectional and (...) another competitive — that are incoherent with one another. My point is not that Mr. Bowie's model is fatally flawed, but that it needs to be improved. (shrink)

Despite experiencing an early and protracted neoliberal transformation, France has exhibited an acutely ambiguous stance towards neoliberal practice. This is illustrated by, for example, regular nationwide protests opposed to policies with an overtly neoliberal flavour, or the coexistence of heavy taxation and a profound financialisation of its economy. This article seeks to explain why neoliberalism successfully developed in France, despite such an ambiguity. The focus will be placed on the transformation of labour relations, which will reveal the important role played (...) by both the technocratic elite and firm-level negotiations in legitimating neoliberal practice. It will be argued that while several relevant sociological explanations offer some valuable insights for making sense of neoliberalism’s successful development in France, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘passive revolution’ provides a very fruitful basis upon which to capture the singularity of the French case. (shrink)

Democracy, as collective self-government by citizens, rests on citizens’ capacity to bargain in good faith with those whose interests are not their own. Fair bargains that ensure adequate security and welfare rest on an implicit agreement: Each citizen recognizes that sectional interests (including our conceptions of ideal justice) will never be fully realized, but they are better off inside the bargain than outside of it, and will bargain again another day. Striking and revising civic bargains depend on the education (...) of citizens: In aggregate, the citizenry must develop the requisite civic skills, political knowledge, and capacity for judgment. (shrink)

Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? -/- We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in (...) academia can be disadvantaged in such situations by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner is disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration. (shrink)

We consider a spatial bargaining model where players collectively choose a facility location on a two-dimensional rectilinear distance space through bargaining using the unanimity rule. We show that as players become infinitely patient, their stationary subgame perfect equilibrium utilities converge to the utilities that satisfy the lexicographic maximin utility criterion introduced by Sen.

This second Cambridge University Press collection of papers by Vernon L. Smith, a creator of the field of experimental economics, includes many of his primary authored and coauthored contributions on bargaining and market behavior between 1990 and 1998. The essays explore the use of laboratory experiments to test propositions derived from economics and game theory. They also investigate the relationship between experimental economics and psychology, particularly the field of evolutionary psychology, using the latter to broaden the perspective in which (...) experimental results are interpreted. The volume complements Professor Smith's earlier work by demonstrating the importance of institutional features of markets in understanding behavior and market performance. Specific themes investigated include rational choice, the notion of fairness, game theory and extensive form experimental interactions, institutions and market behavior, and the study of laboratory stock markets. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the merit of bargaining theory, in its economic and ecological forms, as a model for understanding variation in the frequency of participation in cooperative fishing among men of Ifaluk atoll in Micronesia. Two determinants of bargaining power are considered: resource control and a bargainer’s utility gain for his expected share of the negotiated resource. Several hypotheses which relte cultural and life-course parameters to bargaining power are tested against data on the frequency of (...) cooperative sail-fishing participation. Consistent with predictions generated from bargaining theory, we show that (1) age is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, (2) men of highranking clans and men with high levels of education fish less than men of low-ranking clans and less-educated men, (3) men with high expected utility gains from fishing returns fish more than men with low expected utility gains, (4) number of dependents is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, and (5) the number of young genetic offspring residing with a man is positively correlated with cooperative fishing participation, whereas the number of genetic offspring more than 13 years old who are residing with a man is negatively correlated with cooperative fishing participation. (shrink)

Collective labour disputes are inevitably related to the institutes of a dispute, since the employees and employers often fail to reach a consensus on a particular issue. Moreover, the employers do not always follow the agreed terms and conditions of the collective agreement. In order to disclose the problems of the settlement of collective labour disputes in Lithuania, it is necessary to analyse the conception and classification of the institutes of dispute, distinguishing the conception of collective (...) labour disputes, the procedure of settlement of such disputes, and possible methods of settlement with the emphasis on the institutes of a strike. This article also seeks to reveal the peculiarities of the cases that settle individual labour disputes, the subject of which at least partially includes the provisions of the collective agreement, and collective labour disputes regarding the legality of strike. (shrink)

This review article discusses the conception of collective rights necessary to ground contemporary entrenchments of minority educational rights, Indigenous rights and collective bargaining rights, as discussed in Miodrag Jovanović’s book, Collective Rights: A Legal Theory. Jovanović argues for a role for value collectivism in elucidating a rationale for the entrenchment of rights held by what he conceives of as pre-legally existing groups with interests not reducible to those of their individual members. This approach can offer an (...) explanation for the entrenchment of minority educational rights and Indigenous rights. The article extols Jovanović’s attempt to grapple with an explanation for rights not explained within standard liberal theory, even in Will Kymlicka’s attempt to justify minority rights within liberalism. The review also critiques the argument offered by Jovanović. First, the review argues that a full-fledged adoption of value collectivism is not necessary to provide a justification for irreducibly collective rights and that the unnecessary adoption of such a theoretical construct may, in practical terms, work counter to the ongoing entrenchment of the rights it seeks to justify, thus becoming what it will categorize as a ‘self-threatening theory’. Second, the review argues that Jovanović’s stark division of rights held by pre-legally existing groups and legally constituted collective entities undermines his account’s ability to explain collective bargaining rights of trade unions that are entrenched in some jurisdictions. (shrink)

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend (...) on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions. (shrink)

In 1926, François Machon, a Swiss physician who lived for many years in Argentina, organised the restitution of a religious garment that had been stolen from the cathedral of Paraguay in the late 1860s and was kept in the Swiss Musée d'ethnographie de Neuchâtel (MEN) in exchange for a small part of his ethnographic collection. In the following decade, he donated more of his own collections to the MEN, but also negotiated as a go-between for the donation of his son (...) Roger's collections. On one occasion he managed, again, to arrange the exchange of a proto-historic Swiss lake-dweller axe for a small collection of Amerindian artefacts. The Machons' case sheds light on the logics of donations of a private collection holder, his tactics and strategies of persuasion, and his entangled web of affects, straddling two countries and two networks of fidelity in a context of migration. It also helps us understand the complex rationalities of acquisition and the polysemy of a peripheral municipal cultural institution. This case informs us about the rationales of a peripheral museum and on the criteria used to assess the quality of donators and their collections; it illustrates the asymmetry of the exchange values of European and South American, ancient and contemporary, artefacts, and the unequal vocality of the different actors. Similarly, it gives us a perspective on the rationales that were mobilised to justify giving away parts of its collections. The exchange of artefacts between the Machons and the MEN helps us understand museums not only as patrimonial of scientific institutions, but also as economic actors, whose agents convince, gamble, bargain, and negotiate, and try to make best use of their resources, symbolic and monetary, to increase their assets and social benefits. (shrink)

Recent labor disputes between registered nurses and hospitals in Minnesota, California, and Pennsylvania raise moral questions about nurses’ professional obligations, nurses’ right to collectively bargain to preserve or improve wages, benefits, and working conditions, and patients’ right to medical care. Deontology and consequentialism focus too narrowly on nurses and patients, and thus ignore the nature of the healthcare community as a system of competing interests. When considered in this context, nurses’ strikes are shown to be consistent with this system of (...) competing interests, and thus are morally permissible. (shrink)

Collective bargaining is the main vehicle for labour worldwide to negotiate wages, benefits, retirement policies, training and other terms of working with management in both the public and private sectors. Labour economists have long been active in modelling the relations between collective bargaining agreements, labour markets and social welfare conditions. This book presents a theoretical model of unions which offers a unified treatment of the centralisation of bargaining, the credibility of labour contracts, the unionisation of (...) labour markets and the relative bargaining power of the union. Tapio Palokangas develops the microfoundations of bargaining and examines collective bargaining interacting with public policy, investment and growth, and international trade and specialisation. In conclusion Professor Palokangas challenges the commonly held view that collective bargaining has a negative impact on economics welfare, and argues that with the existence of market failure, collective bargaining can be welfare enhancing. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of the University of Bridgeport's Faculty Council in relation to the faculty union. The Faculty Council is a governing body composed of elected faculty representatives from different schools and departments within the university. Faculty Council leaders facilitated the certification of AAUP as the faculty's bargaining agent in 1973 and, under the author's leadership, the faculty petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to decertify the union in 1991. The author participated on the picket line during (...) the 1975, 1978 and 1987 faculty strikes, but crossed the picket line during the 1990 strike. (shrink)

For decades, policy-makers in government, development banks and foundations, NGOs, researchers and students have struggled with the problem of how to protect people who are displaced from their homes and livelihoods by development projects. This book addresses these concerns and explores how debates often become deadlocked between 'managerial' and 'movementist' perspectives. Using development ethics to determine the rights and responsibilities of various stakeholders, the authors find that displaced people must be empowered so as to share equitably in benefits rather than (...) being victimized. They propose a governance model for development projects that would transform conflict over displacement into a more manageable collective bargaining process and would empower displaced people to achieve equitable results. Their book will be valuable for readers in a wide range of fields including ethics, development studies, politics and international relations as well as policy making, project management and community development. (shrink)

Most of the literature on phase one trials has focused on ethical and safety issues in research on patients with advanced cancer, but this article focuses on healthy, adult subjects. The article makes six specific recommendations for protecting the rights and welfare of healthy subjects in phase one trials: 1) because phase one trials are short in duaration (usually 1 to 3 months), researchers should gather more data on the short-term and long-term risks of participation in phase one studies by (...) healthy subjects; 2) researchers should develop strict inclusion/exclusion criteria that exclude unhealthy or vulnerable subjects, such as decisionally impaired people, in phase one studies; 3) subjects should not participate in more than one phase one study at the same time and should wait at least 30 days between participating in different studies; 4) researchers should develop a database to keep track of phase one participants; 5) subjects should be guaranteed a minimum wage equivalent to the equivalent type of unskilled labor, but there should be no upper limits on wages; and 6) subjects should be allowed to engage in collective bargaining with research sponsors. *Disclaimer: The ideas and opinions expressed in this article are the authors' personal views and do not represent the views of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National Institutes of Health, or the United States government. (shrink)

Thesis: The exclusion of organized labor/management issues from the principal arenas for business ethics study and discussions needs to be remedied. The paper develops this thesis in three steps: 1) Exclusion: A careful examination of select textbooks, journals, and conferences provides evidence as to the virtual absence of unions and such crucial organized labor/management issues as labor organizing and collective bargaining; 2) Inclusion: A series of brief arguments favoring inclusion of these issues in business ethics based on the (...) notion of privileged institutions, adversarial posturing, the societal benefits, and globalization; 3) Suggestions: Some practical, cooperative initiatives involving the academy, management and labor, such as, labor officials as guest speakers and members of business school committees, internships in labor organizations, training workshops in business ethics for labor leaders, fora for joint management/labor discussions of issues each group faces in the economy and the legislatures. (shrink)

Codes of conduct are the main tools to privately regulate worker rights in global value chains. Scholars have shown that while codes may improve outcome standards (such as occupational health and safety), they have had limited impact on process rights (such as freedom of association and collective bargaining). Scholars have, though, only provided vague or general explanations for this empirical finding. We address this shortcoming by providing a holistic and detailed explanation, and argue that codes, in their current (...) form, have limited impact on trade union rights due to (i) buyers paying lip service to trade union rights, (ii) workers being treated as passive objects of regulation in codes of conduct, (iii) auditing being unable to detect and remediate violations of trade union rights, (iv) codes emphasizing parallel means of organizing, (v) suppliers having limited incentives for compliance, and (vi) codes being unable to open up space for union organizing when leveraged in grassroots struggles. Our arguments suggest that there is no quick fix for codes’ limited impact on trade union rights, and that codes, in their current form, have limited potential to improve trade union rights. We conclude by discussing ways in which codes of conduct, and private regulation of worker rights more generally, could be transformed to more effectively address trade union rights. (shrink)

How might good work – skilled, autonomous work which affords workers opportunities for meaningful social cooperation in decent conditions – be made available to all? I evaluate five commonly advanced strategies: an unregulated labor market, egalitarian redistribution of resources, state regulation, collective bargaining, and workplace democracy. Each, I argue, has significant limitations. An unregulated labor market ignores workers' unduly weak bargaining power vis-à-vis employers. Egalitarian redistribution alone fails to solve this problem due to distinctive and endemic imperfections (...) of labor markets. Direct state regulation is insufficiently context-sensitive and insufficiently dynamic in the face of technological and other developments. Collective bargaining gives workers only indirect and sometimes costly influence over their working conditions. And workplace democracy leaves workers vulnerable to collective action problems induced by competition between firms. I argue, however, that these strategies can be complemented in a promising way by ‘syndicalist economic democracy’: direct worker participation in the government of the economy, largely specific to particular occupations or economic sectors but above the level of the individual workplace. (shrink)

Plantation workers have seemingly little opportunities for labour agency, defined as the worker’s ability to act and improve their conditions. In response to a call for a better understanding of the horizontal dimension shaping labour agency, this article questions what local factors determine the worker’s ability to act by analysing the institutional constraints embedded in the national context through a mixed methods approach. A combination of qualitative and quantitative data is used to understand what shapes and constrains the potential for (...) labour agency in the case of plantation workers in the pineapple sector of Costa Rica. We provide new empirical evidence of the relation between the local opportunity structure—proxied by perceived job security and union awareness—and labour agency in terms of a worker’s intention to choose forthright (voice), evasive (exit) or repressed (loyalty) actions. The model results indicate that a lack of job security and a lack of union awareness significantly reduce the likelihood to use forthright actions (such as voicing concerns, striking or joining a union) compared to evasive (such as leaving the job) or repressed actions (such as doing nothing). In addition, the qualitative analysis of the local opportunity structure identifies four institutional constraints: weak employment protection, vulnerability of migrant workers, limited workers’ representation and insufficient labour law enforcement. Besides overcoming these institutional constraints, empowering workers to make their voices heard also requires awareness raising about their collective bargaining rights and more job security. (shrink)

A vast amount of empirical research has been compiled on labor laws yet more is called for in view of the rapid changes occurring in this field. This article discusses the attempts to individualize the relationship, as well as make labor markets more flexible. A sociological perspective on the post-war situation viewed the industrial system as stable and self-adjusting. The article emphasizes the emergence of new data sources and methods and considers the role of theory in shaping the empirical research (...) agenda. Labor legislations only provide the structure within which collective bargaining would occur, while abstaining from directly influencing the outcome. This article reviews the state of the art on a number of substantive issues: the law governing collective labor relations; minimum wage laws; employment protection legislation; the operation of labor courts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and the relationship between labor law and corporate governance systems. (shrink)

Considerable interest has long existed in two separate phenomena of considerable social interest, namely children’s early exposure to employment outside of any organizational, legislative, or collective bargaining protection, and teenage smoking. We used data from a large national survey to address possible direct and indirect links between children’s early employment intensity and smoking because of significant long-term implications of the link between work and well-being in a vulnerable population. Fifth to ninth grade children’s informal employment intensity was related (...) to both smoking history and smoking intent, and these effects were partially mediated by the amount of weekly spending money and self-esteem. The number of one’s parents and friends who smoke separately moderated the relationships between self-esteem and weekly spending money, and smoking behavior. These findings illustrate the complex consequences of young children’s exposure to early employment, and emphasize the need for research on the ethical implications of pre- and early teenagers who are employed outside of the formal employment context. (shrink)

This paper examines cross-national differences in the development of sectoral collective bargaining in the European telecommunications industry following comparable changes in market regulations. The authors seek to explain why centralized, coordinated bargaining institutions were established in Austria and Sweden, both within incumbent telecommunications firms and at the sector level, while Germany and Denmark experienced decentralization and disorganization of bargaining at both levels. The authors argue that these outcomes resulted from differences in institutional loopholes employers were able (...) to exploit to avoid centralized bargaining and past union structures that influenced patterns of interunion cooperation. These two explanatory factors were interrelated: the presence or absence of institutional loopholes affected the basis for cooperation between unions, while labor cooperation was an important power resource unions could draw on to close emerging loopholes. Findings demonstrate the importance of sector-level political dynamics for the construction or erosion of solidaristic bargaining structures under pressure from market liberalization. (shrink)

The constitution of Pakistan contains wide range of provisions for the protection of labour rights. Pakistan has been bestowed with 70 labour laws along with 90 rules and regulations thereunder. In spite of these labour laws along with rules and regulations, labour force is facing multifarious challenges that posit direct threat to their legal recognised rights. In this regard this study was carried out to study the main hurdles that labour rights encountered in historical perspective. Moreover, in the wake of (...) devolution plan through 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, what problems in respect of enforceability and legality have arisen? Labour laws promulgated in various Pakistani regimes have been discussed to figure out what really prevented successive governments to ensure minimum protection to labour strata of the nations. The article concludes with some recommendation that are sin-qua-non in current globalization where rights have emerged as the most sacred instruments in the hands of weaker portion of a society. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes' method of deriving some moral principles from a social contract has inspired some contemporary moral philosophers to combine the contractarian approach with the model of rational behavior familiar to economists, in order to derive substantive principles of right from essentially formal constraints on the choice of principles. They argue that the device of a hypothetical social contract could serve to generate intuitively plausible moral principles even when the contractors are assumed to be self-interested maximizers of expected utility . (...) Since economic rationality, as defined here, is a relatively pliable model of rational deliberation, the hope is that this approach will provide a systematic tool for the derivation and justification of moral principles. ;Given this conception of rationality, a hypothetical social contract may be interpreted as any of several formal models of rational choice, each of which I examine, as exhibited in the work of some contemporary contract theorists: John Rawls' early work represents the view that choosing the social contract involves an individual decision under certainty; in his later work , Rawls presents the social contract as an individual decision made under ignorance; John Harsanyi defends the case for an individual decision under risk; and David Gauthier's recent work treats the social contract as the product of a rational collective bargain. ;I argue that, if the model of economic rationality is taken seriously, none of these conceptions of the social contract produce principles which conform to our considered moral judgments, and most of them will fail to produce a contractual agreement of any sort. Consequently, I conclude that the combination of economic rationality and procedural constraints on the deliberations of such contractors is an inadequate substitute for other-regarding sentiments usually considered necessary for the justification of moral principles. (shrink)

What place does organizing have in the Church’s synodal journey? In his address for the opening of the Synod on Synodality in 2021, Pope Francis described synodality as “unity, communion, the fraternity born of the realization that all of us are embraced by the one love of God.” Yet the process of collective bargaining is often fraught with division, contention, and adverse interactions based on competing interests. The author argues that, in addition to following Catholic social teaching, organizing (...) serves a crucial pragmatic and theological role in the synodal journey. First, the author explores contemporary theology on synodality and, second, applies it to the 2015 San Francisco archdiocesan teachers’ union dispute, in which the teachers entered the collective-bargaining process to try to repel the archbishop’s effort to strip them of their nondiscrimination rights and force employees to abide by strict sexual-morality codes. Finally, he reflects on organizing’s broader ecclesiological impact. (shrink)

This article challenges popular wisdom that economic globalization uniformly increases working time in industrialized countries. International investment and trade, they argue, have uneven effects for workplace bargaining over standard hours and over work-time flexibility, such as use of temporary or fixed work contracts. The authors explain how such globalization will tend to more substantially decrease standard hours than it does work-time flexibility. And they explain how works councils and union-led collective bargaining alter the way globalization affects both (...) aspects of working time.The analysis of German enterprise data supports these expectations. Measures of globalization diminish standard working hours but yield more temporary work, fixed-contract work, and flexible working arrangements. Works councils and collective bargaining, however, mediate these effects in contrasting ways. Among enterprises without works councils or collective agreements globalization triggers more standard hours, but among firms with such representation globalization triggers fewer hours. With respect to flexibility, however, globalization increases use of temporary or fixed-term contracts more strongly where works councils or collective bargaining are present than when they are not. In short, economic openness has uneven consequences for working time, and firm-level labor representation channels those consequences in ways that highlight political agency in how people respond to globalization. (shrink)