The paper investigates an elliptical construction, Clarification Ellipsis, that occurs in dialogue. We suggest that this provides data that demonstrates that updates resulting from utterances cannot be defined in purely semantic terms, contrary to the prevailing assumptions of existing approaches to dynamic semantics. We offer a computationally oriented analysis of the resolution of ellipsis in certain cases of dialogue clarification. We show that this goes beyond standard techniques used in anaphora and ellipsis resolution and requires operations (...) on highly structured, linguistically heterogeneous representations. We characterize these operations and the representations on which they operate. We offer an analysis couched in a version of Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar combined with a theory of information states (IS) in dialogue. We sketch an algorithm for the process of utterance integration in IS which leads to grounding or clarification. The account proposed here has direct applications to the theory of attitude reports, an issue which is explored briefly in the concluding remarks of the paper. (shrink)

We offer a computational analysis of the resolution of ellipsis in certain cases of dialogue clarification. We show that this goes beyond standard techniques used in anaphora and ellipsis resolution and requires operations on highly structured, linguistically heterogeneous representations. We characterize these operations and the representations on which they operate. We offer an analysis couched in a version of Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar combined with a theory of information states (IS).

Die Rezeption des Jesus-Buchs von Papst Benedikt hält an. Vielfältige Aspekte werden diskutiert. Eigene Aufmerksamkeit findet dabei das Gespräch des Papstes mit dem Jesus-Verständnis von Rabbiner Jacob Neusner. Dieses Gespräch ist bereits als Faktum von großem hermeneutischen Gewicht: Jüdische Stimmen sind eine Instanz für die Erkenntnisbildung christlicher Theologie. Am Dissens des Rabbiners in seinem literarischen Gespräch mit Jesus knüpft der Papst an, um das christologisch bestimmte Jesus-Verständnis zu präzisieren. Allerdings wirft Neusners Pointierung des Dissenses die Frage auf, ob sein Jesus-Verständnis (...) nicht zu sehr beim Differenzkriterium verharrt, ohne dem Kriterium der Kohärenz zwischen Jesus und dem Judentum hinreichend gerecht zu werden. Diese Frage trifft nicht gleichermaßen das päpstliche Jesus-Verständnis, legt der Papst doch mit der Kennzeichnung Jesu Christi als "lebendige Tora Gottes" ein Fundament von Kontinuität, dem weiter nachzugehen die christliche Theologie aufgerufen ist. Jedoch schwächt die päpstliche Redefigur des "Überschreitens" diese Kontinuität, über die man vom nächsten Jesus-Buch des Papstes weitere Aufhellung erhofft.Pope Benedict's book on Jesus continues to find reception. Many different aspects are being discussed. Special attention is given to the Pope's conversation with Rabbi Jacob Neusner's understanding of Jesus. By its very presence, this conversation has great hermeneutic weight: Jewish voices have authority in forming knowledge within Christian theology. For the Pope's Christological understanding of Jesus, he picks up the rabbi's dissent in his literary conversation with Jesus. Of course, Neusner's emphasis on disagreement raises the question whether his understanding of Jesus does not persist too much with the criterion of difference without doing justice sufficiently to the criterion of coherence between Jesus and Judaism. This question does not apply to the same degree to the Pope's understanding of Jesus, since in attributing to Jesus Christ the character of "living Torah of God", the Pope lays a foundation of continuity that calls upon Christian theology to reflect further. However, the Pope's use of the expression "transcending" weakens this continuity, which causes one to hope for further clarification in the Pope's next book on Jesus. (shrink)

The theme of “presence” holds an ambivalent place in Gerald O'Collins’ Christology. On the one hand the theme is O'Collins’ “most creative contribution to contemporary Christology” and on the other hand the notion itself is a difficult and stubborn concept that can be best understood in an evolutionary way. This deeper analysis of “presence,” which is not offered by O'Collins, occupies a center stage in Bernard Lonergan's Christology. This essay mediates O'Collins’ account of “presence” with Lonergan's evolutionary understanding of the (...) term—a scientific theological account Lonergan worked out in dialogue with phenomenology and the sciences. The paper argues that such a mediation is necessitated by the fact that the meaning of “presence” is key to understanding the Chalcedonian definition of the union of the two natures of Christ, an important Christian dogmatic teaching that both O'Collins and Lonergan consider sacrosanct, and that a clarification of this meaning advances not only Christian understanding of Christ's presence in history, but also Christ's presence in non-Christian religions. (shrink)

In this paper, I endeavor to penetrate to the heart of Janusz Kuczyński’s writings about his concept of universalism and to offer my own deliberations upon it based upon my previous writings concerning universalism and dialogue and on my considerations of necessary conditions for the possibility of universal dialogue taking place. To this end, I posit ten conditions for the possibility of entering into genuine universal dialogue. For clarification of Kuczyński’s concept of universalism, I analyze his (...) concept into meta-universalism and holistic universalism. I also discuss the important role of complementarity in the selection of the content of both types of universalism. Finally, I discuss how the phenomenological epoché can be employed to choose the basic values that constitute the shared values of universalism. In so doing, I make reference to Chinese philosophy to illustrate the universality of ethical values. (shrink)

It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being (...) critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism? (shrink)

Healey et al. use experiments with chat dialogues to test the hypothesis that language co‐ordination is driven by ‘running repairs’. They replace signals of understanding such as “okay” with weaker, ‘spoof’ signals like “ummm”, and replace specific requests for clarification like “on the left?” with signals that suggest a higher degree of misunderstanding like “what?”. The latter manipulation causes participants to switch rapidly to more abstract forms of referring expression.

Persuasion dialogue sometimes helps us to clarify our ideas; this paper attempts to find out what clarification consists in. It criticizes Walton’s view, which explains clarification as making implicit commitments explicit and proposes a different approach according to which clarification consists in replacing narrowly individuated views with epistemically better ones which retain elements of the earlier views. It also argues that clarification so conceived is not one of the main goals of persuasion dialogue but (...) rather an accidental even if welcome side effect. (shrink)

The correlation between dialogue and religion, both as conceptual apparatuses and as current practices, has had a long history. The purpose of this essay is to isolate one such instance – the “critical dialogue” taking place amongst scholars of religions – which involves also the dialogue scholars establish with their field of study and/or a given religious tradition. Following a brief clarification of terminology used, I will proceed to discuss concrete examples of critical dialogue within (...) the Study of Religions and how this might be enhanced. Finally, I will draw some partial conclusions which might pave the way for this critical dialogue to improve and continue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S DIALOGUES AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION GEORGE ScHNER, S.J. Regis College Toronto, Ontario HETHER ONE IS rethinking the content of a course and the place of one's study in the context of a broader curriculum, or whether there is a moment of fundamental questioning which grows out of rereading a classic text or engaging in contemporary debates, such moments of questioning are essential. This essay (...) proposes one of those simple and general questions: in what does the work of the philosophy of religion consist? My consideration of the question, as will become evident, is an exercise in prolegomena, and after this brief introduction there will be two parts to my essay in which the context for a full answer to the question will be explored, before a summary conc1usion will propose an agenda for ful1ther work. Though concept clarification is essential to philosophical reflection, attention to historical development is of equal importance. The two inner parts of this essay will give attention to both, first by discussing a specific texrt and,author, and then by sorting out some fundamental matters of definition. My choice of a classic text and context is David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.1 Such a choice is not to imply that the philosophy of religion begins there or that Hume's notion of either philosophy or religion is: somehow normative. On the contrary, I am entering rthe story in mid1 Dialogues Oonoerning Naturai Religion, ed. R. H. Popkin (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980). References will be indicated within the text by page number. 88 84 GEORGE SCHNER, S.j. stream and am not of the mind that any philosophy is definitive. However, I wish to propose a reading of Hume's text which can be very helpful not only to understand what he is about but also to encourage a rethinking of what the philosophy of religion should be about. Simply as a text, Hume's Dialogues is intriguing. He withheld its publication on the advice of seveml of his friends and continued to revise it until his death, altering nearly every page styJistica1ly and substantively changing all hut four sections. :Before he died, he ensured that his nephew David would have the work published and was busy with some of the most lengthy additions to the text in the last months before his death.2 The work and its contents dearly remained a matter of importance and preoccupation for Hurne, and both the contents and form of the text present essentials of Hume's mature thought. The apparent meandering of the text, as a dialogue among the characters Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea, belies its careful construction. Despite Cleanthes' accusation that Philo proposes his notions in a " rambling way," the logic of the text is a masterpiece of exposition, movement, internal reference, and cumulative rhetorical effect. David Livingston has recently discussed the dialect~cal and narrative character of Hume's writing considered in general as a philosophy of "common life." 3 Hume is seen as both the critic of false philosophy and the artificer of the true by means of the application of his principles of the association of ideas, of nrutural beliefs, of sympathy. In both efforts, Livingston finds Hume increasingly employing narrative aocounts and dialectical argument as he develops his,thought, until in the Dialogues "inquiry is cut free of all systematic constraints and allowed to proceed on its own." 4 I find the insight into Hume's paradigmatic use of 2 These and other details concerning the Dialogues can be found in Ernest C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). s D. W. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Comm01~ Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), esp. chapter two. 4 Livingston, 43. HUME.AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 85 the narrative structure of historical inquiry a helpful clue, but I wouJd modify Livingston's assertion of the abandonment of systematic constraints in the Dialogues. Hume's corrective of speculative systems does not mean that his own text is devoid of a logic or ol'der quite in keeping with the demands of narrative structure, common life, and the past-entailing aspects... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Masao Abe and the Dialogue BreakthroughStephen RoweI am profoundly grateful to Masao Abe for many reasons, including his articulation of Zen and his responsiveness to my own work, but most especially for his breakthrough work on dialogue. For he, along with his Christian partner in dialogue, John B. Cobb Jr., has taken us to a new paradigm, one in which dialogue, in complementary relationship with (...) our more particular practices and traditions, can be valued as a religious practice.1 Together these two towering figures of our time have broken through the koan of abstracted universality versus incommensurable particularity, and hence opened up a possibility for the human future the significance of which cannot be overestimated.In October 1986, I had the good fortune to find myself at the Third North American Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter, the stated theme of which was “Notions of Ultimate Reality in Buddhism and Christianity.” A critical tension was evident early on in this event. Masao Abe spoke very persuasively of the “perspec-tiveless perspective” of Zen, arising from the experience of sunyata as the negation of negation or the radicalizing of Nothingness, of Zen as the affirmation of radical return. John Cobb spoke with equal persuasiveness of our inescapable particularity as historical beings, our ineluctable locatedness, and the irreducible wisdom of Israel and Greece. Both of these opposing views seemed right. How could this be so?To heighten the juxtaposition, it was equally evident that there were three large propositions on which Abe and Cobb very much agreed: first, our need of transformation; second, that this must be mutual transformation; and, third, that transformation must be in the direction of a new universality of humankind, which Cobb describes as “a global memory.” 2 How is it possible for these powerful elements of agreement to be juxtaposed with the critical tension mentioned above? Cobb and Abe, not surprisingly, have their own responses to this question,3 and we can learn from what Abe says about universality and transformation, and how his understanding of both leads him to a specifically religious valuing of the dialogical encounter with the difference that is presented by Cobb.In the paper Masao Abe presented at the 1986 event, he proposed two crucial aspects of dialogue between world religions: (1) seeking clarification of the views peculiar to one’s own tradition through allowing the different views between traditions [End Page 123] to confront one another, and (2) being “free from the peculiarity of our own traditions in order to scrutinize the notion of ultimate reality itself most fitting to our contemporary human predicament and the future of humanity.” 4 The second aspect needs to involve “a very creative and penetrating discussion in which we must be radically critical of our own tradition so that we can re-examine and regrasp the essence of our religion from the more universal and more fundamental position,” and hence “find out the truly ultimate reality for the future of humanity.” 5There is a paradox here: Abe indicates both a more universal orientation and a reappropriation of the essence of our particular traditions. The key to movement beyond paradox as frustrating antinomy to paradox as gateway to vitality is the dialogical practice, and specifically dialogue in its association with mutual transformation and the emergence of a new universality of humankind. For Abe, this turns on the understanding of “universal”:To become a “universal” world religion does not imply a monolithic religion common to East and West, but rather calls for a dynamic structure capable of freely assuming any form, oriental or occidental, according to the area in which it develops and yet without being confined to any limitation of that area. Such a dynamic realization of the “universal” world religion may become possible for Christianity and Buddhism should they genuinely regrasp their respective notions of universal salvation for all mankind.6Dialogue as locus of “dynamic realization” makes possible a new universality, which, for Abe, is based on the self-negation that leads to the awakening of the “true Self,” and “enter[ing] the third historical age of mankind, namely the age of Self-awakened cosmology.” Because “true investigation of the self is always... (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Le principal objectif de ce texte est d'apporter certaines clarifications par rapport à des problèmes et difficultés entourant l'usage actuel des notions de culture, d'appartenance et de dialogue. L'auteur montre que l'idée selon laquelle on pourrait être prisonnier de sa propre culture découle d'une transformation récente de la signification du concept de culture. Cette idée est critiquée comme étant un mythe, le mythe de la monade culturelle, reposant sur une mécompréhension des rapports entre culture, appartenance et dialogue. (...) L'auteur s'efforce de proposer une meilleure compréhension de ces trois concepts, de façon à éviter toute forme de relativisme radical. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to shed light on some difficulties and problems related to the current use of the concepts of culture, belonging and dialogue. The author shows that the idea that we could be prisoners of our own culture stems from a recent transformation of the meaning of the concept of culture. This idea is criticized as a myth, the myth of the cultural monad, based on a misunderstanding of the relationship among culture, belonging and dialogue. The author tries to offer a better understanding of these three concepts, in order to avoid any form of radical relativism. (shrink)

This meditation is a series of reflections about some milestones along my philosophical journey that concern universals, universal definitions, claims to universal moral principles, and universal dialogue. It begins with a focus on the Socratic search for universal definitions of general terms; and it continues with a look at the way my discovery of non-Euclidean geometries began to challenge my attitude toward the possibility of universal definitions of all general terms. Along the way I bring out how Wittgenstein’s notion (...) of “family resemblances” added to this challenge. The meditation continues with reflections on Kant’s attempts to make a case for a universal and unconditional moral imperative. Following this I sketch a counter-case that the concrete human being gets lost in a haze of Kantian abstraction. These reflections bring out the clear conceptual linkage between the “abstract universal” and the “external relation” as canons ofinterpretation.The meditation then makes a shift to some later milestones on my journey, beginning with reflection on the “concrete universal” and the “internal relation” as alternative canons of interpretation. I try to illustrate how Marx critically appropriated Hegel’s view of these canons via discussion of Marx’s notion of “praxis;” and then go on to adopt these canons of interpretation throughout the rest of the meditation. Employing these canons of interpretation, and with Aristotle’s very broad understanding of the term “politics” in mind, I construe universal dialogue to be a mode of discourse oriented toward the development of a new “politics of the global village” that could cultivate the practice of concretely relating to the other person as a person. Inasmuch as Aristotle construed “politics” as involving a developed ethics as well as a “science of society” , the meditation proceeds with a preliminary sketch of these two dimensions of a new “politics of the global village.”My meditation goes on to suggest a fundamental ethical principle that could be concretely and universally adopted by all people, and that could guide universal dialogue. The meditation continues with a sketch of a philosophical reconstruction of a humanistic Marxist “science of society,” and integrates the fundamental ethical principle with it. This sketch is basically a philosophical clarification of Marx’s theory of cultural evolution that brings into play the key role of the concrete universal and the internal relation as fundamental canons of interpretation. The meditation concludes with an argument that universal dialogue on the part of a very wide spectrum of ordinary people, as well as specialists, is the sine qua non for any hope of transforming the secular basis of human societies in the direction of social justice, as all of humanity faces the daunting crises that loom throughout planet Earth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dialogue Between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite, and: The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and PalamasDavid BradshawSaint Gregory Palamas. Dialogue Between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite. Translated by Rein Ferweda with Introduction by Sara J. Denning-Bolle. Binghamton, NY: Global Publications/CEMERS, 1999. Pp. 108. Paper, $17.00.A. N. Williams. The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. (...) 222. Cloth, $49.95.Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) was a Byzantine monk who rose to become Archbishop of Thessalonica and a leading theologian of the Orthodox Church. He is best known for his role in the hesychast controversy. The hesychasts (from hesychia, silence) were monks of Mount Athos who claimed that through prayer and ascetic struggle they had been enabled to see God with their bodily eyes. More precisely, they claimed to see a kind of divine radiance permeating all things, including their own bodies. They insisted that this light was not a created reality but was God himself as he manifested himself to them.When the hesychasts were attacked by an Italian monk named Barlaam, Palamas rose to their defense. The challenge he faced was that of explaining how the transcendent God could be visible to human eyes. His answer was to adapt two terms long in use in other areas of theology, ousia (substance, essence) and energeia (activity, operation). He held that whereas the ousia of God is unknowable to any created intellect, the divine energeiai can be shared in by creatures, who are thereby deified. The "uncreated light" of the monks is simply the divine energeia as it had become visible to the monks through the purification of the heart achieved by prayer, asceticism, and obedience to the divine commandments. Gregory's defense of the hesychasts was endorsed by a series of synods at Constantinople, and to this day he is commemorated in Orthodox churches on the second Sunday in Lent.The importance of Palamas for the history of philosophy lies in the fact that he presents a version of Christian thought that is deeply rooted in tradition, and by most standards fully orthodox, yet owes nothing to western scholasticism. A quick comparison [End Page 586] with Aquinas reveals several points of divergence. (1) Whereas Aquinas holds that all the divine attributes and activities are identical with the divine essence, the distinctions among them being merely quoad nos, Palamas holds that the distinction between the divine ousia and energeia is not just imposed by our perspective but is truly present in God. (2) Whereas Aquinas says little about deification and explicitly reserves the vision of the divine essence to the afterlife, Palamas insists that deification is possible in this life and that the condition of those who experience it is similar (though of course not identical) to that of the blessed after the resurrection. (3) Whereas Aquinas allows that the blessed ultimately do attain a vision of the divine essence, Palamas holds that the divine ousia is intrinsically unknowable to creatures.Whether these differences are as sharp as they seem is a matter that requires careful investigation. The first of the two works under review, Palamas's Dialogue Between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite, is to be welcomed for the clarification it provides of Palamas's views. It is the third of his major works to be translated into English, the others being Triads in Defense of the Holy Hesychasts and One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. I confess to finding it less engaging than the other two; it lacks the freshness and vigor of the Triads (Palamas's earliest work) and the wide-ranging systematic character of the Chapters. Nonetheless, it does provide a helpful elaboration of the ousia -energeia distinction, particularly in the argument (88-90) that such a distinction does not compromise divine simplicity.The second work, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas by A. N. Williams, is the first book-length comparison of these two pivotal figures. It is a revision of the author's doctoral dissertation, and has a certain plodding dryness characteristic of the genre; nonetheless, it is clear and well-informed, and Williams is... (shrink)

In an ongoing dialogue, Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events--for instance, astonishing healings--could require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has supernaturally intervened in earthly affairs. I have not denied that a theist could justifiably consider the occurrence of certain possible (or even actual) events to be strong evidence for theism. But in this essay I continue to deny that the occurrence of any conceivable event would require the (...) acknowledgement of divine intervention by all rational individuals. (shrink)

In Le théatre des philosophes, Taminiaux suggests that both German Idealism and Heidegger understand Greek tragedy as ontological in its import. So does Plato who, however, censures it for the inadequacy of its ontological vision, which he seeks to correct by means of the aesthetic education of the guardians of the ideal city. Taminiaux stresses that Aristotle understands tragedy as a mimēsis of action which is pluralistic, willing to engage with appearances, and oriented toward phronēsis. A key question concerns his (...) understanding of the katharsis or purification of powerful passions, treated here as a cognitive clarification requiring the intense passional engagement that Plato censors. In response to Taminiaux’s claim that Hölderlin’s tragic inspiration is Aristotelian, this essay explores his understanding of tragic purification. In separating the hybristic union of god and man, such purification restores the possibility of interlocutory praxis. (shrink)

This is a dialogue between Lisa and Max on Dag Prawitz's work concerning the concept of deductive validity. Lisa first explains Prawitz's criticisms of the presently prevailing non‐epistemic analyses of validity. Then Lisa describes three different ways in which Prawitz attempted to develop an epistemic concept of validity. Max asks questions for clarification, raises some objections and compares Prawitz's three approaches with other lines of thought. Two inference rules are specially discussed: disjunction introduction and ex contradictione quodlibet. Max (...) and Lisa view Prawitz's contribution as part of a variegated, ongoing research pursuing an explication of the concept of validity, which began with the Socratic and Platonic distinction between merely persuasive arguments and good arguments and with Aristotle's definition of syllogism. Throughout the history of philosophy, logicians have aimed at clarifying a pre‐theoretic idea of good deduction and have proposed, criticized, refined, adjusted precise theoretical concepts of validity. Prawitz has criticized current views about validity, has advanced new proposals and revised them. His work is an important chapter of the long pursuit of the concept of validity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Acceptance of the Other as a Similarly Valid Path and Awareness of One's Self-Culpability:A Deepening Realization of My Religious Identity through DialogueKenneth K. TanakaAs the title of my paper indicates, two features of my identity have become more vivid as the result of my participation in the International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter (IBCTE) sessions. The first of the two stemmed from my rude awakening that not everyone involved with our (...) sessions accepted the assumption that the other was a similarly valid soteriological path.In one of our sessions a few years back, the discussion moved to a topic of the nature of "ultimate path," which, as it turned out, began to raise some extremely sensitive issues. An unusually tense atmosphere hung over the discussion table, a rare turn of events for our usually jovial dialogue group composed mostly of liberal-minded members. One of the Christian members gave voice to her fundamental view that Jesus was the sole path through which one can be saved. It was clearly what anyone would regard as an exclusivist position. In asking for further clarification, she reiterated her view that her Christian faith necessitated that she took that position, and that I as a Buddhist was, therefore, not included in that soteriological scheme. I responded to her that I understood that I would not be in her scheme since I was not Christian, but would I nevertheless be saved? After some hesitation, in so many words, she replied that I would not be! Had she been a member of a more conservative group, it would have been easier to accept that kind of a response, but coming from an academic with liberal leanings, her comments caught me off guard. But on the other hand, I appreciated her honesty in being true to her understanding of the tradition, for it seemed to me that it was not an easy thing for her to say.This short encounter has been etched firmly in my mind and, ironically, remains for me the most memorable moment among all of the IBCTE sessions attended. I did not pursue the matter further at that time (aside from the fact that time had run [End Page 41] out for that particular session), since I was aware that such an exclusive position (as distinguished from those of inclusivism and pluralism) was common among Christians. I just happened to have encountered it in a rather unexpected circumstance and was not prepared with a comeback.This encounter forced me to inquire about my own position concerning the salvation of people other than Buddhists. Would I regard her as not being saved? After some probing and reflection on my part, I can say with little hesitation that I would never be able to say, "no, you are not." I have no basis on which to refute what her time-tested tradition promises. I am not in a position to negate the claims of her tradition or to question the sincerity of her commitment. From my Buddhist perspective there is no universal criterion on which to make judgments about others. My personal view on this issue has been similar to John Hick's pluralism position, but without his insistence that all paths reflect and lead to the same truth.Perhaps, my view reflects a prevailing, modern or postmodern understanding of Shinran (1173–1262), the founder of my tradition (Jodo-Shinshu), who is often portrayed as an extremely liberal thinker as seen in the following words attributed to him from the Tannisho (emphasis added):Now, whether you accept the Nembutsu, entrusting yourself to it, or reject it, that is your own decision.These rather well-known passages reinforce the image of Shinran, particularly in the Jodo-Shinshu community in the United States, as an accommodating and tolerant thinker.However, the picture is a little more complex, for I am also aware that Shinran held what I refer to as an "exceptionalist" view. Based largely on his historical belief that with the arrival of Mappo, the Last Period of the Dharma, there were no other teachings appropriate for the age of spiritual decadence. While he was tolerant of others, thereby allowing even his... (shrink)

What is econophysics? What makes an econophysicist? Why are financial economists reluctant to use results from econophysics? Can we overcome disputes concerning hypotheses used in financial economics and that make no sense for econophysicists? How can we create a profitable dialogue betweenfinancial economists and econophysicists? How do we develop a common theoretical framework allowing the creation of more efficient models for the financial industry? This book moves beyond the disciplinary frontiers in order to initiate the development of a common (...) theoretical framework that makes sense for both traditionally trained financial economists and econophysicists. Unlike other publications dedicated to econophysics, this book is written by twofinancial economists and it situates econophysics in the evolution of financial economics. The major issues that concern the collaboration between the two fields are analyzed in detail. More specifically, this book explains the theoretical and methodological foundations of these two fields in anaccessible vocabulary providing the first extensive analytic comparison between models and results from both fields. The book also identifies the major conceptual gate-keepers that complicate dialogue between the two communities while it provides elements to overcome them. By mixing conceptual, historical, theoretical and formal arguments our analysis bridges the current deaf dialogue between financial economists and econophysicists. This book details the recent results in econophysics that bring it closer to financial economics. So doing, it identifies what remainsto be done for econophysicists to contribute significantly to financial economics. Beyond the clarification of the current situation, this book also proposes a generic model compatible with the two fields, defining minimal conditions for common models. Finally, this book provides a research agendafor a more fruitful collaboration between econophysicists and financial economists, creating new research opportunities. In this perspective, it lays the foundations for common theoretical framework and models. (shrink)

This article is inspired by Jane Sahi’s commentary, ‘Dialogue as Education: Martin Buber’, published under the feature ‘Classics with Commentary’ in the Monsoon 2005 issue of Contemporary Education Dialogue. I seek to further the discussion of the contributions of Martin Buber to the discourse of education through an elaboration and clarification of the ideas, concerns and critiques exposited by Jane Sahi. These concerns can perhaps be understood under the following themes: (i) reflections on educational practice in the (...) light of Buber’s ideas; (ii) the role of language in dialogue; (iii) the idea of learning; (iv) attitudes towards the ‘other’; (v) the teacher–pupil relationship and (vi) the role of the teacher. Although ideas on these themes in the writings on Martin Buber’s have helped me in articulating this response, Jane Sahi’s commentary forms the basis of my reflections. (shrink)

This paper is not an article in a regular sense. It is a dialogue between François-David Sebbah, one of the two editors of this topical collection, and Jean-Luc Nancy, one of the most eminent representatives of the contemporary French Thought. This dialogue took place in the first half of 2022 in a written form, because of the sanitary restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic and because Nancy was heavily sick. Sebbah sent to Nancy a text, corresponding to Section (...) 2.1, and Nancy responded to it with another text, corresponding to Section 2.2. Unfortunately, Nancy died on August 23, 2022, and could not revise his own text nor pursue the dialogue, as it was originally planned. For this reason, an introductory clarification by Sebbah, corresponding to Section 1, has been added. The purpose of such clarification is to introduce the reader to Nancy’s philosophy of technology—although technology never had a central role in Nancy’s reflections. In Section 2.1, Sebbah proposes a distinction between “French Theory,” “French Thought,” and “French Philosophy.” He also proposes a list of twelve possible intersections between the French Thought and the philosophy of technology. In Section 2.2, Nancy criticizes the use of expressions such as “French Thought.” He also insists, in a Heideggerian vein, on the fact that Technology (with a capital “T”) does not depend on human ends but has its own ends. (shrink)

Ce volume contient la transcription de plusieurs entretiens radiophoniques : La Tribune de Paris (1946-1948), La Tribune des Temps Modernes (1947), Les Entretiens sur la philosophie (1950-52), et les longs Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier (1959). Alors que les premiers sont malheureusement donnés sans les interventions des tiers (Sartre, Hyppolite, etc.), qui sont résumées, ceux avec Charbonnier sont livrés in extenso, y compris avec les chutes non retenues lors des émissions radio. Enfin, s’ajoutent à cet ensemble des textes de la main (...) de Merleau-Ponty, il s’agit des interventions dans le Forum de L’Express (1954-54) qui n’avaient pas été retenues par l’auteur lorsqu’il a composé les « Propos » de Signes (1960). L’essentiel du volume est consacré à la politique, et permet de préciser le rôle que Merleau-Ponty assignait au philosophe dans la cité : celui d’un analyste qui ne cherche pas seulement à dévoiler les mensonges des idéologies, mais à montrer ce que les situations peuvent avoir d’ambigu, sans pour autant renoncer à l’idéal de liberté et de justice, par un mélange de pragmatisme et de discours de vérité qui s’adresse directement à la conscience des citoyens et non à telle classe sociale. This volume contains the transcripts of several radio interviews: La Tribune de Paris (1946-1948), La Tribune des Temps Modernes (1947), Les Entretiens sur la philosophie (1950-52), and the lengthy Entretiens avec Georges Charbonnier (1959). While the first few are unfortunately presented without the other person’s responses (Sartre, Hyppolite, etc.), which are summarized, those with Charbonnier are presented verbatim, including the slips not retained in the radio broadcasts. Finally, texts by Merleau-Ponty’s own hand are added to this collection. They are the responses in the Forum of L’Express (1954-54) that had not been retained by the author when he composed the “Propos” of Signs (1960). The bulk of the volume is dedicated to politics and enables the clarification of the role that Merleau-Ponty assigned to the philosopher in the city: that of an analyst who does not just seek to expose the falsehoods of ideologies, but to reveal the potential ambiguity in situations through a mixture of pragmatism and truth speaking that addresses itself directly to the conscience of citizens and not to a particular social class, and all of this without renouncing the ideal of liberty and justice. Questo volume contiene la trascrizione di diverse interviste e colloqui radiofonici: La Tribune de Paris (1946-1948), La Tribune des Temps Modernes (1947), Les Entretiens sur la philosophie (1950-52), e le lunghe interviste di Merleau-Ponty con Georges Charbonnier (1959). Mentre i primi colloqui sono restituiti purtroppo senza gli interventi di terzi (come ad esempio Sartre e Hyppolite, etc.), che vi si trovano solamente riassunti, le interviste con Charbonnier sono invece riportate per esteso, ivi compresi gli errori che erano stati eliminati nelle trasmissioni via radio. Completa il volume una selezione di testi di Merleau-Ponty, in cui sono raccolti gli interventi apparsi nella rubrica Forum de L’Express (1954-54), che non erano confluiti nella sezione « Propos » pubblicata dall’autore in Segni (1960). L’insieme del volume è essenzialmente dedicato alla tematica politica e permette di comprendere il ruolo che Merleau-Ponty assegnava al filosofo rispetto alla città : quello di un analista che non cerca solamente di smascherare le menzogne delle ideologie, ma anche di mostrare l’ambiguità delle circostanze, senza però rinunciare ad un ideale di libertà e di giustizia, con un miscuglio di pragmatismo e di discorso di verità che si rivolge direttamente alla coscienza dei cittadini e non a una certa classe sociale. (shrink)

This review article assesses the usefulness of two substantial recent books on religion by liberal political philosophers, Cécile Laborde and Aurélia Bardon (eds), Religion in Liberal Political Philosophy, and Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion. It opens by situating these books against the landscape of UK-based work on the place of public religion in liberal democracy by both liberal political philosophers and Christian political theologians. Noting the relative paucity—by comparison with those from North America—of contributions on the theme from both quarters, it (...) welcomes these books as providing important clarifications for political theologians of how many of the precise tensions between religion and liberal democracy might be better understood and how debate between the two disciplines might thereby be enhanced. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate distinctive utterances in non-task-oriented conversational dialogue through the comparison between task-oriented dialogue and non-task-oriented conversational dialogue. We then found that Indirect Responses and Clarification Requests are significant in non-task-oriented conversational dialogue. IRs are cooperative responses to other's question, while CRs are clarification questions. We analyzed the rhetorical relations about IRs and CRs. We then found that the IRs are generated by evidence and causal relations, while the CRs are generated (...) by elaboration relation and causal relations. (shrink)

A key requirement for the automatic generation of argumentative or explanatory text is to present the constituent propositions in an order that readers will find coherent and natural, to increase the likelihood that they will understand and accept the author’s claims. Natural language generation systems have standardly employed a repertoire of coherence relations such as those defined by Mann and Thompson’s Rhetorical Structure Theory. This paper models the generation of persuasive monologue as the outcome of an “inner dialogue”, where (...) the author attempts to anticipate potential challenges or clarification requests. It is argued that certain RST relations such as Motivate, Evidence and Concession can be seen to emerge from various pre-empting strategies. (shrink)

Background Ethics communication has been described as a pedagogical form, promoting development of ethical competence among nursing students. The ‘one to five method’ was developed by this research group as a tool for facilitating ethical communication in groups among healthcare professionals but has not yet been evaluated. Aim To explore post-graduate nursing students’ experiences of practicing ethical communication in groups Research design The study design is qualitative. Participants and research context The study comprised 12 nursing students on a post-graduate course (...) for Registered Nurses focusing on palliative care. After education the students engaged as participants and facilitators in ethics communication in groups, with support from the ‘one to five method’. Data were derived from the students written reflections and subjected to thematic analysis. Ethical considerations The study was performed in accordance with the ethical standards in the 2013 Helsinki Declaration and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Medical Faculty at Umeå University Results An overall theme was identified, ‘being supported to achieve a democratic dialogue concerning ethical problems’ and five themes, related to each step of the ‘one to five method’. The themes concerned: putting the experience of an ethical dilemma into words; being confirmed by shared emotions; defining the value conflict using ethical principles; expressing virtues of empathy and raised awareness; jointly finding various action approaches. Discussion Regular ethics communication in groups encourages nursing students to actively seek understanding and clarification of ethically difficult situations. Conclusions The results indicate that ethics communication in groups could be a way of developing virtues during education. Interventions using the ‘one to five method’ need to be further studied among student groups from other healthcare contexts. (shrink)

This post is one in a series of posts about the ground-realities of interreligious dialogue. Interreligious dialogue is not the same as ecumenism. And this blog-post shows how Christian and Hindu celibates have veered to discussing categories which are inapplicable to one or the other religion. To quote part of the post: "So the first critique of interreligious dialogue that needs clarification is this problem of religious relativism. The Sanatana Dharma does not admit of relativism, moral (...) or religious because there is no scope for duality within the Dharma. So we respect and not tolerate all major religious traditions in the world for in our Upanishads is explicated the truth of Creation: the One has become the many. Relativity implies duality. Such is not found within any of the branches of the Sanatana Dharma.". (shrink)

Like some other human sciences, sociology has had a recurrent concern to clarify the ambivalent relationship between its professional accounts of social reality on the one hand and lay understandings of social reality on the other. Sociological ethnographers have claimed to accomplish this clarification by including in their accounts both direct representation and responsive interpretation of the vernacular voice of those human subjects whose actions and understandings comprise the focus of their inquiries. I briefly examine some of the practical (...) and textual strategies by which studies have accomplished this. I go on to note that the authenticity of ethnographic work has itself become a matter of dispute on the grounds of the ineradicable asymmetry between the professional voice of the researcher and the vernacular voice of research subjects. Drawing on work in literary theory, anthropology and feminist scholarship, a favoured solution to this problem has argued for the necessity of acknowledging the essentially dialogical character of the relationship between researchers and subjects and also of finding ways to make ethnographic texts reflect this character. This article draws attention to an alternative set of professional practices that prefer ‘co-construction’ to ‘dialogue’ as a term of art. Its use encourages and facilitates the close and detailed examination of the multiple ways in which subjects already speak of and for themselves and others within the local sites of their real-world activities. Studies of these matters accord the vernacular voice of human subjects renewed significance for sociological investigation as part of a radical ‘respecification’ of prior understandings of the proper relationship between vernacular and professional accounts of social reality. The article assesses the upshot of these claims for the current practice and future prospects of sociology as one of the human sciences. (shrink)

In this critical response to Charles Ess’ ‚Ethical Pluralism and Global Information Ethics’ presented in this Special Issue of Ethics and Information Technology, it is firstly argued that his account of pros hen pluralism can be more accurately reformulated as a three layered doctrine by separating one acceptance of diversity at a cultural level and another at an ethical theoretic level. Following this clarificatory section, the next section considers Ess’ political and sociological reasons for the necessity and desirability of pros (...) hen pluralism, criticising the former reasons as social scientifically problematic, while elaborating on the latter as more persuasive. In the last section, I discuss how pros hen pluralism may be realised, making three arguments in particular. First, Ess’ requirement for sensitivity to cultural diversity is to be interpreted as differentiated and extended sensitivity. Second, his discussion of shared responses to central ethical problems is ambiguous and needs further elaboration and clarification. Third, his focus on dialogue and Socratic education is persuasive, although excessive optimism is not reasonable. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between persuasive definition and common knowledge (propositions generally accepted and not subject to dispute in a discussion). We interpret the gap between common knowledge and persuasive definition (PD) in terms of potential disagreements: PDs are conceived as implicit arguments to win a potential conflict. Persuasive definitions are analyzed as arguments instantiating two argumentation schemes, argument from classification and argument from values, and presupposing a potential disagreement. The argumentative structure of (...) PDs reveals different levels of disagreement, and different pos-sibilities of resolving the conflict or causing dialogical deadlock. (shrink)

In his 1972 essay “The Incapacity for Conversation” (“Die Unfähigkeit zum Gespräch”) Gadamer takes up the question of whether changes in society have made it such that we are losing our ability to participate in dialogue. By the end of the essay he argues that this is not the case and that the claim that someone is incapable of dialogue is merely an excuse for not listening to the other person. Over the course of the essay Gadamer provides (...) a clarification of what exactly counts as a conversation and of how conversation is connected to friendship. (shrink)

Empirical evidence from dialogue, both corpus and experimental, highlights the importance of interaction in language use – and this raises some questions for Christiansen & Chater's proposals. We endorse C&C's call for an integrated framework but argue that their emphasis on local, individual production and comprehension makes it difficult to accommodate the ubiquitous, interactive, and defeasible processes of clarification and repair in conversation.

During the past ten years Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) has become part of the repertoire of specialized decision-oriented theories in the business ethics literature. The intention here is to (1)␣provide a brief overview of the structure and strengths of ISCT; (2) identify recurring themes in the extensive commentary on the theory including brief mention of how ISCT has been applied outside the business ethics literature; (3) describe where research appears to be headed; and (4) specify challenges faced by those (...) who seek to reform ISCT. Key themes in the critiquing literature relate to (a) the identification process for hypernorms; (b) justification of the recognition of hypernorms; (c) proposals for considering meso or meta norms; (d)␣clarification of the relationship between stakeholder concepts and ISCT; (e) problems with potentially unoccupied moral free space; (f) sources of ethical obligation within the ISCT framework; and (g) the potential role for concepts of stakeholder dialogue and engagement. (shrink)

The eponymous dialogue presents the sophist as a figure who defies definition, and those difficulties are attributed to the conception of the image. Ultimately, the sophist is defined as a species of image maker. The image, however, which is important throughout the Platonic corpus as a metaphor, an analogy, and a metaphysical concept as well, receives in the Sophist little clarification or definition apart from whatever may be inferred from the division of image making arts. In the Sophist, (...) the sophist escapes definition as in no other dialogue, rendering even the concluding division one that makes the distinction of the sophist from the philosopher problematic, if not impossible. The paper explores how the dialogue problematizes and rethinks the metaphysics of the image, as compared to its use in dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic, pointing to a refinement in understanding the relation of judgment to knowledge and appearance to reality. (shrink)

BackgroundRespect for autonomy is a key concept in contemporary bioethics and end-of-life ethics in particular. Despite this status, an individualistic interpretation of autonomy is being challenged from the perspective of different theoretical traditions. Many authors claim that the principle of respect for autonomy needs to be reconceptualised starting from a relational viewpoint. Along these lines, the notion of relational autonomy is attracting increasing attention in medical ethics. Yet, others argue that relational autonomy needs further clarification in order to be (...) adequately operationalised for medical practice. To this end, we examined the meaning, foundations, and uses of relational autonomy in the specific literature of end-of-life care ethics.MethodsUsing PRESS and PRISMA procedures, we conducted a systematic review of argument-based ethics publications in 8 major databases of biomedical, philosophy, and theology literature that focused on relational autonomy in end-of-life care. Full articles were screened. All included articles were critically appraised, and a synthesis was produced.ResultsFifty publications met our inclusion criteria. Twenty-eight articles were published in the last 5 years; publications were originating from 18 different countries. Results are organized according to: (a) an individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (b) critiques of this individualistic interpretation of autonomy; (c) relational autonomy as theoretically conceptualised; (d) relational autonomy as applied to clinical practice and moral judgment in end-of-life situations.ConclusionsThree main conclusions were reached. First, literature on relational autonomy tends to be more a ‘reaction against’ an individualistic interpretation of autonomy rather than be a positive concept itself. Dichotomic thinking can be overcome by a deeper development of the philosophical foundations of autonomy. Second, relational autonomy is a rich and complex concept, formulated in complementary ways from different philosophical sources. New dialogue among traditionally divergent standpoints will clarify the meaning. Third, our analysis stresses the need for dialogical developments in decision making in end-of-life situations. Integration of these three elements will likely lead to a clearer conceptualisation of relational autonomy in end-of-life care ethics. This should in turn lead to better decision-making in real-life situations. (shrink)

The fruit borne of the debate concerning the economy of the gift carried out between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion in the 1990s continues to ripen into the present with publications like Anthony Steinbock’s lucid It’s not about the Gift: From Givenness to Loving. I challenge and qualify the fundamental argument of this book in dialogue with two principal French proponents of givenness, Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, against whom Steinbock promotes his strategy of the gift. While Steinbock wishes (...) to displace our relation to the other from giving to loving, I suggest that the discourse of givenness remains the very movement of loving as such. Steinbock occupies a position reminiscent of, but not reducible to, gift-exchange theory, rooted in reciprocity between lover and beloved, whereas I am inclined to move near to the terrain of the unconditioned gift in which loving need not entail reciprocity. My position is not so much a counterclaim as it is a clarification of the inextricable unity between giving and loving. The final section contends that the I enlarge my horizon when I give myself because I do not grasp the other, nor do I expect or obligate the other’s givenness in return; rather in my growth beyond my own self-interest, I allow the other to be given just as the other likes to be given. (shrink)

In an imagined dialogue between two figures called “Carnap*” and “Quine*” that appeared in the Library of Living Philosophers volume in 1986, certain proposals and clarifications of the linguistic doctrine were offered by Carnap* answering Quinean objections, but these were brushed aside rather breezily in a reply to this dialogue in the same volume by Quine himself. After a brief summary of the questions at issue in that earlier dialogue, Carnap* is here allowed a final reply, introducing (...) yet another variant on his series of more precise formulations of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth and touching on other issues raised both by Quine* in the earlier dialogue and by Quine himself in his reply. (shrink)

Resumo: Este estudo analisa as narrativas radiofônicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma e conteúdo através do qual o autor buscou proporcionar para a infância de seu tempo uma possibilidade de experiência com o contemporâneo. Ao se pensar as peças do ponto de vista didático e do ponto de vista da aprendizagem, pode-se encontrar nelas a intencionalidade de Benjamin, bem como a atenção e o cuidado dado por ele a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para o esclarecimento como Aufklärung, no cotidiano prosaico das (...) massas. Esse cuidado o levou a questionar, a exercitar e a experimentar a transmissão do conhecimento por meios novos e metodologias inovadoras para a época, sem perder de vista a perspectiva dos vencidos, em sua batalha diária, ou seja, em seu cotidiano. As peças, portanto, não são modelos apenas em sua estrutura narrativa, mas também de uma intencionalidade pedagógica emancipadora que pode dialogar com a criança, mediante a ludo-linguagem de domínio e fluência das crianças. A infância, nesse sentido, é signo de uma nova subjetividade fortalecida e, assim, capaz de resistir e de se desviar dos encantos e das promessas do populismo fascista que, no século XXI, não deixou de rondar a todos. Palavras-chave: Narrativas Radiofônicas; Experiência; Walter Benjamin Radiophone tales: the emergency of a modern form of narration in Benjamin Abstract: This study analyzes Walter Benjamin's radio narratives as a form and content through which the author sought to provide the childhood of his time with a possibility of experiencing the contemporary. Whenever thinking about the pieces from the didactic point of view and from the learning point of view, it could find Benjamin's intentionality among it, as well as the attention and care given by him to elements apparently irrelevant to the clarification, such as Aufklärung, in the prosaic daily life of masses. This care led him to question, exercise and experiment with the transmission of knowledge through new means and innovative methodologies for the time, without losing sight of the perspective of the losers, in their daily battle, that is, in their daily lives. The plays, therefore, are not models only in their narrative structure, but also of an emancipatory pedagogical intentionality that can dialogue with the child, through the ludo-language of mastery and fluency of children. Childhood, in this sense, is a sign of a new, strengthened subjectivity and, consequently, capable of resisting and deviating from the charms and promises of fascist populism that, in the 21st century, did not cease to haunt everyone. Keywords: Radio Narratives; Experience; Walter Benjamin Cuentos radiofónicos: la emergencia de una forma moderna de narración en Benjamin Resumén: Este estudio analiza las narrativas radiofónicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma y contenido a través del cual el autor buscó proporcionar para la infancia de su tiempo una posibilidad de experiencia con lo contemporáneo. Al pensar en las piezas, desde el punto de vista didáctico y desde el punto de vista del aprendizaje, se puede encontrar en ellas la intencionalidad de Benjamin, así como la atención y el cuidado dado por él a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para el esclarecimiento como Aufklärung, en el prosaico diario de las masas. Ese cuidado lo llevó a cuestionar, a ejercitar y a experimentar la transmisión del conocimiento por medios nuevos y metodologías innovadoras para la época, sin perder de vista la perspectiva de los vencidos, en su batalla diaria, o sea, en su cotidiano. Las piezas, por lo tanto, no son modelos solo en su estructura narrativa, sino también de una intencionalidad pedagógica emancipadora que puede dialogar con el niño, mediante el Ludo lenguaje de dominio y fluidez de los niños. La infancia, en ese sentido, es signo de una nueva subjetividad fortalecida y, así, capaz de resistir y de desviarse de los encantos y de las promesas del populismo fascista que, en el siglo XXI, no dejó de rondar a todos. Palabras clave: Narrativas Radiofónicas; Experiencia; Walter Benjamin Data de registro: 07/03/2023 Data de aceite: 22/11/2023. (shrink)

Any well-structured argumentative exchange must be preceded by some preparatory stages. In the pragma-dialectical four-stage model of critical discussion, the clarification of issues and positions is relegated to the confrontation stage and the other preparatory matters are dealt within the opening stage. In the opening stage, the parties involved come to agree to discuss their differences and to do so by an argumentative exchange rather than by, say, a sequence of bids and offers. They should also come to agree (...) on the rules of dialogue, on roles, on logical principles, on types of argument, and on the propositions that can be used as basic premises. All in all, a lot of work needs to be done before the first topical argument can be put forward. Especially the opening stage seems prone to further disagreements and protracted discussions, e.g., about the admissibility of particular kinds of argument or particular basic premises. There is also the problem that a successful opening stage threatens to settle matters beforehand and thus put the argumentation stage out of business. The paper suggests some measures that could alleviate the workload of the opening stage, without making the argumentation stage otiose. (shrink)

A survey of a wide range of social?scientific disciplines reveals a definite convergence of theoretical interest in human cognition and communication as situated, concerned, and embedded in social commitment. Recent contributions within situation semantics and cognitive science explicitly reject some of the constraints inherent in their shared philosophical heritage and prepare novel ground for dialogues between fields as far apart as formal semantics and ?dialogical? text theory. Issues such as purely cognitive versus motivational aspects of human situatedness, and the relationship (...) between models of individual information processing, on the one hand, and hermeneutic?dialectic assumptions about social and collective features of meaning and mind, on the other, are thus made topics of cross?disciplinary discussions. These are some of the many problems in need of further clarification if we want to explore the possibility of bridging and/or transcending the gulf between analytic?rationalist and hermeneutic?dialectic contributions to our insight into human cognition and communication. (shrink)

Buddhism has become one of the main dialogue partners for different psychotherapeutic approaches. As a psychological ethical system, it offers structural elements that are compatible with psychotherapeutic theory and practice. A main concept in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and postmodern psychoanalysis is intersubjectivity. In relational psychoanalysis the individual is analysed within a matrix of relationships that turn out to be the central power in her/his psychological development. By realising why one has become the present individual and how personal development is connected with (...) relationships, the freedom to choose and create a life that is independent from inner restrictions should be strengthened. In Mahāyāna-Buddhism, intersubjectivity is the result of an understanding of all phenomena as being in interdependent connection. Human beings are a collection of different phenomena and in constant interchange with everything else. Personal happiness and freedom from suffering depends on how this interchange can be realised in experience. The article focuses on the philosophical psychological fundaments in both approaches and emphasises clarification of to what the term ‘intersubjectivity’ exactly refers. This clarification is essential for the current dialogues, as well as further perspectives in this interdisciplinary field. (shrink)

With contributions from leading scholars in constitutional law, this volume examines how carefully designed and limited doctrines of proportionality can improve judicial decision-making, how it is applied in different jurisdictions, its role on constitutionalism outside the courts, and whether the principle of proportionality actually advances or detracts from democracy. Contributions from some of the seminal thinkers on the development of scholarship on proportionality extend their prior work and engage in an important dialogue on the topic. Some offer substantial critiques, (...) others defend the doctrine and offer important clarifications and extensions of their prior work. Throughout, the authors engage not only with case law from around the world but also with existing scholarly treatments of the subject. Mathematical treatments are avoided, making the book accessible to readers from both 'soft' and hard' social science backgrounds. (shrink)

This essay presents an in-depth interpretation of the controversial dialogue in Analects 13.18 through careful and critical investigation of its historical background and philosophical significations. With a clarification of the multifaceted connotations of the word zhi (?, upright, forthright), my study brings out the play of irony in Confucius's words in Analects 13.18. According to my interpretation, not only is Confucius's reaction not inappropriate but it also demonstrates the art of early Confucian moral discretion that was informed by (...) the teaching of quan (? moral discretion). Accordingly, Confucius's judgment of the case embodied a high and bright middle way of moral choice originating in the openness and sincerity of heart. It epitomized a singular moment of deliberation and decision that was responsible for a sinuous opening of piety and individuality within the interplay of conflicting conditions and requisitions. (shrink)

In present-day political and moral philosophy the idea that all persons are in some way moral equals is an almost universal premise, with its defenders often claiming that philosophical positions that reject the principle of equal respect and concern do not deserve to be taken seriously. This has led to relatively few attempts to clarify, or indeed justify, 'basic equality' and the principle of equal respect and concern. Such clarification and justification, however, would be direly needed. After all, the (...) ideas, for instance, that Adolf Hitler and Nelson Mandela have equal moral worth, or that a rape victim owes equal respect and concern to both her rapist and to her own caring brother, seem to be utterly implausible. Thus, if someone insists on the truth of such ideas, he or she owes his or her audience an explanation. The authors in this volume - which breaks new ground by engaging egalitarians and anti-egalitarians in a genuine dialogue - attempt to shed light into the dark. They try to clarify the concepts of "basic equality", "equal moral worth","equal respect and concern", "dignity," etc; and they try to justify-or to refute-the resulting clarified doctrines. The volume thus demonstrates that the claim that all persons have equal moral worth, are owed equal concern and respect, or have the same rights is anything but obvious. This finding has not only significant philosophical but also political implications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Morality in Flux: Medical Ethics Dilemmas in the People's Republic of ChinaRen-Zong Qiu (bio)IntroductionModern China is undergoing a fundamental change from a monolithic society to a rather pluralistic one. It is a long and winding road. Marxism is facing various challenges as the influence of Western culture increases. Confucianism is still deeply entrenched in the Chinese mind but various religions, including Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity are experiencing a revival. (...) Almost fifty minorities coexist in the country in addition to the majority Han people. Tension and conflict are inevitable as diverse—and sometimes incompatible—values come to the fore at this historic juncture. Many fields, including medicine, face new challenges, and in this environment the field of bioethics is flourishing.Like many countries, China is groping with the effects of new medical technology and skyrocketing health care costs. But in the context of the Chinese sociocultural environment, some unique—as well as more familiar—issues arise. None of the classic texts provide ready-made answers to these dilemmas; we must find the answers ourselves. The only reasonable way to resolve the conflicts between opposing values is through dialogue, consultation, and negotiation among the various social and cultural groups.The bioethical dilemmas receiving the most attention in China now relate to the two ends of life: birth and death. On one end are issues relating to reproductive technology, especially birth control and family planning; at the other end is euthanasia.Dilemmas Surrounding Reproductive TechnologyAccording to traditional Chinese belief, not having a child results from not having virtue. In fact, the most serious violation of the Confucian [End Page 16]principle of filial piety is to be without offspring. A Chinese man without a child experiences heavy psychological pressure, and the burden is especially onerous for women because infertility is always blamed on the wife. Wives who do not bear a child are stigmatized and mistreated—even abused—in families that stick to traditional values.In China today, this widely held belief is colliding with another reality: an apparent increase in infertility among newly-married couples. The rate may be about 5 percent. These couples turn to doctors for help.Artificial insemination by donor (AID) and by husband is now widely practiced. Eleven provinces have established sperm banks, and private doctors are performing AID for considerable fees. But procedures to address legal and ethical problems associated with the procedure have lagged behind. With the exception of a few centers in large cities, AID is undertaken without established procedures or policies relating to the selection of donors and recipients, records about those involved, or clarification of the status of the child. The legal status of the child remains unresolved.The status of the child within the community is also unresolved as traditional values clash with the application of modern technology to childbearing. The case of "The Child Who Did Not Belong" (see box), illustrates how an AID child is not accepted by the family that embraces traditional values because he is not the husband's biological child.In vitro fertilization (IVF) is another alternative. Two IVF centers are in operation, one in Beijing and the other in Changsha, and both have succeeded in producing live births. This technology has received considerable media attention and is generally accepted even among those with traditional views.But much of this medical technology is not widely accessible—especially in rural areas—and so some infertile couples resort to surrogate motherhood to ensure an heir. An infertile couple enters into a contract with a woman who has intercourse with the husband in order to bear a child for the couple. This practice is called "borrowing a wife." In some villages, the "borrowed wife" receives as much as 10,000 yuan (five times a professor's monthly salary or about $250) for a girl and double that for a boy.But the more common and thorny problems involved with the beginning of life relate to birth control, family planning, and the "one couple, one child" policy that the Chinese government instituted to curb overpopulation. The goal of that policy is to prevent China's population from exceeding 1.2 billion in the year 2000... (shrink)

The article discusses the problems of philosophical geography, philosophical multipolarity, georationality. The debates on these issues are becoming interdisciplinary. Specialists in Eastern philosophies and cross-cultural communications as well as epistemologists, scientific methodologists, cognitive scholars, synergists became participants of the discussion held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The problem of Eurocentrism in academic philosophy has become the main topic of discussion. The opponents of the “regional” multipolarity argued that the Western European tradition of rationality was (...) an example of the rationality per se. The proponents, who relied heavily on the ad professionem arguments, advocated multipolarity and demonstrated the irreducibility of the world-pictures, languages and ontologies of philosophical systems. A point of view was expressed that Eurocentrism had an ideological background. The disputants noted that there was need to redefine or clarify such fundamental concepts as logic, rationality, scientific rationality, universalism, processuality. The redefinition of the concept of rationality is for the studies of various types of rationality outside European cultures. Methodologists of science drew attention that the cognitive problems of intercultural communications turned out to be similar to the problems faced by theory of complexity. The analysis of philosophical, logical and other cases in various “zones of exchange” reveals a plurality of directions in the global and local socio-cultural spaces. The panelists raised the question of the role of philosophy in the global world and its responsibility in uniting nations. The authors of the article draw attention to many functions that the Western European conceptual system performs in the formation of philosophical language, mentality and communication. The dynamics of philosophical discussions, the dialogue of the West and the East lead to the clarification of philosophical positions, the emergence of new concepts and meanings as well as the formation of discourses of the future. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ever-Moving Soul in Plato's PhaedrusDougal BlythThe proof of the immortality of the soul at Phdr. 245c5-246a2 is unique in the dialogue for its apparent philosophical rigour and technical style, and it is peculiar in its rhetorical and mythical context.1 It is introduced as the first stage of Socrates' palinode, exhorting Phaedrus to give himself to a true lover rather than a non-lover. On this basis the philosopher (...) will then describe the course of true love (erōs) as the attempt of an older man to lead the soul of a younger whom he loves, along with his own soul, up and back to the original immortal condition of the "winged" soul which contemplates true being (246a-257b).As the groundwork upon which this vision is built the proof of the immortality of the soul deserves close study, not only of its argument, but also its rhetorical achievement and relation to the subsequent myth. It might be a parody or imitation of a Pythagorean proof, but the definition of soul and the role that plays in the implied theory appear original to Plato.2 Nevertheless, the importation of a fragment of some more extensive physical theory into a speech on love is surprising, and demands explanation.3 My procedure here involves the recovery of significant features [End Page 185] of the theory, firstly by reference to the myth, secondly by comparison with other dialogues containing related concepts and positions, and finally and most importantly by extended analysis of the physical and cosmological postulates of the argument itself.4 It should then emerge from my attention to the stages of its presentation that, as might be expected in its epideictic context, the statement of the proof involves significant rhetorical finesse. It both establishes the credibility of the subsequent myth, and, with its cosmic sweep, prepares the listener for the profundity of the latter. Moreover the proof is written so as itself to provoke that philosophical erōs for understanding which the myth then describes.I. To begin, we need some idea of what soul the proof is concerned with. The three possible meanings of the ambiguous phrase (245a5) are (i) every individual soul, (ii) one comprehensive world soul, or (iii) some common aspect of all living things, which, despite the mortality of psychophysical individuals, would be immortal in itself.5 The plurality of separate individual souls [i.e., sense (i)] is excluded by the requirements of the proof (see below), that "all soul" be one unique source of cosmic motion. No specific doctrine of a world soul [i.e., sense (ii)] is expressly stated in the Phaedrus; I shall in fact argue that the world soul is signified by the gods' chariots in the following myth, but in that case this cannot be equivalent to "all soul," since immortal souls (or fragments of soul as such) are described as entering into human and animal bodies, whereas the gods do not (248c-249d). This seems sufficient grounds to understand "all soul" as (iii)-one common soul in which we all participate insofar as we are alive; thus Plato writes "all soul cares for what is soulless (i.e., body), and travels round the whole world ('all [End Page 186] heaven', ) coming to be in different forms at different times" (246b6-7).Since the identity of the subject concerned in the proof of the immortality of "all soul" receives its only clarification subsequently in the course of the following myth, before turning to a detailed consideration of the argument I shall first survey the implications of the myth for the cosmological status of immortal soul. It is represented here as a chariot rising up to the sphere of the fixed stars, where each lesser soul follows in the train of its appointed god; and by passing beyond the outermost edge of the visible universe, insofar as it is capable, the soul studies the forms beyond, the truly divine, by proximity to which even gods are divine (249c6). Gods are thus, in this dialogue, paradigms of that divine soul which is said to circumnavigate the cosmos in governing it (246b7-c2, e5-6) and soul has its... (shrink)

The Analysis of Wonder is a stimulating and worthy introduction to the difficult and unique thought of Nicolai Hartmann. In this venue, the focus is upon criticisms of Cicovacki’s book. The opportunity to elicit further clarification and argumentation from Cicovacki should be fruitful. Hartmann’s philosophy is truly unique in nature and vast. As such, it is worth noting at the outset that, given the nature of Cicovacki’s book and a lack of deeper familiarity with Hartmann’s philosophy, the concerns raised (...) herein may very well be issues in Hartmann that Cicovacki is replicating. The criticisms addressed herein present five sets of worries related to The Analysis of Wonder. The first three may be relatively minor concerns having to do with what is meant by the rediscovery of the world; Cicovacki’s criticisms of post-modernism and existentialism; and Cicovacki’s use of Arendt as a way of framing Hartmann’s value to contemporary philosophy and beyond. The latter two sets of worries are more substantive. They involve Hartmann’s account of the importance of a loving attitude and Hartmann’s theory of personality. Again, these are presented in the spirit of an invitation to dialogue more about Hartmann, a figure who Cicovacki represents well in The Analysis of Wonder. (shrink)

This paper argues that the contemporary challenge for ISUD and philosophy itself is to repair and replenish our shared and overlapping lifeworlds through the recovery, critique, clarification, and renewal of authentic values, insights, and achievements from the widest possible plurality of traditions, cultures, and philosophical visions. We must liberate the life world from the snares of creeping nihilism. We must repair and replenish the life world through open and honest communication, through philosophical dialogue among an ever-greater plurality of (...) perspectives and points of view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Christian Identity and Genuine Openness to the Religious Beliefs of OthersSchubert M. OgdenNot the least important thing I have learned from my participation in the International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter is that genuine interreligious dialogue is possible only under certain conditions. Specifically, I am now confirmed in the assumption I made in beginning my participation that one can enter into such dialogue only if one can somehow claim (...) truth for one's own religious beliefs without thereby denying, explicitly or implicitly, that others' religious beliefs also may possibly be true. But how is it possible to claim that one's own beliefs as a Christian are true while allowing for at least the possible truth of others' beliefs as well?This is how I, as a Christian, formulate the question—or, at any rate, one of the questions—that I took to be raised by the topic discussed at the most recent meeting of our group: "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World." One implication of this formulation, obviously, is that, in my view, a necessary aspect of Christian identity, as of religious identity generally, is the confession, or profession, of certain religious beliefs, together with the claim that these beliefs are true. Moreover, by "true" in this context I understand not merely "substantially true," in the sense of agreeing in substance with any other true religious or existential beliefs, but also "formally true," in the sense of providing the norm with which any other religious or existential beliefs must agree in order to be true beliefs. With this understanding, then, the question I propose to pursue really asks, "How is it possible to be a Christian and to claim formal truth for one's own religious beliefs while allowing that others' beliefs also can be formally true?"This explains, in turn, why the other operative term in the title of my paper is not simply "openness," but "genuine openness." One might possibly think—or be thought—to be open to the religious beliefs of others simply because one allowed that their beliefs could indeed be true provided only that they substantially agreed with Christian beliefs taken as the norm for judging their truth. But on my analysis of the claim that others themselves make for the truth of their beliefs, one would [End Page 21] not be genuinely open to their beliefs at all. For their claim is that their beliefs are formally true and therefore themselves the norm with which all other religious or existential beliefs, including Christian beliefs, must agree if their own claim to be true is a valid claim. My test of "genuine openness," then, is openness to at least the possibility that the religious beliefs of others are formally true in the same sense in which I as a Christian claim my own religious beliefs to be so.The other thing to note about my formulation of the question is what it does and does not ask. It does not ask whether it is possible to claim formal truth for my beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true; rather, simply assuming that it is possible, somehow, to do this, it asks how it is possible. In other words, what are the necessary conditions of the possibility of claiming formal truth for one's own religious beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true?With this clarification of our question, I now want to indicate how I, as a Christian and a theologian, answer it. This I propose to do by briefly developing my answer against another that is currently being given to it by what appears to be a growing number of other Christians and theologians.I refer to those who are commonly called—and call themselves—"religious (or Christian) pluralists," or simply "pluralists." According to these Christians and theologians, the monistic claim traditionally made for the truth of Christian beliefs, to the effect that they alone among religious or existential beliefs are formally true, can no longer be defended and should be given up. Far from being the only true religion, Christianity is in fact... (shrink)