This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major (...) objections to cheap preferences engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. (shrink)

This paper is about the shaping of student workload preferences by educational institution design, and how this creates distrust by staff in those preferences when staff are asked to use those preferences in re-designing the courses they teach. It is a case study of the construction of student workload preferences by the context of a particular higher education institution. In more detail: Failures to standardize the work required to receive equal credit points from different courses make (...) credit points unfit for their official purposes. Moreover, increasingly, institutions are found where students are required to take a high number of courses simultaneously. This study aimed to identify plausible hypotheses about how high course-loads and standardization failure interact by examining credit point standardization failure at an Estonian university where students are required to take twice as many courses as their peers at better performing universities. The hypotheses supported by the study are: the high course-load both made standardization failure useful to students seeking to manage the high course-load and contributed toward standardization failure because it rendered students’ assessments of workload untrustworthy to lecturers who regulate that workload. Existing advice on standardization of workloads within the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System is criticized for its insensitivity to the constructive effects of course-load on student workload preferences. (shrink)

One explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality. But why not just communicate the information in their ban, perhaps via a “would have banned” label?Because product labeling is cheap-talk, any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality, inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told. In fact, when regulators expect market failures to result in under-consumption of a drug, and so would not ban it for (...) informed consumers, regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers. (shrink)

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages which are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender. We characterize the resulting equilibria without refining out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Subsequently, we apply an (...) adapted version of the no incentive to separate condition to our model. We show that if the sender and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver, then NITS only admits the equilibrium with the largest possible number of induced actions. When the preferences between players are not aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee uniqueness, and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show, this improvement can occur to such an extent that the equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et al. upper bound for receiver’s payoffs in mediated communication. (shrink)

Rilke's remark conjures up an officious array of well-meaning persons bent on completing our orderly passage from cradle to grave. They tidy our files cosily about us, inject us with extreme unction and slide us into the warm embrace of the undertaker. At the forefront of the array stands the doctor, part mechanic and part priest. His main task is to repair the living with resources whose effective and impartial allocation is a chief topic of medical ethics. But his role (...) is not that of an impartial allocator: his patients want his partisan support. This builds a moral tension into a role played out where system meets patient, and one made instructively plain in the care of the dying. The system no doubt prefers death to be cheap and orderly but this thought may not move someone like Rilke wanting a death of his own. The doctor is then caught between his general duty to patients at large and his particular duty to the patient in front of him, a tension tautened for a Hippocratic promoter of health and life by a patient in search of an exit. (shrink)

Intersectionality theory explores the special sorts of disadvantage that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. One significant methodological problem for the quantitative study of intersectionality is the difficulty of acquiring data sets large enough to produce significant results when one is looking for intersectional effects. For this reason, we argue, simulation methods may be particularly useful to this branch of theorizing because they can generate precise predictions and causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and (...) can thus guide future empirical work. We illustrate this point through models which show that intersectional oppression can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of preferences and abilities. The conditions necessary to derive such disadvantage are relatively minimal. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases. (shrink)

An important finding of the game theoretic research on signaling games is the insight that under many circumstances, a signal obtains credibility by incurring costs to the sender. Therefore it seems questionable whether or not cheap talk—signals that are not payoff relevant—can serve to transmit information among rational agents. This issue is non-trivial in strategic interactions where the preferences of the players are not aligned. Researchers like Crawford & Sobel, Rabin, and Farrell demonstrated, however, that even in the (...) case of partially divergent interests, cheap talk may be informative. They assume that signals have an exogenously given meaning that is common knowledge between the players, and they explore the conditions under which such a signal is credible. This discussion has obvious relevance to the program of Gricean pragmatics in linguistics. According to Grice’s "Cooperative Principle”, this research tradition only considers scenarios where the interests of the players are aligned. Nevertheless, the assumption of differential signaling costs introduces an element of non-aligned interests. The present paper proposes a framework that combines these two research strands. Using an inference protocol of iterated best response, it gives a recipe for how the interlocutors derive rationalizable strategies from exogeneously given "literal” meanings of signals. No special assumptions about the alignment of interests or signaling costs are made. After introducing the formal model, the paper sketches several applications of this model to problems in linguistic pragmatics, like scalar implicatures, the division of pragmatic labor, and the interpretation of measure terms. (shrink)

What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real object? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalmers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and scientific computer simulations to (...) critically engage with Chalmers’s position. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer provides model descriptions. This result motivates a deeper analysis of the way in which Chalmers builds up his realism. I argue that he buys realism too cheap. For instance, he does not really specify what virtual objects are supposed to be. As a result, rhetoric aside, his virtual realism isn’t far from a sort of fictionalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martha Nussbaum on Dickens's Hard TimesPaulette KidderAt the heart of Martha Nussbaum's work in capability ethics is a rejection of utilitarianism. Nussbaum has repeatedly recounted a pivotal moment in Dickens's Hard Times (1854), in which the young Sissy Jupe delivers an innocent but devastating critique of the utilitarian system.1 Nussbaum's most extended and compelling reading of Hard Times appears in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.2 Nussbaum (...) convincingly shows that Dickens's novel is a "deep attack" on utilitarianism, going to the heart of the assumption that the human good consists in maximizing the satisfaction of preferences of the greatest aggregate of persons.In what follows, I will review Nussbaum's philosophical reading of the novel and its critique of utilitarianism, and then return to Hard Times to show that Nussbaum has systematically omitted references to the Biblical themes and references that pervade the novel. Arguing that Dickens's attack on utilitarianism draws much of its power from the resonance of these historically rooted symbols of transcendence, I will conclude with a reflection on the reasons for Nussbaum's avoidance of these themes in her own reading of the book.Hard Times, which focuses on a set of characters living in the polluted and class-divided manufacturing city of "Coketown," is known as Dickens's most polemical novel. The novel announces its central theme immediately in the opening speech by Thomas Gradgrind to the young students of the Gradgrind School: "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach [End Page 417] these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else...."3From the youngest age, the children in Gradgrind's school are taught to avoid wonder and imagination and only to focus on science and mathematics—the study of what is observable and measurable. This education leaves his two eldest children, Tom and Louisa, miserably unequipped for the choices they face as adults. Young Tom Gradgrind grows up to be an undisciplined wastrel, incurring gambling debts that lead him to embezzle money and then to frame a factory worker, Stephen Blackpool, for the crime. Louisa Gradgrind endures a miserable marriage to her father's wealthy friend, Josiah Bounderby.At the moral center of the novel is Sissy Jupe, a girl who proves impervious to Gradgrind's educational system. Sissy, the daughter of a horse trainer who works for Sleary's Circus, is abandoned by her father and taken into the Gradgrind home. Sharing the moral center with Sissy is Stephen Blackpool, a weaver whose honesty and conviction cause him to run afoul of both his employer Bounderby and the demagogic Slackbridge, organizer for the trade union.In her reading of Hard Times, Nussbaum identifies four elements of utilitarianism: commensurability, aggregation, maximizing, and exogenous preferences, all of which are both dramatized in the novel and critiqued by it (PJ, p. 14). Commensurability means that "all the valuable things under consideration [are regarded as] valuable because they contain some one thing that itself varies only in quantity" (PJ, p. 14). Characters that Dickens presents as memorable individuals are seen by Gradgrind's system as "parcels of human nature." Students in Gradgrind's School are called by number instead of name, and the workers of Coke-town are seen as "hands and stomachs," and are likened to "ants and beetles." Individuality is erased by what Nussbaum terms Gradgrind's "abstracting mathematical mind" (PJ, p. 21).Aggregation, the second utilitarian element, means that data about individual lives is pooled, "without regarding the boundaries between lives as especially salient for the purposes of choice" (p. 14). Louisa Gradgrind is taught, for example, to view the working classes as "Something to be worked so much and paid so much, and there ended; something to be infallibly settled by laws of supply and demand; something that blundered against those laws, and floundered into difficulty; something that was a little pinched when wheat was dear, and overate itself when wheat was cheap... But, she had scarcely thought more of separating [End Page 418] [the people of Coketown] into units, than of separating the sea itself into its... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journey to WellnessRoberta PriceI should preface this by saying that as a child and early teen years I was lean, well within my weight range for my height of 5’3”. I was physically active as a snow skier, swimmer, hiker and biker. I started running in high school until I got pregnant at the age of 17 in 1988, but even then, my family and I had a gym (...) membership and I worked out with a trainer until my belly got too big and complications from pre–eclampsia forced me to bed rest the last four weeks of my pregnancy. I gained about 80 pounds, mostly water, during this time. Post pregnancy, I lost all my weight and resumed my active lifestyle of walking etc. It wasn’t until I got married in 1990 that I found my weight creeping up on me, slowly, every year. I was still active with three kids and a husband by then, but bad eating habits and cheap carbohydrates were not my friend.My efforts to return to leanness started a few years ago, about 2006. At that point, I weighed at least 200 pounds and I was not happy. Everyone knows the best way to lose weight is to exercise and watch what you eat, so I start daily walks. While walking I started having problems with my legs going numb to the point that I could not feel my feet hit the ground. At first I thought this feeling was due to a pinched nerve as a result of a single–vehicle car accident I was in earlier that year. Some days my legs would not bother me while walking and other days only a few steps would bring on the numbness. Also, I was susceptible to feelings of panic and a racing heart beat. My doctor at the time never once mentioned my weight being an issue. The nurse would write my weight on the chart, I would cringe as I waited for the lecture from my doctor about my weight to start. It never did. It was a strange, sort of “non–issue” with him as I had three kids so I was fat from that. My physician just said, “Lose the weight, I have no idea what is causing the numbness in your legs.”Fast forward to 2011, I am now under the care of a chiropractor in hopes of relieving the numbness that is happening all too frequently now. An ultrasound of my veins showed good blood flow so that ruled out a circulation issue. The chiropractor prescribed physical therapy to help ease my lower back pain hoping that would relieve the nerves I thought were pinched. I was prescribed high blood pressure medication by my doctor, with adverse side effects such as a nagging cough that would not go away—no matter how much cough medicine I consumed. It was during these sessions with my physical therapist that I was able to lose 10 pounds.There is a lot of self–talk in the life of an overweight or obese person. Everyday I woke up, knowing I had to lose weight. Every single time I looked in any mirror or saw any photo (which I was careful to be the photographer and not a subject as denial had become my best and worst friend). It was the subject of many a late night conversation with my husband, whom by the way, at his worst weight was 30 pounds over his preferred height to weight ratio. Not a single doctor I saw previous to this offered any hope for weight loss other than to shove a piece of paper at me telling me to eat these “healthy foods” listed. Since I was the family chef and chief purchaser of food, I was buying and eating vegetables, fruit, whole grains, and attempting to cut down on the processed foods—although, we were heavy eaters of potatoes, pastas, bagels, pizzas and other high carbohydrate foods. Over the years, [End Page 112] the most weight I had lost “counting calories” or portioning out “slow carbs” over “fast carbs” only afforded me a 15 pound loss, to be gained... (shrink)

Agribusiness corporations primarily involved in providing livestock feed—colloquially known as the “ABCD” (Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and the Louis Dreyfus Company)—have begun to enter the fishing industry around the world. I argue that this recent entry of agribusiness multinationals in aquaculture, focusing particularly on Cargill, arises to take advantage of strategic opportunities to proliferate, or create links with respect to feed production and development within value chains. Concerning such opportunities, as I document, Cargill first leveraged its access to (...) cheap, overproduced grains in the 1990s, developing ways to insert corn and soy into what it calls “aquafeed.” Next, the multinational firm began proliferating links within fishing industry value chains in the form of introducing new technical assistance services, as well as creating feed supplements and additives. As I explain, these efforts to proliferate links in the supply chain exist as opportunities to charge rents, or surplus profits, which is possible because Cargill retains the right to control the new products and services. An additional link in the chain includes how the corporation has expanded its role in the global food system from its past as an intermediary, to engaging consumers in direct ways by attempting to create their preferences. I conduct my analysis of Cargill’s corporate strategy by focusing on reporting from the fishing industry publication, Aquafeed News, detailing developments from 2000 through 2023. (shrink)

Communicating the process quality of ethically produced food effectively is of highest interest to policy makers, organizations, retailers and producers in order to enhance ethical food production and increase ethical label use. The objective of this paper is to unveil the effectiveness of different communication treatments in regard to changing purchase behavior of different consumer groups. Different communication material for beef produced according to consumer expectations was compiled and applied in a consumer survey—incorporating a choice experiment and a questionnaire—with 676 (...) respondents in three cities of Germany. A Latent Class Mixed Logit Model was basis to identify different consumer segments and their response to the different communication treatments. The effects of different communication treatments unveil the importance to address information in an objective manner. Target groups could be enlarged through the assessment of clear, objective information. Moreover, most consumers were more likely to refrain from choosing a cheap beef product from conventional, barn-based rearing. Hence, consumers might be interested in reducing their overall consumption of beef and prefer the consumption of high value ethical beef with less frequency. Producers, market actors and policy makers should realize that a high share of consumers, not only smaller target groups, value ethical food and may be ready to change their consumption habits, if they are adequately informed. (shrink)

Cyber technology gives states the ability to accomplish effects that once required kinetic action. These effects can now be achieved with cyber means in a manner that is covert, deniable, cheap, and technologically feasible for many governments. In some cases, cyber means are morally preferable to conventional military operations, but in other cases, cyber's unique qualities can lead to greater mischief than governments would have chanced using kinetic means. This volume addresses the applicability of traditional military ethics to cyber (...) operations, jus ad vim, the rights of the targets of cyber operations, cyber sabotage, cyber surveillance, phase zero operations, psychological operations, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic ethics. Uniquely, it includes a number of cyber incidents that do not currently exist as case studies and have not received much public attention. This volume has been designed to work as a handbook for military and security professionals involved in cyber training, teaching, and application. (shrink)

Do farmers in the southern Mexican highlands practice science? The anthropologist Roberto González argues that they do in his well‐written and solidly researched account of Zapotec farmers' cultivation of corn, sugarcane, and coffee. This book speaks to enduring questions concerning the nature of science through its focus on the often‐overlooked sophistication of traditional farming. Historians of science interested in agriculture, international development, and definitions of science more broadly will find in Zapotec Science a rich store of wide‐ranging questions and provocative (...) answers.González aims to move beyond the limitations of many sociological and anthropological studies of traditional societies. Many ignore international “cosmopolitan” influences, and most that do deal explicitly with these treat the traditional and the cosmopolitan as separate spheres. González finds no reason to treat these categories as nonoverlapping, as he documents how Zapotec farmers have experimented with and adopted techniques, implements, and crop varieties from many parts of the globe. And the flow goes both ways. Many so‐called cosmopolitan scientists are beginning to recognize the importance of traditional knowledge for solving problems in industrialized nations. But though the boundaries may be blurred, González argues that the conceptual bases of Zapotec agriculture are “culturally incommensurable with those predominating in industrialized societies” .In Chapter 1, González elaborates his position relative to other anthropological work on local science and traditional ecological knowledge and poses comparative questions about Zapotec and cosmopolitan science. Chapters 2 and 3 richly detail the daily practice of Zapotec agriculture and its environmental and geographical, cultural, and historical contexts. González emphasizes campesinos' craft, the refined skills that underlie every aspect of home, community, and agricultural life.González's research comes to the fore in the middle chapters on maize, sugarcane, and coffee cultivation. Here he clearly illustrates how Zapotec farming is founded on five fundamental values: household maintenance , mutual aid among families, personification of the earth and supernatural beings, an understanding of physical work as normal and desirable, and an emphasis on the quality of food over its quantity. For each crop he shows how present agricultural practices have emerged from an evolving balance between local crop development over hundreds or thousands of years and carefully weighed periodic opportunities to adopt new practices or plant varieties. Sugarcane cultivation, for example, illustrates how Zapotec farmers' decisions grow out of the five core values rather than a more narrow “economic rationality.” Zapotec communities do not consume cheap, white, processed sugar; rather, they produce and use an older, less processed, more expensive form called panela. Panela's persistence in their diet is due to its role in reciprocal social relationships and to Zapotecs' preference for high‐quality, good‐tasting food. The book concludes with a critique of Green Revolution development strategies and a lively discussion of the fertile borderlands between traditional and cosmopolitan knowledges.González's definition of science, closely related to Bronislaw Malinowski's, centers on practical knowledge. González argues that Zapotec farmers practiced science as they experimented with new techniques and implements from beyond Oaxaca's borders. Although traditional and cosmopolitan knowledge are conceptually distant, the author places great weight on what they share: both are systematic searches for practical knowledge. Traditional agriculture offers materials and methods that cosmopolitan scientists increasingly need.This book's strength lies, not surprisingly, near González's expertise: his careful description and analysis of Zapotec farmers' practices, logic, and values. As with all ambitious and worthwhile projects that pull together scientific enterprises that are culturally, geographically, and conceptually distant, González's book leaves questions unanswered. His characterization of cosmopolitan science is at times contradictory and often narrow. While Zapotec scientists are said to consider a variety of procedures and techniques and “adopt what seems to work according to their own categories, and reject what does not,” cosmopolitan scientists operate according to “one view, one procedure” . A more thorough characterization of cosmopolitan science would strengthen the comparisons with Zapotec farming and would complement the direct treatment that González provides for cosmopolitan science's exceptions, sustainable agriculture and alternative medicine. This would also help to clarify differences between natural scientists and development economists, whose values are often not distinguished. Furthermore, cosmopolitan science seems to dwell outside of Mexico. What would it look like to widen the lens to include the Mexican urban academic scientific community? How does this book speak to the wider literature on scientific practice that largely focuses on cosmopolitan science?Zapotec Science is an important contribution to our understanding of nonindustrialized agriculture outside of the United States. It will, I hope, prompt historians to delve into the historical relationships among people who employ agricultural knowledge toward divergent goals: scientists, farmers, and government leaders dwelling in different national and professional cultures. (shrink)

Contemporary mate preferences can provide important clues to human reproductive history. Little is known about which characteristics people value in potential mates. Five predictions were made about sex differences in human mate preferences based on evolutionary conceptions of parental investment, sexual selection, human reproductive capacity, and sexual asymmetries regarding certainty of paternity versus maternity. The predictions centered on how each sex valued earning capacity, ambition— industriousness, youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity. Predictions were tested in data from 37 samples (...) drawn from 33 countries located on six continents and five islands. For 27 countries, demographic data on actual age at marriage provided a validity check on questionnaire data. Females were found to value cues toresource acquisitionin potential mates more highly than males. Characteristics signalingreproductive capacitywere valued more by males than by females. These sex differences may reflect different evolutionary selection pressures on human males and females; they provide powerful cross-cultural evidence of current sex differences in reproductive strategies. Discussion focuses on proximate mechanisms underlying mate preferences, consequences for human intrasexual competition, and the limitations of this study. (shrink)

People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs. The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change. We discuss the role that social relationships (...) play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relationships between corporate community involvement activities, the organizational structures within which they are managed, the firm's industry and evolving stakeholder attitudes and preferences in a sample of 148 U.K. based firms who have demonstrated a clear desire to be socially responsible. The research highlights significant associations between the allocation of responsibility for community involvement within the firm, its industry and the extent of its community involvement activities. Consistent with the view that managerial structures may play (...) a significant role in the implementation of community initiatives, the results identify significant variations in community involvement policies across alternative organizational forms. However, important similarities in corporate community policies across alternative structures are also shown to exist suggesting that corporate community involvement activities may be influenced by the preferences of societal stakeholders. (shrink)

I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason (...) to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for prefer- ences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism. (shrink)

While the concept of adaptive preferences is an important tool for criticizing injustice, it is often claimed that using the concept involves showing disrespect for persons judged to have adaptive preferences. In this paper, I propose an account of adaptive preferences that does the relevant political work while still showing persons two centrally important kinds of respect. My account is based in what I call an indirect substantive account of autonomy, which places substantive requirements on the options (...) available to a person, rather than on the option that she ultimately prefers. This allows us to pinpoint cases in which a person's circumstances have rendered her insufficiently autonomous, without saying that any conception of the good must be non-autonomous tout court. (shrink)

Adaptive preferences give rise to puzzles in ethics, political philosophy, decision theory, and the theory of action. Like our other preferences, adaptive preferences lead us to make choices, take action, and give consent. In 'False Consciousness for Liberals', recently published in The Philosophical Review, David Enoch (2020) proposes a criterion by which to identify when these choices, actions, and acts of consent are less than fully autonomous; that is, when they suffer from what Natalie Stoljar (2014) calls (...) an 'autonomy deficit'. According to Enoch, such actions are not protected in the usual way against interference by others; there is not the same prohibition against trying to prevent someone from acting in a particular way when that action is motivated by such adaptive preferences and is an attempt to satisfy them. In this note, I raise two concerns about Enoch's criterion. (shrink)

Background Immense volumes of personal health information are required to realize the anticipated benefits of artificial intelligence in clinical medicine. To maintain public trust in medical research, consent policies must evolve to reflect contemporary patient preferences. Methods Patients were invited to complete a 27-item survey focusing on: broad versus specific consent; opt-in versus opt-out approaches; comfort level sharing with different recipients; attitudes towards commercialization; and options to track PHI use and study results. Results 222 participants were included in the (...) analysis; 83% were comfortable sharing PHI with researchers at their own hospital, although younger patients were more uncomfortable than older patients. While 56% of patients preferred broad consent, 38% preferred specific consent; 6% preferred not sharing at all. The majority of patients preferred to be asked for permission before entry into a contact pool. Again, this trend was more pronounced for younger patients. Approximately half of patients were uncomfortable sharing PHI with commercial enterprises. Most patients preferred to track PHI usage, with the highest proportion once again reported by the youngest patients. A majority of patients also wished to be notified regarding study results. Conclusions While most patients were willing to share their PHI with researchers within their own institution, many preferred a transparent and reciprocal consent process. These data also suggest a generational shift, wherein younger patients preferred more specific consent options. Modernizing consent policies to reflect increased autonomy is crucial in fostering sustained public engagement with medical research. (shrink)

Commentary on Walsh, E. 2020. Cognitive transformation, dementia, and the moral weight of advance directives. The American Journal of Bioethics. 20(8): 54–64.

One fundamental assumption often made in the literature on unawareness is that risk preferences are invariant to changes of awareness. We study how exposure to unawareness affects choices under risk. Participants in our experiment choose repeatedly between varying sure outcomes and a lottery in three phases. All treatments are exactly identical in phase 1 and phase 3, but differ in phase 2. There are five different treatments pertaining to the lottery faced in phase 2: The control treatment, the treatment (...) with awareness of unawareness of lottery outcomes but known number of outcomes, the treatment with awareness of unawareness of outcomes but with unknown number of outcomes, the treatment with unawareness of unawareness of some outcomes, and the treatment with an ambiguous lottery. We study both whether behavior differs in phase 3 across treatments and whether differences of subjects’ behavior between phases 1 and phase 3 differ across treatments. We observe no significant treatment effects. (shrink)

The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw but that it's not clear that this flaw matters (...) morally or politically. What matters is whether they suffer from an autonomy flaw. To answer this question, the author develops an account of autonomy failure, according to which a preference is nonautonomous if an injustice played an appropriate role in its causal history. The author then discusses the moral implications—and in an initial way, the political ones as well—of proclaiming a preference, or consent based on it, nonautonomous in this way. (shrink)

How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show (...) that the problem is even worse: inconsistency threatens if we accept both that your desires determine what is good for you and that you must prefer what is better for you. After I have introduced a useful toy model and stated the inconsistency argument, I will go on to discuss a couple of unsuccessful theories and see what we can learn from their mistakes. One important lesson is that how you would have felt about a life had you never led it is irrelevant to the question of how good that life is for you. What counts is how you feel about your life when you are actually leading it. Another lesson is that a life can be better for you even if you would not rank it higher, if you were to lead it. (shrink)

Interest in the use of medical data for health research is increasing. Yet, as Elizabeth Ford and colleagues rightly note, there are open questions about the suitability of existing ethical and regulatory oversight frameworks for these research approaches. In their feature article, ‘Should free text data in electronic medical records be shared for research? A citizen’s jury study in the United Kingdom’, Ford et al report the results of a deliberative engagement study in which 18 members of the public were (...) asked whether and under what conditions free text data from medical records should be shared for research purposes. The authors’ explicit aim was to inform national policy on sharing medical text. Public attitudes—stated otherwise, the attitudes of patients whose medical information will ultimately be used under any data sharing policy—are a necessary input into ethical and regulatory decision-making about use of medical data for health research. Though public attitudes will rarely be determinative, they must be weighed in order to uphold the ethical principle of respect for persons.1 Ford et al ’s article is, therefore, an important contribution to …. (shrink)

As vaccines against COVID-19 are scarce, many countries have developed vaccination prioritisation strategies focusing on ethical and epidemiological considerations. However, public acceptance of such strategies should be monitored to ensure successful implementation. In an experiment withN=1379 German participants, we investigated whether the public’s vaccination allocation preferences matched the prioritisation strategy approved by the German government. Results revealed different allocations. While the government had top-prioritised vulnerable people (being of high age or accommodated in nursing homes for the elderly), participants preferred (...) exclusive allocation of the first available vaccines to medical staff and personnel caring for the elderly. Interestingly, allocation preferences did not change when participants were told how many individuals were included in each group. As differences between allocation policies and public preferences can affect trust in the government and threaten the social contract between generations, we discuss possible strategies to align vaccination prioritisations. (shrink)

It is a longstanding problem for theorists of justice that many victims of injustice seem to prefer mistreatment, and perpetuate their own oppression. One possible response is to simply ignore such preferences as unreliable ‘adaptive preferences’. Capability theorists have taken this approach, arguing that individuals should be entitled to certain capabilities regardless of their satisfaction without them. Although this initially seems plausible, worries have been raised that undermining the reliability of individuals' strongly-held preferences impugns their rationality, and (...) further excludes already marginalised groups. I argue that such criticisms trade on an ambiguity between two uses of the term ‘adaptive preference’. An adaptive preference is often assumed to be irrational, and an unreliable guide to its possessor's best interests. However, I suggest a preference may also be adaptive in the sense that it is an unreliable guide to our distributive entitlements, and that this does not require an assessment of individuals' rationality. I consider this distinction in relation to disability, arguing that this clarification allows us to justifiably ignore some disabled individuals' preferences, in the context of theorising about distributive justice, without disrespecting or undermining their rationality or culture. (shrink)

This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.

Both mainstream and disability bioethics sometimes contend that the self-assessment of disabled people about their own well-being is distorted by adaptive preferences that are only held because other, better options are unavailable. I will argue that both of the most common ways of understanding adaptive preferences—the autonomy-based account and the well-being account—would reject blanket claims that disabled people’s QOL self-assessment has been distorted, whether those claims come from mainstream bioethicists or from disability bioethicists. However, rejecting these generalizations for (...) a more nuanced view still has dramatic implications for the status quo in both health policy and clinical ethics. (shrink)

In this study conducted during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, I explored how trait morbid curiosity was related to interest in 1) factual information about Coronavirus that was specifically morbid; 2) general factual information about Coronavirus; 3) pandemic and virus genres of films and TV shows; and 4) genres of film and TV shows that center around threat more broadly. Participants who scored high in morbid curiosity reported increased interest, compared to usual, in pandemic/virus genres as well as horror and thriller (...) genres. Morbidly curious participants were also more interested specifically in morbid information about Coronavirus. Furthermore, disgust sensitivity was unrelated to these preferences. These results provide initial evidence that trait morbid curiosity can predict particular media preferences in the face of a real threat, and that morbid curiosity may reflect an adaptive predisposition in some individuals toward learning about the dan­gerous and disgusting aspects of a threat. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to analyze investor behavior towards socially responsible mutual funds. The analysis is based on an experimental study where a sample of individuals takes investment decisions under different parameters of information about the investment alternatives and expected returns. In the experiment, each participant decides how to distribute an investment budget between two funds, returns on which are uncertain and change over time. Two treatments are conducted, each providing a different degree of information on the socially (...) responsible (SR) character of one of the two investment alternatives. The results obtained suggest that although individuals’ criteria for investment are essentially guided by returns and diversification, participants invest significantly more in a fund when they are explicitly informed about its SR nature. In particular, participants who declare being concerned about SR actually invest significantly more in the SR alternative. Furthermore, the level of SR faithfulness among a small group of investors is such that they invest the main share of their budget in the SR fund, even when the return differential is highly unfavorable. Providing clear information about the SR characteristics of an investment is crucial to help investors express their preferences. (shrink)

I argue that a gendered division of labor is often the result of choices by women that count as fully voluntary because they are an expression of preferences and commitments that reflect women's understanding of their own good. Since liberalism has a commitment to respecting fully voluntary choices, it has a commitment to respecting these gendered choices. I suggest that justified political action may require that we fail to respect some people's considered choices.

We investigated the accuracy of gender stereotypes regarding digital game genre preferences. In Study 1, 484 female and male participants rated their preference for 17 game genres (gender differences). In Study 2, another sample of 226 participants rated the extent to which the same genres were presumably preferred by women or men (gender stereotypes). We then compared the results of both studies in order to determine the accuracy of the gender stereotypes. Study 1 revealed actual gender differences for most (...) genres—mostly of moderate size. Study 2 revealed substantial gender stereotypes about genre preferences. When comparing the results from both studies, we found that gender stereotypes were accurate in direction for most genres. However, they were, to some degree, inaccurate in size: For most genres, gender stereotypes overestimated the actual gender difference with a moderate mean effect size. (shrink)