Theorizing about human character to understand what it is to be a morally good person and how being morally good relates to acting rightly and living well has always been a central concern of moral philosophy. Traditional virtue theory, however, neglects two significant matters. The first is the sociopolitical dimensions of character: how character is shaped by, supports, and resists domination and subordination. While feminist ethics has begun to theorize virtue in relation to oppression, it shares (...) with traditional virtue theory a second problematic inattention to something of equal importance for understanding character and moral life, namely, bad character or vice. I argue that rich accounts of vice are needed to achieve the aims not only of traditional and feminist ethical theory but also of every moral agent facing the central moral task of trying to become a morally good person leading a morally worthy life. This paper explicates a substantive reorientation in moral theory in general and feminist ethics in particular, arguing for two changes. The first is a move to “critical character theory,” which seeks to understand moral character as both a site and source of domination and subordination, as a center of resistance both to oppression and to change, and as both subject and object of liberatory struggle. The second change is more serious and sustained attention to theorizing vice both as damage inflicted by domination, subordination, and by struggles both to maintain and to resist and overthrow them, and as a mechanism through which domination persists and emancipation is thwarted. (shrink)

One persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the (...) ways in which this alternative differs from some of the mainstream theories in general jurisprudence, the article argues that it provides more elegant solutions to two problems that have puzzled legal philosophers in the past: the paradox of customary international law and the shifts in legal discourse over history. (shrink)

Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a (...) hierarchical system for action prediction, and serves to inform hypotheses about agents’ beliefs and desires, which are in turn used to predict and interpret behavior. (shrink)

Character strengths are widely studied positive traits considered to be “values in action,” reflecting morally valued virtues. They are hypothesized to serve as pathways to the manifestation of values in life for the benefit of individuals and societies. However, there is surprisingly limited theoretical writing and empirical research on the expected links of character strengths with specific values [e.g., as defined by Schwartz ] or on character strengths as the pathway for behavioral and social manifestations of these (...) values. In this paper, we delineate theoretical links between the two theories and outline their implications. We then provide an initial empirical examination of a specific character strength – gratitude, as a pathway from Schwartz’s self-transcendence values to prosocial behavior and peer acceptance, in two samples of adolescents. The findings indicated that most pathways were significant, providing initial support for the theoretical model. However, in one of the samples, the indirect path from self-transcendence values to prosocial behavior was only marginally significant. Taken together, the findings point to the need for further research on the role of character strengths in creating a pathway from values to various social outcomes. (shrink)

Within the field of aesthetics, there are several approaches to answering what affects how and whether an individual engages with a particular art or aesthetic object. Two theories that attempt to come to a solution on this issue are theories of attunement and attachment which respectively argue that one’s engagement is primarily affected by one’s attunement or attachment, through a system of values, beliefs, and associations, to an object. While these theories are successful in responding to a variety of cases, (...) individually, they leave something to be desired explicatively, and, in light of this, I will develop in this essay an alternative that centres itself on the character of the aesthetic subject which will do the work of both approaches without having to make any taxing conceptual commitments. (shrink)

From Character to Color was written to explore Critical Race Theory from logical, moral, and educational standpoints, as these relate to history, people and racial groups.

A survey of character-based ethical theory across traditions.

The goal of this book is to develop a new framework for thinking about what moral character looks like today. My central claim will be that most people have moral character traits, but at the same time they do not have either the traditional  ...

A critical issue facing the criminal justice system today is how best to promote ethical behavior by public prosecutors. The legal profession has left much of a prosecutor’s day-to-day activity unregulated, in favor of a general, catch-all admonition to “seek justice.” In this article the author argues that professional norms are truly functional only if those working with a given ethical framework recognize the system’s implicit dependence on character. A code of professional conduct in which this dependence is not (...) recognized is both contentless and corrupting. Building on the ethics of Aristotle and modern philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, the author argues that virtue theory can help bridge the gaps in prosecutorial ethics where other forms of moral reasoning fail. The author analyzes three especially difficult ethical problems frequently confronted by prosecutors in the field. He demonstrates not only that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Criminal Justice Standards fail to answer any of these complex questions, but also that future attempts to more closely regulate how prosecutors should act in any of these nuanced situations are unlikely to succeed. The author argues that honesty, fairness, courage, and prudence are the primary virtues that citizens have a right to expect of their public prosecutors. He then demonstrates how these four key virtues might provide important guidance to conscientious prosecutors striving to do what is right. The author concludes by offering several insights into how the field of virtue ethics might inform both the structure and organization of government law offices, and the manner in which individual prosecutors working within these offices might perceive and fulfill their professional roles. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory choice in logic are abductivism and predictivism. These accounts have in common reliance on pre-theoretical logical intuitions for the assessment of candidate logical theories. In this paper, I investigate whether intuitions can provide what abductivism and predictivism want from them and conclude that they do not. As an alternative to these approaches, I propose a (...) Carnapian view on logical theorizing according to which logical theories do not simply account for pre-theoretical intuitions, but rather improve on them. In this account, logical theories are ameliorative, rather than representational. (shrink)

Early Confucian ethics can best be understood as character consequentialism, an ethical theory concerned with the effects actions have upon the cultivation of virtues and which concentrates on certain psychological goods, particularly certain kinship relationships which it regards not only as intrinsically but also instrumentally valuable, as the source of more general social virtues. According to character consequentialism, the way to maximize the good is to maximize the number of virtuous individuals in society, but because human virtues (...) cannot be cultivated by pursuing their good consequences directly, they must be sought as expressions of a life ideal. This ideal entails developing one's nature to fulfill Heaven's design. (shrink)

Dream reports from 21 dreamers in which a metamorphosis of a person-like entity or animal occurred were coded for characters and animals and for inner states attributed to them (Theory of Mind). In myths and fairy tales, Kelly and Keil (1985) found that conscious beings (people, gods) tend to be transformed into entities nearby in the conceptual structure of Keil (1979). This also occurred in dream reports, but perceptual nearness seemed more important than conceptual nearness. In dream reports, most (...) inanimate objects involved in metamorphoses with person-like entities were objects such as statues that ordinarily resemble people physically, and moreover represent people. A metamorphosis of a person-like entity or animal did not lead to an increase in the amount of Theory of Mind attribution. We propose that a character-line starts when a character enters a dream; properties and Theory of Mind attributions tend to be preserved along the line, regardless of whether, metamorphoses occur on it. (shrink)

Highlighting the contemporary resurgence of interest in Aristotle's ethical theory, this text contributes to the debate by asserting that, in Aristotle's view, excellence of character is constituted both by the sentiments and by practical reason.

Implicit morality theories refer to people’s beliefs about whether individuals’ moral character is fixed or malleable. Drawing on the social cognitive theory of morality, we examine the relationship between employees’ implicit morality theories and their organizational citizenship behaviors toward coworkers (OCBC) and coworker-directed deviance (CDD) through a moral self-regulatory mechanism. A laboratory experiment (Study 1), an online experiment (Study 2), and a multi-wave, multi-source field survey (Study 3) found that the more employees held a fixed belief about morality, (...) the lower their sense of moral control, especially when their moral identity was lower. This perceived lack of moral control, in turn, predicted decreased OCBC, particularly when the workgroup ethical climate was weak. However, this relationship did not hold for CDD. Overall, our research highlights implicit morality theories as a novel antecedent of employees’ workplace behaviors, and identifies the underlying moral self-regulatory process, along with individual and situational boundary conditions. (shrink)

This book argues that the question posed by virtue theories, namely, “what kind of person should I be?” provides a more promising approach to moral questions than do either deontological or consequentialist moral theories where the concern is with what actions are morally required or permissible. It does so both by arguing that there are firmer theoretical foundations for virtue theories, and by persuasively suggesting the superiority of virtue theories over deontological and consquentialist theories on the question of explaining morally (...) bad behavior. Virtue theories can give a richer account by appealing to the kinds of dispositions that make certain bad choices appear attractive. This richer account also exposes a further advantage of virtue theories: they provide the best kinds of motivations for agents to become better persons. (shrink)

Psychological questions within philosophical ethics, although very often deeply distrusted, are justified if we presume the ultimate unity of the ethical and psychosocial subject. Such questions are especially well-grounded when we deal with a philosophy that is as practical as Stoicism. Because of both their contents and origins, the theories of values and emotions proposed by this ancient school may attract the suspicious attention of psychologists. For there are good reasons to suggest that the ideas in question were neurotic – (...) that they arose from and caused neurosis. This hypothesis can be verified within the framework of Paul Tillich’s multidisciplinary conception of neurosis. After a somewhat more detailed analysis, it turns out that the Stoic conception is in principle neither the result nor the cause of neurotic disturbances. Furthermore, it seems that it is quite the contrary – it causes people to flourish psychologically and existentially. It must nevertheless be emphasized that Stoic philosophy, if misunderstood or led astray, still might become neurotic in character. (shrink)

퇴계의 성리설에 있어서 심성과 우주 본원의 리(理)에 관한 주장들은 리발설(理發說) 리동설(理動說)의 형태로 일관되게 지속된 반면, 물리(物理)에 관한 주장은 임종 직전에 리도설(理到說)로 수정되었다. 이는 그의 성리설이 일관된 통일성을 상당기간 갖추지 않고 있었음을 반증하는 사실이기도 하다. 왜 그렇게 되었을까? 이는 그의 학문이 논리적 이해 중심의 정합적인 이론체계 구축에 치중하는 학문이라기보다는 마음으로부터 확증되어가는 실재적인 리(理), 체험적인 리를 중시하는 강한 심학적 학문 특성을 지니고 있었기 때문이다. 그리고 사물의 리와 심성의 리에 대해 상이한 인식과 접근방법을 갖고 있었기 때문이다. 그의 학문의 가장 중요한 목표는 마음에 내재하는 (...) 당위 법칙인 인(仁)을 구하여 이를 실현하는 것이라 하겠다. 이는 성리학적 방법으로는 거경(居敬)과 궁리(窮理)를 통해 천리(天理)를 인식 보존하고 인욕을 극복할 때 실현되는 것이다. 그런데 이를 실현하는 그의 주된 방법은 사물의 리를 궁구하는 것(窮理)보다는 자기 마음의 온전한 체(體)를 존양하고 그 발용을 성찰(省察)하는 거경(居敬) 즉 내성적인 측면에 중점이 두어져 있다. 이러한 공부를 통해 체득되는 리(理)는 자연세계의 물리(物理)라기보다는 ‘인의예지(仁義禮智)의 성(性)’ 즉 가치세계의 법칙이며, 그러한 가치가 투영되어 파악된 지공(至公) 지성(至誠)의 천리(天理)라 할 수 있다. 마음의 리와 사물의 리에 대한 이러한 상이한 인식과 접근방법, 이것이 바로 그의 성리설이 앞서 논했던 그러한 형태를 갖게 된 가장 중대한 이유라고 하겠다. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Mencius aesthetic features, that he inherited before Confucius and Confucius to "goodness-in-one" as the characteristics and tendencies of the Confucian aesthetics, and in its human nature is good, based on the "goodness-in-one" This proposition reflects a profound the sake of being in the main character. In this paper, respectively, from the moral emotions, moral reasoning and moral will of the three areas, see Mencius, human nature is good and what actually provides the theoretical basis, the "good" and "beauty" to (...) above the sake of unity in the personality; then "desirability of that good, have all been of that letter, full of that beauty," as the central passage, Mencius, human nature is good in theory of thinking under the clear implication of which, in order to be able to explore one idea Mencius goodness The Katsuyoshi. A special characteristic of Mencius' aesthetic theory is that he carried on the Confucian tradition of "the union of the beautiful and good". He also made this theory the embodiment of. His most basic notion that "human nature is essentially good. " This article would like to lay as a basis three aspects of moral emotion, moral reasoning and moral will, in looking at Mencius' theory of the goodness of human nature. These findings culminate in" the good "and" the beautiful "in a person. I would also like to examine Mencius'" A man who commands our liking is called a good man, he whose goodness is part of himself is what is called a real man, and he whose goodness brims over is called a beautiful man ", as the crux of this article. From his consideration of man's essence as good, we can bring light to the profundity of his meditations on the synthesis of the beautiful and good. (shrink)

“Moral Character: An Empirical Theory” and “Character and Moral Psychology” represent part of the research output of the Templeton-funded Character Project, which was headed by Christian Miller. In ‘Moral Character’, Miller develops his “mixed trait” account of character. The first two parts consist in conceptual background and the empirical grounding for his account . In part three Miller develops and describes his account, before showing the extent of its application in part four . In (...) ‘Character and Moral Psychology”, he gives the reader more details about the metaphysics of his view , places it in relation to other accounts of character and personality , shows the normative and meta-ethical implications of his account , and opens a discussion of what could follow from his account in terms of improving character .The first thing to note about these books is the impressive rang .. (shrink)

The challenge of thick character consists in explaining the apparent fact that one object can be charactered in many ways. If we assume a trope bundle theory, we ought to answer in turn the two following questions: What are the requirements on a trope bundle theory if it is to adequately account for thick-character?; Is a trope bundle theory that meets those requirements preferable to rival theories? In order to address the above questions, the paper (...) proceeds as follows. In the first section I cover two preliminary matters: I introduce the concept of thick-character and distinguish it from other related concepts. Then, I sketch several leading accounts of character and situate bundle theory among them. Also, I pick up and argue that there are three requirements on a trope bundle theory if it is to adequately account for thick-character. Lastly, in the third section I pick up and argue that the requirements spell trouble for trope bundle theory. This trouble, I argue, indicates that trope bundle theory—and hence bundle theory simpliciter—fails to better its chief rival, substance-attribute theory. (shrink)

In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's theory, (...) morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 146. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 8, Issue 4, Page 278-285, December 2019.

In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark) Henry Stapp has presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under suitable conditions “the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time” must “depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time.” I suggest that this conclusion contains an essential ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression “statement referring only to phenomena confined to an (...) earlier time,” when such a statement talks about the outcome of an experiment that was not actually performed. As a result Stapp’s argumentation does not imply that future choices can affect present facts. But it does provide a wonderful and instructively different opportunity to reexamine a central point of Bohr’s famous reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. (shrink)

This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both (...) how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience. (shrink)

War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases of armed conflict that just war theories and international humanitarian law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war. These changes give rise to worries about what counts (...) as war and thus what norms to use in evaluating a particular conflict. In this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war gives us reasons to take reductionist revisions of just war theory seriously. By reductionist theories of war I mean those revisions within the just war tradition that suggest that we can use ordinary peacetime interpersonal analyses of moral responsibility and liability to harm to decide what justice requires in times of war. (shrink)

Jeffrie G. Murphy's third collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his two previous collections: Retribution, Justice and Therapy and Retribution Reconsidered. Murphy now explores these topics in the light of reflections on issues that are normally associated with religion: forgiveness, mercy, and repentance. He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of (...) gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling. As always, his perspective may be described as Kantian; and, indeed, this collection contains the first extended piece of Kant scholarship that he has done in years: a long essay on Kant on theory and practice. (shrink)

박재연은 고유명을 다른 종류의 어휘들과 구별해주는 변별적 속성이 그 발생적 조건에 있다고 주장한다. 박재연에 따르면 고유명이 한 자연언어에 속하는 표현이 되기 위해서는 사회적 공인이 필요하지 않다. 이러한 주장은 고유명이 사회적 성격을 갖는다는 언어 철학계의 주류 입장과 충돌하는 것으로 보인다. 만일 박재연의 이론이 성공적이라면 이는 고유명의 사회성에 대한 주류 입장을 수정해야 함을 보여주는 중요한 기여가 될 것이다. 그러나 나는 실제로는 그렇지 못하다는 것을 논증할 것이다. 최성호는 주류 입장을 바탕으로 박재연의 이러한 주장을 공격한다. 이러한 비판은 고유명이 공적 언어 표현이며 그 유의미성은 공적인 (...) 규칙에 바탕을 두고 있다는 전제를 바탕으로 작동한다. 그러나 맥킨지는 이러한 고유명의 사회성에 대한 전제를 명시적으로 부정하면서 고유명의 지시체 결정이 개별 화자의 지시체 식별 능력에 기초하고 있다는 개인주의 이론을 제기한다. 맥킨지에 의하면 고유명은 애당초 공적인 자연언어의 일부가 아니다. 박재연의 이론과는 달리 개인주의 이론은 최성호의 비판을 회피할 수 있으며 고유명의 변별적 속성, 의미, 지칭 결정의 문제 모두에 대한 통합적인 이론적 답을 제시해줄 수 있다. 그러나 사회적인 이름사용관행을 통해서 고유명의 의미론적 지시체가 결정되며, 고유명이 공적 자연언어의 일부로서 사회적 규약의 지배를 받는다는 입장 역시 적어도 동등한 수준으로 맥킨지가 설명하고 있는 지칭 결정의 영역을 설명할 수 있다. 이러한 입장은 또한 앞서 언급한 세 가지의 문제 모두에 대해서도 개인주의와 마찬가지로 통합적 설명을 제공할 수 있다. 더 나아가, 지칭 결정에 대한 이름사용관행 중심 이론의 설명은 일반성과 단순성 차원에서 개인주의 이론에 비해 상대적인 이점을 갖는다. 따라서 개인주의 이론이 고유명의 사회성을 배제하는 데 성공했다고 볼 수 없으며 사회적 이름사용관행에 기초한 고유명 이론은 여전히 설득력이 있다. (shrink)

Along 19th and 20th centuries, art became a sort of new religion, sometimes coexisting peacefully with the institutional one, sometimes trying to provide what the institutional religion was not able to provide any more. Nowadays, art has adopted many of the solutions, topics and theories that theology has handled since it was born. Arthur C. Danto treats art as a reality whose history is over (and so, a escathological reality) and also as a metaxological (metaxy=between) reality dwelling between two realms. (...) Thus, we cannot decide by pure perceptive means whether something is art or not. This consideration has important consequences for art theory. (shrink)

In this paper I examine whether different suggestions made in the philosophy of perception can help us to explain and understand the phenomenal character of emotional experience. After having introduced the range of possible positions, I consider qualia-theory, reductive pure intentionalism and reductive impure intentionalism. I argue that qualia-theory can easily explain why emotions are phenomenal states at all but that it cannot account for the “inextricable link thesis” which is quite prominent in the philosophy of emotion. (...) Reductive pure and impure intentionalism, in turn, seem to fit better with this thesis but they have difficulties to explain what makes emotions phenomenal states at all. Therefore, I finally discuss whether non-reductive intentionalism might be an option for explaining the phenomenal character of emotional experience. (shrink)

Kant's moral theory has received trenchant criticism for its rigorism. Rigorism generally denotes an overemphasis on rules in moral theory, and a consequent neglect of the roles of emotional receptivity and perception in moral judgement. Critics of Kant's ethics have invoked the term rigorism with reference to any one of three overlapping features of Kant's moral theory. Usually rigorism designates the 'rigid and insensitive uniformities of conduct' that result from the mechanical application of rules. Occasionally it refers (...) to the excessively strict moral standard implied by Kant's conception of the good will. But some critics object to rigorism in just the sense in which Kant himself understood and embraced it: as referring to moral theories that admit only two types of moral character, namely good and evil ones. The complaint, which Kant was fully aware of, is that this bipolar view of character is woefully inadequate to our experience of the gradations of virtue and vice. (shrink)

CONDUCT AND CHARACTER is a concise anthology of readings in ethical theory that covers the major schools of thought as well as a handful of fundamental topics in ethical theory. Reading selections in the chapters provide coverage of both classical and contemporary philosophical writings, representing a spectrum of viewpoints on each theory or topic. The readings include brief introductions to assist students in identifying key ideas and have been selected and edited in order to optimize student (...) comprehension. This collection is perfect for ethics courses that focus on theory, as well as a supplementary text for applied ethics courses. Because of short, self-contained chapters it also works very well for an ethics component in introductory philosophy courses. (shrink)

In a letter to Engels (24 August 1867), Marx says that the best of his book (Capital) are (i) the “dual character of the labour embodied in commodities” and (ii) the surplus value theory. Marx's vindication of first point is the subject of the present article.1 We contend that the « dual character of the labour embodied in commodities » is a fundamental and specific property of a commodity society. Marx is right when he calls our attention (...) to it...... (shrink)

The following intellectual as opposed to practical reasons for all anthropologists doing fieldwork are examined: fieldwork: (1) records dying societies, (2) corrects ethnocentric bias, (3) helps put customs in their true context, (4) helps get the "feel" of a place, (5) helps to get to understand a society from the inside, (6) enables appreciation of what translating one culture into terms of another involves, (7) makes one a changed man, (8) provides the observational, factual basis for generalizations. None of these (...) is found sufficient to make fieldwork imperative for all anthropologists, although they are quite sufficient to allow that it is imperative for anthropology as a whole that fieldwork in some form by some people continue. In place of the view of fieldwork as an essential preparation for doing anthropology, an alternative role for it is explored: namely as a testing procedure. The implications of this--that the study of problems and the articulation of theories can usefully proceed prior to or even independently of fieldwork--are drawn out, and a new institution of selective fieldwork is proposed. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that an operational organism concept can help to overcome the structural deficiency of mathematical models in biology. In our opinion, the structural deficiency of mathematical models lies mainly in our inability to identify functionally relevant biological characters in biological systems, and not so much in a lack of adequate mathematical representations of biological processes. We argue that the problem of character identification in biological systems is linked to the question of a properly formulated organism (...) concept. Lastly, we demonstrate how a decomposition of an organism into independent characters in the context of a specific biological process--such as adaptation by means of natural selection--depends on the dynamical properties and invariance conditions of the equations that describe this process. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a line of argument against one form of realism about fictional characters : abstract artifact theory, the view according to which fictional characters like Harry Potter are part of our reality, but, they are abstract objects created by humans, akin to the institution of marriage and the game of soccer. I will defend artifactualism against an objection that Mark Sainsbury considers decisive against it: the category-mistake objection. The objection has it that artifactualism attributes to (...) people who produce and process sentences and thoughts about Harry Potter massive error, indeed, a category mistake about what kind of thing Harry Potter is; for an abstract object isn’t the sort of thing that can wear glasses, ride a double-decker bus, attend school. Given problems with this objection, artifactualism, I shall conclude, remains a tenable contender. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical look at the idea that evolutionary theory is a statistical theory. It argues that despite the strong instrumental motivation for statistical theories, they are not necessary to explain deterministic systems. Biological evolution is fundamentally a result of deterministic processes. Hence, a statistical theory is not necessary for describing the evolutionary forces of genetic drift and natural selection, nor is it needed for describing the fitness of organisms. There is a computational advantage to (...) the statistical theory of population genetics, but population genetics succeeds only by eliminating causes from its account of evolutionary change. (shrink)

Various influential ethical theories propose that we should strive to develop morally sound character traits, either because good actions are those that issue from good character traits, or because good traits are those that generally incline us toward actions that are good for some independent reason such as the intentions with which they are performed or the consequences of performing them. This proposal obviously raises questions about the nature and origins of character traits, and our degree of (...) control over them. For if we cannot develop our traits then this proposal should be abandoned, and if we can then we need to know how this is best achieved. (shrink)