Results for 'believability'

961 found
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  1.  39
    Why I Believe.Why I. Believe In God - 1993 - In John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer, Introduction to philosophy: classical and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  2. Bogdan Mihai Radu.Young Believers, An Exploratory & Participation In Romanian - 2010 - Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 9 (25):155-179.
     
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  3. Johannes Bronkhorst.What Did Indian Philosophers Believe - 2010 - In Piotr Balcerowicz, Logic and belief in Indian philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. pp. 13.
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  4. James Garvey.P. Believing - 1997 - Cogito 11:14.
     
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  5.  39
    Existence and Believability.Dominik Kauss - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):2-38.
    This paper argues that true singular existentials are rationally indubitable. After the claim is clarified and motivated (Section 1), it is defended against objections inspired by Cartesian skepticism and semantic externalism (Section 2), a Fregean fine‐grained conception of propositional content (Section 3), Kripke's causal theory of reference (Section 4), a Stalnakerian coarse‐grained conception of propositional content (Section 5), as well as Evans's account of descriptive reference fixing (Section 6). The discussion is brought to a close by concluding that either true (...)
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  6. Reasoning from double conditionals: The effects of logical structure and believability.Carlos Santamaria Juan A. Garcia-Madruga Philip & N. Johnson-Laird - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):97 – 122.
    We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or ''figures" of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C , or If C (...)
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  7.  16
    Mnemonic accessibility affects statement believability: The effect of listening to others selectively practicing beliefs.Madalina Vlasceanu & Alin Coman - 2018 - Cognition 180:238-245.
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  8.  24
    First page preview.Bishop John & Believing Faith - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (3).
  9. Francois Recanati.Can We Believe What We Do - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1).
     
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  10. as They Think'in.George‘What Americans Really Believe Bishop & Why Faith Isn’T. As Universal - 1999 - Free Inquiry 19 (3).
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  11. (Hard ernst) 126–132 corrigendum.J. van Brakel, Erik J. Olsson, Believing More & U. Kriegel - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):457-458.
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  12.  66
    Make-Believe and Model-Based Representation in Science: The Epistemology of Frigg’s and Toon’s Fictionalist Views of Modeling.Michael Poznic - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):201-218.
    Roman Frigg and Adam Toon, both, defend a fictionalist view of scientific modeling. One fundamental thesis of their view is that scientists are participating in games of make-believe when they study models in order to learn about the models themselves and about target systems represented by the models. In this paper, the epistemology of these two fictionalist views is critically discussed. I will argue that both views can give an explanation of how scientists learn about models they are studying. However, (...)
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  13. Believing and willing.Louis P. Pojman - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):37-56.
    It is widely held that we can obtain beliefs and withhold believing propositions directly by performing an act of will. This thesis is sometimes identified with the view that believing is a basic act, an act which is under our direct control. Descartes holds that the will is limitless in relation to belief acquisition and that we must be directly responsible for our beliefs, especially our false beliefs, for otherwise we could draw the blasphemous conclusion that God is responsible for (...)
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  14. Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, and subsequently acquire an (...)
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  15. Believing one’s reasons are good.Adam Leite - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):419-441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called "Inferential Internalist" principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...)
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  16. Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.
    The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further (...)
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  17. Believing conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
    I argue that it is rational for a person to believe the conjunction of her beliefs. This involves responding to the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes. In addition, I suggest that in normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction just is to believe its conjuncts.
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  18.  31
    Believing in God the Father: Interpreting a phrase from the Apostle’s Creed.Marcel Sarot - 2016 - HTS Theological Studies 72 (4):1-4.
    In our days, the creedal phrase 'I believe in God the Father almighty' is interpreted primarily along Trinitarian lines: It is applied to God as the Father of Jesus Christ. Here I argue that it has a dual background: in Jesus' prayer practice, in which He consistently addressed God as 'Father', and in the Hellenistic habit of referring to the Creator as 'Father'. I discuss Jesus' use of the term 'Father' against its Old Testament background, and argue that it primarily (...)
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  19.  65
    Does believing that everyone else is less ethical have an impact on work behavior?Thomas Tyson - 1992 - Journal of Business Ethics 11 (9):707 - 717.
    Researchers consistently report that individuals see themselves acting far more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviors. They suggest that this belief encourages unethical conduct and contributes to the degeneration of business ethics; however, they have not specifically investigated the consequences of this belief. If undesirable work behaviors actually do occur, educators and other ethics advocates would be strongly encouraged to dispel this widely held notion.In the present study, data was collected from college students and practicing (...)
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  20. Believing on trust.Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):2009-2028.
    The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I (...)
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  21.  93
    Incontinent believing.Alfred R. Mele - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.
    In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at (...)
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  22.  76
    Why believe?John Cottingham - 2009 - New York: Continuum.
    Belief and its benefits -- Belief, reason, goodness -- Belief and the unknown -- Obstacles to belief -- Belief and meaning -- Learning to believe -- Believing and living.
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  23.  98
    Responsible Believers.Mark Leon - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):421-435.
    For an action to be free, for an agent to be responsible for his action, it is sometimes thought that he must act from a will that is free or for which he is responsible. There is a connection between freedom of action and freedom or autonomy of will, but the connection cannot be the one envisaged here, modelling free will on a free action, for not only does that set off an obvious regress, but as importantly the elements of (...)
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  24.  25
    Believing and Acting: The Pragmatic Turn in Comparative Religion and Ethics.G. Scott Davis - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    How should religion and ethics be studied if we want to understand what people believe and why they act the way they do? An energetic guide to the study of religion and ethics, rejecting theories from postmodernism and cognitive science in favour of a return to pragmatic enquiry.
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  25.  19
    Believing philosophy: a guide to becoming a Christian philosopher.Dolores G. Morris - 2021 - Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
    Believing Philosophy introduces Christians to philosophy and the tools it offers believers, helping them understand, articulate, and defend their faith in an age of unbelief.
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  26.  17
    What Believers Don't Have to Believe: The Non-Essentials of the Christian Faith.Craig Payne - 2006 - Upa.
    What Believers Don't Have to Believe, author Craig Payne uses evidence from the Creeds, Christian history, the scriptures, and philosophy to establish what one is required to believe to maintain Christian orthodoxy, and how much one is not required to believe. This book focuses on five areas of disagreement: creation, biblical inerrancy, human nature, Christian political involvement, and eschatology.
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  27.  78
    On believing, saying and expressing.Thomas C. Ryckman - 1989 - Synthese 79 (2):191 - 200.
    Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.
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  28.  16
    Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists (...)
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  29.  20
    Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - New York: Routledge.
    The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products (...)
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  30. To believe is to believe true.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):131-136.
    It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state of belief that (...)
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  31. Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can (...)
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  32.  5
    Suits on make-believe games.Micah D. Tillman Core Division, Stanford Online High School, Redwood City, Ca & Usa - forthcoming - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy:1-16.
    While Bernard Suits's understanding of games has significantly influenced the philosophy of sport, the longest sustained investigation in The Grasshopper is of make-believe and roleplaying games. Suits’s discussion of make-believe and roleplaying is found in chapters 9 through 12, but what he says there is uncharacteristically unclear. To clarify Suits’s account, the present paper distinguishes between two arguments that Suits interweaves. In the first, Suits argues that game playing is not a species of play. In the second, Suits argues that (...)
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  33.  87
    Really believing in fiction.David B. Suits - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):369–386.
    How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this "paradox of fiction" make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all-or-nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not-p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories tell (...)
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  34.  68
    On believing that I am thinking.Tom Stoneham - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
    It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person (...)
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  35. Believing as We Ought and the Democratic Route to Knowledge.Matthew Chrisman - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst, The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 47-70.
    In the attempt to understand the norms governing believers, epistemologists have tended to focus on individual belief as the primary object of epistemic evaluation. However, norm governance is often assumed to concern, at base, things we can do as a free exercise or manifestation of our agency. Yet believing is not plausibly conceived as something we freely do but rather as a state we are in, usually as the mostly automatic or involuntary result of cognitively processes shaped by nature, bias, (...)
     
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  36. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...)
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  37. Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
    There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at (...)
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  38.  65
    Believability and syllogistic reasoning.Jane Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Alan Garnham - 1989 - Cognition 31 (2):117-140.
    In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have (...)
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  39. Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.
    Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being (...)
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  40. Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
    What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical (...)
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  41. Believing in Others.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95.
    Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A (...)
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  42. Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.
    In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.
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  43. The duty to believe according to the evidence.Allen Wood - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):7-24.
    'Evidentialism' is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one's beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take (...)
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  44.  25
    Believing in God: A Philosophical Essay.Gareth Moore - 1988 - Clark.
    This book examines what it means to believe in God. It does not discuss arguments for the existence of God but seeks to understand some of the ways the word ’God’ and related words function in the lives of believers. The approach is thus related to Wittgenstein’s. Constant themes are that ’God’ is not the name of a person and that the concept of ’absence’ is central in understanding language about God. Topics covered are: differences between language about God and (...)
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  45. Believing in Reincarnation.Mikel Burley - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (2):261-279.
    Is it absurd to believe that, in the absence of bodily continuity, personal identity could be retained? Bernard Williams argued for an affirmative answer to this question partly on the basis of a well-known thought experiment. Some other philosophers, including D. Z. Phillips, have accepted, or appear to have accepted, Williams' conclusion.Yet the argument has the consequence of dismissing as absurd the sorts of reincarnation beliefs which, within their proper contexts, have a meaningful role in the lives of many millions (...)
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  46. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief.Andrew Dole - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (2):250-253.
    Preface ix Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1 The metaquestion: what is the issue about the ‘justifiability’ of religious belief? 4 Faith-beliefs 6 Overview of the argument 8 Glossary of special terms 18 2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26 A standard view: the concern is for epistemic justifiability 26 The problem of doxastic control 28 The impossibility of believing at will 29 Indirect control over beliefs 30 ‘Holding true’ and ‘taking to be true’ (...)
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  47.  26
    Believer Personality in the Perspective of Verification and Imitation.Süleyman Yavuzer - 2022 - van İlahiyat Dergisi 10 (16):48-70.
    The concept of faith is a word that comes from the root e-m-n, meaning to believe, to trust, to be attached, to obey, to obey and to follow. It is a concept that is used with different conjunctions/letters in Arabic language grammar and semantics and gains different meanings according to the conjunction/letter used together, also differs and diversifies depending on the starting points and approaches, and has special field uses as well as meaning contractions and expansions. Investigative faith includes a (...)
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  48.  67
    Believing in a Fiction: Wallace Stevens at the Limits of Phenomenology.R. D. Ackerman - 1979 - Philosophy and Literature 3 (1):79-90.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:R. D. Ackerman BELIEVING IN A FICTION: WALLACE STEVENS AT THE LIMITS OF PHENOMENOLOGY The "ring of men" of "Sunday Morning" will chant their "devotion to the sun, / Not as a god, but as a god might be, / Naked among them, like a savage source" (CP, pp. 69-70).' Solar nakedness is deferred even as it is named. The problem for belief is the question of appearance and (...)
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  49.  94
    On Believing: A Reply to Professor R. W. Sleeper.H. H. Price - 1967 - Religious Studies 2 (2):243 - 245.
    I am very grateful to Professor R. W. Sleeper for his critical comments on my article, as also for the kind way in which he has expressed them. I should now like to make a few comments on his comments. May I first say that I have no objection to being metaphysical? I do not like the word ‘metaphysics’ very much, and wish that we could find a less provocative one. But still, I do think that the difference between the (...)
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  50.  77
    Believing and Asserting Contradictions.Manuel Bremer - 2007 - Logique Et Analyse (200):341.
    The debate around “strong” paraconsistency or dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) has – apart from metaphysical concerns - centred on the questions whether dialetheism itself can be definitely asserted or has a unique truth value, and what it should mean, if it is possible at all, to believe a contradiction one knows to be contradictory (i.e. an explicit contradiction). And what should it mean, if it is possible at all, to assert a sentence one knows to be (...)
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