Believe what you want

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further argue that the explanations don't cut deep enough. Making the aim of truth internal to a state does not explain why we can't produce at will states without this feature but sharing these states' motivational role. I put forward a different explanation. I argue that consciousness makes manifest the attraction of the norm of truth. If we are consciously attending to the question of whether p, we cannot help but make a judgement in line with what the evidence gives us grounds for believing true

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,880

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
Transparency and Reasons for Belief.Benjamin Wald - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):475-494.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Rationality and the Role of the Will in Belief Acquisition.Laurie Anne Catherine Pieper - 1993 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
131 (#169,334)

6 months
16 (#200,250)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Noordhof
University of York

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
Direction of fit.I. Lloyd Humberstone - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):59-83.
Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.

View all 15 references / Add more references