Freedom was a core theme of Michel Foucault's later writings, as well the central tenet of the work of pro-capitalist writer Ayn Rand. This article firstly demonstrates some surprisingly similar arguments made in the oeuvres of these unlikely bedfellows regarding how cultivation of the self/holding the self as one’s highest value (in Foucault's and Rand's respective lexicons) can lead to an ethic of freedom. Secondly, the article examines the ways in which both ‘author functions’ (in Foucault's sense) have recently (...) been deployed in political discourse to stand in for caricatured versions of the freedoms of right-wing greed and left-wing moral relativism. Foucault is doubly problematized, moreover, since, as well as being used as a metonym for the perceived dangers of identity politics by the right, his ambivalent and ambiguous relationship with neoliberalism proves a problem to many scholars who wish to fit him squarely into a left-wing continental canon. (shrink)

To talk about the sociology of literary representation is, first and foremost, to propose to historicize representational activity at that crucial point where its social and linguistic dimensions intersect.1 The troublesome incongruity between these two dimensions need not be minimized, but it can be grappled with as soon as the presuppositions of either the hegemony of the subject or that of language itself are questioned. In this view, the position of George Lukács tends to ignore the state of extreme vulnerability (...) and recurrent jeopardy in which representation has always found itself, just as Michel Foucault’s diametrically opposed view of the ultimate hegemony of discourse obliterates or displaces a lot of unbroken contemporary representational practice. Even more important, both these quite different approaches may be said to appear monistic in that the gaps and links between what is representing what is represented are viewed either in terms of closure and continuity or in terms of rupture and discontinuity. But as I shall proceed to glance at some representational strategies in the late modern period, the question needs to be faced whether it is not precisely in these gaps and links, and in the way in which, simultaneously, the gaps are closed and the links are broken up, that historical activity can be seen to assert itself.If the contradiction of system and event, of predetermination and performance can be seen to affect representational activity, and if this contradiction can at all be formulated in terms of a sociological Erkenntnisinteresse, issue of historicity must be discussed on more than one level: not only on the level of what is represented but also on the level of rupture between them as well as their interdependence) together and to attempt to interconnect the semiotic problematic of signification and the extratextual dimension of representativeness, as involving changeful relations of writing, reading, social reproduction, and political power. In this view, the use of signs, although never quite reducible to a referential function, must be reconsidered and this question needs to be asked: under which conditions and in which respects would it be possible to talk of sociology in that area of instability itself which marks the relations between signifier and signified, between the author’s language and the reader’s meaning? Robert Weimann is professor of English and American literature at the Zentralinstitut für Literaturgeschichte, Akademie der Künste, Berlin DDR. His books in English include Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in Theater and Structure and Society in Literary History. His most recent book-length study in German is Shakespeare und die Macht der Mimesis: Repräsentation und Autorität im Elisabethanischen Theater. (shrink)

In this work, author expressed new R-Synthesis specifically. Good and/or correct perspective that must be behind the definitions and administration generally expressed. New perspective of the philosophy explained generally. Philosophy of GodForm is defined and expressed as connected/related with the following concepts: (a) basic principles, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies, (c) 14 lower constructional philosophies, (d) eight basic philosophies. As special cases, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, Philosophy of Wireless Administration and others defined as hybrid philosophies. 17 specific components/units (...) which can be considered to define the basic principles of the related formation, are proposed to be designed by GodForm and defined by the author. Philosophy of GodForm and its relation with Values and Positions specifically defined. New Era Theory and New Era Belief explained generally. Some specific religions/beliefs are defined as variants/forms of the Progressive Religion. Good and/or correct power authorities (R-Power Authority) are defined due to 29 categories. Functional position levels defined for the R-Power Authorities with a unique table. As result of the R-Synthesis, functional position levels of some philosophers, some scientists, and of Prophet Jesus, Prophet Mohamed, Prophets Mouses, Buddha, and of Confucius generally/specifically defined. Integration and past/present effects of some R-Power Authorities in 5 x 5 Ideal Political Construction specifically explained. New Era Belief, Concepts of GodX and Science relation explained with the following concepts: (1) Religion of GodForm, (2) Knowledge of GodX, (3) Nature of GodX. With this respect, some other characteristics of 7 GodX power authorities expressed with details as complementary information. Following concepts/systems defined to arrange and solve some/most/all religious problems, which are determined with R-Synthesis: (a) Religious Responsibilities and Positions, (b) Ideal Religious Administration, (c) Sustainable/Continuable Political Administration System, (d) Community Values Council/Authority for each world country, (e) Progressive Councils. 15 general religious position categories defined to express their good and/or correct meanings/values/responsibilities in the religious system. 21 general/specific cases/programs defined due to New Era Belief to solve possible past/present/future community values problems, to have continuous, judicious, and progressive administration about the 36 kinds of community values. Progressive Councils, which are related with the CUS-WW-HO, are defined. Progressive Religion Council and some of the related religious responsibilities expressed for the kind progressive religion studies due to the Philosophy of Progressive Religions. (shrink)

St. John of the Cross was aware of the fact that his mysticism resisted prosaic, discursive representation; however, most contemporary scholars have overlooked this radical component of his work. First, I trace the major philosophical influences on John’s work: Medieval Neoplatonism and Scholasticism. Second, by drawing on the Barthesian-Foucauldian concept of the author function, I demonstrate that the Mystical Doctor saw his poetry as free-standing, inexhaustible by even his own efforts to systematize key aspects of his poetry—an insurmountable (...) task, which he had to be compelled to compile and publish by the nuns he guided in spiritual direction. (shrink)

At several points throughout his career, Foucault suggests that publishing texts without authors’ names attached would be a useful step towards dismantling what he calls the “author-function:” a social and political role structured according to the way discourse is treated and disseminated in a particular social setting. I discuss Foucault’s criticisms of the author-function in terms of its relationship to the political role of intellectuals, and I argue that the demise of this role cannot be achieved (...) through the means of authorial anonymity, as Foucault suggests. Rather, it must be undermined from a position within this role itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognise the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we anyway already aim to realise theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of (...) concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognised as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo explora el estatuto del arte en la filosofía de Spinoza, en el marco de la inversión copernicana que da origen a la estética y del barroco holandés. Si bien el pensamiento spinozista se inscribe en la conversión antropológica, en donde lo bello resulta ser un efecto en el sujeto y no una cualidad de los objetos, su comprensión del arte es inasimilable a la “estética” como ámbito diferenciado y autónomo que se consolida en el siglo XVIII, (...) y más bien concibe el arte integrado a la vida y a la experiencia común -a la vez que, en cuanto praxis de origen corporal al alcance de cualquiera, presenta puntos de contacto con las vanguardias históricas del siglo XX-. Spinoza, según se propone en este texto, concibe la producción de “obras de arte” menos como un hecho estético que como una actividad corporal éticamente orientada a la vida buena.: The present work explores the status of art in the philosophy of Spinoza, within the framework of the Copernican revolution that gives rise to aesthetics and the Dutch Baroque. Although the Spinozist thought is inscribed in the anthropological conversion by virtue of which beauty turns out to be an effect on the subject and not a property of objects, its understanding of art is unassimilable to "aesthetics" as a differentiated and autonomous area that it was consolidated in the eighteenth century, and rather conceived art integrated to life and common experience -at the same time, as praxis of bodily origin within the reach of anyone, presents points of contact with the historical avant-gardes of the twentieth century-. Spinoza conceives the production of "artworks" less as an aesthetic fact than as a body activity ethically oriented to the good life. (shrink)

Recently, the second author, Briseid, and Safarik introduced nonstandard Dialectica, a functional interpretation capable of eliminating instances of familiar principles of nonstandard arithmetic—including overspill, underspill, and generalizations to higher types—from proofs. We show that the properties of this interpretation are mirrored by first-order logic in a constructive sheaf model of nonstandard arithmetic due to Moerdijk, later developed by Palmgren, and draw some new connections between nonstandard principles and principles that are rejected by strict constructivism. Furthermore, we introduce a variant (...) of the Diller–Nahm interpretation with two different kinds of quantifiers, similar to Hernest’s light Dialectica interpretation, and show that one can obtain nonstandard Dialectica by weakening the computational content of the existential quantifiers—a process called herbrandization. We also define a constructive sheaf model mirroring this new functional interpretation, and show that the process of herbrandization has a clear meaning in terms of these sheaf models. (shrink)

The dialogue being a form of communication represents a dynamic structure. Speech communication analysis is mostly based on the material of spontaneous dialogue, but it can be analyzed on the material of a fiction dialogue as well. The fiction dialogue appears to be the product of one of the most complicated types of communication. It refers to fiction and literature and its subjects are the author, the readers and the characters. The functional-communicative approach in the analysis of a fiction (...) dialogue reveals new possibilities for the communicative analysis of the communicative behavior of a certain character. The article deals with the description of the dialogue function in the stories by V. M. Shukshin. The specificity of the artistic dialogues is defined by its aesthetic function. The dramatic category becomes the principle of V. M. Shukshin’s poetics. Verbal and visual form created by the writer is a peculiarity of his artistic system. Polyfunctionality of the dialogues in Shukshin’s stories determines his dominant, text forming function. The dialogue in this case possesses a high level of informativeness: it moves the action, develops the plot, exposes the interrelation between the characters thus defining their behaviour. The test of the characters in Shukshin’s works is made by means of dialogues, that’s why the characterological function is very important. It represents an essential feature of the writer’s prose style. The dialogue is a means of modeling the ‘speech mask‘ that reflects the peculiarities of speech behavior of Shukshin’s characters. In Shukshin’s stories, the dialogue performs an evaluating function as it gives the opportunity to deliver some evaluating positions. The evaluating position is the perception and evaluation of the depicted objects by the author and actors. It’s the dialogues that expose the Shukshin’s characters’ peculiarities of the worldview, ethics and values. (shrink)

The very rules of our language games contain mechanisms of disregard. Philosophy of language tends to treat speakers as peers with equal discursive authority, but this is rare in real, lived speech situations. This paper explores the mechanisms of discursive inclusion and exclusion governing our speech practices, with a special focus on the role of gender attribution in undermining women’s authority as speakers. Taking seriously the metaphor of language games, we must ask who gets in the game and whose moves (...) can score. To do this, I develop an eclectic analysis of language games using basic inferential role theory and the concept of a semantic index, and develop the distinction between positional authority and expertise authority, which often conflict for members of oppressed groups. Introducing the concepts of master switches and sub-switches that attach to the index and change scorekeeping practices, I argue that women’s gender status conflicts with our status as authoritative speakers because sex marking in semantics functions as a master switch—“the F-switch”—on the semantic index, which, once thrown, changes the very game. An advantage of using inferentialism for understanding disregard of women’s discursive authority is that it locates the problem in the sanctioned moves, in the deontic structure of norms and practices of scorekeeping, and not primarily in the individual intentions of particular people. (shrink)

At the time of his sudden death in 1977, the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka left a large philosophical legacy with no will and testament. For the last 43 years, the editors of his Collected Works have been reconstructing a unified and thematically articulated oeuvre from the more than 10,000 pages found in his drawers and boxes. It should in the end include not only the texts published during Patočka’s lifetime but also his many unpublished manuscripts, fragments, variations, drafts of unfinished (...) philosophical projects, notebooks and letters. After demonstrating in which sense the death of the author coincides in Patočka’s case with the birth of his oeuvre, the article aims to show that the unity of Patočka’s work is not something given, but rather something to be artificially reconstructed, in an always disputable fashion, since the internal coherence of its various thematic divisions is necessarily itself a matter of ongoing interpretation. (shrink)

The teacher self is a composite psychological construct which encompasses the cognitive, affective, emotional, and social dimensions of teaching. This qualitative study draws on Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism, answerability, and addressivity to discuss how English language teachers negotiated the shifting and conflictive context to construct selves in relation to the promoted communicative language teaching approach. Based on narrative interviews and classroom observations with five tertiary English teachers in China, we found that these teachers were actively engaged in the dialog with (...) their prior learning experiences and active, responsive in answering their contexts while authoring selves in everyday teaching practice. The multiple-case study data support a Bakhtinian understanding that teachers are active users and producers of theory in their own right, highlighting teachers’ agency, creativity, and autonomy. Based on Bakhtin’s dialogism and the case study findings, we bring cognition, identity and practice together and conceptualize the teacher self as having multiple facets and layers: the autobiographical self, the discursive self, and the pedagogical self. The three selves are constitutive of the consummated whole of the teacher self instead of being separate entities functioning individually. The study is concluded with implications for language teacher education and teacher development. (shrink)

All organizations have gray areas where the border between right and wrong behavior is blurred, but where a major part of organizational decision-making takes place. While gray areas can be sources of problems for organizations, they also have benefits. The author proposes that gray areas are functional in organizations. Gray areas become problematic when the process for dealing with them is flawed, when gatekeeper managers see themselves as more ethical than their peers, and when leaders, by their own inattention, (...) inaction, and poor modeling, minimize the importance of building a moral community by delegating gray area issues to second-tier administrators. Gray areas provide wiggle room in coping with ethical dilemmas in organizations. (shrink)

The author of the paper critically analyzes a quasi-theory of future contingents (PFC) given by Marcin Tkaczyk and proposes his own explication of its theses and terms. The author makes it by introducing operational definitions of temporal and modal concepts, distinguishing between the causal and functional determination, discussing the status of the principle of bivalence, and replacing Tkaczyk’s theses by their new formulations. As a result, the author states, among other things, that (contrary to Tkaczyk) there is (...) no contradiction between the thesis about the opened future and the thesis about divine omniscience, because it requires the causal (but not functional as it is a case) determination between a true proposition and its determined fact. The author also shows that Tkaczyk’s examples of the retroactive causes are not an accurate solution of the antinomy because they are, at most, the examples of the factors which change the picture of the past but not the past itself. (shrink)

A literary/philosophical speculation into the roots of our conceptions of authority, investigating to what degree they are a function of an agent or of a context.

Legitimate authority -- The claims of law -- Legal positivism and the sources of law -- Legal reasons, sources, and gaps -- The identity of legal systems -- The institutional nature of law -- Kelsen's theory of the basic norm -- Legal validity -- The functions of law -- Law and value in adjudication -- The rule of law and its virtue -- The obligation to obey the law -- Respect for law -- A right to dissent? : civil disobedience (...) -- A right to dissent? : conscientious objection --The purity of the pure theory -- The argument from justice, or how not to reply to legal positivism. (shrink)

Call “epistocracy” a political regime in which the experts, those who know best, rule; and call “the epistocratic claim” the assertion that the experts’ superior knowledge or reliability is “a warrant for their having political authority over others.” Most of us oppose epistocracy and think the epistocratic claim is false. But why is it mistaken? Contemporary discussions of this question focus on two answers. According to the first, expertise could, in principle, be a warrant for authority. What bars the successful (...) justification of epistocracy is that the relevant kind of expertise does not exist in politics (either because there are no procedure-independent standards of right or wrong in politics, or because, though such standards exist, no one knows better than anyone else what they require). This skeptical position comes, however, at a significant cost: Without the assumption that some political decisions are better than others, and that some people know better than others what these decisions are, it is difficult to make sense of much of our political practice, including how we criticize politicians and choose among candidates for office. The second answer accepts that there is expertise of the relevant sort in politics. It argues, however, that such expertise does not justify political authority because political justifications are subject to special “acceptability requirements.” Since claims to expertise are normally not acceptable to all qualified (reasonable etc.) points of view, they cannot function as premises in the justification of political authority, and the epistocratic claim fails. Yet as a number of critics have pointed out, this (broadly Rawlsian) strategy faces significant problems: it is at least unclear whether the strategy in fact bars all epistocratic conclusions whether there is any principled way to draw the distinction between qualified and non-qualified points of views on which it depends; and whether principled defenses for it are available and internally consistent. This article outlines a third and previously largely overlooked answer, which resists the epistocratic claim without either denying the existence of expertise in politics or invoking special acceptability requirements for political justifications. The only plausible argument for the epistocratic claim, this article argues, focuses on the compensatory role that the expert’s authority plays in correcting the subject’s relative unreliability or other agential shortcomings. The expert’s authority is thus justified only if the subject, by adopting a policy of obeying the expert’s directives, does not face problems that are very similar to the ones that the expert’s authority was meant to solve in the first place. If, for instance, the subject finds it no easier to reliably identify what the expert’s directives require of him than to reliably assess and act on the reasons with which the expert is meant to help him, then the expert’s directives lack the compensatory value that would justify her authority. But if some widely accepted empirical conjectures about politics in a pluralistic political community are correct, then citizens normally either have no reason to adopt a policy of obeying experts, or the experts with regard to whom they have reason to adopt such a policy differ, so that no expert has the kind of general authority over the polity that we associate with political rule. (We may call this the “non-compensation argument” against epistocracy.) The argument is important both because it helps shed light on the proper relation between authority and expertise in general, and because it shows that we can normally reject the epistocratic claim without adopting either the skeptical or the Rawlsian strategy, thus undercutting whatever support these views derive from the mistaken perception that they are necessary for resisting the threat of epistocracy. Finally, because the anti-epistocratic constraints it introduces apply only to justifications of the subjects’ duty to obey, but not to the existence or activities of political institutions as such, the compensation argument can accommodate our anti-epistocratic intuitions without excluding epistemic considerations from the design of political institutions more generally. (shrink)

In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize (...) a certain practical end. Although such strong focus on functions is quite natural , I argue in this paper that an artefact’s intentional nature is not exhausted by functional considerations. Many non-functional properties of artefacts—such as their marketability and ease of manufacture—testify to the intentions of their users/designers; and I show that if these sorts of considerations are included, one gets much more satisfactory explanations of artefacts, their design, and normativity.Keywords: Artefacts; Dual Nature program; Function; Intentionality; Normativity. (shrink)

The question of how to legitimize authority is generally addressed with reference to Raz’s service conception of authority. Yet, his functional explanation does not concern itself with how authoritative institutions are empowered at the outset. Even though Raz’s monistic account of authority is coupled with input legitimacy and pluralized with Waldron’s analysis of the inter-institutional allocation of authority, it does not assist us in inter-legal situations. As inter-legality is a theory oriented towards finding legitimate ways of legal intersection, this article (...) aims at showing how authorities between different legal orders may engage in a legitimate relationship. In doing so, it benefits from Roughan’s pluralistic and relational account of authority coupled with a conjunctive justification thesis. (shrink)

This paper, a contribution to “micro set theory”, is the study promised by the first author in [M4], as improved and extended by work of the second. We use the rudimentarily recursive functions and the slightly larger collection of gentle functions to initiate the study of provident sets, which are transitive models of $\mathsf{PROVI}$, a subsystem of $\mathsf{KP}$ whose minimal model is Jensen’s $J_{\omega}$. $\mathsf{PROVI}$ supports familiar definitions, such as rank, transitive closure and ordinal addition—though not ordinal multiplication—and Shoenfield’s (...) unramified forcing. Providence is preserved under directed unions. An arbitrary set has a provident closure, and the extension of a provident $M$ by a set-generic $\mathcal{G}$ is the provident closure of $M\cup\{\mathcal{G}\}$. The improvidence of many models of $\mathsf{Z}$ is shown. The final section uses similar but simpler recursions to show, in the weak system $\mathsf{MW}$, that the truth predicate for $\dot{\varDelta}_{0}$ formulæ is $\Delta_{1}$. (shrink)

This paper puts forward an account of blame combining two ideas that are usually set up against each other: that blame performs an important function, and that blame is justified by the moral reasons making people blameworthy rather than by its functionality. The paper argues that blame could not have developed in a purely instrumental form, and that its functionality itself demands that its functionality be effaced in favour of non-instrumental reasons for blame—its functionality is self-effacing. This notion is (...) sharpened and it is shown how it offers an alternative to instrumentalist or consequentialist accounts of blame which preserves their animating insight while avoiding their weaknesses by recasting that insight in an explanatory role. This not only allows one to do better justice to the authority and autonomy of non-instrumental reasons for blame, but also reveals that autonomy to be a precondition of blame’s functionality. Unlike rival accounts, it also avoids the “alienation effect” that renders blame unstable under reflection by undercutting the authority of the moral reasons which enable it to perform its function in the first place. It instead yields a vindicatory explanation that strengthens our confidence in those moral reasons. (shrink)

This book explores how the creations of great authors result from the same operations as our everyday counterfactual and hypothetical imaginations, which cognitive scientists refer to as 'simulations'. Drawing on detailed literary analyses as well as recent research in neuroscience and related fields, Patrick Colm Hogan develops a rigorous theory of the principles governing simulation that goes beyond any existing framework. He examines the functions and mechanisms of narrative imagination, with particular attention to the role of theory of mind, and (...) relates this analysis to narrative universals. In the course of this theoretical discussion, Hogan explores works by Austen, Faulkner, Shakespeare, Racine, Brecht, Kafka and Calvino. He pays particular attention to the principles and parameters defining an author's narrative idiolect, examining the cognitive and emotional continuities that span an individual author's body of work. (shrink)

Authority is a moral power of the community in whose service it is exercised through constitutive consent for coordinating its functions and achieving its purpose.

The problem of the ‘mountain man’, the caricature of self-sufficiency and individualism, is not a new one for autonomy theorists. It seems plausible that there is genuine value in self-direction according to one’s deeply-held principles. If autonomy involves something like this, then anyone concerned with autonomy as a social rather than individualistic phenomenon must explain what the mountain man gets wrong when he denies that his autonomy admits of being placed under obligations to others. In particular, the mountain man challenges (...) autonomy-minded social anarchists: if his denial of legitimate non-voluntary obligations is correct, then it is not just the state we should reject, but any organising body with coercive powers. This may be consistent with individualist anarchism or right-libertarianism, but it sits ill with the social anarchist intuition that we can have genuine political obligations. My thesis addresses this problem in three stages. First, I argue for a functional analysis of authority and autonomy: the concepts are not pre-existing “immovable objects”, but rather are defined by the role that they are intended to play in our discourse. I suggest that we need a concept of political or institutional authority in order to resolve co-ordination problems and pursue collaborative social goods, and a concept of autonomy to explain when and why self-direction is valuable. Second, I defend a social-relational conception of autonomy. The autonomous agent is powerful and authoritative, where this power and authority is in large part constituted, rather than merely affected, by the social structures and relations that we stand in. We are powerful and authoritative, I argue, when we stand in relations of non-domination: we are not vulnerable to arbitrary interference in our lives, and this non-vulnerability is defended in virtue of recognition respect for us as agents. There are two important implications of this account: that autonomy comes with a built-in equality condition whereby everybody’s autonomy is threatened if anybody’s is, and that there is no principled distinction to be drawn between ‘personal’ and ‘political’ autonomy. In the last three chapters, I suggest an autonomy-justified conception of authority. I argue for autonomy as the crucial collaborative good which authoritative institutions help us to pursue, and suggest that such institutions may legitimately claim authority if they act or effect actions in ways which are likely to promote or defend autonomy-constituting relations, and act or effect actions in ways consistent with maximal equal autonomy. Finally, I return to the anarchist argument, showing that while my accounts of autonomy and authority give us a plausible picture of how autonomy is compatible with genuinely authoritative institutions, this picture still has no room for the state. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Introduction * Epistemic versus Practical Authority * Scientific Authority and Its Limits * The Validation for Acknowledging Authority * Ecclesiastical Authority * Which One? * Note * References * Further Reading.

This paper explores the tension in Kierkegaard’s Christian discourses between Kierkegaard’s overt emphasis on Scriptural authority and Kierkegaard’s imaginative Scriptural use, through an analysis of the discourse series, “Thoughts That Wound from Behind—for Upbuilding.” The paper argues that Kierkegaard employs Scriptural language both imaginatively to create distanciation and directly to create confrontation, without differentiating how Scriptural authority functions in these two uses. The paper concludes that when Kierkegaard emphasizes Scriptural authority, he is really emphasizing the authority of “Christian concepts” stabilized (...) in Christian tradition, and that he utilizes Scripture freely and imaginatively to challenge readers with those authoritative concepts. (shrink)

In an earlier chapter, the author argues that naturalists can justifiably accept realism about material objects only if the methods of science justify belief in intrinsic modal properties. One suggestion as to how they might do this is as follows: beliefs attributing intrinsic modal properties to material objects are justified because their truth provides a good explanation for the existence of proper functions in nature. This examines this suggestion and argues that, except in the case of objects that are (...) the products of design, proper functions are not empirically detectable. (shrink)

In recent times, the exponential growth of sequenced genomes and structural knowledge of proteins, as well as the development of computational tools and controlled vocabularies to deal with this growth, has fueled a demand for conceptual clarification regarding the concept of function in molecular biology. In this article, we will attempt to develop an account of function fit to deal with the conceptual/philosophical problems in that domain, but which can be extended to other areas of biology. To provide (...) this account, we will argue for three theses: (1) some authors have confused metatheoretical issues (about the meaning and application criteria of terms) with metaphysical ones (about teleology); this led them to (2) look for explicit definitions of “function”, in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria of application, in order to make the concept of function eliminable; however, (3) if one leaves metaphysical worries aside and focuses on functional attribution practices, it is more adequate to say that the concept of function has an open texture. That is, that a multiplicity of application criteria is available, none of which is sufficient nor necessary to attribute a function to a trait, and which only in concert form a clear picture. We distinguish this thesis from some usual forms of pluralism. Finally, we will illustrate this account with a historical reconstruction of the ascription of a water transport function to aquaporins. (shrink)

Recently something close to a consensus about the best way to naturalize the notion of biological function appears to be emerging. Nonetheless, teleological notions in biology remain controversial. In this paper we provide a naturalistic analysis for the notion of natural design. Many authors assume that natural design should be assimilated directly to function. Others find the notion problematic because it suggests that evolution is a directed process. We argue that both of these views are mistaken. Our naturalistic (...) account does not simply equate design with function. We argue that the distinction between function and design is important for understanding the evolution of the physical and behavioral traits of organisms. (shrink)

The authors consider the important problem of creative expression of a musician-teacher for modern musical pedagogy. Based on the analysis of research literature, the content and functions of creative expression in musical and performing activities are revealed. It is characterized by the aesthetic nature of creative self-expression, internal harmony of will, emotional and intellectual intents of self-expression.

Looking for an adequate explication of the concept of a biological function, several authors have proposed to link function to design. Unfortunately, known explications of biological design in turn refer to functions. The concept of general design I will introduce here breaks up this circle. I specify design with respect to its ontogenetic role. This allows function to be based on design without making reference to the history of the design, or to the phylogeny of an organism, (...) while retaining the normative aspect of function ascriptions. The concept is applicable to the function and design of technical artifacts as well. Several problems well known with other definitions can be overcome by this approach. (shrink)

This volume handles in various perspectives the concept of function and the nature of functional explanations, topics much discussed since two major and conflicting accounts have been raised by Larry Wright and Robert Cummins’s papers in the 1970s. Here, both Wright’s ”etiological theory of functions’ and Cummins’s ”systemic’ conception of functions are refined and elaborated in the light of current scientific practice, with papers showing how the ”etiological’ theory faces several objections and may in reply be revisited, while its (...) counterpart became ever more sophisticated, as researchers discovered fresh applications for it. Relying on a firm knowledge of the original positions and debates, this volume presents cutting-edge research evincing the complexities that today pertain in function theory in various sciences. Alongside original papers from authors central to the controversy, work by emerging researchers taking novel perspectives will add to the potential avenues to be followed in the future. Not only does the book adopt no a priori assumptions about the scope of functional explanations, it also incorporates material from several very different scientific domains, e.g. neurosciences, ecology, or technology. In general, functions are implemented in mechanisms; and functional explanations in biology have often an essential relation with natural selection. These two basic claims set the stage for this book’s coverage of investigations concerning both ”functional’ explanations, and the ”metaphysics’ of functions. It casts new light on these claims, by testing them through their confrontation with scientific developments in biology, psychology, and recent developments concerning the metaphysics of realization. Rather than debating a single theory of functions, this book presents the richness of philosophical issues raised by functional discourse throughout the various sciences.​ Content Level » Research Keywords » Causal role theory of functions - Determination of content - Ecosystem selection - Etiological theory of function - Evolutionary biology - Functional explanations - Historical concepts in biology - Larry Wright - Neurosciences - New mechanism - Selected effects functions - Systemic theory of functions - William Wimsatt Related subjects » Anthropology & Archaeology - Epistemology & Philosophy of Science - Evolutionary & Developmental Biology - Neuroscience - Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.- Section I. Biological functions and functional explanations: genes, cells, organisms and ecosystems.- Part 1.A. Functions, organization and development in life sciences.- Chapter 1. William C. Wimsatt. Evolution and the Stability of Functional Architectures.- Chapter 2. Denis M. Walsh. Teleological Emergence: The Autonomy of Evo-Devo.- Chapter 3. Jean Gayon. Does oxygen have a function, or: where should the regress of biological functions stop?.- Part 1.B. Functional pluralism for biologists? Chapter 4. Frédéric Bouchard. How ecosystem evolution strengthens the case for functional pluralism.- Chapter 5. Robert N. Brandon. A general case for functional pluralism.- Chapter 6. Philippe Huneman. Weak realism in the etiological theory of functions.- Section 2. Section II. Psychology, philosophy of mind and technology: Functions in a man’s world.- Part 2.A. 2A. Metaphysics, function and philosophy of mind.- Chapter 7. Carl Craver. Functions and Mechanisms in Contemporary Neuroscience.- Chapter 8. Carl Gillett. Understanding the sciences through the fog of ”functionalism.’.- 2.B. Philosophy of technology, design and functions.- Chapter 9. Fran¸ coise Longy. Artifacts and Organisms: A Case for a New Etiological Theory of Functions.- Chapter 10. Pieter Vermaas and Wybo Houkes. Functions as Epistemic Highlighters: An Engineering Account of Technical, Biological and Other Functions.- Epilogue.- Larry Wright. Revising teleological explanations: reflections three decades on. (shrink)

This book explores issues at the core of modern linguistics and cognitive science. Why are all languages similar in some ways and in others utterly different? Why do languages change and change variably? How did the human capacity for language evolve, and how far did it do so as an innate ability? Simon Kirby looks at these questions from a broad perspective, arguing that they can be studied together. The author begins by examining how far the universal properties of (...) language may be explained by examining the way it is used, and how far by the way it is structured. He then considers what insights may be gained by combining functional and formal approaches. In doing so he develops a way of treating language as an adaptive system, in which its communicative and formal roles are both crucial and complementary. In order to test the effectiveness of competing theories and explanations, Simon Kirby develops computational models to show what universals emerge given a particular theory of language use or acquisition. He presents here both the methodology and the results. Function, Selection, and Innateness is important for its argument, its methodology, and its conclusions. It is a powerful demonstration of the value of looking at language as an adaptive system and goes to the heart of current debates on the evolution and nature of language. (shrink)

Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias seems better (...) understood as a case of habituated belief than as a mere association or an example of what Tamar Gendler calls ‘alief’. If there is to be genuine first-person epistemic authority over persisting mental states, therefore, an alternative account to Moran’s is required in the case of desire and perhaps in the case of belief. More generally, the neglect of habituation in recent philosophy of mind is a symptom of the need for philosophers to take the temporal structure of rational agency more seriously. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in the transcendental dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason in Germany. Authors, however, often do not pay enough attention to the fact that Kant’s theory of reason (in the narrow sense) and the concept of ideas derived from it is not limited to this text. The purpose of this article is to compare and analyze the functionality of mind as a subjective ability developed by Kant and Fichte with the (...) Hegelian expansion of the mind to the idea of universal rationality. The relevance of such a comparison is connected with the need to demonstrate how the Hegelian paradigm of absolute rationality causes either the subsequent rejection of reason as a philosophical principle in the 19th and´20th centuries counter-discourse, or reduction of reason to the concept of pragmatic rationality. In the first part of this paper, the author intends to differentiate between at least 7 different types of ideas and their functions in Kant’s works. In the second part, he demonstrates how Fichte tries to systematize them beginning with reason, which at first creates an idea of itself. Special attention is paid to the way that Fichte categorizes them with the help of 5 spheres of action or 5 worldviews. The third and final part of the article discusses how Hegel goes beyond the frame of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness using different demands linked to the concepts of “reason” and “ideas”. Although these requirements are not found in Kant and Fichte, they entail a set of difficulties, which the author considers in conclusion. The author’s interpretation of the theory of ideas and their functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel demonstrates the dynamic character of the theories of reason in classical German philosophy, as well as the relevance of the 7 types of ideas that retain their significance for philosophy of the 21st century. Keywords: Kant and German idealism, types of ideas, functions of reason, worldviews, the problem of different demands. В Германии на протяжении последних двух десятилетий возрос интерес к трансцендентальной диалектике «Критики чистого разума». Однако авторы часто не обращают внимания на то, что кантовская теория разума (в узком смысле), в которой разворачивается работа с идеями, не ограничивается этим текстом. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ разработанной Кантом и Фихте функциональности разума как субъективной способности с гегелевским расширением разума до идеи всеобщей разумности. Актуальность такого сравнения связана с необходимостью продемонстрировать то, каким образом гегелевская парадигма абсолютной разумности вызывает либо последующий отказ от разума как философского принципа в контрдискурсе XIX–XX вв., либо редукцию разума к понятию прагматической рациональности. В первой части данной статьи вводится различение по меньшей мере семи различных видов идей и связанных с ними функций в философии Канта. Во второй части демонстрируется попытка Фихте их систематизировать исходя из утверждения том, что разум должен сначала создать идею о самом себе. Проанализировано также предложенное Фихте распределение идей на пять сфер действенности или типов мировоззрения. В третьей, итоговой части статьи рассмотрен выход гегелевской мысли за рамки трансцендентальной философии сознания. Автор статьи связывает этот процесс с выдвижением не осуществимых в контексте философии Канта и Фихте требований к понятиям «разум» и «идея» и анализирует ряд сложностей, вызванных этими требованиями. Таким образом, интерпретация учения об идеях и их функциях у Канта, Фихте и Гегеля демонстрирует динамический характер теорий разума в классической немецкой философии и актуальность семи видов идей, которые сохраняют свое значение для философии XXI в. Ключевые слова: Кант и немецкий идеализм, виды идей, функции разума, мировоззрение, проблема различных требований. (shrink)

Present world is the victim of conflicts on the basis of misunderstanding of religious dogmas of different religions, irrationality, ignorance and intolerance. People are moving away from knowledge, truth and reason. Indeed people accept false beliefs, hallucinations and myths. The role of religious plurality in philosophy is not to integrate and harmonize religions, especially religions cannot, and rather it is the business of religious pluralism to learn, think and acquire knowledge about the variety of religious beliefs, statements and injunctions. This (...) paper determines the function of intelligence/intellect to understand religious pluralism. How and where we make mistake in the plurality of religions. In this paper there is no issue to describe the conflict between faith and reason however reason is only to think and clear the ambiguities which we are using either to integrate one religion with another or to refute the religious dogmas of other religions. That is why authority places a significant part which teaches humans how to use their reason to bring peace, tranquility and acceptance in the plurality of religions. Mostly the scholar who practicing their religions and without having the authority and knowledge of other religions they are vehemently criticizing other religions. This paper shows that what is authority and where to use it. Who are authoritative persons? If authority in one religion is transferred to another what would happen. What would happen if authority is misrepresented? This paper further illuminates the concept of rational outlook to modify and learn from different religious; furthermore we can discuss the nature of consciousness or awareness in exploring religious pluralism. Is it necessary for a person who believes in one religion to learn another religion in order to resolve the controversies and evils in different religions conditional to authority? The more we mixing up religions into each other, the more religious conflicts arise. Therefore this paper tries to furnish people's mind with consciousness about religions realities and state of affair, inculcate world with rational outlook to ponder, analyze, understand and evaluate as well tolerate and accept the truth and authenticity in the domain of religions. This study analyzes and stress on the exertion of relative vision in accordance and intimation with reason, authority and moral consciousness to resolve the conflicts, diversities and issues in the field of religious pluralism. (shrink)