Virtue ethics seems to be a promising moral theory for understanding and interpreting the development and behavior of artificial moral agents. Virtuous artificial agents would blur traditional distinctions between different sorts of moral machines and could make a claim to membership in the moral community. Accordingly, we investigate the “machine question” by studying whether virtue or vice can be attributed to artificial intelligence; that is, are people willing to judge machines as possessing moral character? An (...) experiment describes situations where either human or AI agents engage in virtuous or vicious behavior and experiment participants then judge their level of virtue or vice. The scenarios represent different virtue ethics domains of truth, justice, fear, wealth, and honor. Quantitative and qualitative analyses show that moral attributions are weakened for AIs compared to humans, and the reasoning and explanations for the attributions are varied and more complex. On “relational” views of membership in the moral community, virtuous machines would indeed be included, even if they are indeed weakened. Hence, while our moral relationships with artificial agents may be of the same types, they may yet remain substantively different than our relationships to human beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave1 David Gauthier Hume's account in the Treatise ofthe artificial virtues, their obligation and motivation, resists easy interpretation. Two passages, taken from his discussion of promises, will introduce, the problems I propose to examine. First: No action can be requir'd of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. (...) This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it cannot be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now 'tis evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any inclination to observe them.... But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions.2 Ignore for the present the last sentence quoted. Hume seems clearly to be claiming that (1) an action can be a duty only if there is some motive to perform it other than a sense of duty, and (2) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping other than a sense of duty. From (1) and (2) we may infer that (3) an act of promise-keeping can not be a duty. But since the sense of duty motivates an action only ifit is apprehended to be a duty, then from (2) and (3) we may conclude that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. And the second passage: Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind.... The difficulties, Volume XVIII Number 2 401 DAVID GAUTHIER that occur to us, in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises, we either surmount or elude. For instance; the expression of a resolution is not commonly suppos'd to be obligatory; and we cannot readily conceive how the making use of a certain form of words shou'd be able to cause any material difference. Here, therefore, we feign a new act ofthe mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend. But we have prov'd already, that there is no such act of the mind, and consequently that promises impose no natural obligation. (T 523) This time, ignore for the present the first sentence. The remainder would seem to confirm my reading ofthe first passage. Hume claims that (5) there is no natural obligation to perform an act of promise-keeping, but (6) we feign the willing of such an obligation. If, as Hume has claimed in the previous passage, (2) there is no motivation to perform an act ofpromise-keeping other than a sense ofduty, and if obligation and duty may be taken as equivalent, then we may conclude as before that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. In his theory of the artificial virtues and vices, Hume considers "the three fundamental laws ofnature, thatofthestabilityofpossession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises" (T 526). It would seem, from the passages cited, that Hume must suppose that there is no real obligation to keep promises, but only a feigned obligation. And since the reasoning that Hume employs in the first ofthe passages that I have cited is explicitly identified with "that reasoning, which prov'd justice in general to be an artificial virtue" (T 518), it seems clear that he must also suppose that there is no real obligation to uphold stability of possession and its transference by consent—no real obligation to observe the other laws of justice or equity.3... (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss two familiar objections to Hume's account of cognition, focusing on his ability to give a satisfactory account of the more normative dimensions of thought and language use. In doing so, I argue that Hume’s implicit account of these issues is far richer than is normally assumed. In particular, I show that Hume’s account of convention-driven artificial virtues like justice also applies to the proper use of conventional public languages. I then use this connection between (...) Hume’s conception of language and his moral theory to show how he can respond to a number of basic objections to his views. In doing so, I explore the sense in which human cognition is essentially linguistic, and so social, for Hume, as well as many other issues concerning the relationship between Hume’s philosophy of mind and language, his epistemology, and his ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier Annette C. Baier Gauthier's splendidly dialectical paper1 first sets out Hume's official Treatise account ofhow each personhas a self-interested motive to curb her natural but socially troublesome self-interest, by agreeing to the adoption ofthe artifices ofprivate property rights, transfer by consent, and promise (provided others are also agreeing to adopt them), andhow the sympathy-dependent moral sentiment approves (...) of such a redirection of"the interested passion." Enlightened self-interest gives us the natural obligation tojustice; the fact that it is morally approved turns it into a moral obligation. Self-hatred for any breaches of the moral obligation may come in to bolster the self-interested motivation, and this will be helped along by the extra artifices employed by educators and politicians. So far so good. But now enters the sensible knave, who queries the initial assumption that each will in fact gain more by strict conformity to the rules of the Humean social artifices than by occasional carefully calculated and undetected breaches of them. If the knave is right, then the Treatise story ofhow reasonable self-interested people can get themselves to conscientiously respect property rights (including rights ofbarter), and to keep promises, is in trouble. Only by an erroneous calculation of their interest could they end with the motivation which Hume attributes to them, and finds to be morally approvable.Gauthier argues that there are indications even in the Treatise that Hume is aware ofthe flawed nature ofhis official account, since he attributes "sophistry" to some attempted justifications of honest behaviour, and attributes "feigned acts" of impossible willing to some conscientious promise-keepers. Gauthier finds Hume to have, in the Treatise, a second, less official story ofwhat it takes to be motivated to be just—that it takes error, and letting oneself be taken in by feignings and sophistry. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals this submerged account surfaces in the sensible knave's challenge and Hume's admission that his own answer will not be satisfactory to the knave. The charms of official Humeanjustice, Gauthierconcludes, are spurious, sincethe "anatomy" of the account of the rational motivation to be just is known to be unsound. "The sensible knave's message is thathuman society... lacks any moral foundation." Volume XVIII Number 2 429 ANNETTE C. BAIER This is a sombre tale. One of its unwelcome implications is that Hume himself, really believing that the knave is right, but unwilling tobe seen tohave the bad grace to "dehver a theory, however true which... leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious," is simply trying to "sink" the knave's truth in oblivion by creating a smoke-screen of insincere rhetoric about the greater delights of consciousness of integrity over the knave's satisfaction in his ill-gotten gains. So there really are two sombre tales—one, attributed to Hume, about justice, and one about Hume's dupUcity (or is it mere cynical frivolity?): Gauthier crafts both stories beautifully, directing our attention to bits ofHume's text injust the right order for his dramatic purposes. But is he giving us truth or fiction? I completely agree with Gauthier's version of Hume's official Treatise story, that the moral obligation to justice supervenes on the "natural obligation" for which Hume believes the natural motivation to be collectively redirected self- (or family) interest.2 1 agree that there are one or two passages, especially in the Treatise section, "Of the obUgation of promises," that seem to jar with this account, and which much somehow be explained. I agree that Hume believes that his reply to the knave is, from the knave's point ofview, unsatisfactory. Now for some disagreements. First, about Hume's reply to the knave.3From the viewpointofthevirtuous dues-payingmemberof"the party of humankind," Hume's is a perfectly satisfactory reply. It will be plain truth, for a person with the other Humean virtues (including equity, which is listed as a natural virtue),4 that justice will bring as great or greater good than would judicious injustice. Even if it would be "simply preposterous" to believe that the social order is dangerously threatened by any... (shrink)

David Hume’s position on religion is, broadly speaking, “politic”: instrumental and consequentialist. Religions should be tolerated or not according to their effects on political peace and order. Such theories of toleration are often rejected as immoral or unstable. The reading provided here responds by reading Hume’s position as one of radically indirect consequentialism. While religious policy should serve consequentialist ends, making direct reference to those ends merely gives free reign to religious-political bigotry and faction. Toleration, like Hume’s other “artificial (...) virtues” (justice, fidelity to promises, allegiance to government), is a universally useful response to our universal partiality—as established uniformity, however tempting, is not. This implies that toleration can progress through political learning, becoming broader and more constitutionally established over time. A sophisticated Humean approach thus shares the stability and normative attractiveness of respect- or rights-based arguments while responding more acutely and flexibly to problems the former often slights: antinomian religious extremism; underdefined political agency; and internationalized, politicized religious movements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:46. ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND ACQUIRED SOCIAL CONCERN I One of Hume's most celebrated contributions to moral philosophy is his distinction between natural and artificial virtue. This is obviously intended to be an important distinction but its significance is less than obvious. Many modern commentators view both as interest based, with the natural virtues related to our immediate interests while the artificial are linked (...) to our enlightened long-term interests. Despite the fact that this standard reading does have some textual support (e.g., T535, 2 537), it is not without its difficulties. The major problem lies in the account of why artificial virtues are, in fact, virtues. Natural and artificial virtues frequently encourage conflicting actions. For example (T497498 ), the repayment of a loan to a "seditious bigot" may be in accord with the artificial virtue attached to justice, but nevertheless may thwart public as well as individual interest and consequently clash with natural virtue. As a result, we are faced with two alternatives: We can either accept the standard interpretation and its attendant incoherencies or we can re-examine Hume's natural/artificial distinction in hopes of arriving at a reading capable of avoiding these complications. What follows is an attempt to exploit the second option. In essence, I shall urge that a sharper distinction is needed between the artificial and natural virtues. The present deficiency clearly emerges once we realize that the standard account totally overlooks a critical aspect of Hume's doctrine. Not only does Hume provide a speculative history of how societal conventions arose from the state of nature (an essentially diachronic account), but he also offers an explanation of why we now attach moral approbatior to actions falling within these conventions (an essentially 47. synchronie account). It is the latter that enables Hume to explain the connection between moral sentiment and the artificial virtues; yet this aspect is completely neglected on the popular interpretation. These two accounts must be distinguished and clarified in order to understand Hume's intent and position. II Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtue is roughly this: Natural virtue is attributable to those sentiments and passions which, if acted upon, generally tend to yield pleasing results to ourselves or others. On the other hand, we ascribe artificial virtue to actions which constitute a certain practice, the observance of which tends towards the good of mankind. Thus, an action is naturally virtuous if it is motivated by a sentiment which, if regularly acted upon, would have pleasant results. Because of this, naturally virtuous actions usually have pleasing consequences. It is in our own self-interest to promote the natural virtues and the actions they engender. Meanwhile, we attach artificial virtue to actions falling under a practice or convention. In effect, we view the entire practice as well as its particular constituent actions as virtuous. This distinction seems fairly simple; nonetheless it has two significant consequences. First, in both cases, virtue is attributed to the motives behind rather than the specific actions themselves. For instance, Hume argues that benevolence is a natural virtue (E295-302), therefore any action following from this motive will be virtuous. However, the same action fails to be virtuous if it does not stem from the sentiment of benevolence. It is the motive that bestows virtue upon the action. Similarly, an action is artificially virtuous if it arises from an artificially virtuous motive. For example, an action is 48. artificially virtuous if it springs from the desire to do what is just (an artificially virtuous motive) ; yet the same action is not virtuous if it is inspired by a nonvirtuous motive or mere caprice. Just as with their natural counterparts, artificially virtuous motives are responsible for the actions they induce. But it is here that the similarity ends, for natural virtue is assigned to motives to perform immediately agreeable actions while artificial virtue is connected with motives to act within institutions deemed to be in the interest of society. To return to the earlier examples, actions arising from benevolence will almost always have an immediately agreeable affect, although, as Hume admits (T497-498, 597; E286, 304), there are exceptions. Of course actions performed for the... (shrink)

Several authors have recently noted Hume’s relative silence on the virtue of strength of mind and how it is developed. In this paper I suggest that Hume had good reasons for this silence, and I argue that Hume’s discussion of artificial virtue, especially the virtue of allegiance, reveals a complex view of the limitations on human efforts at self-reform. Further, it reveals the need for government and externally-imposed regulative structures to enable the development of strength of (...) mind. I argue that because of this, strength of mind awkwardly straddles Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtue. I conclude that, in comparison with traditional models of self-control, Humean strength of mind is indirect, artificial, and social. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume offers a detailed account of what he calls the artificial virtues: of justice, of fidelity to promises, and of allegiance to political authority, among others. According to virtually everyone, Hume’s discussion of these artificial virtues—and especially of the conventions on which he argues they depend—is inspired, rich, and subtle. At the same time, also according to virtually everyone, Hume’s discussion is deeply puzzling. Indeed, many have thought the puzzles so deep as to render Hume’s (...) position internally inconsistent. Puzzling though Hume’s discussion is, this chapter argues that Hume’s account of the artificial virtues is not just consistent but plausible and attractive. (shrink)

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for (...) further research. (shrink)

In the following pages, our specific aim is to show how Hume’s analysis of justice provides the occasion for the gradual display of some key elements of a psychosocial action theory, which lay the foundations for later social thinking. -/- RESUMEN: En lo que sigue, nuestro objetivo específico es mostrar cómo el análisis que realiza Hume de la justicia proporciona la ocasión para introducir de manera gradual elementos clave para el desarrollo de una teoría psico-social de la acción, presupuesta en (...) buena parte del pensamiento social posterior. (shrink)

One of the most common contemporary approaches for developing an ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) involves elaborating guiding principles. This essay explores the limitations of this approach, using the history of bioethics as a comparative case. The examples of bioethics and recent AI ethics suggest that principles are difficult to implement in everyday practice, fail to direct individual action, and can frequently result in a pure proceduralism. The essay encourages an additional attention to virtue, which forms the dispositions (...) of actors, directs them to valued ends, and encourages right action in particular situation to complement principles. Practices and professions like medicine or warfighting that already have rich traditions of reflection on virtue ethics will be especially fruitful fields for developing an AI ethics of virtue. (shrink)

Hume scholars have been anxious to point out that when Hume calls Justice, chastity and so on artificial virtues, he is in no way denying that they are real virtues. I shall argue that they are mistaken, and that anyone who wants to understand Hume's account of Justice and his category of artificial virtues must take seriously his choice of the word ‘artifice,’ recognizing that it means not only ‘Skill in designing and employing expedients,’ but also ‘address, cunning, (...) trickery.'My suggestion will seem strange given Hume's own repeated plea that we not take the term ‘artifice’ too seriously. Yet while it is generally good policy to take people - at least philosophers - at their word, this is a Justified exception, Justified not only by Hume's known proclivities to irony and subtlety, but also by the implications of hearkening to his plea. To see the implications of not taking the terms ‘artificial’ and ‘artifice’ seriously, one can read either Duncan Forbes’ or Barry Stroud's criticisms of Hume's account of Justice. (shrink)

(1997). Hume's motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 373-388.

This chapter contains section titled: The Origin of Justice The Particular Motivation for the Obligatory Nature of Justice The Whole of Artificial Virtues: Property, Promises, Government, and Chastity References Further Reading.

본 논문의 목적은 현재의 인공지능(artificial intelligence, 이하 AI) 윤리 논의에서 결여되어 있는 AI 개발자 윤리의 중요성과 필요성을 부각하고, AI 개발자 윤리로 덕성(virtue)기반의 모델이 적합함을 보여 이를 제안하는 것이다. AI는 고정된 과학기술이 아니라 발전노정에 있는 동적이라는 특성과 인간과의 상호작용에서 AI를 만든 인간의 삶에 지대한 영향을 끼치는 재귀적 특성이 있는 과학기술이다. 이러한 AI의 특성으로 인해, AI가 초래할 리스크에 대응하려는 AI 윤리는 발전 과정에 따라 제시되어야 한다는 점에서 체계적이고, 실천을 도모하는 동기부여의 구조를 가져야 한다는 점에서 기존 도덕의 형식적 특징인 1인칭, 2인칭, (...) 3인칭 관점이 통합될 필요가 있다. 그런데 최근에 활발하게 제시된 많은 AI윤리 지침에 대한 메타 분석에 따르면, 현재의 지침으로서의 AI 윤리 논의들은 1인칭 관점의 동기부여가 없는 3인칭 관점에만 한정되어 실질적인 ‘윤리 실현’(ethics realizing)을 도모하기에 취약하다. AI 윤리 지침 자체가 추상적이고 모호할 뿐만 아니라, AI를 개발하는 사람들에게 아무런 영향력을 행사하지 못하는 ‘윤리 세탁’(ethics washing)에 불과하기 때문이다. 이러한 한계를 보완하기 위해서는 AI 개발자들이 AI 윤리를 내면화하여 규범적으로 실천하게 할 수 있게 하는 AI 개발자 윤리가 필요한데, 본 논문은 덕성 기반의 AI 개발자 윤리가 이러한 목적을 위해 효과적이라고 주장한다. 덕성 기반의 AI 개발자 모델은, 과학적 덕성 모델(scientific virtue model)이 그랬던 것처럼 AI 개발의 목적이 무엇인지, AI개발자들의 전문직 덕성(vocational virtue)이 무엇인지, 그리고 이러한 덕성을 함양하기 위한 효과적인 교육 방법은 무엇인지 등의 이론 연구와 AI 개발자들과의 소통을 토대로 하는 경험 연구의 결합을 통해 실천적 차원의 모델로 구체화될 수 있다. 본 논문에서 이론적으로 제안하는 덕성 기반의 AI 개발자 윤리가 추후 한국 사회의 경험 연구를 통해 실천적 차원의 모델로 구체화되어 AI가 초래하는 윤리적 문제들에 효과적으로 대응하면서 AI의 혜택이 풍성히 향유되는데 기여하기를 기대한다. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has permeated every section of human life. Some even suggest that artificial moral advisors (AMAs)—that is, AI-driven artefacts designed to assist human moral growth by providing moral advice—can help humans to lead virtuous lives. With a focus on Thomas Aquinas's theological virtue ethics, this article will argue that AMA projects are cast into question because, theologically speaking, the cultivation of virtues and moral growth are inseparable from hope and patience given through God's grace, which (...) is immeasurable and cannot be reductively mathematised into AI models. Moreover, the tension between AI's efficiency and patient moral life offers further criticism of AMAs. That said, the theology of patience brings forth a conceptual apparatus through which to qualify the virtuous AMA as a tool to bring together human moral advisors as silent hearers and human moral advisees as patient inquirers. (shrink)

흄의 철학에서 여성주의 논의와 관련된 첫 번째 쟁점은 인위적 덕으로서 ‘순결’과 ‘정숙’에 대한 흄의 입장이 어떠하였는가 이다. 즉 이 논의와 관련해 흄이 성차별주의자인가 아닌가 하는 것이었다. 두 번째 쟁점은 이성과 감성의 대결구도 속에서 여성주의를 새롭게 해석하는 것이다. 본 논문의 목적은 이 두 쟁점을 소개하고 나아가 이성과 감성의 대결 구도가 아닌 확장적 의미에서의 이성 개념인 ‘반성’ 개념을 통해 여성주의의 가치를 발견하는 것이다. 흄은 ‘도덕’과 ‘이성’에 관해 본질적으로 현실적이고 진보적인 생각을 가졌다고 말할 수 있다. 즉 그는 무엇이 옳은 행위이고 참된 믿음인가에 대해 (...) 어떤 특권적이고 시간을 초월한 관점이 있다는 것에 반대한다. 흄의 이러한 생각은 20세기 여성주의철학 논의에서 두 가지 흐름에 영향을 주었다. 첫째, 평등주의 시각의 여성주의 철학자들은 ‘이성’의 능력에 있어 여자와 남자가 동일하기 때문에 정치권력에 있어서도 남녀가 평등해야 한다고 주장한다. 한편, 이와 다른 전통의 여성주의 철학자들은 여성과 남성의 차별성을 통해 여성의 우월성을 부각시키려 했다. 그에 따르면 여성은 감수성에 있어 남성보다 훨씬 뛰어나고 도덕은 감수성의 문제이기 때문에 여성이 도덕적으로 더 우월할 수 있다고 주장한다. 한편, 21세기에 들어 여성주의 철학에서는 ‘이성’이라는 개념에 대해 새로운 접근을 시도함으로써 여성주의에 대한 새로운 패러다임을 제시한다. 이 논문에서 우리는 이러한 입장에 대해 살펴보게 될 것이다. 나는 흄 철학에서 가장 논쟁적 주제의 하나인 ‘이성’ 개념에 대한 최근 게릿과 베이어의 서로 다른 해석이 양립 가능함을 보임으로써 흄 철학에서 여성주의의 가치를 부각시키고자 한다. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Moral Sentiments Sympathy The Distinction between Natural and Artificial Virtues Honesty with Respect to Property Fidelity to Promises The Natural Virtues and Sympathy The Common Point of View Specific Natural Virtues Conclusion: Sympathy and Justification References Further reading.

Philosophers, technologists, and pundits are beginning to recognize the deep ethical questions raised by artificial intelligence. So far, attention has concentrated in three areas: how we are being damaged or controlled by profit-driven algorithms, and what to do about it; how to ensure that autonomous, intelligent machines make “good” decisions, and how to define what these decisions are; and how to think about the possibility of artificial superintelligence surpassing and perhaps controlling us. To the extent that theorists have (...) looked at the good that AI can bring, they have tended focus on possibilities for material abundance and leisure. In addition, virtually all of this theorizing to-date has been limited to Western ethical frameworks. Especially given the huge investments in AI presently being made in China, it seems prudent to expand our collective philosophical frameworks to encompass a more global set of ethical perspectives. (shrink)

Although virtue ethics has repeatedly been proposed as a suitable framework for the development of artificial moral agents, it has been proven difficult to approach from a computational perspective. In this work, we present the first technical implementation of artificial virtuous agents in moral simulations. First, we review previous conceptual and technical work in artificial virtue ethics and describe a functionalistic path to AVAs based on dispositional virtues, bottom-up learning, and top-down eudaimonic reward. We then (...) provide the details of a technical implementation in a moral simulation based on a tragedy of the commons scenario. The experimental results show how the AVAs learn to tackle cooperation problems while exhibiting core features of their theoretical counterpart, including moral character, dispositional virtues, learning from experience, and the pursuit of eudaimonia. Ultimately, we argue that virtue ethics provides a compelling path toward morally excellent machines and that our work provides an important starting point for such endeavors. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To (...) achieve this goal, we critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)

The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence,The monk's humility, the hero's pride,All, all alike, find Reason on their side.Hume's moral philosophy is often interpreted as an example of a naturalistic approach to ethics. J.L. Mackie, for instance, writes that in Hume the questions of moral philosophy are answered ‘in sociological and psychological terms, by constructing and defending a causal hypothesis.’ Similarly, Páll S. Árdal claims that Hume ‘is concerned with an attempt to discover those psychological laws that explain human emotions and (...) the behaviour of people in society.’ I argue in this essay that if Hume is read in this way as developing a general explanatory theory of moral sentiments, he faces an inescapable dilemma. Section I presents the dilemma. In sections II and ill, I argue why for Hume — interpreted as a proponent of general psychological laws — there is no way out of this dilemma. (shrink)

In “A Virtue Ethics Critique of Ethical Dimensions of Behavioral Economics,” Professor Daryl Koehn criticizes the field of behavioral economics. She argues that behavioral economists ignore many important factors that affect how people make decisions, that their results are derived from experiments where subjects make choices in overly restrictive, artificial, and thin contexts that do not capture the richness of reality, and that the approach brings up psychological motivations that affect behavior in a piecemeal, ad hoc way that (...) does not capture the overall tapestry of the factors that influence the choices that we make. In this comment, I offer responses to many of these criticisms, and note where I think we have common ground. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is predicted to play an increasingly central role in warfare, with weaponized robots taking over more battlefield operations, and military algorithms mediating in, or substituting for, human decision-making in areas such as intelligence collection and analysis, targeting, and strategic decision-making. The primary focus of this article is the potential impact of the widespread use of AI systems on soldiers and military leaders themselves – namely, on their moral character, skills, emotions, and agency – and on how (...) they are perceived by the society which they defend. Increasing the use of AI in the military may undermine the conditions necessary for the cultivation and practice of martial virtues and commitment to the common good. The essay focuses on the three virtues of courage, deep loyalty, and prudence or practical wisdom. It then asks what kinds of “technocratic” vices might be encouraged in warfighters by the use of AI systems. It closes by analyzing the wider social and political implications of an expansive use of AI in the military. The risk is that, as AI takes over more military functions, the military ceases to be seen as a civic and republican institution and instead is seen as a mere extension of technocratic power. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is predicted to play an increasingly central role in warfare, with weaponized robots taking over more battlefield operations, and military algorithms mediating in, or substituting for, human decision-making in areas such as intelligence collection and analysis, targeting, and strategic decision-making. The primary focus of this article is the potential impact of the widespread use of AI systems on soldiers and military leaders themselves – namely, on their moral character, skills, emotions, and agency – and on how (...) they are perceived by the society which they defend. Increasing the use of AI in the military may undermine the conditions necessary for the cultivation and practice of martial virtues and commitment to the common good. The essay focuses on the three virtues of courage, deep loyalty, and prudence or practical wisdom. It then asks what kinds of “technocratic” vices might be encouraged in warfighters by the use of AI systems. It closes by analyzing the wider social and political implications of an expansive use of AI in the military. The risk is that, as AI takes over more military functions, the military ceases to be seen as a civic and republican institution and instead is seen as a mere extension of technocratic power. (shrink)

Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and (...) is more informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity? (shrink)

The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges much of our traditional understanding of military ethics. What virtues and what sort of ethics education are needed as we move into an ever more AI-driven military reality? In this article we suggest and discuss key virtues that are needed, including the virtue of prudence and the accompanying virtue of good and proper storytelling. We also reflect on the ideal of “explainable AI,” and philosophize about the role of fear in (...) helping us understand what is actually at stake in a military infused with AI-enabled and AI-driven weapons. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of unity of virtues by analyzing justice. The nature of justice cannot be appreciated without a prior understanding of the limited scope of the word and of the concerns that are related to it. Justice is an artificial virtue that has to be qualified. To be a just person is to make appropriate decisions in some of the areas in which one deals with other people. Virtues can have important and visible links with (...) other areas of a person's character. Virtue-ethics would be immune from the criticisms and would have no more disadvantages than does character-ethics. However, it is likely to say that there are people who, by the highest standards, genuinely possess some virtues but lack others. Virtue requires that one have all virtues. Virtues cannot be treated as essentially separate from one another. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Hume's thought on comportment between the sexes developed over time. In the Treatise he was interested in explaining why the world seeks to impose artificial virtues of chastity and modesty on women and girls, and how it manages to do this so successfully. But as time passed he became increasingly concerned with justice towards women and the role of free interactions between the sexes in facilitating sociability. While his later work continues to explain (...) the origin of the artificial female virtues of chastity and modesty in the way he had in the Treatise, it also recognizes and condemns proprietary attitudes towards women and surveys various ways of achieving a balance between male jealousy and sociability. It concludes by condemning the male vices of jealousy and "gallantry" while suggesting that the emphasis on female chastity and modesty is excessive. (shrink)

It is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the techno-scientific claims of the transhumanists. Instead, I question seriously the nature of the ethics and morals they claim can, or soon will, be manipulated artificially. I argue that while the possibility to manipulate human behavior via emotional processes exists, the question still remains concerning the content of morality. In other words, neural moral enhancement does not capture the fullness of human moral psychology, which includes moral capacity and moral content. (...) In this article, I revisit the debate between Hume and Kant concerning the role of emotions and reason in moral philosophy. I do so with reference to the work of philosopher Alasdair McIntyre. His moral philosophy has long stood as an essential text in virtue ethics, which constitutes the basis for my critique of the promise to engineer virtues (what I call “neural moral enhancement”). First, I outline three specific shifts that occurred in the history of Western moral philosophy in order to contextualize current debates on the nature of morality/moral agency. Second, I summarize MacIntyre's critique of contemporary moral philosophy and show its relevance to an assessment of neural moral enhancement. Finally I argue that moral neuroenhancement is a one-dimensional conceptualization of moral agency that does not reflect the fullness of human moral psychology. It envisions a world in which individual moral capacities will be enhanced and controlled but says nothing about the nature of the morality. (shrink)

Given that artificial moral agents—such as autonomous vehicles, lethal autonomous weapons, and automated financial trading systems—are now part of the socio-ethical equation, we should morally evaluate their behavior. How should artificial moral agents make decisions? Is one moral theory better suited than others for machine ethics? After briefly overviewing the dominant ethical approaches for building morality into machines, this paper discusses a recent proposal, put forward by Don Howard and Ioan Muntean (2016, 2017), for an artificial moral (...) agent based on virtue theory. While the virtuous artificial moral agent has various strengths, this paper argues that a rule-based utilitarian approach (in contrast to a strict act-utilitarian approach) is superior because it can capture the most important features of the virtue-theoretic approach while realizing additional significant benefits. Specifically, a 2-level utilitarian artificial moral agent incorporating both established moral rules and a utility calculator is especially well-suited for machine ethics. (shrink)

Virtue theory is a natural approach toward the design of artificially intelligent systems, given that the design of artificial intelligence essentially aims at designing agents with excellent dispositions. This has led to a lively research programme to develop artificial virtues. However, this research programme has until now had a narrow focus on moral virtues in an Aristotelian mould. While Aristotelian moral virtue has played a foundational role in the field, it unduly constrains the possibilities of (...) class='Hi'>virtue theory for artificial intelligence. This paper aims to remedy this limitation. Philosophers have developed a rich tradition investigating virtues, their normative domains and their structure. Drawing on this tradition, I propose a three-dimensional classification system of possible artificial virtues: virtues can be classified according to the domain in which virtue is an excellence, norm that makes a virtue an excellence, and mode of how the virtue delivers the excellence. With this framework, we can discern gaps in the current theorising about artificial virtues. Additionally, it gives us a tool to evaluate the competences of extant artificially intelligent systems. (shrink)

New technologies from artificial intelligence to drones, and biomedical enhancement make the future of the human family increasingly hard to predict and protect. This book explores how the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics can help us to cultivate the moral wisdom we need to live wisely and well with emerging technologies.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are 'black boxes'. The initial response in the literature was a demand for 'explainable AI'. However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or 'interpretable' is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritising interpretability in medical AI may constitute a 'lethal prejudice'. In this paper, we defend the value of (...) interpretability in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realised. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems , may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to - and perhaps even harm - patients. (shrink)

Based on a case that happened in 2001 in China, the author wants to show the ethical and legal issues arising from a woman's wish, which should be her basic right to have a child by assisted reproduction technology. This paper attempts to analyse if there is some relationship between bioethics and happiness, and to find if there is some reason that bioethics should provide help for those whoever need it. The case is about a woman whose husband was sentenced (...) to death, she applied to court to allow her to have a child for her husband by artificial insemination of her husband. The conclusion of paper is that there is no direct relationship between bioethics and happiness, virtue and vice of bioethics not only depends on its moral background, but also the legal system, social psychology and other social circumstances. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to proliferate into every area of modern life, there is no doubt that society has to think deeply about the potential impact, whether negative or positive, that it will have. Whilst scholars recognise that AI can usher in a new era of personal, social and economic prosperity, they also warn of the potential for it to be misused towards the detriment of society. Deliberate strategies are therefore required to ensure that AI can be safely (...) integrated into society in a manner that would maximise the good for as many people as possible, whilst minimising the bad. One of the most urgent societal expectations of artificial agents is the need for them to behave in a manner that is morally relevant, i.e. to become artificial moral agents (AMAs). In this article, I will argue that exemplarism, an ethical theory based on virtue ethics, can be employed in the building of computationally rational AMAs with weak machine ethics. I further argue that three features of exemplarism, namely grounding in moral exemplars, meeting community expectations and practical simplicity, are crucial to its uniqueness and suitability for application in building AMAs that fit the ethos of AI4SG. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics stand to change many aspects of our lives, including our values. If trends continue as expected, many industries will undergo automation in the near future, calling into question whether we can still value the sense of identity and security our occupations once provided us with. Likewise, the advent of social robots driven by AI, appears to be shifting the meaning of numerous, long-standing values associated with interpersonal relationships, like friendship. Furthermore, powerful actors’ and (...) institutions’ increasing reliance on AI to make decisions that may affect how people live their lives may have a significant impact on privacy while also raising issues about algorithmic transparency and human control. In this paper, building and expanding on previous works, we will look at how the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technology may lead to changes in identity, security, and other crucial values (such as friendship, fairness, and privacy). We will discuss what challenges we may face in the process, while critically reflecting on whether such changes may be desirable. Finally, drawing on a series of considerations underlying virtue ethics, we will formulate a set of preliminary suggestions, which—we hope—can be used to more carefully guide the future roll out of AI technologies for human flourishing; that is, for social and moral good. (shrink)

1Preface: Malthus the Utilitarian vs. Malthus the Christian moral thinker. The chapter aims at reconstructing the deadlocks of Malthus scholarship concerning his relationship to utilitarianism. It argues that Bonar created out of nothing the myth of Malthus’s ‘Utilitarianism’, which carried, in turn, a pseudo-problem concerning Malthus’s lack of consistency with his own alleged Utilitarianism; besides it argues that such misinterpretation was hard to die and still persists in Hollander’s reading of Malthus’s work. ● -/- 2 Eighteenth-century Anglican ethics. The chapter (...) gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown worked out a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number of possible sets of laws on the basis of a maximizing criterion, happiness for his creatures. ● -/- 3 Malthus’s meta-ethics. The chapter reconstructs the two ethical chapters of the second Essay. It argues that Malthus’s ethics is not dependent on Paley’s, but is derived from Cumberland, Butler, Gay, Brown. Besides, it argues that theodicy takes a new place in the 1803 Essays and ethics becomes a key to theodicy. The new solution is that, once it has been proved that passions can be mastered and that a world where passions are under control would be a comparatively happy place, a society where moral restraint prevailed would make the middling ranks more numerous, reduce dependence, and preserve liberty. ● -/- 4 Malthus’s early normative ethics: a morality of freedom. The chapter reconstructs young Malthus’s views on the foundations of ethics, proving his adhesion to voluntarist consequentialism. Then it reconstructs his treatment of political issues, whence a clear stance emerges in favour of traditional Whig concerns, such as political freedom, personal independence and dignity. Finally, it gives a fresh look at the theological argument in the two well-known final chapters, locating it in the context of consequentialism, voluntarism, and quasi-Leibnizian theodicy. ● -/- 5 Malthus’s intermediate normative ethics: a morality of prudence. Malthus’s normative ethics focuses on two main ‘natural’ virtues, benevolence and chastity, and three artificial virtues. These include love for equality and love for liberty. A special place is granted to another virtue, prudence, which is the link between natural and artificial virtues. This special virtue also provides an invisible link between the private and the public domains, in that it contributes to combine self-love with general happiness. This is granted by the unintended results mechanism, or “the happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin first with them. No cooperation is required”. ● -/- 6 Malthus’s mature normative ethics: a morality of humanity. The chapter describes reactions by Evangelicals, such as Gisborne, Sumner, and Chalmers, to Malthus’s theory and Malthus’s transformation of his own system in order to pave objections. This amounts to incorporating The Evangelicals’ ideas into his own system. The friendly controversy with his Evangelical fellow-travellers yielded several important changes in 1806, 1817, and 1826 editions of the second Essay in the formulation of Malthusian ethics, in the adoption of moral improvement instead of happiness as the variable to be maximised, in the adoption of generalized education as the main weapon in the war on poverty. ● -/- 7 Malthus’s applied ethics. The chapter reconstructs Malthus’s treatment of a few issues in ‘applied ethics’, sexual morality, public morality, poverty, and besides, war and slavery. On the first issue, he argues the duty to marry only at a time when one is ready to carry the burden of six children as a moral duty imposed by prudence and rejects birth control because of its alleged effect of encouraging ‘indolence’. On the second issue, he defends a peculiar kind of Whiggism as anti-Machiavellian politics centred on rights, equality, and dignity. On the third issue, his final approach is a kind of Institutional approach to poverty, making room for generalized basic education, free markets for labour and allowing for a subsidiary role for private beneficence. The goal to be aimed at is bringing about circumstances which tend to elevate the character of the lower classes of society and offer them a chance of being respectable, virtuous and happy. ● -/- 8 Conclusions: strengthening the theological foundation. Malthus’s criteria for policy appraisal were not utilitarian ones. His normative ethics and his politics were sharply different from Bentham’s. Utility is just one element in Malthus’s ethics, going with laws of nature and rights, and ironically, far from being a Benthamite insertion, is the most markedly theological element in Malthus’s system of ideas. ● -/- . (shrink)

This paper proposes a model of the Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent (AAMA), discusses a standard of moral cognition for AAMA, and compares it with other models of artificial normative agency. It is argued here that artificial morality is possible within the framework of a “moral dispositional functionalism.” This AAMA is able to “read” the behavior of human actors, available as collected data, and to categorize their moral behavior based on moral patterns herein. The present model is based (...) on several analogies among artificial cognition, human cognition, and moral action. It is premised on the idea that moral agents should not be based on rule-following procedures, but on learning patterns from data. This idea is rarely implemented in AAMA models, albeit it has been suggested in the machine ethics literature (W. Wallach, C. Allen, J. Gips and especially M. Guarini). As an agent-based model, this AAMA constitutes an alternative to the mainstream action-centric models proposed by K. Abney, M. Anderson and S. Anderson, R. Arkin, T. Powers, W. Wallach, i.a. Moral learning and moral development of dispositional traits play here the fundamental role in cognition. By using a combination of neural networks and evolutionary computation, called “soft computing” (H. Adeli, N. Siddique, S. Mitra, L. Zadeh), the present model reaches a certain level of autonomy and complexity, which illustrates well “moral particularism” and a form of virtue ethics for machines, grounded in active learning. An example based on the “lifeboat metaphor” (G. Hardin) and the extension of this model to the NEAT architecture (K. Stanley, R. Miikkulainen, i.a.) are briefly assessed. (shrink)

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative (...) schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable? Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly adopted in society, creating numerous opportunities but at the same time posing ethical challenges. Many of these are familiar, such as issues of fairness, responsibility and privacy, but are presented in a new and challenging guise due to our limited ability to steer and predict the outputs of AI systems. This chapter first introduces these ethical challenges, stressing that overviews of values are a good starting point but frequently fail to suffice due to the (...) context sensitivity of ethical challenges. Frequently, additional (ethical) values emerge for specific applications, as e.g. challenges with fraud detection are very different from those around language technologies. Second, methods to tackle these challenges are discussed. Main ethical theories (virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology) are shown to provide a starting point, but often lack the details needed for actionable AI Ethics. Instead, mid-level philosophical theories coupled to design-approaches such as Design for Values, together with interdisciplinary working methods, offer the best way forwards. The chapter aims to show how these approaches can lead to an ethics of AI that is actionable and that can be proactively integrated in the design of AI systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 349 Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics. By JOHN CASEY. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. ix + 226. By this philosophical study of the four cardinal virtues, John Casey joins the ever.expanding ranks of those moral theorists who have con· trihuted to the contemporary theory of the virtues. But Casey's hook is set apart from the others both by the exceptionally high quality of his analysis (...) and even more by his thesis that traditional thinking on the virtues is in tension, at least, with fundamental Christian assumptions about the nature of the moral life. For both these reasons, his hook deserves serious attention, especially by those scholars who argue for a special congruity between virtue theory and Christian ethics. Although the title might suggest otherwise, this hook is not primarily a historical study. Rather, Casey uses the traditional schema of the four cardinal virtues (courage, temperance, practical wisdom or prudence, and justice) as the basis for philosophical analysis, which is intended as "a modest rediscovery and (hence) criticism of a tradition which we inherit" (p. viii). Along the way, he draws on a diverse selection of writers, among whom Aquinas as well as Aristotle are prominent. His thesis is that the tradition of the virtues is "worldly," that is, in significant tension with our dominant Christian and Kantian assumptions about morality, in two ways: "[the virtues] include an element of self-regard, and... they rely upon material conditions for their fulfillment" (p. viii). And yet the tradition of the virtues is not simply at odds with our received assumptions about morality. As Casey argues in his brilliant first chapter, "Persons," the Kantian commitment to respect for persons implies that the adventitious qualities that distinguish individuals are far more significant morally than Kant could allow. In the first place, the human qualities that do in fact command our respect include such capacities as intelligence, wit, and even strength. While we may want to distinguish in theory between respect for these sorts of qualities and a purely moral respect for a good will, Casey argues that this sort of distinction is artificial and untrue to our actual judgments. Hence, he concludes, " If there is no adamantine distinction between what characterizes someone purely as a person, and all other advantages and attractive qualities a human being may have, then the way is clearly open for a 'worldly' scheme of values" (p. 9). Secondly, he argues that respect for persons necessarily presupposes some capacities for empathy and emotional response that on Kant's theory must he wholly irrelevant to the moral life (pp. 9-28). Correlatively, he claims that the individual's sense of oneself and 350 BOOK REVIEWS others is mediated through an awareness of one's body and its relation to others' bodies in a way that a Kantian theory cannot readily allow: "We can, then, move naturally from the idea of persons as self-conscious, rational beings, to them as beings with certain emotions and attitudes, and with a certain apprehension of themselves and others mediated through their sense of their own and others' bodies " {p. 43). Finally, he argues that these interlocking human qualities and capacities necessarily entail not only a willingness to acknowledge the claims of others but also a readiness to make certain claims upon others, to set a value on oneself, that is at least in tension with the Christian ideal of self-abnegation (pp. 44-50). I have dwelt at some length on the first chapter of Casey's book because it sets out the main lines of analysis for the subsequent chapters. In the course of developing his main thesis, he offers a number of fascinating analyses of particular questions, including a defense of the unity of the virtues (pp. 67-78), a discussion of the ways in which a virtue can he a bodily quality (pp. 105-113), and an argument that practical wisdom, and therefore moral goodness, may depend in part on the possession of a more than average level of intelligence (pp. 144147 ). At times, the very richness of his analyses can make it difficult to perceive the threads of a coherent argument. But he consistently returns to his... (shrink)

Virtue ethicists argue that modern ethical theories aim to give direct guidance about particular situations at the cost of offering artificial or narrow accounts of ethics. In contrast, virtue ethical theories guide action indirectly by helping one understand the virtues—but the theory will not provide answers as to what to do in particular instances. Recently, this had led many to think that virtue ethical theories are self-effacing the way some claim consequentialist and deontological theories are. In (...) this paper I defend virtue ethics against the charge of self-effacement. I distinguish between modestly self-effacing theories, immodestly self-effacing theories and theories that recommend indirect guidance. Though all self-effacing theories are indirect, not all indirect theories are self-effacing. I argue that virtue ethics is not self-effacing, but rather indirectly action-guiding. The response I articulate draws on the distinctive virtue ethical mode of action-guidance: namely, that thinking hard about virtue and what kind of person one aims to be offers the kind of guidance we want (or should want) as we face practical moral problems. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are “black boxes.” The initial response in the literature was a demand for “explainable AI.” However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or “interpretable” is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritizing interpretability in medical AI may constitute a “lethal prejudice.” In this paper, we defend the value of (...) interpretability in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realized. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems, may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to—and perhaps even harm—patients. (shrink)

It is important to reveal how humans evaluate an explanation of the recent development of explainable artificial intelligence. So, what makes people feel that one explanation is more likely than another? In the present study, we examine how explanatory virtues affect the process of estimating subjective posterior probability. Through systematically manipulating two virtues, Simplicity—the number of causes used to explain effects—and Scope—the number of effects predicted by causes—in three different conditions, we clarified two points in Experiment 1: that Scope's (...) effect is greater than Simplicity's; and that these virtues affect the outcome independently. In Experiment 2, we found that instruction about the explanatory structure increased the impact of both virtues' effects but especially that of Simplicity. These results suggest that Scope predominantly affects the estimation of subjective posterior probability, but that, if perspective on the explanatory structure is provided, Simplicity can also affect probability estimation. (shrink)

The last few years have seen a remarkable revival of interest in the virtues, which have regained their central role in moral philosophy. This thought-provoking new collection is a much-needed survey of virtue ethics and virtue theory. The specially commissioned articles by an international team of philosophers represent the state of the art in this subject and will set the agenda for future work in the area. The contributors--including Lawrence Blum, John Cottingham, Julia Driver, Rosalind Hursthouse, Terence Irwin, (...) Susan Moller Okin, Onora O'Neill, Michael Slote, Michael Stocker, and David Wiggins--cover practical virtue ethics, ancient views of the virtues, impartiality and partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtue and the good life, the vices, emotions, politics, feminism, moral education, and community. (shrink)