A growing number of theorists have looked to the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind or the affordance-based approach from ecological psychology to make sense of a wide variety of phenomena; some theorists believe that these theoretical accounts can offer rich insights about the nature of mental disorders, their etiology, and their characteristic symptoms. I argue that theorists who adopt such approaches also should embrace the further claim that all mental disorders are affective disorders. First, enactivist (...) accounts of mental disorder push us toward such a view insofar as they characterize such conditions in terms of disordered sense-making and conceptualize sense-making as fundamentally affective. Second, conceptions of mental disorder that emphasize affordance perception likewise motivate such a view insofar as they highlight the role that affectivity plays in the disclosure of action possibilities. What is more, both sense-making and affordance disclosure are best understood as processes of selective attention and responsiveness that rely heavily on affectivity. To illustrate and support these claims, I discuss how (a) language disturbances in schizophrenia and (b) “context blindness” in autism both result from disruptions to affectivity and selective attention that make it difficult for subjects to engage effectively with relevant affordances. (shrink)

Affective disorders arise in stressful situations from aberrant sensory information integration that affects energetic nutrient (i.e., glucose) utilization to the cognitive centers of the brain. Because energy flow is mediated by molecular signals and receptors that evolved before the first complex brains, the phylogenetically oldest signaling systems are essential in the etiology of affective disorders. The corticotropin‐releasing factor (CRF) peptide subfamily is a phylogenetically old metazoan peptide family and is pivotal for regulating organismal energy response associated (...) with stress. Highly conserved, both the CRF peptide family and its receptors possess a structural relationship to the teneurins, and their receptors, latrophilins, respectively. The CRF homologous region of teneurin is defined as the “teneurin C‐terminal associated peptide” (TCAP) and antagonizes CRF action, regulates mitochondrial energy production, and is anxiolytic in vivo. Here, it is postulated that TCAP represents an ancient peptide that mediates intercellular information transfer of stressful and noxious events by regulating energy utilization among neurons. (shrink)

The problems of contemporary states are in large part “affective disorders”; they are failures of states to properly understand and coordinate the emotions of the individuals within and in some instances outside the state. By excluding, imprisoning, and marginalizing members of their societies, states create internal enemies who ultimately enervate their own power and the possibility of peace and freedom within the state. Spinoza’s political theory, based on the notion that the best forms of state are those that (...) coordinate the power and emotions of those within a state, offers us both a diagnosis of and a cure for these affective disorders. In this paper I will outline Spinoza’s notion of the power of the state as a function of the power and coordination of the emotions of its citizens, and show that when the state contracts an affective disorder, such as excessive crime, rebellion, terrorism, etc. the state has failed to properly empower, include and coordinate the passions of the multitude of its citizens and subjects. (shrink)

Individual differences in emotional reactivity or affective style can be decomposed into more elementary constituents. Several separable of affective style are identified such as the threshold for reactivity, peak amplitude of response, the rise time to peak and the recovery time. latter two characteristics constitute components of affective chronometry The circuitry that underlies two fundamental forms of motivation and and withdrawal-related processes-is described. Data on differences in functional activity in certain components of these are next reviewed, with (...) an emphasis on the nomological network of surrounding individual differences in asymmetric prefrontal The relevance of such differences for understanding the nature affective dysfunction in affective disorders is then considered. The ends by considering what the prefrontal cortex “does” in certain of affective style and highlights some of the important questions for future research. (shrink)

Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via_ regia_ to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and (...) making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Current theories suggest that the brain is the sole source of mental illness. However, affective disorders, and major depressive disorder (MDD) in particular, may be better conceptualized as brain-body disorders that involve peripheral systems as well. This perspective emphasizes the embodied, multifaceted physiology of well-being, and suggests that afferent signals from the body may contribute to cognitive and emotional states. In this review, we focus on evidence from preclinical and clinical studies suggesting that afferent thermosensory signals contribute (...) to well-being and depression. Although thermoregulatory systems have traditionally been conceptualized as serving primarily homeostatic functions, increasing evidence suggests neural pathways responsible for regulating body temperature may be linked more closely with emotional states than previously recognized, an affective warmth hypothesis. Human studies indicate that increasing physical warmth activates brain circuits associated with cognitive and affective functions, promotes interpersonal warmth and prosocial behavior, and has antidepressant effects. Consistent with these effects, preclinical studies in rodents demonstrate that physical warmth activates brain serotonergic neurons implicated in antidepressant-like effects. Together, these studies suggest that (1) thermosensory pathways interact with brain systems that control affective function, (2) these pathways are dysregulated in affective disorders, and (3) activating warm thermosensory pathways promotes a sense of well-being and has therapeutic potential in the treatment of affective disorders. (shrink)

A number of studies have shown reduced recall of specific autobiographical memories (AMs) in patients after attempted suicide, but in all of them the study samples were confounded with diagnoses of affective disorders. The present study aims to demonstrate impaired specific autobiographical memory in patients after a suicide attempt without a diagnosis of an affective disorder. Four groups were compared: (1) patients with an actual major depression and a suicide attempt; (2) patients after a suicide attempt without (...) a lifetime history of an affective diagnosis; (3) patients currently suffering from major depression without a suicide attempt; and (4) control persons not suffering from either of the two conditions during their entire life. Individuals with major depression and a suicide attempt showed reduced specificity of AM and, most importantly, patients with a suicide attempt—despite the absence of an affective disorder—were equally impaired with recall of specific AMs as were patients with major depression. The authors propose that reduced specific AM is a common vulnerability factor that can lead either to the development of an affective disorder and/or to a suicide attempt. (shrink)

Current psychiatric classification adopts a disorder-focused diagnostic approach, as exemplified within ICD-11 and DSM-V. Although this approach has improved reliability of categorization, its validity and utility has been questioned (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Insel et al., 2009; Sanislow et al., 2010). Limitations include high comorbidity between supposedly distinct disorders; heterogeneity within diagnoses; limited treatment efficacy; and similarities across disorders in aetiology, latent symptom structure, and underlying biology. There is also evidence of transdiagnostic cognitive-behavioural processes (Harvey et (...) al., 2004). An alternative approach is therefore to focus on fundamental underlying mechanisms of psychopathology rather than observed symptom clusters. This article considers the possible benefits, hurdles, and steps towards implementation of this transdiagnostic mechanistic approach, using the example of repetitive negative thought. (shrink)

Rehabilitation mobility has become a new demand and travel mode for people to pursue active health. A large number of tourists choose to escape the cold in warm places to improve their health every winter. In this study, we collected the health index data of Seasonal Affective Disorder tourists from western China before and after their cold escape in Hainan Island in winter, aiming to compare whether rehabilitating cold escape can improve the Quality of Life of SAD tourists by (...) hierarchical analysis. Compared with previous studies, this paper has the following contributions: Firstly, the study samples were accurately screened according to the pathogenesis of SAD tourists and the confounding factors were strictly controlled; Secondly, the observational experimental method was used to conduct inter-group and intra-group control studies on 695 samples, and the results were more objective and reliable. Thirdly, the effect of treatment on the quality of life of 397 tourists in the rehabilitation mobility group was quantitatively evaluated from three factors including age, gender and sunshine exposure level by multivariate analysis of variance. Research results show that the rehabilitation environment brought by rehabilitation activities can help improve the health status of tourists. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept of “Tourism Therapy” and constructs a theoretical framework. The conclusion of this paper provides a scientific basis and reference for the study of tourism healing as a non-medical alternative therapy. (shrink)

A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through (...) the world. When the world no longer produces predicted affect the organism needs to explain this unpredicted absence of feeling. It is important to this account that cognition and perception are otherwise intact. Consequently the mind’s representation of the world and its emotionally salient properties are unchanged, leading the mind to predict a characteristic affective response. When that prediction is not fulfilled the organisms feels as if she is no longer present in experience. This is reported at the as feeling of depersonalization. (shrink)

Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s (...) genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy of individuation, sense-making is described as the process of progressive concretization and structuration of the self-world structures that support the intentionality of conscious experiences. Accordingly, affectivity is described as the force that anticipates a partial self-world coherence in sense-making. Structurally different types of affective experiences are integrated into the genetic picture and, on this basis, a reinterpretation and classification of certain mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and the anxiety spectrum, is provided. In this way, this work contributes to a phenomenologically informed enactive account of mental disorders as disorders of affectivity. (shrink)

There is growing attention towards atypical brain-body interactions and interoceptive processes and their potential role in psychiatric conditions, including affective and anxiety disorders. This paper aims to synthesize recent developments in this field. We present emerging explanatory models and focus on brain-body coupling and modulations of the underlying neurocircuitry that support the concept of a continuum of affective disorders. Grounded in theoretical frameworks like peripheral theories of emotion and predictive processing, we propose that altered interoceptive processes (...) might represent transdiagnostic mechanisms that confer common vulnerability traits across multiple disorders. A deeper understanding of the interplay between bodily states and neural processing is essential for a holistic conceptualization of mental disorders. (shrink)

Advances in emotion and affective science have yet to translate routinely into psychiatric research and practice. This is unfortunate since emotion and affect are fundamental components of many psychiatric conditions. Rectifying this lack of interdisciplinary integration could thus be a potential avenue for improving psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. In this contribution, we propose and discuss an ontological framework for explicitly capturing the complex interrelations between affective entities and psychiatric disorders, in order to facilitate mapping and integration between (...) affective science and psychiatric diagnostics. We build on and enhance the categorisation of emotion, affect and mood within the previously developed Emotion Ontology, and that of psychiatric disorders in the Mental Disease Ontology. This effort further draws on developments in formal ontology regarding the distinction between normal and abnormal in order to formalize the interconnections. This operational semantic framework is relevant for applications including clarifying psychiatric diagnostic categories, clinical information systems, and the integration and translation of research results across disciplines. (shrink)

Se realizó una investigación descriptiva con el objetivo de caracterizar la esfera afectiva de mujeres diagnosticadas con trastornos depresivos, en el período comprendido entre 2012 y 2015. La muestra estuvo conformada por 46 mujeres residentes en la provincia de Camagüey, seleccionadas de manera intencional, a partir de los criterios establecidos por los autores del estudio. Se aplicó el Psicodiagnóstico de Rorschach, según la codificación e interpretación del Sistema Comprehensivo de Exner. Como principales resultados se obtuvo que, en la mayoría de (...) las mujeres, predominó la combinación del Índice de depresión negativo y el Índice de inhabilidad social positivo, el estilo vivencial coartado e introversivo, proporción afectiva baja y Lambda alta. A descriptive study was conducted to characterize the affective sphere of women diagnosed with depressive disorders during a period between 2012 and 2015. The sample consisted of 46 women living in Camagüey, who were selected intentionally using criteria established by the investigation authors. A Rorschach Test was applied, with regard to the encoding and interpretation of Exner´s Comprehensive System. Results suggested that most women exhibited a combination of the negative depression index and the positive social disability index, constricted and introversive experiential style, low affective proportion and high Lambda. (shrink)

An estimated 15% of patients seen by neurologists have neurological symptoms, such as paralysis, tremors, dystonia, or seizures, that cannot be medically explained. For a long time, such patients were diagnosed as having conversion disorder (CD) and referred to psychiatrists, but for the last two decades or so, neurologists have started to pay more serious attention to this patient group. Instead of maintaining the commonly used label of conversion disorder – which refers to Freud’s idea that traumatic events can be (...) converted into deviant behaviour – these neurologists use the term functional neurological disorder (FND) and explain that the problems are due to abnormal central nervous system functioning. The situation that some patients with medically unexplained neurological symptoms are diagnosed with CD and treated by psychiatrists while others are diagnosed with FND and stay under the control of neurologists provides a unique case for analysing how neurological and psychological explanations affect subjectivity. In this article, I compare patient reports from English-language websites from the past 15 years to find out how minds, bodies, brains, and selves act and interact in the accounts of both patient groups. I conclude that the change in label from CD to FND has not only influenced ideas of medically unexplained disorders, but also affected ideas of the self and the body; of self-control and accountability. (shrink)

The neural networks that constitute corticostriatothalamocortical circuits between prefrontal cortex and subcortical structure provide a heuristic framework for bridging gaps between neurocircuitry and executive dysfunction in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). “Cool” and “Hot” executive functional theory and the models of dual pathway are supposed to be applied within the neuropsychology of ADHD. The theoretical model elaborated response inhibition and delayed gratification in ADHD. We aimed to review and summarize the literature about the circuits on ADHD and ADHD-related comorbidities, as (...) well as the effects of neurocircuitry on the executive dysfunction in ADHD. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Behrendt & Young (B&Y) propose an explanation for schizophrenia in terms of a cortical default in the interaction between consciousness and cognition. However, schizophrenia more likely involves miscommunication between subcortical and cortical affective circuits in the brain, a default in the interaction between consciousness and emotion. The typical “affective” nature of hallucinations in schizophrenia provides compelling evidence for subcortical involvement.

Although the role of emotion in socioeconomic decision making is increasingly recognised, the impact of specific emotional disorders, such as anxiety disorders, on these decisions has been surprisingly neglected. Twenty anxious patients and twenty matched controls completed a commonly used socioeconomic task (the Ultimatum Game), in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Anxious patients accepted significantly more unfair offers than controls. We discuss the implications of these findings in light of recent models (...) of anxiety, in particular the importance of interpersonal factors and assertiveness in an integrated model of decision making. Finally, we were able to show that pharmacological serotonin used to treat anxious symptomatology tended to normalise decision making, further confirming and extending the role of serotonin in co-operation, prosocial behaviour, and social decision making. These results show, for the first time, a different pattern of socioeconomic behaviour in anxiety disordered patients, in addition to the known memory, attentional and emotional biases that are part of this pathological condition. (shrink)

Support vector machines (SVMs) are being used increasingly in affective science as a data-driven classification method and feature reduction technique. Whereas traditional statistical methods typically compare group averages on selected variables, SVMs use a predictive algorithm to learn multivariate patterns that optimally discriminate between groups. In this review, we provide a framework for understanding the methods of SVM-based analyses and summarize the findings of seminal studies that use SVMs for classification or data reduction in the behavioral and neural study (...) of emotion and affective disorders. We conclude by discussing promising directions and potential applications of SVMs in future research in affective science. (shrink)

BackgroundIn China, undergraduate students face both academic and career selection pressures, sleep is an important physiological process for them. Investigate the physical exercise, sleep quality of undergraduate students in the education stage in Xuzhou City, and analyze the factors affecting their sleep quality, to promote the health education and psychological health of undergraduate students.Materials and methodsThe Physical Activity Rating Scale-3, the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, and the demographic information questionnaire were used to survey a whole-group sample of four undergraduate colleges (...) and universities in Xuzhou by cluster sampling, the general characteristics including gender, grade, height, weight, domicile, race, economic income, etc., were collected, and the data were analyzed and processed using chi-square tests and multi-factor logistic regression.Results3,366 valid questionnaires were collected from four undergraduate colleges and universities, including 1,355 males and 2,011 females. The detection rate of exercise in Jiangsu Normal University was lower than that in other universities, and the detection rate of sleep disorders was higher than that in other universities. Xuzhou Medical University, the highest detection rate of large exercise, Xuzhou Institute of Technology, the lowest detection rate of sleep disorders. There were significant differences in the detection rate of large amount of exercise among college students of different genders, grades, body types, and majors. There were significant differences in the detection rate of sleep disorders among college students with different gender, grade, family economic status, daily cell phone use time, cell phone purposeless usage, and exercise level. Multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that grade, family economic status, cell phone use time, cell phone purposeless usage is the main influencing factors of sleep disorders in college students.ConclusionThe sleep problems of undergraduates are serious, especially in Jiangsu Normal University. Scientific and appropriate exercise is an important measure to solve the sleep problems of undergraduates. Colleges and universities should actively carry out health education, college students living habits such as cell phone use should be guided training. (shrink)

Premenstrual dysphoric disorder was recently moved to a full category in the DSM-5 . It also appears set for inclusion as a separate disorder in the ICD-11 . This paper argues that PMDD should not be listed in the DSM or the ICD at all, adding to the call to recognise PMDD as a socially constructed disorder. I first present the argument that PMDD pathologises understandable anger/distress and that to do so is potentially dangerous. I then present evidence that PMDD (...) is a culture-bound phenomenon, not a universal one. I also argue that even if medication produces a desired effect, there are biological correlates with premenstrual anger/distress, such anger/distress seems to occur monthly, and women are more likely than men to be diagnosed with affective disorders, none of these factors substantiates that premenstrual anger/distress is caused by a mental disorder. I argue that to assume they do is to ignore the now accepted role that one’s environment and psychology play in illness development, as well as arguments concerning the social construction of mental illness. In doing so, I do not claim that there are no women who experience premenstrual distress or that their distress is not a lived experience. My point is that such distress can be recognised and considered significant without being pathologised and that it is unethical to describe premenstrual anger/distress as a mental disorder. Further, if the credibility of women’s suffering is subject to doubt without a clinical diagnosis, then the way to address this problem is to change societal attitudes towards women’s suffering, not to label women as mentally ill. The paper concludes with some broader implications for women and society of the change in status of PMDD in the DSM-5 as well as a sketch of critical policy suggestions to address these implications. (shrink)

The scarcity of human organs requires the transplant community to make difficult allocation decisions. This process begins at individual medical centers, where transplant teams decide which patients to place on the transplant waiting list. Each transplant center utilizes its own listing criteria to determine if a patient is eligible for transplantation. These criteria have historically considered preexisting affective and psychotic disorders to be relative or absolute contraindications to transplantation. While attitudes within the field appear to be moving away (...) from this practice, there is no data to confirm that eligibility criteria have changed. There are no nationwide guidelines detailing the manner in which affective and psychotic disorders should impact transplant eligibility. Individual transplant centers thus form their own transplant eligibility criteria, resulting in significant inter-institution variability. Data from the 1990s indicates that the majority of transplant programs considered certain psychiatric illnesses, such as active schizophrenia, to be absolute contraindications to transplantation. A review of literature reveals that no comprehensive data has been collected on the topic since that time. Furthermore, the limited data available about current practices suggests that psychiatric illness continues to be viewed as a contraindication to transplantation at some transplant centers. In light of this finding, we review psychiatric literature that examines the impact of affective and psychotic disorders on transplant outcomes and conclude that the presence of these disorders is not an accurate predictor of transplant success. We then discuss the requirements of justice as they relate to the creation of a just organ allocation system. We conclude that transplant eligibility criteria that exclude patients with affective and psychotic disorders on the basis of their psychiatric diagnosis alone are unjust. Just listing criteria must incorporate only those factors that have a causative effect on posttransplant morbidity and mortality. Justice also demands that we eliminate current inter-institution practice variations in favor of national transplant eligibility criteria. Given the limited data available about current practices, we call for an updated study investigating the manner in which affect and psychotic disorders impact transplant eligibility determinations. (shrink)

Self-disorders in depression and schizophrenia have been the focus of much recent work in phenomenological psychopathology. But little has been said about the role the material environment plays in shaping the affective character of these disorders. In this paper, we argue that enjoying reliable (i.e., trustworthy) access to the things and spaces around us — the constituents of our material environment — is crucial for our ability to stabilize and regulate our affective life on a day-today (...) basis. These things and spaces often play an ineliminable role in shaping what we feel and how we feel it; when we interact with them, they contribute ongoing feedback that " scaffolds " the character and temporal development of our affective experiences. However, in some psychopathological conditions, the ability to access to these things and spaces becomes disturbed. Individuals not only lose certain forms of access to the practical significance of the built environment but also to its ​ regulative​ significance, too — and the stability and organization of their affective life is compromised. In developing this view, we discuss core concepts like " affordance spaces " , " scaffolding " , and " incorporation ". We apply these concepts to two case studies, severe depression and schizophrenia, and we show why these cases support our main claim. We conclude by briefly considering implications of this view for developing intervention and treatment strategies. (shrink)

Reimer ( Neuroethics 2008 ) believes that how we use language to characterize psychopathy may affect our judgments of moral responsibility. If we say a psychopath has a disorder we may reduce their responsibility for moral failure. If we say a psychopath is merely different, we may not reduce their responsibility. Vincent ( Neuroethics 2008 ) argues that if this were the case, a diagnosis of disorder would be both necessary and sufficient to reduce the responsibility of some agent for (...) moral failure. Vincent presents two examples to suggest that a disorder is neither necessary nor sufficient to exculpate an individual for moral failure: childhood and hypomania. Vincent suggests instead that our judgments of moral responsibility ought to be based on the individual’s capacity for moral agency. I will side with Vincent in this debate, but argue that the example she uses, hypomania, does not work. I will argue that a diagnosis of hypomania, part of Bipolar II Disorder, is sufficient to exculpate an individual for some moral failure. This is because there are responsibility-relevant capacities missing: the capacities for self-awareness and to control ones abilities. Without these capacities, the individual is not a responsible moral agent. Vincent will need to provide an alternative example to show that the presence of a disorder is not sufficient to exculpate an individual for moral failure. Whilst our use of language is important, that use reflects our judgments of the individual’s capacities for moral agency. Responsibilities are determined not only by capacities, but by the right kind of capacities, and this should be reflected in our moral judgments, and our use of language. (shrink)

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves (...) the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation. (shrink)

Arguably, emotion is always valenced—either pleasant or unpleasant—and dependent on the pleasure system. This system serves adaptive evolutionary functions; relying on separable wanting, liking, and learning neural mechanisms mediated by mesocorticolimbic networks driving pleasure cycles with appetitive, consummatory, and satiation phases. Liking is generated in a small set of discrete hedonic hotspots and coldspots, while wanting is linked to dopamine and to larger distributed brain networks. Breakdown of the pleasure system can lead to anhedonia and other features of affective (...) disorders. Eudaimonia and well-being are difficult to study empirically, yet whole-brain computational models could offer novel insights potentially linking eudaimonia to optimal metastability in the pleasure system. (shrink)

We discuss three varieties of affective dynamics ( affective instability, emotional inertia, and emotional differentiation). In each case, we suggest how these affective dynamics should be operationalized and measured in daily life using time-intensive methods, like ecological momentary assessment or ambulatory assessment, and recommend time-sensitive analyses that take into account not only the variability but also the temporal dependency of reports. Studies that explore how these affective dynamics are associated with psychological disorders and symptoms are (...) reviewed, and we emphasize that these affective processes are within a nexus of other components of emotion regulation. (shrink)

Factory workers make up a large proportion of China’s internal migrants and may be highly susceptible to job and adaptation stress, negative affective states (e.g., depression and anxiety), and Internet gaming disorder (IGD). This cross-sectional study investigated the relationships between job stress, psychological adaptation, negative affective states and IGD among 1,805 factory workers recruited by stratified multi-stage sampling between October and December 2019. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was conducted to test the proposed mediation model. Among the participants, 67.3% (...) were male and 71.7% were aged 35 years old or below. The prevalence of probable depression, probable anxiety, and IGD was 39.3, 28.7, and 7.5%. Being male, younger age, and shorter duration of living in Shenzhen were associated with higher IGD scores. Job stress was significantly associated with IGD (β = 0.11,p= 0.01) but not with negative affective states (β = 0.01,p= 0.77). Psychological adaptation was significantly associated with negative affective states (β = −0.37,p 0.05). Negative affective states were positively associated with IGD (β = 0.27,p< 0.001). The indirect effect of psychological adaptation (β = −0.10,p= 0.004) but not job stress (β = 0.003,p= 0.77) on IGD through negative affective states was statistically significant. The observed psychological correlates and mechanisms are modifiable, and can inform the design of evidence-based prevention programs for depression, anxiety, and IGD in this population. (shrink)

In this chapter, we investigate whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. We argue that addressing this question requires engaging, at least, with three principal issues that have conceptual, empirical, and normative dimensions. First, it must be established whether current measures of psychopathy individuate a unitary class of individuals. By this we mean that persons classifed as psychopaths should share some relevant similarities that support explanation, prediction, and treatment. Second, it must be proven that psychopathy harms the person who has it. (...) Third, it must be established that the harm associated with psychopathy is relevant for the ascription of disorder status. Regarding this latter issue, we argue that psychopathy should be considered a disorder if its harmfulness derives from certain incapacities or limited capacities. These incapacities should affect basic competences that are justifably required for conducting a preferable type of life. Within this framework, we tentatively advance the hypothesis that some normatively justifed conclusions and empirical evidence about psychopathy, that needs nonetheless to be further investigated, might support the claim that people with psychopathy have a mental disorder. (shrink)

Neuropsychiatric disorders such as drug addiction, depression and schizophrenia are often centrally implicated in public health challenges. These conditions impact the individuals affected and have widespread implications, contributing to related crises such as opioid epidemic, rising suicide rates and homelessness. Despite their influence, public health interventions frequently emphasise individual responsibility, overlooking the complex interplay of neurobiological and systemic factors that underpin these disorders. Current public health frameworks, such as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ intervention ladder, prioritise efforts that (...) encourage individual behaviour change. Paetkau critiques this emphasis on individual responsibility, emphasising the need to consider more systemic factors, such as social determinants of health, as targets of necessary intervention.1 We aim to reinforce Paetkau’s critique of the intervention ladder by introducing three neuropsychiatric case studies, each highlighting the limitations of an individual-based framework in addressing psychopathology-involved public health issues. We argue that conditions like addiction, depression and serious mental illness undermine the emphasis on individual responsibility in public health and policy interventions. To this end, neuroscience demonstrates that effective public health interventions necessitate a shift from the long-standing emphasis on individual responsibility towards more comprehensive, systems-level interventions. Opioid overdose deaths in the USA have sextupled since 1999, with over 100,000 deaths in 2023 alone.2 The opioid crisis has since remained one of the most pressing public …. (shrink)