Good Agricultural Practices are central to sustainability standards and certification programmes in the global cocoa chain. Pruning is one of the practices promoted in extension services associated with these sustainability efforts. Yet concerns exist about the low adoption rate of these GAPs by smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana. A common approach to addressing this challenge is based on creating enabling conditions and offering appropriate incentives. We use the concepts of inscription and affordance to trace the vertically coordinated travel of (...) recommended pruning from research to extension and farming sites, and to describe how pruning is carried out differently at each site. Our analysis suggests that enactments of pruning at the extension site reduce the number of options and space for interactions, and this constrains making the practice meaningful to farmers’ repertoires. The conventions guiding and legitimising actions at this site, reinforced by sustainability standards, certification schemes and associated inspections and audits, favour standardised recommendations and consequently narrow room for context-specific diagnostics and adaptions. Therefore, we reframe the adoption problem as a matter of fit between different sites in the ‘agricultural research value chain’ embedded in the operational cocoa chain. Our contribution problematises the dominant framing of low adoption and highlights that the movement of pruning and the sequential enactment at different sites constrain the affordances available for rendering the practice meaningful to farmers’ repertoires. Consequently, addressing the low uptake of GAPs requires institutional work towards conventions that can construct a fit between sites along the agricultural research value chain. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the (...) Adoption Problem causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not. (shrink)

After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the (...) AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles. (shrink)

The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption (...) class='Hi'>problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic. (shrink)

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the (...) Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. (shrink)

Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption (...) problem, arguing that, for a significant class of basic logical principles, there is indeed a difficulty in seeing how they might be ‘freely adopted,’ thereby vindicating something close to the spirit of Kripke’s original claim. This first part of our argument will enforce a significant qualification of Quine’s claim that basic logical principles can be empirically confirmed. In the concluding sections of the paper, we turn to the question, specifically, of the empirical revisability of logic, arguing that when proper attention is paid to the role of reasoning in theory revision, it does indeed emerge that anti-exceptionalism, in full generality, is untenable. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity (...) of our inferences, cannot depend on our adoption of logico-linguistic conventions. (shrink)

According to the Adoption Problem certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation both govern a general structure shared by every logical rule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every meta-logic for any logical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to logical pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a “meta-logical monism”. We find a tension in (...) the dual role that the “unadoptable rules” must play in Finn’s “meta-logical monism” rendering it ineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. Consequently, we argue they cannot be both analogues of MP and UI and inferentially productive. We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a more satisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie. (shrink)

The adoption question asks whether there are logical rules that cannot be adopted if one does not already infer in accordance with them. Several philosophers, most famously Saul Kripke and Romina Padró, agree that there are such rules. Accordingly, they agree that there is an adoption problem. However, there is disagreement over which rules are unadoptable. In particular, while most agree that if there is an adoption problem, modus ponens and universal instantiation are in its (...) scope, many would exclude adjunction from the list. In this paper, I argue that adjunction is in the scope of the adoption problem. Then I show that the most straightforward counterargument against adjunction being in the scope of the problem, which tries to reformulate the adjunction rule into a more palatable one, does not work. (shrink)

What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of (...) logic subject to the Adoption Problem? If not, are there significant cases of logical revision that are subject to the Adoption Problem? We will argue that both questions should be answered negatively. (shrink)

The adoption of Antoninus Pius provided Cassius Dio with the opportunity to insert into his narrative a speech delivered by Hadrian justifying the selection of his successor (69.20.1–5). This article examines the content of the speech and its relationship to Dio’s own thoughts on the mechanics of imperial succession expressed elsewhere in the Roman History. It is argued that the speech articulates Dio’s ideal mode of succession, which sees the promotion of a model civilis princeps, while subtly drawing attention (...) to the problems inherent in a system where an emperor chooses his successor. Furthermore, it is suggested that these views may be read as Dio’s hostile reaction to the practices of his own day. (shrink)

When solving the problem of their placement of the orphans and children deprived of parental care, the parenting, which is carried out in family-type orphanages, foster families and adoptive families, became a priority. Translation into Ukrainian of Arleta James’ book «The science of parenting adopted children» will be a help for adoptive parents in its implementation. The book proposes the psychological characteristics of the arrived children and constructive practical advice on their parenting.

'China, by her resources and her population, is capable of being the greatest power in the world after the United States.' Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China In 1920 the philosopher Bertrand Russell spent a year in China as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Beijing, where his lectures on mathematical logic enthralled students and listeners, including Mao Tse Tung, who attended some of Russell's talks. Written at a time when China was largely regarded by the West as (...) backward and weak, The Problem of China sees Russell rise above the prejudices of his era and presciently assess China's past, present and future. Russell brings his analytical and insightful eye to bear on some fundamental aspects of China's history and politics, cautioning China against adopting a purely Western model of social and economic development, which he regarded as characterized by a combination of greed and militarism. Beginning with an overview of nineteenth-century Chinese history and considering China's relations with Japan and Russia, Russell then contrasts Chinese civilization with Western. He devotes a fascinating chapter to the character of the Chinese, which he argues is complex but ultimately defined by a 'pacific temper'. With uncanny foresight, Russell predicts China's resurgence, but only if it is able to establish an orderly government, promote industrial development under Chinese control and foster the spread of education. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new introduction by Bernard Linsky. (shrink)

The problem of induction is formulated as a set of three questions, namely: ‘What is the nature of the attitude of acceptance that we adopt in relation to certain theories?’ ‘What are the rules according to which we select those theories which we accept?’ and, ‘What is the justification for the adoption of those rules?’. An original answer is proposed for each question in turn, with the help of the new concepts of sub-theory, established sub-theory, aberrant, arbitrary and (...) degenerate theories. The answer to the third question follows the lines of Reichenbach's pragmatic strategy. (shrink)

The article discusses the problem of coexistence of different types of rationality, different scientific and linguistic pictures of the world as well as the problem of the adoption by one culture of another culture’s scientific picture of the world with accompanying transformations of the linguistic picture of the world of the recipient culture. The article deals with the experience of mutual research and collision between Western and Chinese traditions, using the example of medical science. The author examines (...) the problem of the transfer of scientific medical knowledge from Western to Chinese culture in the context of a radical mismatch of scientific and linguistic pictures. The articles considers two different approaches to the translation of Western medical terminology into Chinese, developed at different times by English translators Benjamin Hobson and John Fryer. Hobson was focused on harmonizing new terminology with the usual concepts of the world language picture of the recipient. Fryer preferred to introduce new specific terms, artificially created directly for the needs of a new scientific picture of the world. In the field of medical terminology, the first of the two approaches turns out to be more viable, since it is more focused on its “end users” – Chinese doctors who study Western medicine in order to use its methods in their medical practice. Therefore, there is only partial applicability of the approaches, methods and terminology developed in one tradition for the evaluation and development of another tradition. (shrink)

The “Slicing Problem” is a thought experiment that raises questions for substrate-neutral computational theories of consciousness, including those that specify a certain causal structure for the computation like Integrated Information Theory. The thought experiment uses water-based logic gates to construct a computer in a way that permits cleanly slicing each gate and connection in half, creating two identical computers each instantiating the same computation. The slicing can be reversed and repeated via an on/off switch, without changing the amount of (...) matter in the system. The question is what do different computational theories of consciousness believe is happening to the number and nature of individual conscious units as this switch is toggled. Under a token interpretation, there are now two discrete conscious entities; under a type interpretation, there may remain only one. Both interpretations lead to different implications depending on the adopted theoretical stance. Any route taken either allows mechanisms for “consciousness-multiplying exploits” or requires ambiguous boundaries between conscious entities, raising philosophical and ethical questions for theorists to consider. We discuss resolutions under different theories of consciousness for those unwilling to accept consciousness-multiplying exploits. In particular, we specify three features that may help promising physicalist theories to navigate such thought experiments. (shrink)

In this paper, after clarifying certain features of Gideon Rosen’s Modal Fictionalism, I raise two problems for that view and argue that these problems strongly suggest that advocates of a “Deflationist Strategy” ought not to endorse, or adopt Rosen-style Modal Fictionalism.

When discussing dialogue, argumentation researchers rarely draw the distinction between the story world and interactional world. While mediators often help to shape the interactions among agonists in the emerging flow of spoken discourse, writers of postulated dialogues narrate them, constructing a story world that depicts the agonists, depicts their utterances and their circumstances. In this paper, I ask where the agonists of the dialogue model of argument interact, and I show that they often interact in the story world of postulated (...) dialogues. Postulated dialogues are story problem conversations. Common in textbooks, exams, and standardized tests, story problems create hypothetical situations to illustrate formal relationships among variables, and are designed to be read in a theoretical attitude that treats the characters, objects, and circumstances that they depict as given. When argumentation researchers examine postulated dialogues, they tend to adopt a theoretical attitude, limiting their analysis to the conversation between the agonists depicted in the story world. Reading this way makes it easier to overlook the interactional world where the writing and reading of the texts takes place, obscuring the fact that they are narrated dialogues, often written by researchers. Reading this way also makes it easier to confirm the traditional participation framework of the dialogue model of argument. (shrink)

I am concerned with a very problematic concept of identity which one encounters in studies of practical problems concerning the adoption of children. The notion is problematic in the extreme, as I shall try to show. It seems to crop up not only in the work of researchers on this topic, but in the spontaneous and (apparently) untutored accounts of themselves given by adoptees. The question is whether there is a concept here at all: by which I mean not, (...) instead, a family of concepts linked by family resemblances, but rather some disparate ideas linked only by verbal similarities, and run together for mistaken theoretical purposes. The notion arises crucially in attempts to deal with practical questions arising in determining policies with regard to adoption: with regard to the placement of children for adoption, and the advice to be given to adoptive parents and to adopted children, whether young or adult, who encounter, or perhaps do not even encounter, difficulties. (shrink)

Franz Rosenzweig devoted particular attention to the problem of individuality in Hermann Cohen’s philosophy. He writes that, in comparison with the individuality of the man of religion, “the human being about which aesthetics knew [...] fades now in all its aesthetic individuality to a ‘mere type’”. This statement is actually based on Cohen’s writings: in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Cohen explicitly maintains that the human being that is the object of artistic representation is not a type, but rather an (...) individual. Just three years later, however, in his first book about philosophy of religion, Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Cohen states that the human being that is represented by art is not really an individual; only the man of religion is really individual; the human being represented by art is merely a type. In this paper my aim is to argue for the thesis that these opposite statements belong to different points of view. From an aesthetic point of view the human being represented by art has to be considered as truly individual, but the systematic overview adopted in Der Begriff der Religion can teach us that the individuality of the human being represented by art can’t be maintained from a different point of view than the aesthetic one. (shrink)

E. H. Gombrich's Adoption of the Formula form Follows Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity? This article is a longer note on what is a minor problem in the oeuvre of a great art historian. Its theme is E. H. Gombrich's use of the formula form follows function as the summary of his commonsense approach to the problem of style change. Although I am not sure how interesting this inquiry is in an art historical context, from the (...) perspective of my own field of design history and of modernist design theory, Gombrich's adoption of the formula constitutes an intriguing problem. (shrink)

Some 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase (...) ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent-position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow can political actors identify which putative expert is truly expert, given that any putative expert may be wrong about a given policy question; given that experts may therefore disagree with one another; and given that other members of the polity, being non-expert, can neither reliably adjudicate inter-expert disagreement nor detect when a consensus of experts is misguided? This would not be an important question if the problems dealt with by politics were usually simple ones, in the sense that the (...) answer to them is self-evident. But to the extent that political problems are complex, expertise is required to answer them—although if such expertise exists, we are unlikely to know who has it. This conundrum is illustrated by the financial crisis. The consensus views of financial regulators prior to the crisis appear to have been mistaken, in that the regulators not only failed to anticipate a crisis of the type that occurred, but adopted regulations that may have encouraged the concentration of mortgage risk in financial institutions. Similarly, once the crisis broke, academic financial experts, financial regulators, and journalists—who communicate information from one branch of the division of epistemic labor to another—converged on a narrative of the crisis that, once again, may plausibly be described as inaccurate, but that nonetheless has come to shape the understanding of the crisis shared by the rest of the polity. (shrink)

When doing mental ontology, we must ask how to individuate distinct categories of mental states, and then, given that individuation, ask how states from distinct categories interact. One promising proposal for how to individuate cognitive from sensorimotor states is in terms of their representational form. On these views, cognitive representations are propositional in structure, while sensorimotor representations have an internal structure that maps to the perceptual and kinematic dimensions involved in an action context. This way of thinking has resulted in (...) worries about the interface between cognition and sensorimotor systems – that is, about how representations of these distinct types might interact in performing actions. I claim that current solutions to the interface problem fail, because they have not sufficiently abandoned intuitions inspired by faculty psychology. In particular, current proposals seek to show how cognitive states can enforce prior decisions on sensorimotor systems. I argue that such “determination” views are the wrong kind of views to adopt, given the form distinction. Instead, I offer a proposal on which propositional representations can at best bias us toward certain kinds of action. This kind of view, I argue, appealingly distributes the explanation of action across distinctive contributions from cognitive and sensorimotor processing. (shrink)

The Gettier problem concerns the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the paper I argue that Gettier's cases are not cases of justified true belief because Gettier's examples rely on some problematic assumptions. The first is rather elementary definition of justification and the other is that justification is preserved by entailment, that is, (A) for all agents X, if X is justified in believing that p , and X realizes that the truth of p entails the truth (...) of q , then X would also be justified in believing that q . For the simplistic conception of justification has some alarming consequences we pursue more adequate definition of justification which would satisfy the idea that a necessary condition of justification is to entail or to be entailed by a true proposition. We also show that the (A) is not necessary to provide an elegant counter-example to the definition of knowledge if the elementary definition of justification is adopted. (shrink)

This article investigates the origin of the lack of motivation for adopting significant pro-environmental behavior . I identify three main barriers to motivation: the feeling that there is a need for broad collective action that has not yet materialized, the lack of practical knowledge about what an individual can do in his/her daily life to address environmental problems, and insufficient feedback and approval mechanisms. Subsequently, I argue that an individual's social context may contribute in addressing all three. The motivation for (...) the adoption of PEB behavior is connected to social interaction, which at times seems to shape individual behavior to a greater degree than other factors such as direct risk perception. (shrink)

Methodological pragmatists argue that, given the dire state of the environment, the primary goal of environmentalists, including philosophers who work in environmental ethics, must be to work together to ensure that environmentally friendly policies are put into place. They must set aside their differences and not argue over their competing theoretical justifications of environmental policies, as that contributes to divisiveness among environmentalists and prevents this cooperation from occurring. The proposal to ignore disagreements over theory gets cashed out in three distinct (...) ways, however, and consequently one can identify three distinct versions of methodological pragmatism. Radical methodological pragmatists propose that environmentalists give up on the task of providing well-founded theoretical justifications for environmentally friendly policies and stop engaging in debates over these justifications; rather, they should focus on providing reasons for these policies that connect with whatever values people already have. Moderate methodological pragmatists propose that although there is nothing problematic in offering theoretical justifications in contexts where environmental philosophers disagree on what policy should be adopted, they should work together and put aside their theoretical differences where policy recommendations coincide. Finally, weak methodological pragmatists hold only that environmental philosophers should work together where their policies coincide and there are no additional practical or moral considerations that might be relevant to their ability to work together. The first two positions involve interesting claims, but they are fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, the third is unobjectionable but largely trivial. Thus, there is no reason to think that method­ological pragmatism can contribute to the resolution of problems in environmental ethics. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that the phenomenon of predation is the source of several problems for Donaldson and Kymlicka's account of our duties towards wild and liminal animals. According to them, humans should adopt a general policy of non-intervention with respect to predatory behaviour involving wild and liminal animals. They justify this recommendation by appealing to the status of those animals as, respectively, members of sovereign communities and denizens of human-animal societies. Our goal is not to question their recommendation, (...) but to challenge the reasons given in its support. On the one hand, we argue that, insofar as wild animal communities are incapable of dealing with massive predation, they do not possess the competence required for sovereignty. Moreover, we argue that, even if we leave the issue of competence aside, attributing sovereignty rights to communities including both predators and preys may not be the best way to protect wild animals’ fundamental interests. On the other hand, we argue that there exist two important disanalogies between human denizens and liminal animals, which render Donaldson and Kymlicka's denizenship framework problematic. We suggest that the ultimate justification for a general policy of non-intervention lies in the significant risk of causing greater harm by acting otherwise, due to our limited knowledge and resources. (shrink)

Problem emergence and relational dynamics at the start of a philosophy workshop. This research aims to better understand how a common object is constructed (or not) during an interaction when the purpose of the interaction is to think together philosophically. After presenting what the practice of philosophy for children advocates, we analyze what happens when it is implemented by observing the unfolding of a philosophy workshop involving secondary school students and their teachers. We adopt an empirical approach and a (...) precise follow-up of the contributions of each participant. At the beginning of the workshop, we are interested in looking for those moments when a common problem emerges. Our observations suggest that the process of theoretical elaboration of a philosophical theme and that of the relational dynamics between the participants are intertwined. (shrink)

The question of embryo adoption remains unresolved. Dignitas personae expresses reservations about the practice, but does not reject it. A proper interpretation of Dignitas personae n. 19 shows that the Vatican does not hold that human embryo adoption is intrinsically immoral, but that the question of its morality depends on the circumstances that surround the practice. Embryo adoption as practiced today is often compromised by illicit cooperation with objectionable reproductive technologies; nonetheless, it is possible to identify a (...) best case scenario which may lessen or even eliminate these concerns. That best case is when a Catholic couple, who have not previously utilized in vitro fertilization to overcome a problem of infertility, adopt an abandoned embryo and choose to raise that child as their own. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 329–347. (shrink)

Some 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase (...) ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent‐position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time: An Introductory Address Delivered to the Philosophical Society of the University of Edinburgh All, and to ask you to adopt, for the time, a point of view which may not be your own. Afterwards you can avenge yourselves for this temporary submission by subjecting my words to what criticism you think fit. A philosophic temper is shown, above all things, in the power of entering into the views of another, (...) and taking them for the moment almost as if they were your own, without prejudice to the subsequent critical reaction, which will be effective just in proportion to the degree of your previous sympathetic appreciation of the ideas criticised. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This book explores noteworthy approaches to modal syllogistic adopted by medieval logicians including Abélard, Albert the Great, Avicenna, Averröes, Jean Buridan, Richard Campsall, Robert Kilwardby, and William of Ockham. The book situates these approaches in relation to Aristotle's discussion in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and other parts of the Organon, but also in relation to the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius on the one hand, and to modern interpretations of the modal syllogistic on the other. Problems explored (...) include: Aristotle's doctrine of modal conversion, the pure and mixed necessity-moods, modal ecthesis, the pure and mixed contingency-moods, and Aristotle's use of counter-examples. Medieval logicians brought various concepts to bear on these problems, including the distinction between per se and per accidens terms, the notion of essential predication, the distinction between ut nunc and simpliciter propositions, the distinction between de dicto and de re modals, and the notion of ampliation. All these are examined in this book. (shrink)

Howard argues that the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations in Quantum Field Theory presents a problem for structural realism in this context. I consider two potential ways round this problem: 1), follow Wallace in adopting the 'naive' Lagrangian form of QFT with cut-offs; 2), adapt Ruetsche's 'Swiss Army Knife' approach. The first takes us into the current debate between Wallace and Fraser on conventional vs. algebraic QFT. The second involves consideration of the role of inequivalent representations in understanding (...) spontaneous symmetry breaking and quantum statistics. In both cases, I suggest, the structural realist has sufficient room to manoeuvre. (shrink)

Many studies assume a significant relationship between intention and behavior. However, the data do not always support this assumption. This study used a modified version of social cognitive theory with self-evaluations as an intermediate variable to explore and resolve the problems associated with applying the theory of planned behavior to explain students’ adoption of technology for self-directed learning. We surveyed 285 college students who enrolled in an e-book publishing course using multifaceted technological learning tools. We found that, as an (...) intermediate variable, self-evaluation enhanced the influence of intentions on behavior and improved the accuracy of predictions of college students’ adoption of technology for self-directed learning. Students’ attitudes and perceived behavioral control were important factors influencing their adoption of technology for self-directed learning through their effects on intention; subjective norms were not important in this respect. (shrink)

The problem of evil poses a challenge for traditional theists by asking how they could rationally believe in the existence of an omnipotent and wholly good God given that the world is filled with evil manifested in such events as wars, crimes, and natural disasters. This is widely considered one of the most significant challenges to belief in God and has evoked many responses from traditional theists. However, it is not my aim in this book to propose another response (...) to the problem or to evaluate the effectiveness of existing responses at length. I deliberately refrain from such endeavours. Instead, I take a step back from the ongoing debate surrounding the problem and adopt a unique perspective which transcends the familiar perennial debate between traditional theists and atheists. The thesis that the problem of evil is a problem beyond traditional theism is radical enough. Yet, I argue for an even more radical thesis in this book: supernaturalist theists enjoy advantages that naturalist atheists/non-theists lack when responding to the problem of evil because there is greater hope that the problem can be solved when supernaturalist resources are in place. This thesis, I argue, entails an additional interesting thesis: the problem of evil is a more significant challenge for atheists/non-theists than for traditional theists. (shrink)

In this paper I study the activity of mathematical problem-solving in scientific practice, focussing on enquiries in mathematical social science. I identify three salient phases of mathematical problem-solving and adopt them as a reference frame to investigate aspects of applications that have not yet received extensive attention in the philosophical literature.

This article is about the problem of the justification of basic logical laws. Starting from an exposition of Lewis Carroll’s regress, I show the inadequacy of dominant current approaches in the epistemology of logic: they are incapable of responding satisfyingly to the central problem raised by the regress. The realisation of this failure motivates the need to adopt a different perspective on our conception of logical laws. I suggest, in the last portion of the article, that we should (...) follow a suggestion made by Paul Boghossian and look carefully at the primitivist conception of the foundations of logic, such as it is put forward by Aristotle. (shrink)

This thesis argues that Dame Iris Murdoch’s writings portray a dialectical picture of morality that invites the reader to acknowledge the presence of evil and reflect upon the necessarily ‘opposing forces’ of good and evil. Murdoch’s engagement with both historical and contemporary discussions of evil is traced through close reading of both her published texts, including fiction and philosophy, and her unpublished and recently published texts and resources, including annotations, interviews and letters. These close readings are focused on the theological, (...) psychological and literary aspects of the contemporary problem of evil. The perspectives offered within this study all transcend the focus on goodness invited by Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, thus challenging the biased perspective of scholars of the late-twentieth century who sought to elevate Murdoch’s good characters by drawing equations between her moral philosophy and her fiction. This study begins, first, by demonstrating how Murdoch’s writings engage with the problem of evil, with the theological attempt to reconcile goodness with the presence of evil and suffering in the world, by drawing on her allusions to the Book of Job and to the writings of Simone Weil and Dame Julian of Norwich, all of which assert the necessary presence of evil and suffering in the moral life. Second, I interrogate the inconsistencies between Murdoch’s fictional and philosophical pictures of evil to illustrate how her fictional and philosophical engagement with Saint Paul’s writings reveals that she adopted the same dialectical picture of morality for which she critiqued Jung in her moral philosophy. For her, Jung’s picture of morality merges aspects of dualism and monism, both of which, traditionally speaking, offer two countervailing ways in which to picture the moral life, where evil represents, respectively, either an independent moral force separate from the good or a failure to carry out the moral iii ideals of goodness. Third, I identify and develop a link between contemporary moral, psychological and sociological discourses on psychopathy and the evil characters, both male and female, within Murdoch’s novels: not only do her antagonists and demons, often called ‘enchanter’ figures by scholars, echo the psychopath’s moral psychology, but so too do her saintly figures. Such an ambiguous picture resonates with contemporary interpretations of psychopathy, such as those offered by Robert D. Hare, Kevin Dutton, or Simon Baron- Cohen, which highlight the complex role of compassion, empathy and emotion on the individual’s moral awareness, whether they are saintly or psychopathic. In the final chapter, I argue that Murdoch’s dialectical picture of morality is indebted to Blake, whose The Songs of Innocence and of Experience and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell illustrates the necessity of the ‘contrary’ pairs of innocence and experience, reason and passion, and good and evil. While Murdoch may praise goodness, her complex engagement with evil reveals a dialectical task for the moral agent in which they have to appreciate the complexity of the moral life, with its inherently ambiguous mixtures of emotion and rationality, the saintly and the psychopathic, and goodness and evil. (shrink)

The main aim of this dissertation is to trace the systematic development of Husserl's early theory of intentionality, particularly as it reflects and influences his understanding of the mind-world relation. The dissertation is divided into two parts. ;In the first part, I trace the historical roots of phenomenology back to Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano. I argue that for Brentano, intentionality is a purely mental relation between a mental act and a mentally immanent intentional object or content. I also argue that (...) Brentano embeds this view in a roughly Lockean or "critical realist" position which adds a third element to the two elements of the intentional relation, viz., a really existing, extramental or worldly object---or, as Brentano prefers to call it, "thing." This "thing" is not psychologically accessible but is rather hypothesized by the natural scientist as a causal explanation for our intentional experiences. ;In the second part of the dissertation I chart the course of Husserl's early intellectual development in the period immediately following his philosophical apprenticeship under Brentano, again focusing on intentionality. I document Husserl's initial adoption of the Brentanian view, as well as his growing doubts about Brentano's immanentism. Through his work on the problem of nonveridical intentionality and the descriptive psychology of perception, Husserl is led to reject altogether the idea that intentionality is a genuine relation and to adopt instead an adverbial account which explains intentionality as an exclusive feature of mental acts, one that can be studied without any reference to the objects at which these acts aim. In the Logical Investigations , this conception of intentionality is coupled with a Cartesian, epistemologically oriented methodology to yield a conception of the philosophical study of the mind and its experiences in which no reference is made to the objects of the real world. I conclude the dissertation by indicating briefly how Husserl in subsequent years would augment and deepen this position through his concept of the noema. (shrink)

In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world. Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. (...) Act Consequentialism here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better, e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy. Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism. (shrink)

There seem to exist special conditions unique to those scientific explanations which exmploy micro-parts under which alone such explanations are considered intellectually adequate. Two attempts to specify these conditions have been endorsed since antiquity, but serious counter-examples exist for each one. This paper contends that only in certain circumstances may each of the traditional criteria of adequacy be regarded as acceptable, identifies these circumstances, and examines the consequences of adopting such a dualistic or contextual solution to the problem of (...) micro-explanation. (shrink)

This paper begins with an analysis of global problems shaping education, particularly as they impact upon learning and life chances. In addressing these problems a range of philosophical positions and controversies are considered, including: traditional romantic and institutional views of schooling; and more recent maximalist, neo-liberal, emancipatory and post-modern-perspectives of lifelong learning. In this paper we argue that these do not represent 'the last word' on the provision of learning and the enhancement of life chances and instead we put forward (...) an alternative view based upon the notion of adopting an inclusive problem-solving approach, which we believe may be better suited to offering solutions to the various global problems that have been identified or that are still emerging. We believe that such an approach addresses and expands the individual, social, economic and political features of education and conduces to the improvement and expansion of learning and life chances. (shrink)

This article confronts the problems of establishing normative restrictive claims for delegitimizing conduct and attitudes of cultural appropriation. Using C. Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strhol’s intimacy account (IA) as a background, I offer an alternative of cultural adoption relying upon Alain Locke’s value theory and philosophical pluralism. The phenomenon of cultural adoption I propose develops some insights from Nguyen’s and Strohl’s IA, while critiquing their framework’s perceived limitations. By adding loyalty and intensity to the prerogatives of intimacy, the (...) hope is that a more nuanced approach to the ethical concerns of cultural adoption will be achieved. My contention is that Locke’s notions of a racial sense or kinship feeling provides stronger grounds for establishing an ethics of the passerby or what I will call non-intimate encounters. Next, I will argue that the interpersonal relations of groups cannot be interpreted as simple, but only as complex wholes. Instead of monoliths and exclusive binaries, we have to recognize variation within groups and learn to think in what Albert Murray calls “mulatto,” or a culture of novel hybrids. In the final section, I argue that Locke’s philosophy, broadly construed, operates as a contraceptive knowledge against the growing imperial apathy of populists and absolutists. We should work to abandon forms of political and epistemological violence by rejecting these forms of cultural abuse. It is my grand contention that human groups express in their differences a uniqueness that makes us distrust or admire and like each other. (shrink)

This paper deals with the philosophical questions which gave rise to the traditional realist theories of universals. The main thesis is that these same questions may also be interpreted as scientific-empirical questions. The study of these problems has begun only very recently and the relevance of the results for the traditional problem of intensional entities has only been remarked by few workers aware of the philosophical problem. The approach adopted here is that of regarding man as a perceptual (...) system situated in an environment and showing certain capacities like perception of universals. The possible ways of access to these entities is discussed on the basis of some recent empirical findings related to perception. One conclusion is that in order to answer the basic philosophical question of how properties, particulars and propositions are perceived may be answered within the domains of science, accepting only the usual presuppositions used in it. Basically, such an approach sees the root of the problem in the great complexity of information processing involved in the actual perception of properties, particulars and propositions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of ‘intimate citizenship’ stresses the right of people to choose how they organize their personal lives and claim identities. Support and interest groups are seen as playing an important role in the pursuit of recognition for these intimate choices, by elaborating visible and positive cultures that invade broader public spheres. Most studies on intimate citizenship take into consideration the exclusions these groups encounter when negotiating their differences with society at large. However, much less attention is paid to (...) the ways in which these groups internalize the surrounding ideologies, identity categories and hierarchies that pervade society and constrain their recognition as full citizens. In contrast, this paper aims to emphasize the reproduction of otherness within alternative spheres of life, and to reveal the ambiguities and complexities involved in their dialectic relationship with society at large. To address this issue, the paper focuses on the role that ‘adoption cultures’ of Flemish adoptive parents with children from Ethiopia play in the pursuit of being recognized as ‘proper’ families and full citizens. The ethnographic research among adoptive parents and adoption professionals shows a defensive discourse and action that aims at empowering against potential problems, as well as a tendency to other the adoptive child by pathologizing its non‐normativity. By showing the strong embeddedness of adoptive families' practices of familial and cultural construction in larger cultural frames of selfing and othering, characterized by biologism and nativism, one begins to understand the limits of their capacity to realize full citizenship. (shrink)

Moral error theory claims that all moral judgments are in error. Moral abolitionism is the view that the error theorist should then eliminate moral talk or judgments. This paper discusses the possible effects of adopting abolitionism on lying, breaking the law, adultery, and murder/revenge.

The still unsettled decision problem for the restricted purely universal formulae 0-formulae) of the first order set-theoretic language based over =, ∈ is discussed in relation with the adoption or rejection of the axiom of foundation. Assuming the axiom of foundation, the related finite set-satisfiability problem for the very significant subclass of the 0-formulae consisting of the formulae involving only nested variables of level 1 is proved to be semidecidable on the ground of a reflection property over (...) the hereditarily finite sets, and various extensions of this result are obtained. When variables are restricted to range only over sets, in universes with infinitely many urelements the set-satisfiability problem is shown to be solvable provided the axiom of foundation is assumed; if it is not, then the decidability of a related derivability problem still holds. That, in turn, suggests the alternative adoption of an antifoundation axiom under which the set-satisfiability problem is also solvable . Turning to set theory without urelements, assuming a form of Boffa's antifoundation axiom, the complement of the set-satisfiability problem for the full class of Δ0-formulae is shown to be semidecidable; a result that is known not to hold, for the set-satisfiability problem itself, even for a very restricted subclass of the Δ0-formulae. (shrink)

Social workers with the Dutch Child Protection Board use hypothetical questions as a means to assess the suitability of prospective adoptive parents for adoption. In particular, while talking about the future, prospective adoptive parents are assessed on their educational skills, knowledge and awareness with regard to adoption-specific problems. In our study we analysed the preliminary conversational work that has to be done in order to pose a hypothetical question. We distinguished between 1) patterns that start with an eliciting (...) question as a way of collecting topics with which to build a hypothetical question, and 2) patterns that start with a retrieving question, using themes from earlier conversation. Follow up questions are part of the preparatory work and form a bridge between the elicitation of topics and the actual hypothetical question. These follow up questions can be asked both before and after the introduction of the hypothetical question. Follow-up questions in post-position allow the social worker to challenge parents' answers to hypothetical questions. (shrink)