In questo contributo si intende affrontare, in un modo che potrebbe sembrare certa­mente azzardato, il progetto filosofico weiliano, e in particolar modo la nozione di ripresa, affiancandolo a quello foucaultiano. Le considerazioni che vi vengono svolte, tuttavia, non intendono mostrare che tra i due progetti si dia una sostanziale comunanza e nemmeno istituire tra essi una sorta di confronto o parallelismo. L’intento, assai più circoscritto, è piuttosto quello di tentare di gettare una luce diversa su alcuni aspetti della nozione weiliana (...) di ripresa collocandosi in parte al di fuori della costruzione della «logica della filosofia», ovvero a partire da una possibile piattaforma esterna rappresentata, in questo caso, dalla scelta di alcuni elementi del discorso foucaultiano, e in modo particolare della nozione di “a priori storico”. (shrink)

This article discuss two different approaches used to think historical a priori . On the one hand, when Husserl speaks about historical a priori , he refers to the tradition – one way of stating that history of thought is continuous and follows a common spirit. It implies, at the same time, that the tradition, despite being a discourse that precedes the subject, clearly to exist depends on a discursive subject at his present activity. On other, in Foucault’s (...) proposal, historical a priori will be saw from what would make possible the appearance of multiple statements in a given era . Therefore, it is all about a history not guided by subjectivity, but by the discourse itself. What remains of these two conceptions is to know the status of mathematics and physical sciences: they would be a model or an exception? (shrink)

Este artículo analiza dos proyectos de renovación programática de las Humanidades, los cuales se centran en la noción de información. Consideraremos, por una parte, la propuesta de Friedrich Kittler acerca de un materialismo teórico-informacional, y por otra, la axiomática de las ciencias humanas de Gilbert Simondon. La pregunta que guía nuestro examen crítico es la siguiente: ¿de qué manera, en cada uno de esos proyectos, la noción de información funge como centro para una propuesta renovadora de las Humanidades? Nuestra hipótesis (...) sostiene que hay un común denominador en ambas propuestas, el cual puede formularse en términos foucaultianos del siguiente modo: la información es entendida allí como el a priori histórico actual. (shrink)

Nosso fito no presente trabalho é comparar duas concepções de _a priori_, uma de vertente kantiana, como consta na primeira parte da _Crítica da razão pura_, mais exatamente na Introdução desta mesma obra; a outra, tal qual elaborada por Foucault no livro _As palavras e as coisas_, sob o nome de _a priori histórico_ e articular isto com a questão da genealogia, tal como aparecerá nos trabalhos de maturidade de Foucault, isto é, em seus trabalhos das décadas de setenta (...) e oitenta. Para tanto, lançaremos mão de obras dos dois autores e de alguns comentadores que abordam o tema, sem pretender, no entanto, esgotar o assunto, ou seja, lançando uma pista de pesquisa. (shrink)

Una filosofía crítica de la historia se enfrenta a las injusticias del pasado y, por tanto, pone en duda la legitimidad toda institución que esté en deuda con ellas. De ahí que esa filosofía de la memoria sea, por lo mismo, un pensamiento utópico abierto a nuevas posibilidades de futuro de acuerdo con las esperanzas fracasadas del pasado. En el pasado y en el presente hay un común e indeleble anhelo de humanidad futura.

The problem the author sets himself in this historico-critical study of the post-Kantian development of the a priori is: Can one understand the nature of the a priori as part of the explanation of knowledge, without assigning it exclusively to the subject and without radically identifying the a priori and the a posteriori? Dufrenne thinks this can be done by retaining a dualism of subject and object. Well-written and scholarly. An index would have been helpful.--D. D. O.

En el presente artículo se estudia la prueba a priori de Leibniz en favor de la medición de las fuerzas en su correspondencia con De Volder. El objetivo general es demostrar que este argumento no tiene privilegio para entender la noción leibniziana de acción primitiva de las sustancias. En primer lugar, se analiza el contexto histórico y conceptual que permite comprender dicha prueba a priori. En particular, se explica por qué Leibniz moviliza este argumento y se especifican (...) las nociones allí utilizadas, tales como la de fuerza, acción y acción formal. En segundo lugar, se estudia la estructura de la prueba para analizar su validez. Para ello, se presentan los principales problemas que fueron objeto de las críticas de De Volder y se muestra bajo qué supuesto la prueba es sólida. En tercer lugar, se examina el alcance de esta prueba en relación con el argumento a posteriori y se argumenta que no tiene ninguna ventaja en lo que concierne a la comprensión de la metafísica de Leibniz. (shrink)

La publicación del cuarto y último volumen de la _Historia de la sexualidad_ viene a llenar una larga espera, pero, sobre todo, ella permite tener por fin una visión de conjunto del último gran proyecto histórico-crítico de Michel Foucault. En el presente trabajo quisiera mostrar que con la publicación de _Les aveux de la chair_ (Paris, 2018) se vuelve posible comprender una serie de dificultades que han sido planteadas por los especialistas relativos al “giro” foucaultiano, a partir de los (...) años 1980, hacia una reintegración de la experiencia en el análisis. En particular, quisiera aquí defender que lo que Foucault llama “la experiencia de sí”, bajo la figura particular de la experiencia moral de la sexualidad, no será concebida ni por referencia a un sujeto, ni por referencia a un objeto (ni tampoco de manera “intersubjetiva”), sino como la formación de un _a priori_ histórico: el de la experiencia de la carne como transformación de sí. (shrink)

We present the foucaultian critique of the transcendental theme. We will try to show, sharpening the layout of the problem, that the specific target of such critique is not so much the transcendental instance as such, present in a sui generis way in Foucault himself, as rather a certain interpretation of this instance, mastered by the “knowledge” scheme and its postulates of natural affinity, constituent subjectivity and transcendental theology. So we will determine, in the first place, the framework and reach (...) of such critique. Secondly, we will set forth the interpretation of the transcendental which rules in the foucaultian critique of this theme. In the third place, we will take into account the assumptions which rule in this interpretation. Finally, we will sketch the foucaultian idea of “knowledge” (savoir). (shrink)

In the vast majority of the literature on Kant, the prevailing view is that his conception of analyticity and analytic truths suffers from obscurities and inconsistencies that render it, in the end, unintelligible. In the present paper, I try (i) to underline the meaning of these conceptions of Kant’s, (ii) to bring to the fore a crucial hidden presupposition in his account of analytic truths, and (iii) to present an interpretation that restores an intelligible account of Kantian analyticity and analytic (...) truth. Contrary to the ‘received’ view, I claim that definition is the royal way to Kant’s analyticity and analytic truth, and that the latter cannot be understood apart from a very specific kind of appeal to the intuition of the object falling under the concept being defined. I call this elusive and fragile act “simple intuition,” pointing thus to the medieval notion of apprehensio simplex (and the long history behind it). Then I try to show how this is done with reference to the most suitable species of concepts, the mathematical, and by analogy (and with expectable limitations) to the empirical ones. Of course, the present attempt to reconstruct an intelligible Kantian account of analyticity and analytic truths does not also mean that I endorse it as successful and final in the context of philosophy’s effort to clarify the possibility and kinds of a priori truths. (shrink)

O trabalho procura revisitar o materialismo histórico, as considerações marxianas sobre a “intimidade burguesa” e, por consequência, suas conclusões sobre a incidência dos imperativos sistêmicos e da lógica do Capital na condução da vida cotidiana. O argumento central do trabalho é que a crítica marxiana à intimidade hipostasiada pela sociedade fundada pelo Capital não está reduzida aos elementos dados a priori por sua teoria econômica, mas sintetiza um percurso teórico impulsionado pela antropologia filosófica presente nos Manuscritos de 1844. (...) Desse modo, o trabalho afirma que, sobretudo porque estabelece uma clara distinção entre natureza e cultura, Marx pôde divorciar-se da moralidade hegeliana e afirmar o caráter histórico, ideológico e contingente das relações familiares. Nesse sentido, será demonstrado que ao afirmar a primazia do individualismo possessivo da família burguesa, o autor identifica o “proprietário privado” e o “marido burguês” - no sentido de que a intimidade burguesa é configurada, antes de tudo, pelo sentimento de apropriação do outro. Por fim, discute-se o modo como essas relações assimétricas são trabalhadas n'O Capital, onde a esfera íntima aparece com uma dupla função: a alimentação material do sociometabolismo do capital e a alimentação moral do sistema. (shrink)

Fifteen years after the first edition of this comprehensive work, German historicism remains largely and conspicuously in the shadows. The great historico-philological and historico-sociological work produced by, and on the fringes of, this school has given way to specialization. Great polygraphs of the caliber of a Meinecke, a Vossler, a Curtius, a Cassirer, a Croce, or an Auerbach seem to have completely disappeared from the scene. But is the necessity for cultural synthesis that these men stressed any less urgent today (...) than before? One of the major tasks envisioned by thinkers of the early twentieth century was the development of a philosophical anthropology which would consolidate all the preceding work of cultural synthesis. Today this task remains in the far horizon after a series of distinguished but discontinuous achievements. Thus the reappearance of the ambitious work of Professor Rossi is a welcome event. There are now indications that sociology is moving away from the neutral functionalism of the consensus years and is beginning to show some interest in the subconscious and in concrete constellations of values representative of communal forms of consciousness in a situation. Post-industrial society can no longer be examined with the rough tools of micro- or even macro-analysis. Because of their refinements in quantification and their awareness of the most specific features of every particular form of group consciousness, the new middle range methods are akin to the synthetic spirit of the historical school. As middle range research progresses, its results can provide the ontic ground for an ontology of the human condition in its adjustment to the world, and in its communicative-transcendent goals. For this reason, Rossi’s work, though excellent in its expository aspects should be read with care to avoid overemphasizing, as he does, the distance between rationalism and irrationalism that was apparent in the main tendencies of the historical school. Surely it is a worthwhile thing to show the tensions between the relativists such as Simmel and Spengler, the intuitionists such as Windelband and Rickert, and finally the neo-idealists such as Troeltsch and Meinecke. The tension that pulled apart these intellectual currents shows by contrast the great synthetic force operative in the systems of Dilthey and Weber, which provided the dominant inspiration for the whole school. But the fundamental perspective in today’s reconsideration of historicism need not be the tempering of any search for ideals through the insistence on sober methodological limits. A more fruitful emphasis can be placed today on action as a mediator between thought and adjustment, on community as a mediator between society and individuals, and most of all on expression and adventure as mediators between survival and moral absolutes. With his neo-Kantian insistence on the historical method, on the discovery of the historical horizon of the human condition, and on the establishment of the institutional connections within historical periods, Professor Rossi: a) misses the point of the anti-mechanistic efforts of modern philosophy, i.e., the constitution of synthetic a priori judgments in their true home grounds, the field of spontaneous human communication and action; b) restricts the ability on the part of the historical method to penetrate and elucidate the areas of the unconscious and of passive syntheses ; c) both presupposes and trivializes the definition of freedom. Freedom in Rossi’s interpretation of historicism, seems to result from the objective displacement of values, rather than from the dramatic insufficiency of every finite person as it transpires in the highest forms of symbolic communication and interaction.—A. M. (shrink)

In this work we are going to study the political category of exile related to Southern Cone military dictatorships. It also will be introduced a kind of art state of the art of the principal problem in philosophy´s field, and the epistemological bases that support this research will be clarificated, specially the concept of a priori antropológico. In order to that, it will be an aproach to the notion of exile separating it from other similar categories. The next step (...) is introducing the exile´s problema in an specific histórico-political context, to finally seek for refugee’s voices, that through their testimonies will allow an experincial approach to the probleme. (shrink)

Durante la década del ’60, Foucault realiza sus investigaciones histórico-filosóficas bajo el nombre metodológico de arqueología. Este término para referir al estudio de las condiciones históricas de posibilidad que permitieron la aparición de diversos saberes e instituciones. En su libro Las palabras y las cosas, una arqueología de las ciencias humanas (1966), Foucault centra su trabajo de descripción de las distintas épocas del pensamiento en torno a los conceptos de episteme y a priori histórico, ambos abandonados al (...) menos en la década siguiente, cuando Foucault pasa a describir su labor intelectual como genealogía. En el campo intelectual argentino, la recepción y circulación de la obra de Foucault varió mucho desde los años cincuenta hasta nuestros días. En los últimos años, las categorías arqueológicas fueron utilizadas para pensar tanto la historia intelectual como el diagnóstico de la sociedad contemporánea. En el presente trabajo nos encargaremos de presentar dos actualizaciones de la episteme foucaultiana para pensar las tensiones entre saber y política: la era de las Formas de Elías Palti y la episteme posmoderna de Pablo Manolo Rodríguez mostrando cómo ambas expresiones reformulan el aparato conceptual empleado por Foucault para pensar una arqueología de lo político en el caso del primero y la aparición de la cibernética en el caso del segundo autor. Para dicha tarea, nos concentraremos los elementos que retienen ambos autores argentinos, así como también en aquellos puntos en los que ambos toman distancia del pensador de Poitiers. (shrink)

En tanto que formación discursiva, consideramos que el cine social fordiano tiene en el humanismo socialista y marxiano su a priori histórico, esto es, su condición velada de posibilidad, en especial en el socialismo irlandés del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX, impulsado por figuras históricas de la talla de Theobald Wolfe Tone, el feniano James Stephens, el «Gran Jim» Larkin y el irreemplazable James Connolly. Sin embargo, fundándose en una voluntad de verdad por la que la libertad (...) que conlleva la emancipación económica se ve semiológicamente desplazada hacia una concepción de la libertad como deseo, el discurso reaccionario ha procurado inventariar un cine social fordiano alternativo, esto es, ha pretendido inventar otro John Ford. En el trasfondo de esta confluencia de fuerzas, localizamos la disputa por el control del discurso con el que se nombra y puede ser comunicada la democracia. Tal es lo que sucede en la obra ensayística del hibernómano Antonio Rivero Taravillo, cuya proximidad discursiva con el falangismo lo empuja a inventariar un cine social fordiano desproletarizado en el que se proceden a excluir del orden del discurso películas como El arado y las estrellas y en donde se llega incluso a cuestionar el probado marxismo de James Connolly. (shrink)

This work addresses the question of the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the latter understood as a philosophical discipline in the strict sense. Indeed, unlike what happened some fifty years ago, the debate between the history of philosophy and philosophy seems to be taking place today as an internal debate on the history of philosophy. From this point of view, it is no longer a "quarrel" (in which two opposing positions face: "history or philosophy" vs. "philosophy iff (...) history"), but rather a reflection of those who practice this discipline about our own work, insofar as our work is at the same time historical and philosophical. In this regard, the problem raised in this work focuses on the method, and inextricably linked to the method, on the object and purpose of the historiographic work in (or for) philosophy. In the present work, I propose to defend the positions of archeological philosophy regarding these points (method, object and purpose), against the history of philosophy of analytical tendency. (shrink)

Este libro, que fue escrito como introduccion al problema de la palabra en el Humanismo, senala la eficacia de la retorica y el devenir de sus funciones filosoficas dentro de la tradicion latina. Explica, ademas, por que los humanistas no parten del problema de los entes ni de una concepcion a priori, sino del proceso historico en el cual se nos manifiesta la realidad.

La concepción según la cual la naturaleza es un todo ordenado donde prevalece la regularidad en las propiedades y procesos que caracterizan a las distintas especies recorre el pensamiento occidental desde la filosofía antigua griega hasta nuestros días. Diferentes teorías científicas sobre innumerables aspectos y objetos de la naturaleza elaboradas a lo largo de los siglos, e incluso teorías contrapuestas entre sí, asumieron el orden y la regularidad del mundo como un supuesto innombrado, como un a priori histórico (...) sobre el cual se sustentaron. Existen varias vías posibles de examinar históricamente la construcción y la evolución de una concepción tan vasta y duradera. La que aquí propongo consiste en estudiar la concepción del orden a partir de analizar la excepción y la anomalía que lo alteran o subvierten. En este caso me dedicaré a estudiar las perspectivas aristotélicas, tardo-escolásticas y baconianas sobre los monstruos, también conocidos como “fenómenos preternaturales”. (shrink)

The Human A Priori is a collection of essays by A. W. Moore, one of them previously unpublished and the rest all revised. These essays are all concerned, more or less directly, with something ineliminably anthropocentric in our systematic pursuit of a priori sense-making. Part I deals with the nature, scope, and limits of a priori sense-making in general. Parts II, III, and IV deal with what are often thought to be the three great exemplars of the (...) systematic pursuit of such sense-making: philosophy in the case of Part II, ethics in the case of Part III, and mathematics in the case of Part IV. Much of the attention throughout is devoted to the work of other philosophers: Kant and Wittgenstein feature prominently, and five of the essays take the form of reviews or critical notices of recent work in philosophy. But the interest in never purely exegetical. One of the lessons that emerges from the essays, either in opposition to the views of these other philosophers or by invocation of their views, is that we humans achieve nothing of real significance in philosophy, ethics, or mathematics except from a human point of view, and hence that all three of these pursuits can be said to betoken what may reasonably be called 'the human a priori'. (shrink)

FOR THE PURPOSES of this paper, I will interpret the word "culture" to refer, at its most basic level, to the fundamental categories in terms of which the peoples of that culture spontaneously express their most basic presuppositions. These fundamental categories, or basic presuppositions, designate the specific ways of conceiving reality which are expressed by the sense of the categories themselves. From the standpoint adopted here, they are not to be regarded as impositions of something called "the mind": neither in (...) the form of Kantian a priori categories, nor in the form of Collingwoodian "absolute" presuppositions. They do not form internally coherent "tables" of categories or "constellations" of absolute presuppositions. They constitute contingent ways of trying to understand the complexities of reality, and they are, themselves, a function of that reality of which they constitute a variety of interpretations. And the significant point to underline is that it is precisely when certain fundamental categories of this sort show themselves increasingly, and with increasing urgency, to be mutually incompatible that the stage is set for the necessary emergence of a new orientation in the history of human thinking--an orientation which constitutes an overcoming of the strongly felt incompatibility between whatever fundamental presuppositions are in question. (shrink)

Argues against several influential a priori arguments for individualism in the philosophy of mind that were influential in the 1980s.

This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila’s _Ślokavārttika_, _Pratyakṣasūtra_ chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive (...) existence. Kumārila’s view is contrasted to Plato’s, in the _Theaetetus_, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (_psychē_). (shrink)

Este artículo es parte de un trabajo de investigación bastante más amplio, que llevó casi cinco años de duración, en el cual nos propusimos una lectura rigurosa como singular del concepto de sujeto en Alain Badiou y Jacques Lacan. En vistas a delimitar claramente el tema de estudio, la pregunta que nos formulamos como punto de partida fue la siguiente: ¿qué lugar ocupa el concepto de sujeto en la articulación lógica del pensamento de ambos autores, particularmente en sus dimensiones ontológicas (...) y políticas? Como se podrá apreciar a continuación, dicho trabajo despliega una topología conceptual que a su vez presenta ciertos hitos históricos. Pues es sabido que uno de los temas centrales en torno al cual ha girado la fi losofía política contemporánea ha sido la cuestión del sujeto, y así también, correlativamente, de los saberes y verdades que lo fundamentan. Se ha interrogado por ejemplo ¿cuál puede ser el lugar de este sujeto? ¿Es posible especifi car a priori su existencia? ¿De dónde deriva su estatuto? ¿Se trata de una función trascendental o sustancial, vacía o refl exiva? Estas preguntas responden, en cierta forma, a una concepción de sujeto más bien propia de la metafísica moderna que intentaremos desplazar. (shrink)