In many research studies, tumor biopsies are an unavoidable requirement for achieving key scientific aims. Yet some commentators view mandatory research biopsies as coercive and suggest they should be optional, or at least optional until further data are obtained regarding their scientific usefulness. Further complicating the ethical picture is the fact that some research biopsies offer a potential for clinical benefit to trial participants. We interviewed and surveyed a convenience sample of participants in phase I clinical trials at a single (...) institution. Our primary aim was to describe phase I participants’ understanding of whether a research biopsy offered them the prospect of medical benefit. We also endeavored to describe participants’ views about biopsies—specifically, the benefits of biopsies, if any, and whether biopsies were acceptable, risky, or discouraged trial participation. Finally, we collected data on demographics and attitudes to see if any strong correlations with misunderstanding, acceptability, or riskiness existed. Overall, the respondents tended to view research biopsies as acceptable, though they did not succeed in identifying the lack of benefit of a research biopsy. These findings call for renewed efforts in consent conversations and documents to carefully describe the benefits, or lack thereof, of research biopsies. (shrink)

We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)

Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required (...) a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and of laws we may favour on other grounds. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to set out some of the main views about essence which Aristotle puts forward in Book Z of theMetaphysics.A central feature of Aristotle's account, as we shall see, is his distinction between primary and secondary cases of essence, and a similiar distinction in connection with the related notions of substance and definition. This division between primary and secondary cases means that Aristotle may well have two very different sorts of remark to make about essence, or (...) definition, or substance, according to which of the two kinds of case he has in mind. There is no reason to suppose the same logical properties apply to both the primary and the secondary cases. And when we come to define the various notions, we shall see that if our definitions are right, the logical properties in the two kinds of case are in fact quite different. (shrink)

A presentation of the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted composition and possible responses.

_Paradoxes from A to Z, Third edition_ is the essential guide to paradoxes, and takes the reader on a lively tour of puzzles that have taxed thinkers from Zeno to Galileo, and Lewis Carroll to Bertrand Russell. Michael Clark uncovers an array of conundrums, such as Achilles and the Tortoise, Theseus’ Ship, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, taking in subjects as diverse as knowledge, science, art and politics. Clark discusses each paradox in non-technical terms, considering its significance and looking at likely (...) solutions. This third edition is revised throughout, and adds nine new paradoxes that have important bearings in areas such as law, logic, ethics and probability. Paradoxes from A to Z, Third edition is an ideal starting point for those interested not just in philosophical puzzles and conundrums, but anyone seeking to hone their thinking skills. (shrink)

C I Lewis showed up Down Under in 2005, in e-mails initiated by Allen Hazen of Melbourne. Their topic was the system Hazen called FL (a Funny Logic), axiomatized in passing in Lewis 1921. I show that FL is the system MEN of material equivalence with negation. But negation plays no special role in MEN. Symbolizing equivalence with → and defining ∼A inferentially as A→f, the theorems of MEN are just those of the underlying theory ME of pure material equivalence. (...) This accords with the treatment of negation in the Abelian l-group logic A of Meyer and Slaney (Abelian logic. Abstract, Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981), which also defines ∼A inferentially with no special conditions on f. The paper then concentrates on the pure implicational part AI of A, the simple logic of Abelian groups. The integers Z were known to be characteristic for AI, with every non-theorem B refutable mod some Zn for finite n. Noted here is that AI is pre-tabular, having the Scroggs property that every proper extension SI of AI, closed under substitution and detachment, has some finite Zn as its characteristic matrix. In particular FL is the extension for which n = 2 (Lewis, The structure of logic and its relation to other systems. The Journal of Philosophy 18, 505–516, 1921; Meyer and Slaney, Abelian logic. Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981; This is an abstract of the much longer paper finally published in 1989 in G. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, eds., Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent, Philosophica Verlag, Munich, pp. 245–288, 1989). (shrink)

A: Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other. B: The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same. Z: So, the two sides of this triangle are equal to each other. Achilles fails because he encounters an infinite progression of hidden premises of the form “If all the premises of the argument are true, the conclusion is true”. In [a1], the hidden premise is H1 “If A and B then Z” (...) – surely, if one did not believe that H1 is true, one would have a reason not to accept the conclusion Z. So, the argument [a2] must lead to conclusion Z from A, B and H1. But, one will have to supplement [a2] with H2: “If A and B and H1 then Z” since if one did not believe H2 one would have a reason not to draw conclusion Z. And so on ad infinitum. The puzzle can be seen as arising through the application of an apparently innocent principle of discerning missing premises (§2). If looked at in this light, the standard response given to the paradox does not so much resolve the puzzle as legislates against it being raised with respect to principles of inference (§3). I argue that a fundamental ambiguity infests the test for what is a missing premise (§4). Moreover, it explains why the puzzle appears to, though it does not (§5), arise. I end with some comments on the usefulness of the test (§6). (shrink)

W artykule przedstawione zostaną różne sformułowania argumentu z pragnień, wysuniętego przeciwko naturalizmowi, autorstwa Clive’a S. Lewisa. Analizie zostaną poddane zarzuty o brak logicznej poprawności jego wywodu oraz dotyczące zwodniczego charakteru czynników irracjonalnych, do jakich zaliczają się uczucia i pragnienia. Wykazane zostanie, że sformułowania, w których mamy do czynienia z brakiem konkluzywności antynaturalistycznego wniosku Lewisa, można jednak traktować jako poznawczo wartościowe, gdyż są one oparte na indukcyjnym schemacie wnioskowania. Istnieją natomiast sformułowania, które jedynie wielkim kosztem, jakim jest uznanie Wszechświata za absurdalny, (...) można uznać za niekonkluzywne. Podejrzenie, iż odwołanie do czynników irracjonalnych osłabia argumentację Lewisa, okazuje się błędne. -------------- Zgłoszono: 22/07/2020. Zrecenzowano: 30/08/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 19/09/2020. (shrink)

Cleve Staples Lewis w książce Cuda sformułował argument antynaturalistyczny, który nazwał kardynalną trudnością naturalizmu. Trudność ta ma polegać na tym, że jeśli przyjmiemy naturalizm z zasadą domknięcia kauzalnego, to wszystkie przekonania są faktami, których istnienie można w pełni wyjaśnić poprzez przeszły stan wszechświata oraz jego przemiany rządzone prawami fizyki. Naturalizm jest stanowiskiem, które składa się z przekonań i jeśli aspiruje do oceny bycia racjonalnym stanowiskiem, to powinien być przyjęty ze względu na rozumowanie. To jednak wydaje się być wykluczone ze względu (...) na naturalizm. Peter Van Inwagen w 2011 r. przedstawił krytykę argumentu Lewisa, sugerując, że opiera się on na nieuzasadnionym przekonaniu, że wyjaśnienia kauzalne jako takie oraz wyjaśnienia poprzez rozumowanie wykluczają się. Badam argumentacje obu autorów, dokładnie analizując argument Van Inwagena. Twierdzę, że: po pierwsze, nie uzasadnił on twierdzenia, że powyższe przekonanie przypisane Lewisowi jest faktycznie przesłanką jego rozumowania. Po drugie, przedstawiam na czym polega wytworzenie pewnego przekonania zarazem kauzalnie jak i poprzez rozumowanie. Po trzecie, analizuję tekst Lewisa, wykazując, że wspiera on możliwość spójności dwóch odmiennych rodzajów poprawnych wyjaśnień, ale argumentuję, że zasadniczą dla Lewisa jest teza, iż naturalizm nie pozostawia miejsca na wglądy będące elementem rozumowania i dlatego naturalizm wyklucza ową spójność. Po czwarte, badam przykład Phoebe podany przez Van Inwagena i konkluduję, że nie wystarcza on do stwierdzenia spójności obu typów wyjaśnień. Konkluduję, że artykuł Van Inwagena nie zawiera argumentu podważającego stanowisko Lewisa. (shrink)

To solve the problem of counterpossibles, many philosophers have been arguing that one needs to invoke impossible worlds. This extension of the ontology of modality should save the analysis of counterfactuals from being insensitive to the problem of counterpossibles. Since theories of impossible worlds are extensions of original accounts of modalities, it is worth stressing that proper analyses of counterpossibles should not weaken the latter.In this paper I argue that these theories of impossible wolrds, which are based on D. Lewis' (...) modal realism - Extended Modal Realism and Hybrid Modal Realism - might be consider as either an unattractive for modal realists or insufficient for analyzing counterpossibles. (shrink)

W bogatej literaturze poświęconej C.S. Lewisowi wskazuje się na trzy spotykane w jego publikacjach argumenty przeciwko naturalizmowi filozoficznemu. Są to argument z rozumu, argument z moralności oraz argument z Pragnienia (lub pragnienia transcendencji). Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że Lewis przedstawił także inne antynaturalistyczne rozumowanie odwołujące się do numinotycznej bojaźni, o której pisał Rudolf Otto. W tekście omawiam charakterystykę Pragnienia dokonaną przez Lewisa oraz spotykane w literaturze ujęcia Pragnienia, w których zestawia się je z doświadczeniem numinotycznym. Wykazuję, że Lewis charakteryzował Pragnienie, (...) pisząc o uczuciach rozkoszy, tęsknoty, smutku i niezaspokojenia, wskazywał na subiektywność tego doświadczenia, twierdził, że wywoływane jest ono przez rzeczy z tego świata oraz że ma ono charakter powszechny. Cechy te odróżniają je od doświadczenia numinotycznego. Odmiennie niż w doświadczeniu numinotycznym jest to też odczucie braku czegoś, a nie obecności Boga czy bóstwa. Na tej podstawie argumentuję, że wbrew popularnym ujęciom, Pragnienie, o którym pisał Lewis, różni się istotnie od doświadczenia numinotycznego, a przede wszystkim od doświadczenia numinotycznej bojaźni. Ponieważ Lewis odwoływał się do doświadczenia numinotycznego w swojej argumentacji przeciwko naturalizmowi, stąd można mówić o istnieniu czwartego antynaturalistycznego argumentu Lewisa – argumentu z numinotycznej bojaźni. (shrink)

Casimir Lewy; On the “Justification” of Induction1, Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 5-6, 1 September 1939, Pages 87–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/6.5-6.87.

C. Lewy; VI—Entailment and Propositional Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 107–122, https://doi.org/10.1.

A contemporary of Jesus Christ, Philo of Alexandria ranks among the greatest of Jewish and Greek thinkers.

A critical and detailed introduction to Kant's philosophy, with particular reference to the Critique of Pure Reason. Since Broad's death there have been many publications on Kant but Broad's 1978 book still finds a definite place between the very general surveys and the more specialised commentaries. He offers a characteristically clear, judicious and direct account of Kant's work; his criticisms are acute and sympathetic, reminding us forcefully that 'Kant's mistakes are usually more important than other people's correctitudes'. C.D. Broad was (...) Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge from 1933 to 1953, and this book is based on his undergraduate lectures on Kant. Broad died in 1971 and Dr Lewy has since edited the book for publication. (shrink)