The concept of virtue was of great interest and importance for H. Cohen. In the interpretation of this concept in his latest work “Religion of reason from the sources of Judaism” the most important concepts of this work were brought in the focus: the specificity of definition of what is the religion of reason; understanding of the uniqueness of God; correlation; messianism. For Cohen, a single system of virtues presupposes a single and unique ethics and correlates with the idea of (...) the unity of humanity. The last concept, in his opinion, maturated in the fold of monotheism. Humanity is one, because all people are creations of the unique God. “Religion of reason” treats of the common universal virtues. In the religion of reason, the idea of God and morality are inextricably linked. Cohen rejects metaphysical speculation about the nature of God, about the attributes of God inherent in himself. The religion of the mind speaks of God only in correlation with man. God is a moral ideal and reveals himself to man by giving him moral commandments. Morality connects man and God, and this connection is revealed in detail by Cohen in the theme of virtues. Understanding God as Truth is important for the disclosure of this topic. The corresponding virtue for a person is faithfulness to truth, or truthfulness. In addition to truthfulness in the usual sense, for Cohen, faithfulness to truth requires correct worship of God. The correlation culminates in the idea of messianism, which is interpreted by Cohen as an endless movement of a whole humanity to the social justice. (shrink)

One of the major concerns of the social philosophy is the technological revolution and its impacts on the social systems. Critical views on the systems from the social philosophers depart from the social predicaments of their time. The pivotal critic of Karl Marx in his work of Das Capital, for example, is on poverty caused by the system of capitalism. Capitalism, for him, only produces various social downturns such as slavery, oppressions, exploitations and impoverishment. Herbert Marcuse, meanwhile, pointed at the (...) same problem, but he came from a different point of view from Marx. Marcuse criticized the abundant society. In One Dimensional Man Marcuse rendered a couple of incisive critics on the industrial society. Industrial society, for him, is marked by the abundance and surplus but this society is still oppressed under a new type of slavery, called voluntary slavery. We may briefly say that both philosophers rendered critics on the same matter of the industrial society, but the two stood on the different position. Marx’s critic was on the hungry and deficient society, while Marcuse on a satiated, plenteous and surplus society. The aim of this paper is to present of how Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man ends in the digital age. (shrink)

Many scholars have sought to understand renaissance culture in terms of self-fashioning, a concept that sees the sixteenth-century preoccupation with imitation and performance as symptoms of a desire to conform outwardly to social expectations. Historians of Tudor England and biographers of Thomas More, influenced by this concept, have despaired of discovering the “true” Thomas More behind a bewildering array of self-fashioned masks that More “wore” as both an author and public figure. Recent scholarship seeks to show the coherence of More's (...) character, despite the fact that his life and writings do not fit neatly into contemporary scholarly categories. Understanding More as a “Christian Humanist” and focusing on More's intervention in a controversy between his friends Erasmus and Dorp, this study positions More as engaging in typological emulation, whereby in imitating the correspondence of Jerome and Augustine, he seeks to embody more perfectly the ideal of the Christian orator. (shrink)

The question of what explains individual differences in expertise within complex domains such as music, games, sports, science, and medicine is currently a major topic of interest in a diverse range of fields, including psychology, education, and sports science, to name just a few. Ericsson and colleagues’ deliberate practice view is highly influential perspective in the literature on expertise and expert performance—but is it viable as a testable scientific theory? Here, reviewing more than 25 years of Ericsson and colleagues’ writings, (...) we document critical inconsistencies in the definition of deliberate practice, along with apparent shifts in the standard for evidence concerning deliberate practice. We also consider the impact of these issues on progress in the field of expertise, focusing on the empirical testability and falsifiability of the deliberate practice view. We then discuss a multifactorial perspective on expertise, and how open science practices can accelerate progress in research guided by this perspective. (shrink)

Rush Rhees was a philosopher, and a pupil and close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein. While some of Rhees's own published papers became classics, most of his work remained unpublished during his lifetime. After his death, his papers were found to comprise sixteen thousand pages of manuscript on every aspect of philosophy, from philosophical logic to Simone Weil. This collection of unpublished papers, edited by D. Z. Phillips, includes Rhees's outstanding work on philosophy and religion. Written over an academic lifetime, some (...) of the papers are sympathetic to religion while others are not. It is Rhees's ability to interweave the personal and philosophical, and his integrity and intellectual honesty, which make this one of the most impressive books in twentieth-century philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In “Hume and Julius Caesar,” G.E.M. Anscombe argues that some historical claims, such as “Julius Caesar was assassinated,” serve as touchstones for historical knowledge. Only Cartesian doubt can call them into question. I examine her reasons for thinking that the discipline of history must be grounded in claims that it is powerless to discredit. I argue that she is right to recognize that some historical claims are harder to dislodge than others, but wrong to contend that any are invulnerable to (...) non-Cartesian doubt. (shrink)

Humans are learning agents that acquire social group representations from experience. Here, we discuss how to construct artificial agents capable of this feat. One approach, based on deep reinforcement learning, allows the necessary representations to self-organize. This minimizes the need for hand-engineering, improving robustness and scalability. It also enables “virtual neuroscience” research on the learned representations.

I argue that the picture theory provides both a common referential hase and a common logical syntax for languages embodying alternative conceptual schemes. I offer an analysis of depiction, explicating the Tractarian concepts of pictorial structure, pictorial relationship, and representational form. Significant failure of reference and the existence of languages with incompatible ontological commitments show that on the molar level depiction is not required for sense. Using three premises, taken to be axiomatic for Wittgenstein, I show that analysis leads to (...) a base of elementary propositions which must depict in order to be significant. There, the relations between pictorial structure, pictorial relationship and representational form are such that reference is secured and conceptual relativity precluded. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Organizing the Notes for On Certainty Groundlessness and Language‐games Searching for Primary Links Between Language and Reality Seeing Logic and Practice Pictures, Propositions and Reality Forms of Life Practices and Parallels Is the Title on Certainty a Happy One? Is on Certainty a Polemic against Moore? Is Wittgenstein's Main Interest in Moore's Propositions the Nature of Nonsense? Does Wittgenstein Say that the Propositions he is Interested in Form a Class, and Does he Say the Same (...) of all of Them? Are Wittgenstein's Propositions Context‐free? What is the Connection between Wittgenstein's Propositions and Logic? Is Wittgenstein Appealing to Primitive, Pre‐linguistic Reactions as the Basis of our Language‐games? What is Meant by the Sureness in Our Language‐games? How are Our Conclusions Related to the Notions of a Form of Life or World‐picture? How do Wittgenstein's Conclusions Differ from Some Classical and Contemporary Views of Our Relation to the World? Rhees's Development of Wittgenstein's Concerns. (shrink)

ABSTRACT While philosophers have highlighted important reasons to resist one’s own oppression, they tend to overlook the phenomenon of complacency about one’s own oppression. This article addresses this gap by arguing that some oppressed agents are obligated to resist complacency about their own oppression because failing to do so would significantly harm themselves and others. Complacent members of oppressed groups fail to resist meaningfully, are self-satisfied, and are epistemically culpable. I contend that focusing on the obligation to combat complacency is (...) useful for at least two reasons. First, complacency about one’s own oppression is a distinctive phenomenon that warrants separate philosophical attention. Second, focusing on the obligation to resist complacency helps analyze an undertheorized group of oppressed agents by challenging the binary understanding of power prevalent in the literature on the duty to resist, thereby sharpening philosophical accounts of resistance and filling a gap in a prominent well-being-based theory of resistance. (shrink)

These are but just some of the stories covered in this entertaining book that deals with the history of physics from the end of the 19th-century to about 1930.Quips, Quotes and Quanta (2nd Edition) is unique in that it contains anecdotes on ...

Graphical AbstractThe exquisite morphology of a complex body results from the sum of competitive and cooperative interactions among its subsystems. More details can be found in article number 1900245 by Richard Gawne et al. The cover image shows immunohistochemical staining (in red) of the head of a tadpole of Xenopus laevis, showing the brain, nostrils, and peripheral innervation.