Para completar la exposición de su propio pensamiento Xavier Zubiri dictó en 1968 un ciclo de conferencias titulado Estructura dinámica de la realidad. El texto de esas conferencias es el que ahora, forma este libro. En él analiza el momento dinámico de la realidad, lo que denomina su «dar de sí». Si en Sobre la esencia la realidad era definida como «de suyo», ahora se completaba esa definición afirmando que es, además un «dar de sí». De suyo, la realidad (...) da de sí. Tal podría ser el resumen más apretado de esta obra, que añade precisiones muy importantes a los libros ya publicados en esta misma colección. (shrink)

This paper reports completeness results for dyadic deontic logics in the tradition of Hansson’s systems. There are two ways to understand the core notion of best antecedent-worlds, which underpins such systems. One is in terms of maximality, and the other in terms of optimality. Depending on the choice being made, one gets different evaluation rules for the deontic modalities, but also different versions of the so-called limit assumption. Four of them are disentangled, and compared. The main observation of this paper (...) is that, even in the partial order case, the contrast between maximality and optimality is not as significant as one could expect, because the logic remains the same whatever notion of best is used. This is established by showing that, given analogous properties for the betterness relation, the same system is sound and complete with respect to its intended modelling. The chief result of this paper concerns Åqvist’s system F supplemented with the principle of cautious monotony. It is established that, under the maximality rule, F + is sound and complete with respect to the class of models in which the betterness relation is required be reflexive and smooth . From this, a number of spin-off results are obtained. First and foremost, it is shown that a similar determination result holds for optimality; that is, under the optimality rule, F + is also sound and complete with respect to the class of models in which the betterness relation is reflexive and smooth . Other spin-off results concern classes of models in which further constraints are placed on the betterness relation, like totalness and transitivity. (shrink)

BackgroundViral pandemics present a range of ethical challenges for policy makers, not the least among which are difficult decisions about how to allocate scarce healthcare resources. One important question is whether healthcare workers should receive priority access to a vaccine in the event that an effective vaccine becomes available. This question is especially relevant in the coronavirus pandemic with governments and health authorities currently facing questions of distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.Main textIn this article, we critically evaluate the most common ethical (...) arguments for granting healthcare workers priority access to a vaccine. We review the existing literature on this topic, and analyse both deontological and utilitarian arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation. For illustrative purposes, we focus in particular on the distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine. We also explore some practical complexities attendant on arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation.ConclusionsWe argue that there are deontological and utilitarian cases for prioritising HCWs. Indeed, the widely held view that we should prioritise HCWs represents an example of ethical convergence. Complexities arise, however, when considering who should be included in the category of HCW, and who else should receive priority in addition to HCWs. (shrink)

On sait que sur la question des pensées imperceptibles, Nicole, bientôt suivi par le bénédictin François Lamy, heurte l’opinion d’Arnauld. L’opposition d’Arnauld à Nicole touchant la question de la grâce est bien connue. C’est plutôt de l’originalité philosophique de Nicole qu’il s’agira dans ce travail. En tirant Nicole de « l’ombre d’Arnauld et de Pascal » et en lui faisant crédit d’une consistance spéculative propre, on retrouvera la finesse de sa psychologie, mais on découvrira également l’esquisse d’une subtile anthropologie.

Cogito, ergo sum. Ce n’est pas tiré de la plume de Descartes que cet énoncé apparaît pour la première fois dans les œuvres du philosophe. C’est en effet Caterus qui, dans la première série d’Objectiones aux Meditationes l’écrit, telle que la postérité scolaire va le considérer, comme un objet textuel autonome et digne par soi-même d’intérêt. Le fait est anecdotique, mais il est révélateur. D’abord parce que ce n’est pas Descartes qui a constitué...

We study a class of [0,1][0,1]-valued logics. The main result of the paper is a maximality theorem that characterizes these logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting types theorem to uncountable languages.

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section (...) one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

There has been significant debate about whether the moral norms of medical practice arise from some feature or set of features internal to the discipline of medicine. In this article, I analyze Edmund Pellegrino’s conception of the internal morality of medicine, and situate it in the context of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential account of “practice.” Building upon MacIntyre, Pellegrino argued that medicine is a social practice with its own unique goals—namely, the medical, human, and spiritual good of the patient—and that the (...) moral norms that govern medical practice are derived from these goals. After providing an overview of Pellegrino’s work, I discuss some forceful objections to his theory—specifically, that it is too rigid and incapable of entering into dialogue with contemporary values systems; that it is dependent on an external conception of human flourishing; and that it is incompatible with the rapidly changing nature of modern medicine. In the final section of this article, I consider how theorists working in the Hippocratic tradition might respond to these objections against ethical essentialism by drawing upon MacIntyre’s historico-cultural method as well as what he calls Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology.”. (shrink)

Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we should distribute scarce medical interventions. In this article, however, I sketch an alternative conception of respect for persons—one that is based on an ethic of mutual accountability. I draw in (...) particular upon Stephen Darwall’s writings on respect and the second-person standpoint. I consider the implications of this conception of respect for the distribution of scarce, lifesaving healthcare resources. A second-personal account of respect rules out aggregative approaches to distribution, and instead requires that we give individual consideration to the claims that persons in need make on the resources in our control. The principles that we use to govern our allocation of resources, furthermore, should be principles that are acceptable to all reasonable agents. Building on this insight, the final section of this paper considers how a principle of need can be used as a means to make decisions about the allocation of lifesaving resources. -/- . (shrink)

Several ethicists have defended the use of responsibility-based criteria in healthcare rationing. Yet in this article we outline two challenges to the implementation of responsibility-based healthcare rationing policies. These two challenges are, namely, that responsibility for past behavior can diminish as an agent changes, and that blame can come apart from responsibility. These challenges suggest that it is more difficult to hold someone responsible for health related actions than proponents of responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies suggest. We close by discussing public health (...) policies that could function as an alternative to contentious, responsibility-sensitive rationing policies. (shrink)

Cet article expose les grandes forces économiques qui sous-tendent et organisent le processus de déréglementation caractérisant aujourd’hui les économies développées. Il montre comment, au sein de ce processus, la réglementation change de forme et de nature plus qu’elle ne disparaît réellement. À un contrôle direct par l’autorité publique se substitue progressivement un contrôle indirect par une concurrence encadrée. Les enjeux éthiques de la déréglementation sont abordés à la lumière de cette analyse économique.

This article examines the British colonial theft of Indigenous sovereignty and the particular obstacles that it presents to establishing just social relations between the colonizer and the colonized in settler states. In the first half, I argue that the particular nature of the crime of sovereign theft makes apologies and reparations unsuitable policy tools for reconciliation because Settler societies owe their very existence to the abrogation of Indigenous sovereignties. Instead, Settler states ought to return sovereignty to the land’s Indigenous peoples. (...) In the second half of this paper, I take up some of the practical questions of how this might be done and anticipate a number of objections. Giving up sovereignty would not mean dispossessing the millions of colonists who currently reside in these countries of their homes and property – but it does mean rethinking the constitutional makeup of a country and how that serves to benefit the different peoples who make their homes there. (shrink)

Thomas Riisfeldt’s essay1 is a valuable contribution to the literature on palliative sedation, appropriately titrated administration of opioids (ATAOs) and euthanasia. In this response, I will not deal with the author’s empirical claim about the relationship between opioid use, palliative sedation and survival time. Rather, I will briefly critique the author’s discussion of doctrine of double effect (DDE) and its application to palliative sedation and opioid use at the end of life. That is, I will focus on the ethical claims (...) made by the author. Riisfeldt argues that DDE is incompatible with both Kantian deontology and Millian consequentialism. Yet, I will argue that the DDE is coherent and defensible when interpreted from the perspective of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the theorist who first proposed the doctrine. I will also argue that Riisfeldt mischaracterises ATAOs and palliative sedation as procedures that hasten death as a means to relieve pain. While death may indeed be hastened by ATAOs and palliative sedation, it is not at all clear that clinicians intend to hasten death as a means to relieve pain. Indeed, clinical guidelines explicitly prohibit the intentional hastening of death. Riisfeldt provides a brief summary of the DDE. He describes DDE as a ‘strange hybrid of four principles’. He lists the four criteria that must be met for an act with a good and a bad effect to be permissible. These criteria are the ‘intention and means criteria’ and the ‘intrinsic and proportionality criteria’ (p.127). The author uses Kant and Mill as lens through which to highlight a tension between the intrinsic and proportionality criteria of DDE. The author claims that ‘the intrinsic criterion is derived from deontology, the predominant form of which is championed by Kant’, and that ‘the proportionality criterion is derived from consequentialism, the predominant form of …. (shrink)

We prove strong completeness of the □-version and the ◊-version of a Gödel modal logic based on Kripke models where propositions at each world and the accessibility relation are both infinitely valued in the standard Gödel algebra [0,1]. Some asymmetries are revealed: validity in the first logic is reducible to the class of frames having two-valued accessibility relation and this logic does not enjoy the finite model property, while validity in the second logic requires truly fuzzy accessibility relations and this (...) logic has the finite model property. Analogues of the classical modal systems D, T, S4 and S5 are considered also, and the completeness results are extended to languages enriched with a discrete well ordered set of truth constants. (shrink)

Xavier Landes | : Happiness has become a central theme in public debates. Happiness indicators illustrate this importance. This article offers a typology of the main challenges conveyed by the elaboration of happiness indicators, where happiness can be understood as hedonia, subjective well-being, or eudaimonia. The typology is structured around four questions: what to measure?—i.e., the difficulties linked to the choice of a particular understanding of happiness for building an indicator; whom to include?—i.e., the limits of the community monitored (...) by such an indicator; how to collect the data?—i.e., the difficulties stemming from objective and subjective reporting; what to do?—i.e., the concerns about the use of happiness indicators in public policy. The major points of normative contention are discussed for each of these dimensions. The purpose of this article is to contribute in a constructive manner to happiness research by offering an overview of some major philosophical and political challenges of building happiness indicators. The conclusion underlines the importance of the strategy of diversification- hybridization, which consists in setting a variety of indicators or composite indicators that articulate different understandings of happiness. It is stressed that happiness indicators raise democratic and institutional issues with which normative thinkers should deal. | : Le bonheur est devenu un thème central dans les débats publics. Les indicateurs de bonheur illustrent cette importance. Cet article offre une typologie des principaux enjeux contenus dans le travail d’élaboration d’indicateurs de bonheur quand ce dernier est compris comme hedonia, bien-être subjectif ou eudaimonia. La typologie est structurée autour de quatre questions : 1) que mesurer?, où sont en jeu les difficultés liées au choix d’une compréhension particulière du bonheur pour construire un indicateur; 2) qui inclure?, c’est-à-dire comment tracer les limites de la communauté morale qui est l’objet d’un tel indicateur; 3) comment collecter les données?, où on interroge les difficultés propres aux techniques subjectives et objectives de collecte de données; 4) que faire?, où on soulève l’enjeu des craintes quant à l’usage d’indicateurs de bonheur dans les politiques publiques. Les points majeurs de dispute normative sont discutés pour chaque dimension. Nous espérons ainsi contribuer de manière constructive à la recherche sur le bonheur en offrant un aperçu de quelques défis philosophiques et politiques majeurs relatifs à la construction d’indicateurs de bonheur. Nous concluons en soulignant l’importance de la stratégie de diversification-hybridation qui consiste à mettre en place des indicateurs variés ou composites articulant différentes compréhensions du bonheur. Ces indicateurs soulèvent des enjeux démocratiques et institutionnels que les penseurs normatifs doivent considérer. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a prenex form theorem for a version of Independence Friendly logic, a logic with imperfect information. Lifting classical results to such logics turns out not to be straightforward, because independence conditions make the formulas sensitive to signalling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification over the same variable is shown to cause problems. For instance, renaming of bound variables may change the interpretations of a formula, there are only restricted quantifier extraction theorems, and slashed connectives cannot be (...) so easily removed. Thus we correct some claims from Hintikka [8], Caicedo & Krynicki [3] and Hodges [11]. We refine definitions, in particular the notion of equivalence, and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore those claims, including the prenex form theorem of Caicedo & Krynicki [3], and, as a side result, we obtain an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. It is a known fact that a complete calculus for IF-logic is impossible, but with our results we establish several quantifier rules that form a partial calculus of equivalence for a general version of IF-logic reflecting general properties of information flow in games. (shrink)

Giubiliniet aloffer some helpful reflections on the conscientious provision of medical care and whether and in what circumstances professional associations ought to support the conscientious provision of abortion in circumstances where abortion is banned or heavily restricted. I have several reservations, however, about the argument developed in the article. First, the essay makes questionable use of the case of Savita Halappanavar to justify its central argument about conscientious provision. Second, there is an apparent inconsistency between this article and the authors’ (...) statements elsewhere about the conscientious refusal of care. Third, there are risks that attend to professional associations supporting practitioners who break the law, and yet Giubiliniet aldo not give sufficient attention to this. This response will briefly discuss these three concerns. (shrink)

Replying to Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke, this article shows how Political Marxism offers powerful conceptual tools to understand modes of production that structure historical processes as fundamentally constituted by exploitative social and political relations. I explain how structure, or rules of reproduction, should be understood as alienated social relations, which are inherent to all class societies. Understanding structure this way leaves ample space for – and makes inevitable – the consideration of agency.

Conscientious objection has been the subject of extensive attention in medicine and academic bioethics in recent years. One could be forgiven for thinking that everything that needed to be said has...

Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death—namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure—and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller’s argument and suggest that (...) it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller’s critique. (shrink)

Est-ce un hasard si Jean-Marc Ferry, d'un côté du Rhin, Jürgen Habermas, de l'autre, entrouvrent aujourd'hui la porte de la République au discours religieux? Si la raison publique faite de liberté et d'égalité semblait suffire pour régir le champ économique et social de notre Modernité première, elle s'avère trop courte lorsqu'il s'agit de formuler la norme commune applicable aux fondamentaux de l'existence tels que la vie, le corps, l'amour, la mort... D'où l'appel de nos deux auteurs aux ressources de sens (...) qu'ont accumulées les religions et, singulièrement, le christianisme. Pour prendre cette requête au sérieux, il fallait revisiter les grands axes de la tradition chrétienne (création, faute, incarnation, salut, trinité, eucharistie) pour en dégager les enseignements qui enrichiraient la raison publique d'aujourd'hui. Mais la foi se laissera-t-elle ainsi arraisonner? Et la raison s'ouvrira-t-elle à ce discours qui vient de plus loin qu'elle? La partie est loin d'être gagnée. Xavier Dijon la mène avec grand talent. (shrink)

Résumé L’écriture, la peinture et la relation à l’architecture sont les trois points d’entrée de ce rappel de l’œuvre de Claude Rutault, au travers d’une mise en parallèle avec celle de Rémy Zaugg. Sur le mode du témoignage, Xavier Douroux revient sur l’histoire du Consortium et de sa coopération avec Claude Rutault, notamment sur les expériences de peinture « en architecture » à la villa Savoye de Le Corbusier, à l’agence de Dominique Perrault, au pavillon de Mies Van der (...) Rohe, et à l’ Éclat de folie de Bernard Tschumi. (shrink)

In Racial Prescriptions, Jonathan Xavier Inda offers a critical and timely analysis of the making of BiDil, the first (and only) drug that was marketed exclusively to African Americans. Sibille Merz speaks to him about the re-articulation of racial politics under neoliberalism, the legacies of scientific racism and the molecularization of biopolitics in the genomic age.

En République, II, 369a, Socrate choisit de rechercher la justice dans la polis plutôt que dans l’âme humaine. Pour ce faire, il propose de construire une cité en paroles. Cette construction prendra la forme d’une entreprise de colonisation qui aura son terme au livre IV, 427c. Le présent article s’intéresse à la manière dont Platon s’y est pris pour réaliser cette fondation. L’analyse que nous proposons vise principalement à montrer comment Platon s’inspire du modèle historique de la colonisation pour construire (...) cette cité-modèle. La nomination d’un oikistes, la mise en place de lois fondamentales ainsi que la consultation de l’Apollon delphique assurent à la cité une fondation idéale dans laquelle, parce qu’idéalement fondée, la justice pourra être visible. (shrink)

Xavier Landes,Martin Andersen,Klemens Kappel.

Dans les années 1930, la société cantonaise porte son attention moins sur les consommatrices d’opium que sur les yanhua (“ fleurs de la fumée ”), jeunes et jolies femmes d’extraction modeste employées dans les fumeries afin de préparer les pipes pour les clients. Les yanhua cristallisent des craintes liées au maintien de l’ordre et de la hiérarchie établis. Les séductions conjuguées de la drogue et de l’attrait physique de ces femmes apparaissent susceptibles de favoriser une mobilité sociale de mauvais aloi, (...) qu’elle soit descendante (ruine du fumeur aisé causée par une consommation inconsidérée d’opium), ou ascendante (lorsqu’une yanhua parvient à séduire etépouser un riche client). (shrink)

L’enjeu de cet ouvrage est de mettre au jour une continuité des exercices spirituels dans la philosophie contemporaine depuis Ralph Waldo Emerson et Henri David Thoreau jusqu’aux philosophes que sont, entre autres, Pierre Hadot, Hilary Putman, Stanley Cavell, William James, John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty ou encore Richard Shusterman. A travers le pragmatisme, le méliorisme, le perfectionnisme ou l’esthétique de l’existence, ce parcours de près de deux siècles met en évidence l’idée que la philosophie comme pratique des (...) exercices spirituels demeure, que celle-ci perdure dans notre espace contemporain en s’appropriant parfois de nouveaux terrains comme l’art, le corps... (4e de couv.). (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Ce livre commence par définir ce qu'est un exercice spirituel. Quelle est cette notion qui est aussi une pratique dans l'antiquité? Il analyse en détail l'expression en s'interrogeant sur les théories et les mises en oeuvre qui peuvent s'y référer dans l'antiquité : de l'ascèse à la méditation, de la conversion à la maîtrise de soi ou encore le travail de l'âme. Enfin, cet ouvrage questionne également la continuité des exercices spirituels des Anciens, leurs (...) reprises à l'aube du christianisme, mais également par les philosophies de la Renaissance (Montaigne), des époques classique, moderne (Descartes) et par celles des Lumières (Shaftesbury, Kant, Rousseau).". (shrink)