First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.

This article contributes to the analysis of refusal to license cases as abuse of a dominant position pursuant Article 82 EC from an economic perspective. In the Microsoft case, the European Commission introduced an "Incentives Balance Test" to assess whether the refusal to give access to interface information can be justified by arguing that this information is protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs): The Commission argued that if the overall innovative effects evoked by a compulsory license are significantly higher than (...) without this access, the IPR owner is obliged to license. This should be assessed through balancing the different incentives to innovate between the dominant firm and its competitors. In the paper we pursue two objectives: Firstly, we analyze to what extent the decision of the Court of First Instance, which confirmed the decision of the Commission, helps to clarify the criteria in refusal to license cases; in fact, it is disappointing in this regard. Secondly, we demonstrate that the basic idea of the Incentives Balance Test can be interpreted as a test whether the specific IPRs of the dominant firm can be defended from the perspective of the economics of IPRs. This implies that Article 82 allows competition law to correct economically not optimal IPRs through a specific economic analysis. This is followed by a broad overview on theoretical and empirical insights from economics of IPRs, innovation economics and competition and network economics that can help to develop a more general and sophisticated Innovation Effects Test that can be applied in Article 82 refusal to license cases. (shrink)

Der eigentümliche Ausdruck, der heute meist für Welt steht, der Ausdruck Umwelt, scheint ein Welt-Verhältnis auszudrücken, das den Akzent nicht aufs Objekt, sondern aufs Subjekt verlegt hat, auf die den Weltmittelpunkt einnehmende Monade. Diese scheint die Welt nicht mehr als gegebene, sondern als Ensemble von Varietäten zu verstehen, auf die sie zugreifen kann, dem Flaneur auf den Supermärkten dieser Welt vergleichbar. Der Form nach hält sie an einem Eigentumsbegriff fest, der als substantiell, als statisch auslegt, was in Wirklichkeit dynamisch ist (...) in einer Welt, die seit Generationen keinerlei festes Eigentum mehr gelten lassen konnte. Es ist der permanente Zugriff, der verrät, daß er dem in Wahrheit Rechnung trägt. Das >Eigentum sieht sich auf den permanenten Gestus der Aneignung angewiesen. Ein perverseres System ist geschichtlich wahrscheinlich niemals beobachtet worden. Nicht das viel gescholtene Konkurrenzprinzip, ein weit virulenteres Movens treibt es an. Denn das Aneignungsprinzip. (shrink)

We are concerned with modal logics in the class EM0 of extensions of M0 . G denotes re exive frames. MG the modal logic on G in the sense of Kripke. M is nite if M = MG for some nite G. Finite G's will be drawn as framed diagrams, e.g. G = ! ; G = ! ; the latter shorter denoted by . EM0 is a complete lattice with zero M0 and one M . If M M0 M0 (...) is a succ of M. An ip of M is an immediate predecessor of M. E.g. M ! and M are the only ip's of M in ES4. M[P] denotes the extension of M adding P as a \new axiom", e.g. S4 = M0 [p ! p]. M is nitely axiomatizable if M = M0 [P] for some formula P. One easily shows if M is f.a. then each predecessor is separated from M by an ip of M. It is known that each nite M is f.a. and has only nitely many succ's all of which are nite. (shrink)

Elaborating on the substantial parallels between Molina’s and Kant’s attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge and natural causal determinism respectively, my aim is to establish a proper historical connection as well. Leibniz is shown to be the crucial mediator in two respects: (i) Kant knew Molina’s account of divine knowledge in general in its Leibnizian version through Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In this work, scientia media plays no role in the explication as to how God knows absolute future contingents. (ii) (...) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant resorted to doctrines similar to Molina’s in his criticism of Leibniz’s alternative explication which drew on complete concepts of monads. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In 1932, Wolfgang Pauli was a world-renowned physicist and had already done the work that would win him the 1945 Nobel Prize. He was also in pain. His mother had poisoned herself after his father's involvement in an affair. Emerging from a brief marriage with a cabaret performer, Pauli drank heavily, quarreled frequently and sometimes publicly, and was disturbed by powerful dreams. He turned for help to C. G. Jung, setting a standing appointment for Mondays at noon. Thus bloomed (...) an extraordinary intellectual conjunction not just between a physicist and a psychologist but between physics and psychology. Eighty letters, written over twenty-six years, record that friendship. This artful translation presents them in English for the first time. Though Jung never analyzed Pauli formally, he interpreted more than 400 of his dreams--work that bore fruit later in Psychology and Alchemy and The Analysis of Dreams. As their acquaintance developed, Jung and Pauli exchanged views on the content of their work and the ideas of the day. They discussed the nature of dreams and their relation to reality, finding surprising common ground between depth psychology and quantum physics. Their collaboration resulted in the combined publication of Jung's treatise on synchronicity and Pauli's essay on archetypal ideas influencing Kepler's writings in The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche. Over time, their correspondence shaped and reshaped their understanding of the principle they called synchronicity, a term Jung had suggested earlier. Through the association of these two pioneering thinkers, developments in physics profoundly influenced the evolution of Jungian psychology. And many of Jung's abiding themes shaped how Pauli--and, through him, other physicists--understood the physical world. Of clear appeal to historians of science and anyone investigating the life and work of Pauli or Jung, this portrait of an incredible friendship will also draw readers interested in human creativity as well as those who merely like to be present when great minds meet. (shrink)

In Über Gewissheit umkreist Wittgenstein immer wieder die Frage, ob Moore mit seiner Behauptung, er wisse diese und jene alltäglichen Dinge, wirklich Recht hat. Wittgenstein erweist sich dabei z.T. als Anti-Skeptiker, indem er zu zeigen versucht, daß ein prinzipieller, methodischer Zweifel ä la Descartes unmöglich ist. Andererseits entwickelt Wittgenstein Zweifel philosophischer Natur daran, ob man die Sachverhalte, selbst wenn sie außer jedem vernünftigen Zweifel stehen, wirklich weiß. Diese halb skeptische, halb antiskeptische Position ist jedoch unhaltbar.