William Lyons presents an original thesis on introspection as self-interpretation in terms of a culturally influenced model. His work rests on a lucid, careful, and critical examination of the transformations that have occurred over the past century in the concepts and models of introspection in philosophy and psychology. He reviews the history of introspection in the work of Wundt, Boring, and William James, and reactions to it by behaviorists Watson, Lashley, Ryle, and Skinner.

La pensée, disait William James, doit garder ses portes et ses fenêtres grandes ouvertes. Car notre monde est ainsi : inachevé, brouillon, multiple, imprévisible, risqué et sans garantie. Contre ceux qui cherchent des solutions purement spéculatives aux problèmes de ce monde, en se tournant vers les univers plus lumineux et mieux ordonnés que la religion ou la métaphysique peuvent offrir, James se range du côté de ceux qui acceptent le combat et mettent de l'ordre dans cet univers lui même, (...) par la pensée et par l'action, afin de le rendre meilleur. Contre ceux qui considèrent la science, la philosophie ou la religion comme de simples retranscriptions d'une réalité immuable et parfaite à laquelle l'individu ne peut et ne doit rien ajouter, James en fait des instruments de changement dont la valeur se mesure aux effets concrets qu'ils produisent dans la réalité. Contre la tendance intellectualiste des penseurs rationalistes, James s'est ainsi voulu le champion de l'empirisme, dont l'attitude consiste à se détourner des abstractions, des raisons a priori, des principes figés et des systèmes clos, pour se tourner vers le concret, vers les faits, vers le particulier, vers les conséquences et vers l'action. Cet ouvrage propose une étude systématique de l'ensemble de son œuvre. Quels sont les grands axes de sa psychologie qui intègre ce que le XIXe siècle a produit de meilleur, depuis la nouvelle psychologie scientifique de Helmholtz et Wundt jusqu'à l'émergence de la psychologie clinique moderne de Janet et Freud? Quelles sont les grandes positions de sa philosophie qui a l'ambition de créer une nouvelle pensée pour le XXe siècle en fédérant sous la bannière du pragmatisme les travaux de Peirce, de Dewey, de Mach ou de Bergson? Comment expliquer enfin cette traversée intellectuelle qui l'a conduit peu à peu des sciences biologiques à la psychologie puis à la philosophie, tout en s'efforçant constamment de les concilier avec la religion? Après une première réception enthousiaste, on a longtemps boudé en France ce psychologue et philosophe de génie : trop naturaliste, trop empiriste, trop optimiste, trop américain! Avec cet ouvrage, le lecteur francophone dispose désormais d'un instrument de lecture sans équivalent pour se guider dans la redécouverte de cette œuvre foisonnante et passionnante. (shrink)

In Part One Leiss traces the idea of the domination of nature from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Two books bound together, from the religious period of one of the most renowned and representative thinkers. Written for laymen, thus easy to understand, it is penetrating and brilliant as well. Illuminations of age-old religious questions from a pragmatic perspective, written in a luminous style.

This unique collection of readings provides a resource of primary source material, affording a survey of the history and systems of psychology from pre-Socratic thought to the present. Selected for accessibility, the 24 selections are organized to offer a representation of the historical sweep of psychological interpretations. After presenting approaches to the scholarly study of psychology's history, through an excerpt from Thomas Kuhn, the readings introduce the major themes of psychological inquiry in chronological fashion. The selections include the works of: (...) Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Wundt, Franz Brentano, William James, John Dewey, Sigmund Freud, Ivan Pavlov, John Broadus Watson, B.F. Skinner, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Carl Rogers. Features: Introductory essays for each group of readings provide important historical, social, and cultural background and context. Sample questions encourage critical reflection on the issues raised by the authors. Compatibility with most textbooks in the history and systems of psychology. (shrink)

Several of the essays, like "The Sentiment of Rationality" and "The Knowing of Things Together," are of particular significance in the development of the views ...

Hans Drieschs "Wirklichkeitslehre".--Emanuel Laskers "Philosophie des Unvollendbar".--Carl Ludwig Schleich und die "neue Epoche der Weltanschauung".--Fr. J. Kurt Geisslers "System der Seinsgebiete".--Graf Hermann Keyserlings "Gefüge der Welt", "Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen", "Unsterblichkeit", "Prolegomena zur Naturphilosophie".--Henri Bergsons "Schöpferische Entwicklung".--L. William Sterns "Person und Sache".--G. Heymans "psychischer monismus".--Wilhelm Wundts "Sinnliche und übersinnliche Welt".--Emil Boutroux und die "Kontingenz der Naturgesetze".--Rudolf Otto, Christof Schrempf, Romain Rolland und die intuitive Methode des Welterkenens.--Rudolf Steiners "Philosophie der Freiheit".--Erich Becher und die fremddienliche Zweckmässigkeit.--Edmund Husserl, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, (...) Leonard Nelson und der methodologische Gott.--Anhang: Eucken, Dessoir, Scheler, Heiler, James, Bo Yin Ra, Oesterreich, Schneider. (shrink)

ArgumentAfter having measured the velocity of the nervous impulse in the 1850s, Helmholtz began doing research on the temporal dimensions of visual perception. Experiments dealing with the velocity of propagation in nerves were carried out occasionally for some fifteen years until their final publication in 1871. Although the temporal dimension of perception seems to have interested Helmholtz less than problems of geometry and space, his experiments on the time of perception were technically rather subtle and seminal, especially compared with experiments (...) performed by his contemporaries, such as Sigmund Exner, William James, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Volkmann, and Wilhelm Wundt. Helmholtz’s conception of the temporal aspects of perception reflects the continuity that holds between psychophysiological research and the Kantian philosophical background. (shrink)

This manuscript explores the philosophical implications of ethical principles such as honesty, integrity, fairness, reliability, and objectivity and their impact on professional nursing. By examining these values within Western society, the discussion highlights the importance of integrating these virtues into contemporary nursing education. Through a detailed analysis of each precept, the document underscores their potential to enhance the quality of education, improve interactions among faculty and staff, and achieve positive student outcomes. Ultimately, this treatise advocates for a balanced pedagogical approach (...) in nursing that leverages these elements to foster a more compassionate world, where ethical connections in academia underpin our collective existence. (shrink)

Exoteric dossier : the literary Agamben -- Projection : there is language -- Logos, thinking thought -- Poiesis, thinking through making -- Modernity, productive anti-poiesis -- Logopoiesis, thinking tautology -- Enjambment, the turn of verse -- Caesura, the space of thought.

Neste artigo, pretendo discutir alguns problemas que emergem da associação, já comum na literatura secundária, entre o último dualismo pulsional freudiano, baseado na oposição entre pulsões de vida e de morte, e as teses schopenhauerianas sobre a vida e a morte derivadas de sua metafísica da vontade. A partir de uma confrontação com as leituras de Marcel Zentner e Stephan Atzert, argumentarei a favor da hipótese de que a diferença mais relevante entre os modelos de Freud e de Schopenhauer não (...) diz respeito à distinção no plano ontológico entre dualismo das pulsões e monismo da vontade, mas sim entre sentido biológico e sentido ético da suposta finalidade associada à morte, como “fim” ou “objetivo” da vida. Minha discussão, portanto, gira em torno de uma distinção quanto ao estatuto teleológico que se pode atribuir à dinâmica da relação entre vida e morte nos dois autores. (shrink)

This book explains the transitions in twentieth-century industrial leadership from Britain to the United States and, most recently, to Japan, in terms of the changing business investment strategies and organizational structures in these nations. The author criticizes economists for failing to understand these historical changes. The book shows that this intellectual failure is not inherent in the discipline of economics; there are important traditions in economic thought that the mainstream of the economics profession has simply ignored.

Un siècle avant la parution posthume du Cours de linguistique générale de Ferdinand de Saussure, la linguistique moderne a émergé en Allemagne avec les études de Wilhelm von Humboldt pour la linguistique générale et (entre autres) de Franz Bopp, Jacob Grimm, August Schleicher et Karl Brugmann pour la grammaire historico-comparative des langues indo-européennes. Dès les années 1830, les instituts allemands de philologie et de linguistique ont attiré nombre de jeunes chercheurs de Scandinavie, de France, de Suisse, de Pologne, des USA, (...) etc. Et avec la diffusion de la nouvelle "Science allemande" à l'étranger des échanges intenses se sont épanouis tout au long du XIXe siècle. Ce volume collectif, riche de neuf contributions d'historiens de la linguistique de France, d'Allemagne, de Suisse et des Pays-Bas, vise à retracer certains de ces échanges parmi les plus instructifs, notamment entre Franz Bopp et Michel Bréal, Max Müller et William Whitney, le psychologue Wilhelm Wundt et Albert Sechehaye ou Georg von der Gabelentz et Antoine Meillet. Des voies fécondes étaient ainsi ouvertes à la linguistique du XXe siècle en Europe et en Amérique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sympathy in Mind (1876–1900)Susan LanzoniIn the April 1884 issue of Mind, William James published his influential account of emotion, which stressed the bodily and physiological constitution of various feeling-states.1 The article reflected new trends in physiological psychology, but came under attack by numerous respondents in the journal who argued that there was more to the emotions than physiology.2 As the evolutionary psychologist Hiram Stanley intoned, "emotions in the (...) higher stages are filled out by knowledge and will."3 Many noted that the higher emotions—aesthetic sentiments, sympathy, pity, envy, love—were not marked by clear physiological changes. Charles Darwin had observed that love was not discernable by prominent facial expressions.4 There was also little agreement as to how to divide sentiments from appetites, affections, and passions. What came to be known as the James-Lange theory [End Page 265] of emotion, then, was only one of a variety of theories of emotion circulating in Anglo-American intellectual culture of the late nineteenth century.5In debates about the nature of emotion, the higher emotions—particularly that of sympathy—played a crucial role. Sympathy was most often understood to be a kind of tenderheartedness linked to, but distinct from love. At the same time, sympathy was tethered to a variety of moral and epistemological ends—as a cornerstone in evolutionary ethics, an element in aesthetic appreciation, and even as a source for knowledge of other minds. Sympathy had had a prominent place in eighteenth-century theories of aesthetics, moral sentiments and taste, in the writings of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke. In the late Victorian period, theories of sympathy drew on this lineage and increasingly became tinged with evolutionary and developmental features.Although sympathy in the Victorian period has gained the attention of literary scholars, historians of the mind sciences have not paid it much due, even though its psychological origins and moral correlates were of sustained interest in this period.6 Stefan Collini has argued that British intellectual culture was intrigued by the interplay of egoistic and altruistic tendencies, and the birth of a number of ethical societies in the final two decades of the century attests to the increased emphasis on the moral dimensions of sympathy.7 Anti-vivisection movements and societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children, often with appeals to sympathy, gained adherents in this period in Britain and America.8 In one study, [End Page 266] psychologists distributed scientific questionnaires in order to assess the experiences of sympathy and pity of nearly four hundred subjects.9 There was no underestimating the importance of sympathy for Anglo-American intellectuals, who confidently claimed it was becoming more refined and more widely diffused in their era. Darwin believed that sympathy had been extended to those of the same nation, and prescriptively wrote that it should extend to all nations and races, as well as the imbecile and the maimed. Darwin was echoing here the broader enlightenment sentimentalist tradition that linked the feeling of sympathy to a conception of humanity.10In the pages of the British professional psychological and philosophical journal Mind, sympathy was under scrutiny by scholars in evolutionary and developmental psychology, ethics, and aesthetics. This journal, first published in 1876, and funded by Alexander Bain, examined new trends in physiological and scientific psychology and sought a broad philosophical framework for the understanding of mental life.11 It played a mediating role in the overlapping discussions of science and philosophy and published on a diverse array of topics. Although Mind saw itself as a specialized journal for psychology and philosophy, it was founded at an historical moment when discussions of the mind were not narrowly portioned out to the psychological sciences, as would increasingly be the case after 1900. Indeed, the experimental psychological laboratory emerged as a new scientific institution [End Page 267] only in 1879 with Wilhelm Wundt's Leipzig laboratory, and then in 1897 at the Universities of London and Cambridge. Specialization in the late Victorian age on topics relating to the mind was downright eclectic: during the editorships of George Croom Robertson (1876–1892) and of G.F. Stout (1892–1920), Mind published on physiological... (shrink)

There is satisfactory Evidence that many, professing to 6e original Witnesses of the Christian Miracles, passed their Lives in Labours, Dangers, and Sufferings, voluntarily undergone in Attestation of the Accounts which they delivered, and ...

Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent…. If, after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If on the other (...) hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Context of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of ActionMichael Scottmore than any other topic examined by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations,1 his writings on action and the will are perhaps in greatest need of being put into a historical and theoretical context. Not only do his remarks seem unhelpfully concise, as if intermediary reasoning had been excised by ruthless editing, but also the rationale for several of his arguments is mysterious. Even (...) in the light of the additional comments on action in Zettel, the position or positions with which Wittgenstein is disagreeing are difficult to identify. For example, Wittgenstein introduces his remarks by indicating his opposition to the reduction of willing to an experience:‘Willing too is merely an experience,’ one would like to say (the ‘will’ too only ‘idea’). It comes when it comes, and I cannot bring it about.(PI §611) [End Page 595]But who claims that willing is merely an experience, and is this experience constituted exclusively by ideas or may it also involve feelings? Do the proponents of the theory include those who would respond positively to Wittgenstein’s question: “Are my kinaesthetic sensations my willing?” (PI §621), and who would make use of the finger crossing experiment described in PI §617?Wittgenstein scholars have hoped to answer questions about the nature and provenance of the theories he addresses by examining the manuscript sources of Philosophical Investigations, his later work on the philosophy of psychology, and some of his earlier writings on voluntary action. Wittgenstein himself suggested that his later thought should be read against the background of his earlier work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (PI, viii), and the problem of the will offers a rare opportunity for a direct comparison, it being one of the few issues that seriously occupied him in both his later and earlier investigations. But a comparison with Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of the will—and also with Schopenhauer, a primary influence—offers only partial insights.2 While we may confidently take Wittgenstein’s comments on willing and wishing in PI §614–6 to be a critique of his own earlier views, most of his remarks on the will, which are closely enmeshed with his writings on other psychological issues such as kinaesthetic sensations and feelings of tendency, appear largely to be directed elsewhere. The consensus has been that William James’ The Principles of Psychology (PP) is the source in question, and that James’ ideo-motor theory of action is the main target of Wittgenstein’s remarks.3In this paper I will take issue with this contention, and propose that Wittgenstein’s writings are more suitably read as a response not only to James but to the theories and arguments adduced by late nineteenth century and early twentieth century psychologists on the nature of the will. Specifically, I will argue that the available evidence indicates Wittgenstein’s familiarity with the on-going debate between ideo-motor theorists (of whom James was one significant representative) and innervation theorists concerning the psychic antecedents of voluntary action. I will begin with an outline of the history of this [End Page 596] debate before turning to an evaluation of the evidence for Wittgenstein’s philosophical interest in it.the psychic antecedents of voluntary actionWhen James first proposed his ideo-motor theory,4 the dominant psychological account of the will was the theory of innervation. This latter theory, which was supported by the majority of psychologists including pioneers such as Wundt, Helmholtz and Bain, states that willing consists in a feeling of innervation, that is, a sensation accompanying discharge from the central nervous system into the motor apparatus.5 The intensity of the feeling was thought to vary in accordance with the intensity of the outgoing, or efferent, current.William James, while largely in agreement with innervation theorists on the physiological processes that lead to action, disagreed with their psychological account of willing. James denied that we are conscious of motor discharge, and proposed instead that the psychic antecedent necessary for a voluntary action is a memory image of the experience that is distinctive of the consequent movement. This experience consists in kinaesthetic impressions (the bodily sensations which inform one of the attitude... (shrink)

First published in 1840, this two-volume treatise by Cambridge polymath William Whewell remains significant in the philosophy of science. The work was intended as the 'moral' to his three-volume History of the Inductive Sciences, which is also reissued in this series. Building on philosophical foundations laid by Immanuel Kant and Francis Bacon, Whewell opens with the aphorism 'Man is the Interpreter of Nature, Science the right interpretation'. Volume 2 contains the final sections of Part 1, addressing namely the philosophy (...) of biology and palaetiology. Part 2, 'Of Knowledge', includes a selective review of opinions on the nature of knowledge and the means of seeking it, beginning with Plato. Whewell's work upholds throughout his belief that the mind was active and not merely a passive receiver of knowledge from the world. A key text in Victorian epistemological debates, notably challenged by John Stuart Mill and his System of Logic, Whewell's treatise merits continued study and discussion in the present day. (shrink)

This essay explores the role of the German expression Weltanschauung in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Two philosophical contexts are distinguished in which the term occurs in his writings: a) the classical pragmatist’s discussion of what constitutes Pragmatism and b) the discussion of the systematic place of a »scientific philosophy«, both in terms of its relation to other sciences and in distinction from everyday beliefs. Thus, on the one hand, the essay compares Peirce’s version of pragmatism with the views (...) of other, more subjectivist pragmatists, who used the term »Weltanschauung« to denote their philosophical enterprises: William James and F. C. S. Schiller. On the other hand, Peirce’s ideal of scientific philosophy, particularly of scientific metaphysics, is contrasted with ›non-scientific metaphysics‹ – or how Peirce calls it: Weltanschauung. The essay also shows how his conception of scientific philosophy differs from Wilhelm Wundt’s idea that philosophy should provide a »Weltanschauung« based on the special sciences. (shrink)

Récurrente sous différentes formes dans le domaine de la lexicométrie, l’analyse cooccurrentielle vise à dévoiler les attractions lexicales qui opèrent dans un texte en restituant un état intermédiaire entre la séquence textuelle et l’inventaire lexical, état qui doit combiner l’explicitation syntagmatique de l’une avec la hiérarchisation statistique de l’autre. Pour dépasser les résultats des méthodes de cooccurrence classiques et identifier des systèmes cooccurrentiels plus complexes à l’oeuvre dans le texte, il s’avère nécessaire de substituer à l’approche analytique des associations lexicales (...) une vue synthétique de ces attractions prééminentes en contexte. (shrink)

From 1945 on for two decades, Father William Wade was Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at St. Louis University. This volume, a recovery of his own 1935 Ph.D dissertation, was originally written under the direction of Vernon J. Bourke, later himself a renowned interpreter of both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In his dissertation, Wade displays deep understanding of relationships between Greek and medieval thought as well as of the different influences of Plato and Aristotle by way (...) of Augustine and Thomas. (shrink)

A central figure in Victorian science, William Whewell held professorships in Mineralogy and Moral Philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge, before becoming Master of the college in 1841. His mathematical textbooks, such as A Treatise on Dynamics, were instrumental in bringing French analytical methods into British science. This three-volume history, first published in 1837, is one of Whewell's most famous works. Taking the 'acute, but fruitless, essays of Greek philosophy' as a starting point, it provides a history of the physical (...) sciences that culminates with the mechanics, astronomy, and chemistry of 'modern times'. Volume 1 studies Greek physics and metaphysics, attributing their failure to a method that derived its principles from the common use of language. It surveys the state of the physical sciences in the middle ages, and deals with the rise of 'formal' astronomy - based on observation rather than calculation - as exemplified by Copernicus. (shrink)

A central figure in Victorian science, William Whewell held professorships in Mineralogy and Moral Philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge, before becoming Master of the college in 1841. His mathematical textbooks, such as A Treatise on Dynamics, were instrumental in bringing French analytical methods into British science. This three-volume history, first published in 1837, is one of Whewell's most famous works. Taking the 'acute, but fruitless, essays of Greek philosophy' as a starting point, it provides a history of the physical (...) sciences that culminates with the mechanics, astronomy, and chemistry of 'modern times'. Volume 2 focuses on the rise and development of modern mechanics in the seventeenth century. Whewell shows how Galileo's laws of motion exemplify a paradigmatic shift from 'formal' to 'physical' sciences - a new approach concerned with explaining causes rather than merely observing phenomena. It also discusses the implications for physical astronomy of Newton's discoveries. (shrink)

David Armstrong argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the (...) best explanation and even whether, by Armstrong’s own standards, necessitation relations offer a potential explanation of this explanandum, let alone the best explanation. I defend Armstrong against these particular criticisms. Firstly, even though there are reasons to think that Armstrong’s justification fails as a self-contained defence of induction, it can usefully complement several other answers to Hume. Secondly, I argue that Armstrong’s reasoning is consistent with his own standards for explanation. (shrink)

Making a Scientific Case for Conscious Agency and Free Will makes a series of arguments that certain human behaviors are impossible to explain in the absence of free will, and that free will emerges from materialistic processes of brain function. It outlines future directions for neuroscience studies that can harness emerging technologies and tools for systems-level analysis."--Page 4 of cover.

This article seeks to develop an under-appreciated aspect of spectator activity: the way in which viewers make use of film to enter or sustain a project of bad faith. Based on Jean-Paul Sartre's account of bad faith in Being and Nothingness (1943), the article explains the aspects of bad faith that are pertinent to viewer activity, then explores the way viewers can make use of filmic depictions to facilitate self-denial. For example, spectators may emphasize the fact that persons are depicted (...) in narrow terms as corroboration for their belief that human nature is just as its depicted, thereby denying that we have the freedom to be otherwise. Or spectators may deny the relevance of problematic aspects of themselves when they find it depicted in characters who are admirable in other ways. I then consider whether films themselves can be described as being in bad faith. While technically they cannot, I identify ways that a film may encourage or discourage bad faith in viewers. I also examine how the immersive aspect of film enables viewers to turn attention away from themselves while they engage in self-denial. The case for this approach to viewer activity and film analysis is supplemented by a distinction between traits that do apply to film, e.g., being racist, sexist, or homophobic, and the resources it gives persons to be in bad faith about these social attitudes. I argue that a film can have traits like these while not encouraging bad faith and vice versa, demonstrating the unique perspective offered by approaching film and spectator activity in terms of bad faith. (shrink)

In Divine Providence, Swedish visionary Emanuel Swedenborg describes how God works in our lives to turn us away from evil and toward him while still allow us to make our own choices. Swedenborg addresses a number of questions that challenge people of faith, such as why accidents and disasters happen, and why evil people seem to prosper while others suffer. This edition is a reprint of a 1963 translation by William F. Wunsch.