This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws of (...) thought". In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

Logic is usually presented as a tool of rational inquiry; however, many logicians in fact treat logic so that it does not serve us, but rather governs us – as rational beings we are subordinated to the logical laws we aspire to disclose. We denote the view that logic primarily serves us as logica serviens, while denoting the thesis that it primarily governs our reasoning as logica dominans. We argue that treating logic as logica dominans is misguided, for it leads (...) to the idea of a “genuine” logic within a “genuine” language. Instead of this, we offer a naturalistic picture, according to which the only languages that exist are the natural languages and the artificial languages logicians have built. There is, we argue, no language beyond these, especially none that would be a wholesome vehicle of reasoning like the natural languages and yet be transparently rigorous like the artificial ones. Logic is a matter of using the artificial languages as idealized models of the natural ones, whereby we pinpoint the laws of logic by means of zooming in on a reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Exegetical scepticism is a strand of scepticism about meaning running through the German Enlightenment. This paper provides the first modern account of its tenets, critics, and proponents, and argues that it shares essential features with modern varieties of meaning-scepticism that have been a preoccupation among philosophers of language since the middle of the twentieth century. I argue that exegetical scepticism is a type of epistemological scepticism first introduced as a philosophical position in a theological debate between August Pfeiffer (1640–1698) and (...) Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705). Under contention, so I argue, was the idea that interpretation is never certain because it is necessarily underdetermined by the evidence. Following the effects of this controversy, I show that exegetical scepticism caused a great deal of unrest in German letters in the eighteenth century and can be seen to contribute to the great proliferation of hermeneutical theories in the Aufklärung, indeed to the very birth of hermeneutics as a standalone discipline. Bringing this type of scepticism to contemporary attention supports a reassessment of issues at the heart of meaning-scepticism and hermeneutics itself, and a reconsideration of the histories of Enlightenment scepticism and hermeneutics. (shrink)

Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii") je dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii". Určuji v ní blíže momenty totožnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (...) A určuji v ní též blíže momenty rozdílnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. platnost (závaznost) "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího), platnost (závaznost) (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a vztah "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii"), jsouc dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii", ukazuje, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii je antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově; a ukazuje též, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii, ač antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii, není pojmem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a nepředbíhá ani nepředjímá ani Kantův pojem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (shrink)

The author presents a review of research literature on the analysis of the sphere of informal philosophizing in Russia of the last thirty years. He discusses the genesis and content of the idea of non-institutional creative philosophizing in the works of famous modern Russian philosophers. He notes that philosophical self-identity in today’s Russia is characterized by uncertainty, uncertainty, and mobility. This is directly related to such phenomena as the rapid collapse of book culture, the change of mediums of communication, a (...) clear decrease in the abstracting-reflective component of thinking and the audiovisual turn. The author presents both the review generalized studies of intellectual life and non-institutional philosophizing in modern Russia, as well as works examining the features of theoretical platforms unformal philosophical groups. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophical solutions to the problem of relationships between philosophy of history and historical science. The author recognizes the existence of the long-term methodological crisis. He also considers that any attempt of establishing the special subject area for the philosophy of history is totally irrelevant and inconsistent with the contemporary methodological foundations of socialsciences. The following elaboration of this problem should be based on the principle of the diversified unity of philosophy, sociology and historical science.

Tato stať - recenze - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti" - se zabývá knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti"; v jejích stopách promýšlí a domýšlí tyto otázky: 1. Jaký je dřívější zakládající a zacilující vztah k ideji vzdělanosti? 2. Jaký je nynější vztah k ideji vzdělanosti, zakládající se mimo ni a zacilující se proti ní? 3. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea dnešního "vzdělávání"? 4. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", zvláště pak ve školách jako "vzdělávacích (...) institucích"? 5. Jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje dnešního "vzdělávání" (tj. i jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", tj. i ve školách jako "vzdělávacích institucích")? - Tato recenzní stať - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti", zabývajíc se knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti" a v jejích stopách promýšlejíc a domýšlejíc ony otázky, dodává dodatek o struktuře dnešního školství, dle nějž struktura dnešního školství tkví v rozdělení na vyšší školy - továrny a nižší školy - stoky i v propojení vyšších škol - továren a nižších škol - stok posuvnou hranicí, tj. hranicí posuvnou pouze směrem nahoru, nikoli ovšem směrem dolů. (shrink)

Tato stať - "Úvod do dějepisu jako společenské vědy" - se zabývá těmito otázkami: 1. Co je dějepis a čím se zabývá? 2. Zabývá-li se dějepis též a zvláště smyslem společensko-lidských dějin, mají společensko-lidské dějiny smysl, a mají-li smysl, tedy jaký? 3. Ať již mají, či nemají nějaký smysl, jaký možný smysl má studium dějepisu, resp. jaký možný smysl studium dějepisu může mít a kdy jej může mít? - Zabývajíc se těmito otázkami, je tato stať úvodem do společenských věd jako (...) s dějepisem spjatých a jím vázaných vazbou jejich logického principu s jejich principem historickým. (shrink)

We propose that black holes may serve as a physical substratum for intelligent beings, based on(1) The descriptions of brain and psyche are complementary to each other, as internal and external observers of a black hole in the Susskind-t'Hooft's schema.(2) There is an aspect of the inner structure of a black hole that is isomorphic to the structure of the human subjective domain in the psychological model of reflexion.(3) Both black holes and the brain-psyche system have a facet that can (...) be represented using thermodynamic concepts.(4) Both lend themselves to a holographic description. (shrink)

I focus on the problem of whether a specific biologic basis exists for reinforcing the power of money. I argue in favor of its existence based on a new interpretation of data obtained in experiments with pigeons and rats in an experimental chamber. The experiments demonstrated that in the animals' behavior we can observe some features that had been considered pertinent to human beings only, such as making certain sources of utility “sacred.” (Published Online April 5 2006).

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the (...) existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects. (shrink)

In this article I analyse the correlation between the direct and the mediated in activity, consciousness and personality. Cultural-historical psychology, attitude theory and activity theory were solving the tasks of overcoming the ‘postulate of directness’, which led to the ‘postulate of mediation’. None of these postulates shows in its entirety the path of human psychological development and the work of human consciousness. The direct and the mediated are examined in this article as equally necessary conditions for the development of the (...) human psyche. A lot of attention is paid to the nature of the initial, primary spontaneity of a child as an indispensable condition for mastering culture. The direct is the necessary condition for the development of culture, and the mediated is the mechanism of this development. (shrink)

The article brings to light the idea that Russian Neo-Kantians were among the first in the history of European philosophy to recognize the significance and originality of Hermann Cohen’s philosophical system. In particular, they identified two related points that revealed the ingenuity of the great Marburg thinker: the creation of a new philosophical system and the synthesis of Kant and Hegel within that system. The article also discusses the particular focus on the part of Russian philosophers at the turn of (...) the twentieth century on Cohen’s ethical theories. It is argued that the full value of the German-Jewish thinker’s work for Russian philosophy is only starting to be appreciated, and that the work of Russian Neo-Kantians will be a great help in this endeavor. (shrink)

The parameter-free part \(\textbf{PA}_2^*\) of \(\textbf{PA}_2\), second order Peano arithmetic, is considered. We make use of a product/iterated Sacks forcing to define an \(\omega \) -model of \(\textbf{PA}_2^*+ \textbf{CA}(\Sigma ^1_2)\), in which an example of the full Comprehension schema \(\textbf{CA}\) fails. Using Cohen’s forcing, we also define an \(\omega \) -model of \(\textbf{PA}_2^*\), in which not every set has its complement, and hence the full \(\textbf{CA}\) fails in a rather elementary way.

One of the most fascinating phenomena in the cultural and spiritual life of Russia in the last decade and a half has been the fact that, after seventy years of the official state-implanted materialistic atheism, the witness of the Bible about our world is openly and widely discussed by scholars and theologians. This paper will survey certain features of those debates in which Orthodox authors participate, and also aspects of the understanding of the Hexaemeron (The Six Days of Creation) that (...) are not reflected in those debates but which are brought to light by several eminent Russian theologians of the XIX century and which to my mind have a great significance. (shrink)

Cílem studie je zodpovědět otázku, co znamená v interpretujících humanitních či sociálních vědách zkoumat narativně. Interpretace je pojata jako explikace utváření významu. V návaznosti na toto pojetí je identifikována řada interpretačních dilemat. V tomto kontextu je uveden narativní přístup jako řešení těchto dilemat. Je pojednáno o povaze narativní perspektivy, o vztahu narativity a zkušenosti a o povaze narativních dat. Narativní výzkum je chápán jako rekonstrukce způsobů, jakými je utvářen význam narativními prostředky. Narativní interpretace umožňuje pohybovat se pružně a efektivně: 1) (...) mezi explicitními daty a exemplifikačními schématy, 2) mezi jedincem a kulturou, 3) mezi hermeneutikou podezření a hermeneutikou důvěry, 4) mezi částmi a celkem, 5) mezi obsahem a formou, 6) mezi strukturou a funkcí. (shrink)

The text focuses on reflecting on the role of modern university in a man intellectual development, starting from Nietzsche’s ideas. By drawing up some of the main methodological and philosophical concepts of the German philosopher, the text highlights a series of aspects on the Humboldian nature of current universities – a state of tension under the political, economic and social factors. Thus, the classic concepts of Bildung and Kultur specific to the XIX-century University are analyzed in relation with the crisis (...) that marked the Prussian state of Bismarck period. Higher education being available to the masses is a current problem Nietzsche didn’t avoid to call „savageness” and „decline” of the higher educational system. The purpose of the text is to point out if Nietzsche’s ideas can be still applied nowadays. (shrink)

Benevolenski and Kortunov discuss the array of moral, ethnic, and nationalistic questions emerging after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. They suggest that the cause for the collapse was not poor economic performance, but a moral bankruptcy the people could no longer endure.

Here Bibler argues that the “beginning” of logic must be understood as a conjunction of the logical and extra-logical. This is in fact the justification of the logic of being, which means the conjo...