We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...) is a refinement of Gerrans’s account of delusion as unsupervised by decontextualized processing, I can have all my reasoning processes working reliably and thus judge that my delusion is false but, if I cannot use their outputs when revising the thought itself, the delusion will persist. I also sketch how this framework explains some interesting cases of failed belief-revision in the general population in which people judge that ~p but nonetheless continue to believe that p. (shrink)

We prove, in ZFC,the existence of a definable, countably saturated elementary extension of the reals.

A generic extension L[x]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{L}[x]}$$\end{document} by a real x is defined, in which the E0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{E}_0}$$\end{document}-class of x is a lightface Π21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Pi}^1_2}$$\end{document} set containing no ordinal-definable reals.

Physicalism as a metaphysical or ontological concept has maintained a dominant position since the second half of the last century to the present day. The claim that everything is physically constituted often accompanies microphysical reductionism, which assumes the existence of fundamental laws to which everything is reducible. In this context, a question regarding the status and possible autonomy of the laws of special sciences arises. The article focuses on the basic philosophical discussions between the strong, weak, and non-reductive physicalism that (...) treat the laws of special sciences in different ways, but none of which can be considered sufficiently convincing and successful. The article seeks to prove the existence of a universal mechanism that leads to the emergence of new and complex entities and regulations of their behaviour, thus justifying the autonomous status of special sciences and laws. (shrink)

O artigo visa discutir formas de pensar o conceito de liberdade para além de sua submissão às figuras da autonomia. O objetivo é avaliar a necessidade e pertinência de pensarmos, em nosso contexto sócio-histórico, a liberdade como heteronomia sem servidão. Conceito este que nasce da crítica à elevação do paradigma do auto-pertencimento a condição de via única para a definição da liberdade.

This book assesses how Vatican II opened up the Catholic Church to encounter, dialogue, and engagement with other world religions. Opening with a contribution from the President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, it next explores the impact, relevance, and promise of the Declaration Nostra Aetate before turning to consider how Vatican II in general has influenced interfaith dialogue and the intellectual and comparative study of world religions in the postconciliar decades, as well as the contribution (...) of particular past and present thinkers to the formation of current interreligious and comparative theological methods. Additionally, chapters consider interreligious dialogue vis-à-vis theological anthropology in conciliar documents; openness to the spiritual practices of other faith traditions as a way of encouraging positive interreligious encounter; the role of lay and new ecclesial movements in interreligious dialogue; and the development of Monastic Interreligious Dialogue. Finally, it includes a range of perspectives on the fruits and future of Vatican’s II’s opening to particular faiths such as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. (shrink)

The paper is a critical reaction to a research paper that appeared in Argumentation. It suggests that Goodman’s delineation of the concept of argument for purposes of disciplines like logic is unsatisfactory in several respects. Identifying arguments as sets of propositions is highly problematic. Moreover, Goodman’s delineation is excessively vague and it may commit us to the claim that sequences of sentences which are commonly treated as expressing arguments do not, in fact, represent arguments.

Key premises of the target article by Juslin & Vll (J&V) are challenged. It is also shown that most of the six proposed by the authors as underlying the induction of emotion by music involve nonmusical proximal causes. As a replacement for the state of being-moved is proposed.

We consider games over a finite alphabet with Gurevich-Harrington's winning conditions and restraints as in Yakhnis-Yakhnis . The game tree, the Gurevich-Harrington's kernels of the winning condition and the restraints are defined by finite automata. We give an effective criterion to determine the winning player and an effective presentation of a class of finite automata defined winning strategies.Our approach yields an alternative solution to the games considered by Büchi and Landweber . The BL algorithm is an important tool for solving (...) effectively presented games. The differences between the BL and our algorithms are as follows. Our algorithm is uniformly applicable to winning sets that correspond to boolean combinations of BL winning conditions, while the BL algorithm requires a transformation of such boolean combinations into a single BL condition. Our algorithm directly applies to a larger class of game trees for a given game alphabet than does the BL one. We describe Büchi-Landweber's class of winning conditions in a more transparent way by using finite automata and Gurevich-Harrington's form of winning conditions. Our algorithms that determine the winner of the game and find a winning strategy, are based on a translation of the events in the game in terms of the transition table of the automaton representing the game. This automaton differs from the ones that represent BL winning conditions. Both algorithms need further investigation.The algorithm determining the winner in the game, can be used as a verifier of concurrent programs. This is because programs can be viewed as strategies in Gurevich-Harrington's games and program specifications could be regarded as winning conditions for such games. The algorithm which finds a winning strategy could be used as a basis for automated concurrent program design.The present paper is a sequel to Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 48 277–297. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone rescatar la resistencia y la crítica al poder imperial romano del libro del Apocalipsis como una fuente fundamental para la teología moral cristiana, que lo convirtieron en un foco de luz que ilumina el camino de la conducta humana hacia un mundo mejor. Al mismo tiempo, ofrece pautas para la defensa de la vida en un entorno donde los totalitarismos políticos, económicos y religiosos atentan contra ella. Además, quiere destacar dicha resistencia y crítica como uno (...) de los factores generadores, y por tanto centrales, de la teología del Apocalipsis. Para ello se utilizarán los principios metodológicos de la lectura contextual que parten de la convicción según la cual el texto es una expresión de las vivencias comunitarias del hagiógrafo y de su actitud ante las circunstancias sociales que lo provocaron. El libro busca afectar el entorno, pero este también configura el contenido de la obra escrita. En un segundo momento, con el método se indaga qué de ese momento histórico puede iluminar el presente del lector. En el caso del Apocalipsis, se elegirán los textos en los que el autor presente los temas y actores principales de la trama, a saber: el ser supremo sentado en el trono, el cordero y el mal —simbolizado específicamente en el tercer jinete—, ya que en ellos se juega el mensaje del libro, la soberanía divina que humaniza o la soberanía diabólica deshumanizante. (shrink)

We generalize, on higher projective levels, a construction of “incompatible” generic Δ1 3 real singletons given by Jensen and Johnsbråten.

We consider QED processes in the presence of an infinitely thin and infinitely long straight string with a magnetic flux inside it. The bremsstrahlung from an electron passing by the magnetic string and the electron-positron pair production by a single photon are reviewed. Based on the exact electron and positron solutions of the Dirac equation in the external Aharonov-Bohm potential we present matrix elements for these processes. The dependence of the resulting cross sections on energies, directions, and polarizations of the (...) involved particles is discussed for low energies. (shrink)

Již letmý pohled na filosofii 20. století, která se snaží promýšlet podstatu lidského jednání, budí dojem, že patří k její metodě vrátit se k antickým teoriím a představit je jako historické východisko, jehož nové uchopení povede k lepšímu porozumění aktuálního problému. Tyto návraty, jak je lze sledovat u Heideggera, Gadamera, Ricoeura nebo Arendtové, směřují – nakolik se jedná o teorii jednání – především k Aristotelovi a jeho základnímu rozlišení mezi poiésis a praxis. Cílem následující stati je představit základ teorie jednání, (...) jež byla dílem prvních stoiků ve 3. stol. př. Kr. V naznačeném kontextu si však taková interpretace může činit větší ambice, než jak by se mohlo na první pohled zdát. Zůstává-li totiž Aristotelés pro novodobou filosofii jednání myslitelem, k němuž je třeba se vrátit a s nímž je třeba se vyrovnat, pak je dobré si uvědomit, že právě ve stoicismu lze vidět první a bezprostřední kritickou reakci na Aristotelovu filosofii. Navíc byl stoicismus naukou, v níž se jednání stalo gravitačním bodem všech ostatních úvah a která proto musela svoje vyrovnání s Aristotelem soustředit do pojmů souvisejících úzce právě s jednáním. Lze ovšem snadno vytušit, jaký byl hlavní důvod, proč zůstal stoicismus stranou pozornosti současných filosofů . Přesný vztah stoické nauky k aristotelismu má totiž stále tendenci se skrývat. Navzdory malé četnosti explicitních konfrontací s Aristotelovými argumenty je aristotelismus ve stoicismu přítomen všude – je v něm přítomen natolik, že snaze odlišit oba systémy občas hrozí sklouznutí do povrchních kategorizací, z nichž lze podezírat doxografickou tradici hellénistické a římské doby, která se snaží o uchopení téhož rozdílu. Přesto stoicismus není peripatetická filosofie a lze oprávněně předpokládat, že nahlédnutí odlišnosti mezi obojím vrhne nové světlo na moderní přístup k Aristotelovi. (shrink)

There are many methodological considerations that adversely affect external validity as much as, or even more than, unrepresentative sampling does. Among suspect applications, especially worrisome is the incorporation of WEIRD-based findings regarding moral reasoning and retribution into normative expectations, such as might be held by international criminal tribunals in war-torn areas.

This is the story of a textbook that students of developmental biology have used for 45 years. “An Introduction to Embryology” was released soon after a role for genes in the control of development became finally recognized but not yet well documented. Thus this book manifested the transition from embryology to developmental biology. The story of its author, Boris Balinsky, who against all odds survived to write this book, is remarkable on its own. He started his scientific career in the (...) USSR, but due to 20th century social and political upheavals, ended it in South Africa. This article will shed light on the life of Boris Balinsky, a scientist and writer and will explore the origins of his book. BioEssays 27:970–977, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This article discusses the connection between the ideas of Fyodor M. Dostoevsky and Vladimir S. Solovyov on the need for cultural and moral transformation of those who would claim to participate in...

My dear Aleksandr!I have finally found some quiet time for a slow and attentive read of your article “The Beginning of the Black Notebooks.”1 I very much liked the article, especially for your trul...

ABSTRACTThe psychological and philosophical literature exploring the role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases, seems to b...

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of declarative programming oriented towards difficult search problems. As an outgrowth of research on the use of nonmonotonic reasoning in knowledge representation, it is particularly useful in knowledge-intensive applications. ASP programs consist of rules that look like Prolog rules, but the computational mechanisms used in ASP are different: they are based on the ideas that have led to the creation of fast satisfiability solvers for propositional logic.

We find an explicit basis for all admissible rules of the modal logic S4. Our basis consists of an infinite sequence of rules which have compact and simple, readable form and depend on increasing set of variables. This gives a basis for all quasi-identities valid in the free modal algebra ℱS4 of countable rank.

Le merite de cette etude est son refus de reduire la theologie d'Eckhart au developpement systematique d'une seule notion fondamentale. Mais cette theologie n'y est pas non plus concue comme une sorte d'eclectisme ou chacune de ces notions aurait sa place et trouverait successivement son tour. S'il y a chez Eckhart une notion fondamentale, c'est celle de Dieu, ou, plutot, c'est celle de l'ineffabilite de Dieu. Dieu est l'etre, assurement, mais n'est-il pas plutot l'Un? Ou l'Intellect? Comprendre qu'il est chacune (...) de ces perfections, absolument, purement, donc en apparence a l'exclusion des autres, c'est justement en quoi consiste l'ignorance transcendante qui eleve Dieu au-dela de toutes les affirmations. Vladimir Lossky a ainsi voulu mettre en lumiere le refus qu'oppose Eckhart a toute tentative d'inclure la divinite dans une notion qui se tiendrait pour suffisante a la definir. (shrink)

"This personification of wisdom with golden hair and a radiant aura echoes both the eternal feminine and the world soul. Rooted in Christian and Jewish mysticism, Eastern Orthodox iconography, Greek philosophy, and European romanticism, the Sophiology that suffuses Solovyov's philosophical and artistic works is both intellectually sophisticated and profoundly inspiring. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt brings together key texts from Solovyov's writings about Sophia: poetry, fiction, drama, and philosophy, all extensively annotated and some available in English for the first time (with assistance (...) from the translators Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus)."--Amazon website. (shrink)