The article analyzes the philosophical solutions to the problem of relationships between philosophy of history and historical science. The author recognizes the existence of the long-term methodological crisis. He also considers that any attempt of establishing the special subject area for the philosophy of history is totally irrelevant and inconsistent with the contemporary methodological foundations of socialsciences. The following elaboration of this problem should be based on the principle of the diversified unity of philosophy, sociology and historical science.

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it (...) is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p, which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

Felix Klein and Abraham Fraenkel each formulated a criterion for a theory of infinitesimals to be successful, in terms of the feasibility of implementation of the Mean Value Theorem. We explore the evolution of the idea over the past century, and the role of Abraham Robinson's framework therein.

Knowledge representation, which lies at the core of artificial intelligence, is concerned with encoding knowledge on computers to enable systems to reason automatically. The aims are to help readers make their computer smarter, handle qualitative and uncertain information, and improve computational tractability.

The logic of single-conclusion proofs () is introduced. It combines the verification property of proofs with the single valuedness of proof predicate and describes the operations on proofs induced by modus ponens rule and proof checking. It is proved that is decidable, sound and complete with respect to arithmetical proof interpretations based on single-valued proof predicates. The application to arithmetical inference rules specification and -admissibility testing is considered. We show that the provability in gives the complete admissibility test for the (...) rules which can be specified by schemes in -language. The test is supplied with the ground proof extraction algorithm which eliminates the admissible rules from a -proof by utilizing the information from the corresponding -proofs. (shrink)

This is a review of some of the definitions of the concept of a stable model that have been proposed in the literature. These definitions are equivalent to each other, at least when applied to traditional Prologstyle programs, but there are reasons why each of them is valuable and interesting. A new characterization of stable models can suggest an alternative picture of the intuitive meaning of logic programs; or it can lead to new algorithms for generating stable models; or it (...) can work better than others when we turn to generalizations of the traditional syntax that are important from the perspective of answer set programming; or it can be more convenient for use in proofs; or it can be interesting simply because it demonstrates a relationship between seemingly unrelated ideas. (shrink)

Representative models are considered parts of real scientific theories.

The paper has three objectives: to expound a set-theoretical triplet model of concepts; to introduce some triplet relations (symbolic, logical, and mathematical formalization; equivalence, intersection, disjointness) between object concepts, and to instantiate them by relations between certain physical object concepts.

This paper examines Gadamer's and Davidson's dialogical models of interpretation. It shows them to be comparable, but importantly dissimilar with respect to the kind of agreement they require for communication to be possible. It is argued that this difference entails different concepts of alterity: they model not only how we talk, but implicitly who we can intelligibly talk to. Another important contribution of this paper is to uncover a distinction in Gadamer between two kinds of agreement missed so far by (...) all commentators. The final section of this paper defends a second thesis, namely that the degree of agreement required by the models is proportional to the conceptual difference it can make intelligible. Hence, the extent of graspable cultural difference is not only an empirical matter, but is entailed by our choice of model. (shrink)

It is proposed to analyze the unity of scientific knowledge in terms of its structure-nominative reconstruction. -/- .

There are no universally adopted answers to the natural questions about scientific concepts: What are they? What is their structure? What are their functions? How many kinds of them are there? Do they change? Ironically, most if not all scientific monographs or articles mention concepts, but the scientific studies of scientific concepts are rare in occurrence. It is well known that the necessary stage of any scientific study is constructing the model of objects in question. Many years logical modeling was (...) dominant in the concept studies. Last decades, concepts came to be regarded as the subject of mathematical modeling. However, different authors take different features of concepts as independent variables of their models. Our objective is to characterize informally the spectra of relevant variables for the modeling of scientific concepts. (shrink)

in Handbook of Knowledge representation, Elsevier, 2008.

The changes of concepts are described in the frame of concept triplet model. -/- .

In one of the first genetic screens aimed at identifying induced developmental mutants, Nadine Dobrovolskaïa-Zavadskaïa, working at the Pasteur Laboratory in the 1920s, isolated and characterized a mutation affecting Brachyury, a gene that regulates tail and axial development in the mouse. Dobrovolskaïa-Zavadskaïa's analysis of Brachyury and other mutations affecting tail development were among the earliest attempts to link gene action with a tissue-specific developmental process in a vertebrate. Her analyses of genes that interacted with Brachyury led to the discovery of (...) the t-haplotype chromosome of mouse. After 70 years, Brachyury and the multiple genes with which it interacts continue to occupy a prominent focus in developmental biology research. A goal of this review is to identify the contributions that Dobrovolskaïa-Zavadskaïa made to our current thinking about Brachyury and how she helped to shape the dawn of the field of developmental genetics. BioEssays 23:365–371, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii") je dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii". Určuji v ní blíže momenty totožnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (...) A určuji v ní též blíže momenty rozdílnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. platnost (závaznost) "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího), platnost (závaznost) (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a vztah "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii"), jsouc dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii", ukazuje, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii je antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově; a ukazuje též, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii, ač antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii, není pojmem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a nepředbíhá ani nepředjímá ani Kantův pojem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (shrink)

Tato stať - recenze - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti" - se zabývá knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti"; v jejích stopách promýšlí a domýšlí tyto otázky: 1. Jaký je dřívější zakládající a zacilující vztah k ideji vzdělanosti? 2. Jaký je nynější vztah k ideji vzdělanosti, zakládající se mimo ni a zacilující se proti ní? 3. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea dnešního "vzdělávání"? 4. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", zvláště pak ve školách jako "vzdělávacích (...) institucích"? 5. Jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje dnešního "vzdělávání" (tj. i jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", tj. i ve školách jako "vzdělávacích institucích")? - Tato recenzní stať - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti", zabývajíc se knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti" a v jejích stopách promýšlejíc a domýšlejíc ony otázky, dodává dodatek o struktuře dnešního školství, dle nějž struktura dnešního školství tkví v rozdělení na vyšší školy - továrny a nižší školy - stoky i v propojení vyšších škol - továren a nižších škol - stok posuvnou hranicí, tj. hranicí posuvnou pouze směrem nahoru, nikoli ovšem směrem dolů. (shrink)

This is the story of a textbook that students of developmental biology have used for 45 years. “An Introduction to Embryology” was released soon after a role for genes in the control of development became finally recognized but not yet well documented. Thus this book manifested the transition from embryology to developmental biology. The story of its author, Boris Balinsky, who against all odds survived to write this book, is remarkable on its own. He started his scientific career in the (...) USSR, but due to 20th century social and political upheavals, ended it in South Africa. This article will shed light on the life of Boris Balinsky, a scientist and writer and will explore the origins of his book. BioEssays 27:970–977, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe social content of affective stimuli has been proposed as having an influence on cognitive processing and behaviour. This research was aimed, therefore, at studying whether automatic exogenous attention demanded by affective pictures was related to their social value. We hypothesised that affective social pictures would capture attention to a greater extent than non-social affective stimuli. For this purpose, we recorded event-related potentials in a sample of 24 participants engaged in a digit categorisation task. Distracters were affective pictures varying in (...) social content, in addition to affective valence and arousal, which appeared in the background during the task. Our data revealed that pictures depicting high social content captured greater automatic attention than other pictures, as reflected by the greater amplitude and shorter latency of anterior P2, and anterior and posterior N2 components of the ERPs. In addition, social content also provoked greater allocation of processing resour... (shrink)