Western scholarship on religion and gender has devoted considerable attention to women’s entry into leadership roles across various religious traditions and denominations. However, very little is known about the dynamics of women’s religious authority and leadership in developing settings, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a region of powerful and diverse religious expressions. This study employs a combination of uniquely rich and diverse data to examine women’s formal religious authority in a predominantly Christian setting in Mozambique. I first use survey data to (...) test hypotheses regarding the prevalence and patterns of women’s formal leadership across different denominational groups. I then support and extend the quantitative results with insights on pathways and consequences of women’s ascent to formal congregation authority drawn from qualitative data. The analysis illustrates how women’s religious authority both defies and reasserts the gendered constraints of the religious marketplace and the broader gender ideology in this developing context. (shrink)

This paper identifies the unease underlying the paradoxical «return» of political philosophy in France, an academic phenomenon accompanied by critic denunciations from those authors who aim to distance themselves from traditional «political philosophy». Two significant examples from this rejection are represented by Hannah Arendt (according to the interpretation provided by Miguel Abensour) and Alain Badiou, a fierce critic of Arendt, what constitutes another paradox. From this point of view their search for Truth in a record different from Political Philosophy maybe (...) deserves to try an unprecedented conciliation from both parties.  . (shrink)

Un certain nombre de critiques ont affirmé que dans la doctrine de Descartes il n’y a aucune possibilité d’une esthétique. La plupart des autres ont pensé qu’il y avait, dans cette doctrine, tout au moins une esthétique implicite et que cette esthétique, dont ils empruntaient les traits, non à Descartes lui-même, mais à des critiques comme Boileau, d’Aubignae, Bosse, de Chambray, etc., était rigoureusement rationaliste, Descartes ayant « confondu le Beau dans le Vrai ».J’ai essayé de montrer qu’il y a (...) une esthétique cartésienne explicite : que 1° cette esthétique est moins pauvre qu’on ne Ta dit, si Ton tient compte de tout ce qui dans les Lettres du philosophe est relatif à l’art ; que 2° le Compendium musicæ est plus riche en théorie qu’on ne l’a cru et que les vues qu’y développe Descartes ne valent pas seulement pour la musique ; que 3° ces vues ne sont pas rigoureusement intellectualistes, mais que la part qui y est faite à la sensation et à l’association est au moins égale à celle revendiquée pour la raison ; que 4° s’étant posé la question de savoir ce qu’est le Beau en général, Descartes a conclu qu’il est impossible de le déterminer, qu’il n’y a pas d’évidence esthétique et que, en dernière analyse, « ce qui plaira à plus de gens pourra être nommé simplement le plus beau ». (shrink)

In nature scent is important for man primarily as a marker of food and sexual attractiveness, it polarizes as objects of life and decay, death. Scent, just like touch and taste exists till subject and object get opposed to each other, it is the sphere where body is included into material world, and flesh of the world is incrusted into the body. Aesthetics in its anthropologic meaning is limited by a body- perceptible dimension. Development of such categories as the sublime, (...) tragic, comic are not possible here. Creation of compound aromas, including those which do not exist in nature, can not overstep the limits of the beautiful- -ugly opposition. There is no contradiction, nourishing the comic, the tragic or the sublime, in blending of body with the world by means of scent. The spectrum of the aesthetic in the sphere of aromas is expanded in the plane from the beautiful to the ugly: fragrant, heady, amber, garlic, carpic, putrid, hideous, stinking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forms of Life and Cultural EndowmentsVictor Peterson IIYou know, honey, us colored folk is branches without roots and that makes things come round in queer ways.—Zora Neale Hurston (Their Eyes Were Watching God 15)what does it mean when we speak of a form of life? When speaking of a form of life, we consider one different from others by way of its mode of expression, that is, by its (...) means of construction. This interpretation lends itself to a functional analysis of the material put to use and whose operations jointly express the concept we are after. Modes of expression can be plotted between a rhetorical and semantic axis (Gates 48). As such, "[t]he level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes of a culture and take on additional more active ideological dimensions" (Hall 56). Coordinates within this domain encode signifying practices, revitalizing the traditional concept of signification as a function of what's signified with respect to a signifier. The content of a syntagm in this coordinate system, a point in this plane, indexes its function with respect to others. As such, we will conceive of the content of modes of expression functionally.A function is defined by pairing an element from a domain and another from a sub/co-domain whereby that pair is an element of that function. In this way, we can treat functions as abstract objects. If we treat a domain as what determines the availability of an expression, and a sub/co-domain as representative of its range of application, then the function of applying some proposition maps a movement from a domain of selection to one of composition, that is, its use with respect to others. The function of an expression, then, represents an operation over the possible worlds of its appropriate application (Taylor 201–02, 269, 276). This becomes more interesting when considering assertions whereby one subject is known to be the case for another, a concept that's modeled when a proposition from one is appearing in the object position of another (Fara 65–73). Resultingly, a proposal for an [End Page 26] ontology constituted by modes of interaction rather than identity stipulations to physical entities arises. It follows that if a form of life is understood by way of its mode of expression, then its content is expressed as an ensemble of the functions of its operations. Let this ensemble of functions be called an endowment.There is a pervasive debate in cultural studies that obsesses over proprietary notions as well as the ability to locate an origin. With that in mind, let us consider a coordinate system where there are two perpendicular axes, and we define positions within the space provided at the intersection of lines drawn from each. Each axis is represented by an ordered series of markers. A line drawn from each axis indicates that the coordinates indexed at their intersection is a function of these two markers. This locates an individual at a point in that domain, indexing a relation between the axes framing that space. Therefore, that coordinate-wise space, here a domain of possible expression, is not "empty" as pessimists would claim, but is filled with functional-content, albeit functions yet applied and marked by a point in that plane.Although we are currently speaking of two-dimensional space, the same follows for as many dimensions as we want. A point's location is a function of three values in three dimensions, four in four dimensions, and so on. Forms of life, then, will be comprised of four dimensions. This allows for a space-time conception, wherein joint expressions bend space-time and that space dictates those individuals' possible movements. From this, we construct a geometrical model of space-time represented as a cube composed of two-dimensional slices with these slices extending in a particular direction like cards stacked one on top of the other to model time.We want our conception of a form of life to be spatial. After all, it... (shrink)

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

This thought-provoking book, first published in 1991, examines sexual politics in a world which is being radically changed by the challenges of feminism. Seidler explores how men have responded to feminism, and the contradictory feelings men have towards dominant forms of masculinity. Seidler’s stimulating and original analysis of social and political theory connects personally to everyday issues in people’s lives. It reflects the growing importance of sexual and personal politics within contemporary politics and culture, and demonstrates clearly the challenge that (...) feminism brings to our inherited forms of morality, politics and sexuality. (shrink)

On the face of it, On Tyranny is a straightforward commentary on Xenophon's dialogue Hiero or Tyrannicus. As such it is a very model of thoroughness and learning. It amply repays careful study, and it goes a long way toward explaining Strauss's influence in training a generation of scholars. The dialogue proper takes up just under 20 pages. Its analysis runs to 90-odd pages, followed by another 30 pages of tightly packed notes that are largely devoted to parallels between the (...) Hiero, Xenophon's teaching as a whole, and the teachings of Plato, of Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, of Cicero. What at first appears as an exercise in textual analysis soon reveals itself as a much broader undertaking: the delineation of the main features of classical political philosophy. Strauss does not mean to deny that differences in perspective, procedure, and even conclusions separate the major representatives of classical political philosophy. He does want to maintain, however, that their agreements are more fundamental than are their differences. But even this is incidental to his main purpose: to understand classical political philosophy for the guidance it might provide in understanding the great moral and political problems that confront us here and now. He conceives of these problems in large measure as the consequence of modern philosophy, of what he calls "the modern project." But modern philosophy cannot be understood on its own terms alone any more than it can be understood by directly confronting it with the phenomena. For it does not owe its most characteristic features to such a confrontation. It owes them, rather, to the fact that, from its very outset, it defined itself in explicit contrast to classical philosophy. Modern philosophy is essentially derivative. It presupposes the tradition it opposes. Classical philosophy, and in particular classical political philosophy, on the other hand "... belongs to the fertile moment when all political traditions were shaken, and there was not yet in existence a tradition of political philosophy." Hence "only in the light of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns can modernity be understood. By rediscovering the urgency of this quarrel we return to the origins of modernity." It further follows from this line of reasoning that the quarrel must be re-kindled if we are once again to gain access to the phenomena themselves. To this end historical studies become necessary which do not presuppose that the whole issue has, for all intents and purposes, been settled in favor of the moderns. The most basic and most constant assumption of Strauss's historical studies is, therefore, the assumption that classical philosophy is truer than are any of the teachings that criticize or reject it. The passion and the inventiveness with which he defends this assumption sufficiently prove that he does not put it forward merely for reasons of method or of rhetoric. Yet it seems to fall short of being his settled belief. By stressing his agreements with the ancients and his disagreements with the moderns, by holding the moderns responsible for the great problems that face us while calling for a restoration of classical political philosophy, he fosters the impression that his own views coincide fully with those of classical political philosophy. But even if classical political philosophy spoke with a single clear voice, the fact remains that "no competent man of our age would regard as simply true the complete teaching of any thinker of the past." Presumably only someone who thinks himself competent would issue such a warning. (shrink)

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to (...) the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection. (shrink)

This article introduces the notion of multiple glocalizations as a means of analysing Christianity’s historical record and argues that multiple glocalizations are constitutive of the intertwining between religion and historical globalization. It proposes that four concrete forms of glocalization can be observed: vernacularization, indigenization, nationalization and transnationalization. Each of these offers different combinations of universal religiosity and local particularism. The salience of this interpretation is demonstrated through a cursory analysis of the historical record of Christianity’s fragmentation. It is argued that (...) the very construction of distinct religious traditions (Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism) is an expression of this broader process. Finally, the historical record of Eastern Orthodox Christianity is examined in order to provide for additional historical instances of these forms of glocalization. (shrink)

La violencia actual en África posee un componente traumático cuyo origen se sitúa en el pasado colonial. Comprender esas heridas que aún se expanden por las sociedades africanas es el objetivo del presente texto. Para ello, y con especial atención en la dimensión mental de la violencia, se estudia la violencia colonial, las respuestas surgidas desde el ámbito colonizado y se mantiene una tesis particular acerca de la pugna por el mundo, en sentido arendtiano, y su relación con la política (...) y la violencia. Por último, se argumenta por una separación teórica entre éstas, apostando por la política en África desde la comprensión y mitigación, precisamente, del trauma colonial. (shrink)