Autism provides a model for exploring the nature of self‐consciousness: self‐consciousness requires the ability to reflect on mental states, and autism is a disorder with a specific impairment in the neurocognitive mechanism underlying this ability. Experimental studies of normal and abnormal development suggest that the abilities to attribute mental states to self and to others are closely related. Thus inability to pass standard ‘theory of mind’ tests, which refer to others’ false beliefs, may imply lack of self‐consciousness. Individuals who persistently (...) fail these tests may, in the extreme, be unable to reflect on their intentions or to anticipate their own actions. In contrast, individuals with high‐functioning autism or Asperger syndrome often possess a late‐acquired, explicit theory of mind, which appears to be the result of effortful learning. An experimental study with three people with Asperger syndrome suggested that level of performance on standard theory of mind tasks was strongly related to the ability to engage in introspection. Qualitative differences in the introspections of high‐functioning people with autism are also reflected in autobiographical accounts which may give a glimpse of what it is like to be autistic. (shrink)

The paper presents some essential heuristic and constructional elements of Free Process Theory (FPT), a non-Whiteheadian, monocategoreal framework. I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a free process. I argue that an activity is not a type but a mode of occurrence, defined in terms of a network of inferences. The inferential space characterizing our concept of an activity entails that anything which (...) is conceived of as occurring in the activity mode is a concrete,dynamic, non-particular individual. Such individuals, which I call free processes, may be used for the interpretation of much more than just common sense activities. I introduce the formal theory FPT, a mereology with anon-transitive part-relation, which contains a typology of processes based on the following five parameters relating to: (a) patterns of possible spatial and temporal recurrence (automerity); (b) kinds of components (participant structure); (c) kinds of dynamic composition; (d) kinds of dynamic flow (dynamic shape); and (e) dynamic context. I show how these five evaluative dimensions for free processes can be used to define ontological correlates for various common sense categories,and to draw distinctions between various forms of agency(distributed, collective, reciprocal, entangled) and emergence (weak, strong,as autonomous system (Bickhard/Christensen)). (shrink)

General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense (...) concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a general process. General processes are not individuated in terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of their dynamic relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional mereology, albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a brief sketch of basic notions and strategies of the GPT-framework I show how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, functional, self-maintaining, and recursively self-maintaining interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses of the term. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...) needs to be represented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suffer from a disconnection between a strong naı¨ve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that the currently used distinction between first-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of allocentrism. (shrink)

Abstract“Integrative Social Robotics” (ISR) is a new approach or general method for generating social robotics applications in a responsible and “culturally sustainable” fashion. Currently social robotics is caught in a basic difficulty we call the “triple gridlock of description, evaluation, and regulation”. We briefly recapitulate this problem and then present the core ideas of ISR in the form of five principles that should guide the development of applications in social robotics. Characteristic of ISR is to intertwine a mixed method approach (...) (i.e., conducting experimental, quantitative, qualitative, and phenomenological research for the same envisaged application) with conceptual and axiological analysis as required in professional studies in applied ethics; moreover, ISR is value-drivenand abides by the “Non-Replacement Principle”:Social robots may only do what humans should but cannot do. We briefly compare ISR to other value-sensitive or value-directed design models, with a view to the task of overcoming the triple gridlock. Finally, working from an advanced classification of pluridiscplinary research, we argue that ISR establishes a research format that can turn social robotics into a new transdiscipline. (shrink)

Corresponding to our best physical theories and going against our intuitions the term now is not related to events in the world in a direct way. This knowledge is supported by modern neurobiological investigations. The neurobiological conception of now is compared with the analysis of concepts concerning this issue. The conception turns out to be highly compatible with this analysis. In the last section of the paper I will argue for a considerable link between the notion of truth and the (...) notion of nowness in view of the meta-structure of now. German In Übereinstimmung mit unseren besten physikalischen Theorien und entgegen unserer Intuition bezieht sich der Ausdruck jetzt nicht unmittelbar auf Ereignisse in der Welt - diese Erkenntnis lässt sich durch die neuere neurobiologische Forschung untermauern. Das neurobiologische Zeitkonzept wird sprachphilosophischen Analysen zu diesem Thema gegenübergestellt; es erweist sich mit ihnen als recht gut vereinbar. Im letzten Teil des Beitrags argumentiere ich im Hinblick auf die Metastruktur von jetzt für eine bedeutsame Verbindungslinie zwischen dem Wahrheits-und dem Gegenwärtigkeitsbegriff. (shrink)

The museum of Trebizond houses a seal with a metrical legend of special interest, documenting a Synadenos, who had for some time been in a Sicilian prison but managed to escape, and thanks the apostle Thomas for this liberation. He might be Andronikos Synadenos, the husband of Theodora Komnene, a daughter of Alexios I, who served with distinction as general and as diplomat. As a military commander he maintained order in several border regions such as Dyrrachion, Niš, Cyprus, and finally (...) Trebizond. The legend of the seal enhances the information from his epitaph which is known from Codex Marc. gr. 574: Synadenos must have been taken prisoner as dux of Dyrrachion, either at the fights during the Second Crusade in 1147/49, or during the failed expedition to Southern Italy; it ended in 1158 by a peace treaty which included an exchange of prisoners. The seal stems from Synadenos’ last post in his military career as dux of Trapezunt (before 1179), since it was found there. A parallel piece, also published in this article, is nowadays in Dumbarton Oaks. (shrink)

There is a well-known tension within Sellars' scheme arising from commitments to both an anti-foundationalist epistemology and a Peircean scientific realism. This tension surfaces conspicuously in his treatment of ontological category theory. On the one hand, Sellars applies and extends Carnap's metalinguistic deflation of ontology. On the other hand, however, Sellars is not prepared to 'go conventionalist' but upholds the possibility of a "positive ontology" (Rosenberg). I offer a new reading of Sellars’ Carus Lectures in which I combine two projects. (...) First, I argue that Sellars provides us here with the sketch of a method of ‘category projection’ which can be used, within the setting of Sellars' scheme, to 'transcend from within' the limitations of category theories developed in non-Peircean conceptual structures and to enable us non-Peirceans to make any justifiable descriptive claims about the structure of reality. In the course of doing so I also offer a new reading of Sellars' Carus Lectures, highlighting the systematic advantages that motivated Sellars to view a process ontological interpretation of sensation. (shrink)

This thesis promotes a therapeutic revision of fundamental assumptions in contemporary ontological thought. I show that none of the extant standard theories of objects provides a viable account of the numerical, qualitative, and trans-temporal identity of objects, and that this is due to certain substance-ontological premises. I argue that in order to state the identity conditions of objects we must abandon these premises, together with the idea that objects enjoy ontological primacy. ;I follow a methodological program of formally criticizing an (...) ontological framework by demonstrating that each of the theories developed within this framework is incoherent, i.e., either inconsistent or subject to vicious regress. I proceed in three steps. First, I show that the substance-ontological paradigm cannot be characterized in terms of its basic entities, since there is no extensional, intensional, or functional definition of the notion of substance common to all extant substance ontologies; consequently, I propose to describe the substance-ontological paradigm in terms of its basic assumptions. ;Second, I analyze the contemporary discussion of the problem of individuality, the problem of universals, and the problem of persistence, and uncover 22 characteristic implicit assumptions of substance ontology. I show on the basis of representative examples that, due to their commitment to substance-ontological presuppositions, all extant types of solutions to the three mentioned problems are incoherent. In particular, I take issue with the bare particular view, the qualified particular view, and the bundle view of individuality; different varieties of platonist and nominalist theories of universals and of relational and functional theories of predication; and the endurance and perdurance approaches to persistence. ;Third, while historical process-ontological schemes have dropped some of the revealed substance-ontological presuppositions, I finally explore the result of rejecting all of them and sketch a scheme based on dynamic masses which promises to yield coherent explanations of the ontological features of those complex processes which we commonly consider to be objects. (shrink)

Autism: Mind and Brain provides a comprehensive overview of the latest research on autism and highlights new techniques that will progress future understanding. With contributions from leaders in autism research, the book describes the latest advances, discusses ways forward for future research, and presents new techniques for understanding this complex disorder.

According to the standard view of particularity, an entity is a particular just in case it necessarily has a unique spatial location at any time of its existence. That the basic entities of the world we speak about in common sense and science are particular entities in this sense is the thesis of “foundational particularism,” a theoretical intuition that has guided Western ontological research from its beginnings to the present day. The main aim of this paper is to review the (...) notion of particularity and its role in ontology. I proceed in four steps. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of the tasks of ontology as “theory of categorial inference in L”. An ontological theory states which (combinations of) entity types or categories make true L-sentences true; the features of the stipulated categories explain why L-speakers are entitled to draw certain material inferences from the classificatory expressions of L. Second, I draw attention to the fact that since Aristotle this theoretical program typically has been implemented with peculiar restrictions prescribing certain combinations of category features, e.g., the combination of particularity, concreteness, individuality, and subjecthood. I briefly sketch how these restrictions of the “substance paradigm” or “myth of substance” are reinforced by the standard readings of predicate-logical constants, viz. the existential quantifier and the identity sign. Third, I argue that in the context of the substance paradigm foundational particularism is incoherent. I discuss the current standard conceptions of particulars as developed in the debate about individuation (bare particulars, nude particulars, tropes) and show that their main difficulties derive from the traditional restriction that particulars are so also logical subjects and/or individuals. Fourth, to show that the traditional linkages of category features are not conceptual necessities, I sketch the outlines of an ontology (General Process Theory) based on non-particular individuals. For ontologists in computer science working with description logic this monocategoreal ontology based on more or less generic ‘dynamics’ may hold special interest. As General Process Theory documents, ontologists may well abandon the notion of particularity: in common sense and science we do reason about items that have a unique spatial location at any time, but the uniqueness of their location can be taken to be a contingent affair. (shrink)

A complexidade da realidade humana não permite que a razão instrumental esgote explicativamente os elementos que compõe a realidade educacional. Surge a necessidade de uma atitude aberta e atenta para compreender aquilo que se recusa e esconde na cotidianidade. A fenomenologia hermenêutica é consciência dos limites da racionalidade, postura vigilante, um desafio para a responsabilidade e criatividade na atividade pedagógica.

Parfit’s Branch Line argument is intended to show that the relation of survival is possibly a one-many relation and thus different from numerical identity. I offer a detailed reconstruction of Parfit’s notions of survival and personal identity, and show the argument cannot be coherently formulated within Parfit’s own setting. More specifically, I argue that Parfit’s own specifications imply that the “R-relation”, i.e., the relation claimed to capture of “what matters in survival,” turns out to hold not only along but also (...) across the branches representing the development of a reduplicated person. This curious fact of ‘interbranch survival,’ as I call it, has gone unnoticed so far. The fact that the R-relation also holds across branches creates a trilemma for Parfit’s approach. Either the envisaged notion of personal identity is circular, or the R-relation fails as a reconstruction of the common sense notion of survival, or talk about persons ‘branching’ (being reduplicated etc.) remains semantically empty. In the paper’s last section I suggest that my criticism does not detract from the larger systematic significance of Parfit’s argument. The argument is simply terminologically miscalibrated. Even though Parfit’s branch line argument fails to establish the conceptual separability of survival and identity, it can be used to show the separability of sameness and numerical identity, which should have similar implications for meta-ethics as the original argument. (shrink)

Illusory Abiding: The Cultural Construction of the Chan Monk Zhongfeng Mingben. By Natasha Heller. Harvard East Asian Monographs, vol. 368. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, Harvard Univ. Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 471. $49.95.

O artigo acompanha a reflexão de alguns autores do século XX no que se refere à questão do conhecimento, sobretudo nas discussões em torno da dicotomia mente e mundo. Esses autores são McDowell, Putnam e Rorty. A ênfase é colocada na importância e na necessidade de que aquele que contemporaneamente investiga algum aspecto da realidade, se ocupe também em refletir sobre os pressupostos e fundamentos que operam na sua teoria e na sua prática. Os autores em questão indicam algumas dificuldades (...) e movimentos que acontecem no âmbito das teorias do conhecimento, de modo a ajudar o pesquisador atual a compreender as aporias que percorrem os substratos fundamentadores do seu pensar e fazer investigativo. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 3 Seiten: 749-754.

Carnap’s thought not only played a pivotal role for the development of formal semantics and modern philosophy of science, but also engendered the profound methodological reorientation that distinguishes analytical from traditional ontology. Historically and systematically, Carnap’s formal approach to category theory is the primary source of influence on the three research programs that have given analytical ontology its distinctive profile: the design of constructional systems, the investigation of the expressive power of first order theories, and the meta-linguistic reduction of abstract (...) terms. Each of these research programs takes off from Carnap’s deflation of traditional category theory as set out in the Aufbau and modified in Syntax. None of these programs, however, follow Carnap in his claim that category theory, even in the attenuated sense of a derivational systematization of cognitive contents, may ultimately be separated from metaphysics or remain metaphysically “neutral.” Carnap’s “neutralism thesis” is taken to imply the stronger “elimination thesis,” his explicit anti-metaphysical pronouncements that stand and fall with semantic verificationism. However, I will argue, first, that the neutralism thesis is historically and systematically independent of the elimination thesis. Second, unlike the elimination thesis, the neutrality claim and Carnap’s attempt to cash it out in the Aufbau is important for the methodology of contemporary ontology, at least where it follows constructivist predilections. Third, Carnap’s neutrality claim in the Aufbau is supported by an implicit conception of reality as invariance-structure. Yet, just as the structuralization of referential domains may be able to warrant neutrality, it threatens the explanatory aspirations of constitution theory. This tension between neutrality and explanatory power sheds new light on the notion of “foundedness,” Carnap’s curious restriction on the interpretation of the system’s basic relation that has struck some as outright incoherent. (shrink)

The paper traces, historically and systematically, the influence of Carnap’s philosophical program on the writings of Nelson Goodman, focusing on the relationship between Carnap’s Aufbau and Goodman’s Structure of Appearance. In particular, drawing on unpublished material from the Carnap Research Archives, I show that Carnap had already anticipated Goodman’s criticism of the method of quasi-analysis and that Goodman misconstrued the status of this procedure on several counts. I also argue that Carnap’s anti-metaphysical stance left his approach with an explanatory deficit (...) which Goodman’s pragmatist pluralism is able to address. (shrink)

Substance ontologists claim that substances are ontologically primary because the category of substance enjoys unique explanatory potential. Unless it can be shown that "only" substances fulfill the central explanatory tasks in ontology, this inference from explanatory success to ontological primacy amounts to a fallacy akin to the error Whitehead called 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness'. I investigate recent prototypical arguments for substance metaphysics and try to show that some explanatory functions of substance can also be fulfilled by other ontological categories. (...) In particular, I argue against M. Ayers that there is no reason to think that all and only substances are discrete individuals, natural wholes, and logical units. I conclude that the category of substance does not provide us with a uniquely powerful explanans for the notion of logical and physical unity. (shrink)

Processes constitute the world of human experience - from nature to cognition to social reality. Yet our philosophical and scientific theories of nature and experience have traditionally prioritized concepts for static objects and structures. The essays collected here call for a review of the role of dynamic categories in the language of theories. They present old and new descriptive tools for the modelling of dynamic domains, and argue for the merits of process-based explanations in ontology, cognitive science, semiotics, linguistics, philosophy (...) of mind, robotics, theoretical biology, music theory, and philosophy of chemistry and physics. The collection is of interest to professional researchers in any of these fields; it establishes - for the very first time - crossdisciplinary contact among recent process-based research movements and might witness a conceptual paradigm shift in the making. (shrink)

Exploring the conceptual baseline of Parsons's sociology and maintaining focus on its links with 20th century history, this book sheds light on the requirements of analytical rigor in the social sciences through examination of the debates in which Parsons was engaged throughout his life. In addition to revisiting Parsons's extensive oeuvre, Uta Gerhardt takes up various themes in current research and theory - including social inequality, civic culture, and globalization - thus demonstrating what the conceptual approaches of Parsons can accomplish (...) today. (shrink)

The depiction model presents a major advance in our theoretical conceptualization of how humans experience and understand social robots. But the scope of the model is, I suggest, more limited: It pertains to one possible phase in a more comprehensive cognitive-practical dynamics of sense-making (“sociomorphing”) as conceptualized in the OASIS framework. According to the OASIS framework, some basic social actions can be realized by robots, while others may be depicted in the way described by the model.

This paper discusses how facet-like structures occur as a commonplace feature in a variety of computer science disciplines as a means for structuring class hierarchies. The paper then focuses on a mathematical model for facets (and class hierarchies in general), called formal concept analysis, and discusses graphical representations of faceted systems based on this model.