Missing information in one of the first three writings of the Book of the Twelve can be filled in by reading all three of them in sequence, so that understanding one prophet depends on reading the others. Five topics—the superscriptions, the call to return to YHWH, the Day of the Lord, the end of God's patience, and the Sinai Torah—are considered in detail before introducing redaction-critical hypotheses.

To read literature is to read the way literature reads. René Girard’s immense body of work supports this thesis bountifully. Whether engaging the European novel, ancient Greek tragedy, Shakespeare’s plays, or Jewish and Christian scripture, Girard teaches us to read prophetically, not by offering a method he has developed, but by presenting the methodologies they have developed, the interpretative readings already available within (and constitutive of) such bodies of classical writing. In The Prophetic Law, literary scholar, theorist, and critic Sandor (...) Goodhart divides his essays on René Girard since 1983 into four groupings. In three, he addresses Girardian concerns with Biblical scripture (Genesis and Exodus), literature (the European novel and Shakespeare), and philosophy and religious studies issues (especially ethical and Jewish subject matters). In a fourth section, he reproduces some of the polemical exchanges in which he has participated with others—including René Girard himself—as part of what could justly be deemed Jewish-Christian dialogue. The twelve texts that make up the heart of this captivating volume constitute the bulk of the author’s writings to date on Girard outside of his three previous books on Girardian topics. Taken together, they offer a comprehensive engagement with Girard’s sharpest and most original literary, anthropological, and scriptural insights. (shrink)

La diffusion des révisions hiéronymiennes des Bibles latines s’est faite notamment à travers les textes liturgiques latins. La présente communication s’intéresse à l’utilisation de l’oeuvre du moine de Bethléem dans les prières des livres liturgiques (missels, sacramentaires et bénédictions pontificales). Elle est centrée sur les citations des livres dits “des petits prophètes”. Si l’oeuvre de Jérôme s’impose progressivement dans la vie liturgique occidentale à partir de la deuxième moitié du VIIe et du VIIIe siècle, plusieurs missels et sacramentaires comportent aussi (...) bien des citations de la révision de Jérôme que de versions des Vieilles latines. C’est notamment le cas de sacramentaires irlandais de la fin du VIIe siècle et du missel gallican dit Missale Gothicum, datant des années 700. À cette époque, l’oeuvre de Jérôme n’est donc pas encore utilisée par la liturgie comme un ensemble unifié. La citation et l’allusion aux anciennes traductions latines persiste même dans la péninsule ibérique et la liturgie mozarabe jusqu’au XIIe siècle. Une étude détaillée des allusions au livre II de Jonas montre que des morceaux de versets issus des Vieilles latines se sont maintenus pendant tout le Moyen-Âge dans des livres ayant recours à la Vulgate, peut-être parce qu’ils étaient passés dans la culture biblique collective. Cet article souligne donc la nécessité d’une analyse détaillée, livre liturgique par livre liturgique, pour étudier les citations de la Bible dans la liturgie latine, car une même pièce liturgique peut emprunter à plusieurs traductions différentes. (shrink)

This article examines the current use of Jesus language in a convenience sample of twenty-five mission statements from Roman Catholic hospitals and health care systems in the United States. Only twelve statements specifically use the words “Jesus” or “Christ” in their mission statements. The author advocates the use of explicit Jesus language and modeling. While the witness of Jesus in the Gospel healing narratives is not the only corrective to current abuses in the health care delivery system, it is (...) foundational to the integrity of Roman Catholic health care identity and mission. An analysis of Gospel healing narratives is used to illustrate the prophetic dimension of Jesus' wisdom, word, and witness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIMETIC THEORY AND THE PROGRAM OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS Lillian E. Dykes Memphis, Tennessee No prophet can claim to bring a final message unless he says things mat will have a sound of reality in the ears of victims.... (William James, The Variety ofReligious Experience) Is it possible to live nonviolently? The works of René Girard involve us in understanding of the Gospel's revelation of the mechanisms of violence and (...) nonviolence, but how is one to begin applying the Gospel to end violence? If Girard shows us thatviolence is the basis ofall culture and religion, where does one find a new model today? Ifthe shift from human to transcendent mediation results only in personal destruction, then why bother? IfGirard is correct, and the power ofthe nonviolent Gospel is moving like a vapor through the world, where are the people who are living non-violently? Is there corroboration for Girard's statement, "A new kind ofhumanity is in the process of gestation; it will be both very similar to and very different from the one featured in the dreams of our Utopian thinkers" (Things Hidden 445)? Ifit were possible to show that someone, somewhere were able to live in community without the protection ofscapegoating, following their lead might save us from the spirals ofviolence we arecreating. Ifone could find a design or an application ofGirard's theories, with confirmation that the resultis peace, would people be willingto consider giving upthe protection of violence? Some demonstration that Girard's understanding of Gospel Lillian E. Dykes91 non-violence is practical and possible seems necessary in order to hasten a non-violent cure for our violent world. Perhaps we must accept on faith that it is possible to live non-violently. Ifit were not, then why would the Gospels have ever been written and why have they persisted? In my examination ofhistorical applications ofnonviolence, it seemed that whenever non-violence was implemented, the results were remarkable. Of course, we think of Jesus, Paul, Francis, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King...but they are all dead and most ofthem were murdered. Yet there is a modern community where Girard's theories ofnon-violence through the relinquishment ofhuman mediation is being lived out daily. And, thankfully, it is a flourishing community that experiences healing and renewal through the practice ofwhat René Girard terms "the abandonment ofmimetic desire" (Things Hidden 430). The world is witnessing the healing power of non-violence without knowingthatGospel non-violence is involved. Millions ofmen andwomen are attempting to live non-violently in the "Utopian" community ofGirard and the Gospels without havingread Girard and withoutthe need to believe in the truth ofthe Gospels. It seems to me that the twentieth century has seen the establishment of a community not based upon scapegoating but, rather, upon having been scapegoated. It is a fellowship ofthe Spirit that distinguishes itself by being a fellowship ofbelievers without "religious" scapegoating. Itresembles first century Christianity and is experiencingthe same explosive growth. This phenomenon is what I call the non-violent "religion" ofAlcoholics Anonymous. In this Fellowship of A. A. we can see what might be called, in Girardian terms, a community of scapegoats. Since 1935 there has been a laboratory wherein the theories of René Girard are beingapplied. Bill Wilson, anothervisionary, intuitedthe underlying mimetic principles which Girard shows us, and implemented his understandings in orderto escape the violence1 ofhis addiction to alcohol. Though he did not articulate what he discovered in the way that René Girard has, Wilson found a way to break free ofmimetic desire. He knew that to continue to drink would result in his death (AA 13). Though he did not speak ofhis dilemma in terms ofmimetic crisis, he found a way out of alcoholism by exchanging the mediator of his desires. What Girard discovered and now describes is demonstrated by the practical applications 1In the words of Jack Alexander, "There is a close resemblance between the criminal psychopath and the alcoholic mind. Both are grandiose, resentful, defiant, and hating of authority; both unconsciously destroy themselves trying to destroy others" (Pass it on 364). 92Mimetic Theory andAlcoholic Anonymous contained in the writings of Wilson, in the book Alcoholics Anonymous, with its Twelve Steps, and the Twelve Traditions... (shrink)

Many mawlids (mawlid al-nabī) have been written as a reflection of the love for the prophet Muhammad. Süleymān Çelebi’s (d. 825/1422) Wasila al-nacāt, has been seen as the founding work in Turkish literature in this category. The effect of Wasila al-nacāt has continued for centuries, and inspired many other mawlids. One of them is Enverī Erzincānī’s work named Mawlūd al-sharīf (Sumbul al-gulzār al-kalām al-kadīm). In literature tradition, mawlids are written in masnawī in ​​verse form, Mawlūd al-sharīf was written in style. (...) ode. In this respect, the work can be seen as an exception between the other ones. Another remarkable aspect of the work is the similarity between the two stories in Nasibī al-mawlid which is estimated to be written in XV. or XVI. century. Until now, no academic work has been done about Mawlūd al-sharīf. The sources that provide information about Mawlūd al-sharīf report about, two copies, one in Çorum Hasanpasha Manuscript Library (Çorum Hasanpaşa Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi) and the other in Kastamonu Manuscript Library (Kastamonu Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi). Research showed that the copy in Kastamonu was in fact another copy of Wasila al-nacāt another copy of Mawlūd al-sharīf was also found in the Çorum Hasanpasha Manuscript Library (Çorum Hasanpaşa Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi). The number of couplets of Mawlūd al-sharīf has increased to 202 with the finding of the second copy. About the author of the work that is approximatly written in the XVII. or XVIII. century no information could be found. This study, introduces the Mawlūd al-sharīf and its authors, compares it with Wasila al-nacāt and presents an critical analysis of the text.Summary: The term mawlid means birth, birth time and place of birth. It was used to describe works such as the birth of the Prophet, miracles and the death of the Prophet. Next to these there also many mawlids about the lifes of Fatīma the daughter of the Prophet and her husband Alī, and few about the lifes of a spiritual guide. The first examples of this type seen in Arabic literature are Ibn Dihya al-Kalbī (d. 633/1235), Muhammad al-Azafī (d. 633/1236) and Cafar b. Hasan al-Barzancī (d. 1177/1764); Muhammad b. Masūd el-Kāzarūnī (d. 758/1356) and Sūzanī (d. 569/1173). The celebrations related to mawlid have turned into ceremonial form in the era of the Fatimies. The Fatimies held, Mawlid-al-Alī, Mawlid al-Hasan, Mawlid al-Husayin and Mawlid al-Fatīma ceremonies next to the Prophet’s. The first mawlid ceremony in the form of today was seen in the time of Muzaffar al-Dīn Gokboru (d. 630/1233).Different ideas have been put forward about the first mawlid text in Turkish literature, but Süleymān Çelebi’s Wasila al-nacat has been accepted as a pioneer work in the recognition and love of this kind. Many mawlids were written with the influence of Wasila al-nacat. The likeness of the content and the motifs of the majority of mawlids to Wasila al-nacat is interpreted as a strong sign indicating its importance in this genre. The translation of Wasila al-nacat into Arabic, Circassian, Greek, Kurdish, Tatar, Sawamish, English, German, Albanian, Bosnian... languages ​​should be considered as a factor that exposes its breadth.It is estimated that around 200 Turkish mawlids have been written, but this number is increasing with new studies. One of these mawlids is the work of Enverî Erzincānī called Mawlūd al-sharīf Ethem Erkoç and Mehmet Fatih Köksal are the researchers who have been aware of the existence of this work for the first time. Both researchers mention that the work has 142 couplets and the only copy is that in the Çorum Hasanpasha Writing Works Library (Çorum Hasanpaşa Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi). In his work called Mawlid-nāma Köksal states that there is a second copy of the work, but the copy of Kastamonu, which is known as the second copy, is actually a copy of Wasila al-nacat. In the present study, another more bulky version of Mawlūd al-sharīf was recorded in Çorum Hasanpasha Manuscript Library (Çorum Hasanpaşa Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi). In the catalogs of the National Library (Milli Kütüphane) and Çorum Hasanpasha Manuscript Library (Çorum Hasanpaşa Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi), the mawlid is indicated as Persian; the reason fort his mistake might be, the fact that the first twelve of the text is Persian.Although there were many poets who used the pseudonym Enverī there is no poet in Turkish literature, who was from Erzincan and wrote a mawlid with the same pseudonym. It was understood that the poet was a sayyid.In five places the author’s name or pseudonym is mentioned. His work shows that he is from Erzincān and that he has a mawlid. As a mawlid poet Enverī, adopted a quite ambitious style. He praises himself for writing in Persian, being the best Persian speaker in this area, and boasted his pure character and wise poetry.In the headlines of the copies the work is called Mawlūd al-sharīf / Sunbul al-gulzār al-kalām al-kadīm. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to consider the work as a double name sage. The copies do not include a record of the copyright date of the work. According to the second copy, which is shorter and which has the impression that it is incomplete, the work was copied in 1249/1833. It can be said that the Mawlid was written in the XVII. or XVIII. century because of its language and style.In the mawlid tradition of writing mawlid, generally masnawī form was preferred. Rarely some mawlids were conposed in verse styles. One of these works, which are two for now, is the one in which Çizmeci-zāde Vehbī wrote the couplets of Wasila al-nacat in sixth verse form. The other one is the Mawlūd al-sharīf of Enverī Erzincān. Mawlūd al-sharīf was written entirely in the form of an ode, except of two stories with 48 couplets must have been added later. The work with 202 couplet was separated from Wasila al-nacat and other mawlids in terms of starting with a Persian tawhid and using the style of an ode. Because of the small number of citations, the subjects described in Wasila al-nacat have not been contacted or have been summarized. Mawlūd al-sharīf is one of the shortest ones. Because of the small number of couplets of Mawlūd al-sharīf, the subjects described in detail in Wasila al-nacat are either not mentioned or only summarized. The work, consists of two major sections: The birth of the Prophet and the miracle of miraj. The remarkable feature of Mawlūd al-sharīf is that the two stories told are identical to the stories in Nasībī Mawlid (XV. or XVI. century). The first story tells how, a Jewish couple living in Baghdad became Muslims because of their respect for the mawlid ceremony. The second story tells about, a young named Alī who organized a mawlid ceremony with little money left from his mother and therefore died with faith. Surprisingly, this similarity is seen in the content and narrative forms of the stories in both texts. The fact that the comparative stories are almost the same makes on think of the possibilities of imitating, quoting or saving rather than an impression of the author by the previous text. Taking into account the chronological time, it seems more likely to accept the quotations in the Mavlūd al-sharīf as duplicating. Writing the stories in Mawlūd al-sharīf after the main chapters and the line differences in the rulers reinforce the impression that the stories are added later. (shrink)

Suyolcu-zāde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was an important sûfî poet being a member of Ismā‘īl Rūmī branch, the sect of Qādiriyya. He carried out the duty of spiritual and ethical guidance at Qādiriyya Lodge in Tekirdağ. Besides his sûfî character, he was a poet having an extensive knowledge about the theoretical and aesthetical bases of Dīwān literature. The only original copy of Nahrī’s Dīwānçe including his poems registered in the Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. There are forty-five Turkish, twelve (...) Arabic and three Persian poems by Nahrī in this copy. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of Nahrī’s poems in Dīwānçe in the light of the analysis on some poems that we chose. Any study was not found about the poet’s life and poems in the literature review we made. In this study, poems are classified according to the verse form and the language, and the number of couplets, type of prosody, form, style and content of the chosen poems are evaluated accordingly. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the Religious-Sûfîstic belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī and inform the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century.Summary: Suyolcu-zâde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was a member of Qādiriyya Dervish Convent in Tekirdag where he was born. He became the head sheikh of this convent following his father Sheikh Muḥammad Efendi and worked for the convent in several ways. Nahrī Aḥmad moved back to his hometown in 1182/1768-1769 after completing his Hajj duty and died soon after that. Nahrī had two works according to Osmanlı Müellifleri (Ottoman Authors) and it is stated that the first one of these two works is about “unity of existence”. It should be mentioned that we haven’t found a copy of this work yet. The other work of Nahrī is his Dīwānçe, which includes his poems. The only copy of this significant work is registered in Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. In this study, we had the chance to determine a third work of Nahrī which has never been mentioned in the related literature. This third work that we determined is based on the information in an Arabic poem on the page 21a of the poet’s Dīwānçe. This book that we determined is an interpretation book completed in 1166/1752-53 but Nahrī Aḥmad didn’t mention the name of the work. Nahrī Aḥmad was a spiritual guide and sufi, and he was assigned to the duty of showing the true path in dervish lodge following his madrassa education, learning Qādiriyya lodge’s morals and methods and completing his “spiritual journey”. Besides these, he was a significant poet who could write poems in Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages and he was literary competent who knew the theoretical and aesthetic rules of Dīwān literature and used these features professionally in his works. When Nahrī’s poems are analyzed, it can be seen that he adopted the understanding of existence, knowledge and belief based on Islamic Sufism. Besides, it can be seen that he internalized the significant Religious-Sufi Turkish literature figures including especially Yūnus Emre.In the copy of his Dīwānçe, registered in Vatican Library, there are forty-five Turkish, twelve Arabic and three Persian poems. There are two other poems that weren’t written by Nahrī in the same work. These poems were written by a poet with penname of ‘Ᾱrif in the period when Nahrī’s son Muḥammad Muṣlih al-Dīn was the head sheikh in the same Dervish convent. These historical poems are significant as they describe the re-building of ruined Tekirdag Qādiriyya convent after Nahrī’s period. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe on the basis of chosen poems. As far as we could determine, there is no other study on Nahrī’s works. Nahrī’s Dīwānçe wasn’t a kind of rearranged work of collected poems. Therefore, we classified the poems in terms of the form and language and evaluated the number of couplets, aruz prosody, shape, type and content. Poems of Nahrī in Dīwānçe in terms of verse style are: Four Turkish, three Arabic, one Persian ode, one Turkish compounded stanza, seventeen Turkish, nine Arabic and one Persian major stanza, three Turkish five-line stanzas, two Turkish pentastichs, eighteen Turkish and one Persian lyric.Nahrī Aḥmad wrote five-line stanzas for three of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s lyrics and one of Bāqī’s lyrics. He wrote parallel poems about one pentastich, one lyric and one other poem written in a specific style of blank verse of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Besides, there is also an original poem that is quite unique in the work. Nahrī wrote five couplets before each verse in Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s ode which resulted in the creation of a common ode. Poems in Dīwānçe are contextually religious-Sufi based. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Ismā‘īl Rūmī who was the founder of the order of Rūmiyya branch and other sheikhs of Qādiriyya dervish order are the main names mentioned in the poems. One other significant point in Nahrī’s poems is that he had a deep love and respect for Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. There are praises, quintets and parallel poems about Miṣrī in Dīwānçe which shows Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s effect on his work. This effect is so great that it covered not only the content but also there are the signs of the effect in terms of metaphoric language, words and verses. It can be said that ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī and Niyāzī-i Miṣrī, a member of Khalwatī order, were two significant names that surrounded the mental world of Nahrī, located in the texture of his poems and gave characteristic features to his works. There is a great number of historical poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe. He wrote twenty-six historical verses about various historical issues such as birth and death, construction of mosque, dervish monastery, zawiya, pavilion, repairing of mansion, renovation of dervish convent, enthronement of Sultan and appointment of Grand Vizier. Also, there are some other important parts in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe such as invocation, praise and self-adulation.Although there are not many poems in the previously mentioned copy in Vatican Library, there are various names mentioned in these poems. When these poems are analyzed, it can be seen that there are the names of some prophets, some companions of Prophet Muḥammad such as ‘Alī, Ja‘far al-Sādiq, some Persian legendary characters such as Afrāsiyāb, Rustem and Anūshirwān, some Sufi names such as Manṣūr al-Hallaj, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Shams al-Dīn of Tabrīz, Ḥācī Bektash Velī, Ibn al-‘Arabī and Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī, philosopher Galen and famous love heroes Laylā and Majnūn. That is to say, the poet has a rich world of references. On the other hand, there are the names of some works mentioned in Dīwānçe. Epistle of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī named Devre-i ‘Arshiyya, and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya are the other names mentioned in the work. Name of the places included in Nahrī’s poems are: Aden, Aqmescit, Baghdad, Baghcesaray, Baṭḥā, Balkh, Dimashq, Ḥijāz, Iraq, Iran, Cairo, Ken‘ān, Karbalā, Qılburun, Crimea, Kirmān, Egypt, Nemce, Rūm, Sanaa, Shām, Yemen. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the religious-sûfî belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Moreover, it informs the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century. (shrink)

Muḳātil b. Sulaymān’s (d. 150/767) tafsīr named al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, is accepted as the first completed tafsīr that has reached us from the early sources of tafsīr literature. One of the issues that the mufassir, deals with emphatically by emphasizing the concealment of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr in the Bible. The Mufassir make a connection between the concealment of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr and the falsification of the Bible. When we examine the verses that Muḳātil commented to prove his claim related with falsification (...) of these books, we encounter the phenomenon of takhṣīs in tafsīr. Takhṣīs is a term used in the literature of fiḳh method, in the sense of explaining with a word, with a proof, that some of the individuals it covers are meant. Considering the content of this term, it is understood that Muḳātil’s takhṣīs in tafsīr means limiting the meaning of words with many meanings to only one content. The main issue that prompted Muḳātil to make a takhṣīs in tafsīr is falsification. The issue of falsification of the Bible has been a subject that attracted the attention of Muslim scholars. Because in the Ḳurʾān, the distortion of the Torah is described in the following terms: يحرفون “they distort”, فبدل “altered”, يلون السنتهم “who twist their tongues”, يكتمون “they conceal”, ولا تلبسوا الحق بالباطل “confound not truth with falsehood”, وتكتموا الحق “conceal the truth”, يكتبون الكتاب بِاَيْد۪يهِمْ “They write the book with their hands”. The Ḳurʾān’s statement on this matter encouraged the criticism of the scholars about the Torah. Among the issues criticized there are; tabs̲h̲īr of Muḥammad in previous books, the origin of the Torah, inaccuracy in chronological order, stylistic differences, information errors and contradictions. Among these criticisms directed at the People of the Book, Muḳātil focuses on tabs̲h̲īr. The main source that leads him to argue that Muḥammad was heralded in previous books is the verses of the Ḳurʾān. In addition to this, it is highly probable that the geography where the mufassir lived was also influential in shaping his criticisms. Considering the Jewish population in the neighborhoods where he lived, such as Balk̲h̲ and Marw, it is possible for the commentator to develop a dialogue with the Jews, and it is also possible that his criticisms will be shaped within the framework of these dialogues. Muḳātil’s falsification criticism is expressed in the context of the Prophet’s tabs̲h̲īr. However, the mufassir’s emphasis on tabs̲h̲īr goes beyond the criticism of falsification. The mufessir always keeps the issue alive on the reader’s agenda with short phrases such as “كتم أمر محمد / بكتمان أمر محمد Muḥammad’s subject is hidden in the Torah”, “نعت محمد / صفة محمد / Muḥammad’s qualification”. As far as we can determine, there are fifty-two verses in al-Tafsīr al-kabīr that Muḳātil consider directly related to tabs̲h̲īr. He deals with the issue of distortion in thirty-eight verses. The number of verses that the mufassir associates with both distortion and tabs̲h̲īr is thirty-six. The number of verses that he does not associate with falsification but only about tabs̲h̲īr is twelve. Among them, it has been determined that Muḳātil made takhṣīs in the interpretation of forty-eight verses in total. When we classify his takhṣīs’s, we can form a tidy framework under four main headings: in the interpretation of sila sentences, idioms and idiomatic expressions, determining the content of words, and indicates of pronoun. Since the thought of tabs̲h̲īr is one of the main motifs in the mind of the commentator, his tafsīr’s follow a parallel course to this motif. In the interpretation of many verses, there are examples of interpretations that will legitimize this thought and confirm this claim. As a matter of fact, in the interpretation of the expression يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب “While reading the Book, they bend their tongues” in the 78th verse of sūrat āl ʿImrān, it is said that Muḥammad’s qualification in the Torah were deleted and other adjectives were written instead of it. In the tafsīr of the 37th verse of sūrat al-Nisāʾ, there are the expressions like this: “The concealment of Muḥammad’s tabs̲h̲īr and its removal from the Torah (بكتمان أمر محمد و محوه من التوراة)”. Muḳātil narrowed the content of the expression, which has a wide meaning area. This narrowing of the meaning is technically considered an example of takhṣīs. Other examples where takhṣīs made in tafsir are present in the interpretations of the phrases of guidance/aberration, right/false, belief/disbelief, verse, word, stinginess, knowledge, promise, declaration, turning away and the book of Allah. The tafsīr’s extreme loyalty to the context is accompanied by his limiting the meaning of words with broad content to a narrow content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.3 (2000) 493-497 [Access article in PDF] Louis H. Feldman. Josephus's Interpretation of the Bible. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998. xvi 1 837 pp. Cloth, $75. (Hellenistic Culture and Society, 27) Flavius Josephus has long been famous for his first book, The Jewish War, the primary source for the history of the Jews from the Maccabean Revolt to the destruction (...) of the Temple. Less well known is his later history Jewish Antiquities, but it represents a more accomplished author and involves his own paraphrase of Jewish history found in the Hebrew Scriptures.Feldman addresses two questions to the Jewish Antiquities. First, to what extent has Josephus made his own creative contribution to the biblical history of the Jews? Second, to what extent has Josephus provided a distinguishable and consistent point of view? Feldman seeks to determine how Josephus handles source material (where we have his biblical source for comparison), in the hope that this will enable scholars to better evaluate The Jewish War.The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with Josephus as historian. [End Page 493] Portions of this section were published earlier in the volume Mikra of the series Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum (1988), but the extensive revision and fourfold expansion represent the fruit of Feldman's labor since then. His labor is also found in the second part, which contains twelve "portraits" from a series of previously published studies (newly revised) on major figures in biblical history: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Samson, Samuel, Saul, David, Solomon, and Daniel. (The other portraits and additional studies have been republished in Studies in Josephus' Rewritten Bible [Brill 1998].) The primary focus of each portrait is the model of the Greek hero, beginning with genealogy and wealth and elaborating on the five virtues. Other subheadings include apologetic and stylistic motifs appropriate to each character, and Josephus' removal of theological problems and other difficulties. The following remarks will focus on part 1, which distills the themes of each portrait and does so in the broader context of all his portraits.Feldman argues that the historiography of Josephus is based on the school of Isocrates, with its fictitious speeches and epic proportions, and that of Aristotle, with its scientific classification of lives, culminating in the styles of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Nicolaus of Damascus. As historian, Josephus is more concerned with commenting on the situation of his own day than explaining the past. Accordingly, the genre of "apologetic biography" best describes his Jewish Antiquities.In chapter 2, "Josephus as Rewriter of the Bible," Feldman analyzes Josephus' dependence on the textual traditions of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Greek Septuagint, and the Aramaic targumim. He concludes that the models of the Septuagint and the targumim most resemble Jewish Antiquities, but Josephus has combined their method with that of Greek historians, most notably of Thucydides. Feldman notes that Josephus' self-consciousness of being a prophet and a priest affects his historiography. As a priest, Josephus felt authorized and qualified to interpret the sacred Scriptures. As a prophet, though not of the stature of biblical literary prophets, Josephus is commissioned to play an active role in the politics of his day and to explain the current condition of the Jews in the aftermath of the destruction of their Temple.Chapter 3, "Qualities of Biblical Heroes," provides a thematic synthesis of the different hero studies. The heroes of the Jews are no less noble than the heroes of the Greeks and Romans: their genealogies are illustrious, their births portentous, and their persons endowed with virtuous qualities. Josephus takes great care to exemplify the cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, piety) in his encomia of the biblical characters.Chapter 4, "Josephus as Apologist to Non-Jews and to Jews," is perhaps the most interesting to historians and advances Feldman's goal of analyzing The Jewish War. Josephus draws on Gentile sources to establish the historicity of biblical events, even when they disagree with the biblical account. He attributes the evil inflicted on the Jews... (shrink)

Dede Korkut Stories are a national cultural heritage that narrates about events and challenges of Oghuz Turks in 10th-11th centuries. This period of time is important, as it was the times when Turks became Muslims. In this work, heroism, customs, habits and traditions, socio-cultural and moral life of the Turks before and after becoming Muslims are analysed. One of the topics addressed in this work is religious beliefs and worships of the Turks after became Muslims. In this context, the belief (...) in Allah appears to be the most emphasized type of belief in the stories. The theme of fate, which is included in the subjects of Tawḥīd (oneness of Allāh) is another theme mentioned in the stories. The stories also includes some expressions regarding particularly the Prophet Muḥammad as well as some other prophets. Jibrīl and ʿAzrāʾīl angels are also mentioned. As for the Divine Books, only the Qur’ān is namely addressed and other divine books are not mentioned. The beliefs regarding afterlife, such as death, resurrection, heaven, hell, pool of al-Kawthar (abundance) are also referred to in the stories. The Book of Dede Korkut is not a didactic work written to teach Islam. On the contrary, in the stories, Islam is discussed as an element of the spirit/essence of individual and society. The aim of this study is to investigate the representations of the beliefs of tawḥīd, prophecy and hereafter of the Turks, especially the Oghuz Turks with reference to narrations in Dede Korkut stories. It aims to discuss them in the context of six pillars of faith and evaluate from the Islamic belief point of view.Summary: The Book of Dede Korkut consists of twelve epic stories created within the oral tradition of Turkish Folk Literature. It is said that the origins of these stories, which are one of the oldest works of Turkish Folk Literature, went as far as 7th century. It is generally accepted that the Book of Dede Korkut, which narrates about Oghuz Turks who lived in 10th-11th centuries was transferred to writing after 15th century. There is no information found about writer/s of the Book. Dede Korkut, who considered being the narrator of the stories, is in fact a character in the stories. Dede Korkut plays qobuz, reads poetry, names children, mediates in marital affairs, resolves disputes, and leads religious rituals in the stories. Therefore, he stands out as a saint figure and considered to be wise man of the Oghuz Turks in almost every story, especially regarding social events. In this work, there are many expressions about heroism, customs, habits and traditions, socio-cultural and moral experiences of the Turks before and after becoming Muslims. The stories bear many traces from the earlier Turkish beliefs. However, these are not the issues of this study. The dates of the emergence of the stories, 10th and 11th centuries, coincides with the times when the Turks became Muslim. This situation makes the stories more important as they include rich narratives about the fundamental beliefs of Islam. Especially the belief in Allāh, which is one of the six pillars of faith, appears to be the most emphasized in the stories. In these stories, Turkish and Persian names of Allāh as well as His Arabic names and attributes are mentioned directly or indirectly.The belief in predestination and casualty related with Allāh's eternal knowledge and determination is another faith object that takes place in the stories. The issues regarding the predestination discussed in the stories as follows: the deeds occur with the wish of Allāh; Allāh decides whether the child male or female; Allāh predestines human lifetime, livelihood, time of death and calamities.There are also narrations about the belief in the prophets in the stories. Particularly the Prophet Muhammad's prophecy is prioritised. Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses are the other prophets mentioned in the stories. The successive authority of Adam and His story with Iblīs; the wife and donkey of Noah, not burning of Abraham when he was thrown into the fire, the speaking of Allāh with Moses and the staff of Moses are some of the expressions related with prophecy in the stories. Nimrod against Abraham and Pharaoh against Moses are described as negative personalities in the stories. In the stories, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is handled in a position that intercession is demanded from Him. Greetings and prayers are read for Him. His intercession is sought for forgiveness of sins and acceptance of prayers. He is exalted with some attributions, such as the holly Prophet Peace be upon Him, friend of Allāh, the leader of religion and the headman of religion. When the Prophet Muhammad is mentioned, it is felt that there is a high respect and an enthusiastic love. When he is addressed, the expressions indicating respect and affection, such as "His name is magnificent Muhammad" and "His name is magnificent Muhammad Mustafa" are used in the stories.In the stories, only the Qur’ān is mentioned among the divine books, none of the Torah, the Zabūr and the Injīl is mentioned. It is referred that the Qur’ān descended from the heavens and it is the word of Allāh and His knowledge, and it was copied (collected) by Uthman. It is described as "Magnificent Qur’ān".It is seen in the stories that there is also a place for the belief in angels and only two of the four great angels are mentioned. One of them is ʿAzrāʾīl, the death angel. It is one of the main heroes in the story of Deli Dumrul. ʿAzrāʾīl is described as an angel from the sky, who has red-winged, who takes the souls of living beings by the command of Allāh and kill them. It is also narrated that ʿAzrāʾīl takes the form of human and pigeon, and the struggle of ʿAzrāʾīl with Deli Dumrul. The other great angel mentioned in the stories is Jibrīl. In the story of Emre, the Son of Begil, it is described as an angel fulfilling the commandments of Allāh. Apart from these, there is no information about other angels and their characteristics, such as not being gendered, not to sin, and being created from light. Within the scope of invisible beings, the Devil is also narrated in the stories as it did not prostrate itself to Adam, and therefore it was repelled and cursed.The principle of the belief in Hereafter, which is one of the pillars of faith, is also dealt with in the stories. The ending, death, resurrection, reckoning, Heaven, Hell, seeing Allāh's face in Heaven, drinking water from the pool of al-Kawthar are some of the topics addressed in relation to this principle. While talking about Heaven in the stories, the words "Uçmak" (flight) in Turkish and "Behesht" (paradise) in Persian are mentioned in addition to Arabic "Jannah" (heaven).The Book of Dede Korkut is not a religious book written to teach the ʿaqāʾid (beliefs) of Islam or its practices. On the contrary, it is a work that narrates about people’s lives and social experiences. There is neither any specific verse from the Qur’ān nor sayings or the deeds of the Prophet (ḥadīth) included in the stories. However, the contents of many issues stated in the Qur’ān and ḥadīth are expressed in the stories. For instance, the statements from the surah (chapter) al-Ikhlāṣ (sincerity), such as al-Aḥad (the one), Allāh begets not, nor was He begotten, and not being any equivalent to Him are mentioned in the stories. Likewise, not burning of the Prophet Abraham when thrown into the fire, speaking of Allāh with Moses and giving the stuff to him as a miracle are also stated in the Qur’ān. As for the pool of al-Kawthar, the believers’ seeing Allāh in Heaven, ineffectiveness of the deeds without saying in the name of Allah are mentioned in ḥadīths. However, some information that is not rooted in the Qur’ān and ḥadīths, such as the stinging of Nimrod's arrow is also encountered in the stories. Based on the narrations in the stories, it seems possible to draw the conclusion that the Oghuz Turks mentioned in the Book of Dede Korkut adopted Ahl al-Sunnah (people of Sunnah) interpretation of Islam. However, it should be reminded that this implication will lose its meaning if it is proved that the original versions of the stories were redesigned according to the interpretation of Ahl al-Sunnah in the process of transferring them into writing. (shrink)

The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...) threads of moral discourse, made in turn of other interwoven threads, including transmission of shared codes, appeals to reform of prevailing custom, rational argument about the justification of some precept on the basis of some shared general teaching or principle, and rational argument about the ultimate basis for principles and justification of authoritative teaching. That is, the approach adopted to the reading of ethical texts depends on a firm belief in the fact that philosophers hardly created any ethical doctrine out of nothing. The main point this book tries to highlight is how different philosophical theories emerged and followed each other as a result of attempts at accounting for what was going on in the world of moral traditions. Changes were propelled by controversies between different schools, and highly abstract arguments were the unintended effects of moves made by controversialists forced to transform (and occasionally to turn upside down) their own doctrines in order to face the challenge posed by other arguments. This is the reason why the book examines not only texts that already enjoy pride of place in the history of philosophy (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), but also other texts usually treated in the histories of religions (the Bible, the Talmud, the Quran), and others considered to be much less philosophical (Plutarchus, Pufendorf). -/- 1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism. Two different traditions of morality in VI-V century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates answer to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy. Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistence in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The chapter illustrates then the relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater familias, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexis, or ‘disposition’. Prudence, or better practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with bouleusis or deliberation is examined, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a way of life. The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. -/- 4. Epicurus and ethics as self-care. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of a science of well-being aiming, more than at pleasure as in the popular view, at reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. Cicero is treated, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is chosen as the best example of what the Stoic tradition could yield, an art of living based on sophisticated introspection, in turn aimed at making a kind of cognitive therapy possible, dismantling obnoxious passions at their root by systematically correcting false representations. -/- 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism. A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torā (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Leviticus is stressed as the turning point when emphasis mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, is combined with the legal tradition, yielding the change in sensibility of the Second Temple time. Philo of Alexandria is described as one of the three leading figures – together with Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Yeshua – at the apex the emergence of the mentioned new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, two eventually identical precepts whose meaning is arguably more sober and sensible than the long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine has made us believe and no novelty vis-à-vis so-called Ancient-Testament teachings. -/- 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism. The first section examines the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirqé Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deòt, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexeis and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was ‘the tool by which the world was built’; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous , but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure Judaism. The third section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manichaeism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. The last section summarizes the turbulent history of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and a few topics from the Stoic-Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua had been influenced by cynic preachers, is a proof of the necessity felt by Christian preachers to translate the original ‘Christian’ teaching into a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where an early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 8. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism. The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. Al-Farabi wrote an enjoyable remake of the Platonic Republic, arguing that the citizen’s virtues were the basis on which the political building needs to rest. The secular lawgiver is enlightened by the light of reason in his everyday practice of governance, but room is made for the Prophet as the voice of revealed truth that confirms and completes the rational truth that philosophy may afford. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 9. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelian ethics. The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place a first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed just less striking traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Torah and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirké Avot could be translated. -/- 10. Thomas Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics. In the first section the fresh start is described of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium. In a first phase, Anselm and Peter Abelard built on a Platonic and Augustinian legacy. In this phase. remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. Aquinas’s ethics is a theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract a self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave "pure nature" incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones, such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too demanding and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Ia-IIae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas could reduce the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethic, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is not ethical ‘absolutism’, as both traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularist enemies of dogmatic morality tend to believe. It is instead an ethic of prudential judgment. Exceptions to this approach – or better results of logical fallacies – are such claims as the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts", claims that simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences Thomas did not live long enough to draw or was not consistent enough to dare to draw. -/- 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry. The first topic illustrated is the discussion about the notion of pura natura, namely the human condition after the original sin and before divine revelation. The core notion was already there in Aquinas but was later developed by Caietanus (Thomas de Vio) with a number of interesting implications: firstly a view of human nature as such much more positive than Augustine’s and his followers’ view, including both Calvinists and Jansenists; secondly, the implication that the philosopher’s morality, as opposed to the Christian’s morality, is a quite respectable kind of morality; thirdly, that theocracy and prosecution of the unfaithful lacked justification, with more far-fetching consequences than Aquinas himself had dared to draw. The second topic is casuistry, a new name for a comparatively older way of thinking, which was already there in late Stoicism and Cicero as well as in the Talmudic literature. This is an approach aimed at yielding probable enough solutions for doubtful cases even in absence of completely safe staring points. The genre developed from medieval reference books for confessors and became by the sixteenth-century a sophisticated tool-box for dealing with various fields of applied ethics. Francisco Vitoria, the main authority of Baroque Scholasticism, was a controversial figure, among the proponents of the new discipline of casuistry and a consistent proponent of more separation between the religious and the civil authority, stricter limits to the legitimacy of war, innate rights of non-Christian nations in the New World based on the notion of pura natura, providing a standard of ‘natural’ goodness, previous to revelation, on which the Indian nations were judged to live in a naturally good condition, provided with the institutions of family, justice, and religion had accordingly a right to full respect by Christian sovereigns. Bartolomé de Las Casas, arguing along similar lines, was the leader of a historical battle in defence of the rights of the Indios. -/- 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living. A short description of one of the Renaissance Phyrronism, one of the classical philosophies revived in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Montaigne combines the sceptical epistemology with an understanding of ethics – indeed of philosophy as a whole – in terms of an art of living inspired by two basic ideas, sagesse, that is, practical wisdom as the only kind of rationality available after theology, science, and tradition have declared bankrupt, and an aesthetic ideal of self-transformation through the art of writing and introspection. -/- 13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism. The chapter illustrates first the vicissitudes of Augustinianism newly born after the late medieval triumph of Thomist Aristotelianism in the alternative Protestant and Catholic versions processed by the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Then it illustrates the doctrines of Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal’s best disciple, on the impossibility of introspection, on the ubiquity of self-deception, on the incurably evil character of the passion of love, and on the two moralities, the one of the man of the world, the morality of honesty which is indispensable for granting peace and order but devoid of any true value for eternal salvation, since the same external behaviour may be prompted by opposite motivations, and the morality of charity, the only true one but also useless to society. The third topic is Pierre Malebranche’s view of self-deception as a ubiquitous phenomenon accounting for human action and responsibility and his reformulated theory of self-love, no less ubiquitous than for Nicole and yet not as incurably evil, given the distinction between morally indifferent and even necessary amour de soi and vicious amour proper, a distinction on which the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political theory rests. -/- 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality. The chapter is dedicated to the discovery of the idea of a ‘new moral science’. Hugo Grotius is discussed first highlighting the real character of his project, much closer to the Thomist idea of a natural law accessible to non-corrupted human reason when human beings are living in a state of pura natura. Then Hobbes’s combination of scepticism, voluntarism, and conventionalism is described and both the continuity with Grotius’s new science, in the search for non-revealed rational morality, and the break with him, in the adoption of voluntarism and refusal of an intellectualist view of natural law, are illustrated. Pufendorf’s work is illustrated as a synthesis of the two previous attempts and the – up to Schneewind underestimated – paradigmatic example of the new science of morality. -/- 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism. The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number possible sets of laws on a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world. 16. Richard Price and intuitionism. The chapter describes first the doctrines of the Cambridge Platonists, an example of hyper-rationalist reaction to Calvinism. Secondly it describes the sophisticated and universally ignored – from Sidgwick to Anscombe –version of what was later labelled ‘ethical intuitionism’ – showing how it escapes familiar objections and misrepresentations of intuitionism – from Mill to Rawls – in grounding its argument on transcendental arguments while carefully avoiding recourse to introspection and psychological evidence, which has been taken as a too easy target by critics of intuitionism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses Whewell’s ‘philosophy of morality’, as opposed to ‘systematic morality’, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such rational truths but requires consideration of the ongoing dialectics between idea and fact in historically given moralities. Whewell’s intuitionism turns out closer to Kantian ethics than commentators have made us believe until now, and quite different from what Sidgwick meant by intuitionism. -/- 17. Adam Smith and the morality of role-switch. The chapter describes first, Hutcheson’s attempt at basing the ‘new science’ of natural law on different bedrock than Pufendorf and the English Platonists, namely a moral sense, a faculty whose existence is assumed to be proved on an empirical basis. The second step is a reconstruction of Hume’s rejoinder in terms of a new science of man including morality on an ‘experimental’ basis, that is, a ‘Newtonian’ hypothetical-deductive approach, distinguished from Hutcheson’s allegedly uncritical descriptive approach to human nature. The third step is a reconstruction of Adam Smith theory of morality understood as emerging from a spontaneous interplay of exchanges of situations (the most basic meaning of the word ‘sympathy’ as construed by this author). -/- 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. The Enlightenment spirit that suggested the idea of a new morality, free from religion, is illustrated. The notion of utility is illustrated as well as the subsequent formulations of the principle of utility. The idea of felicific calculus is discussed, showing how its inner difficulties prompted several reformulations of the principle of utility in order to avoid undesirable implications of proposed formulations. The role of the thesis of spontaneous convergence between interest and duty is discussed, showing how it left numberless questions open, and the distinction between the virtues of prudence, justice and beneficence is described as a way out of the deadlocks of classical utilitarianism. After Bentham, Mill’s reformed utilitarianism is reconstructed, showing how it is a kind of mixed system – as closer to common sense as it gives up Bentham’s claims to consistency and simplicity – resulting as unintended consequences from the controversies in which Mill was too keen to engage. The hidden agenda of the controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image of the battle between Prejudice and Reason, is described, showing how both competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. -/- 19. Immanuel Kant, practical reason and judgment. The chapter argues that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an ‘empirical moral philosophy’ or moral anthropology including treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life. -/- 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the critique of abstract universalism. The chapter describes first the Romantic movement and the implications some of its concerns, rescuing passions, community, tradition, the individual as the bearer of a unique destiny, and the longing for organic unity between the individual, mankind and nature. Hegel’s contribution is discussed then, highlighting how, on the one hand, he shared a number of these concerns and on the other he had more rationalist leanings. The notion of morality is the pivotal point of the reconstruction, highlighting how Hegel construes this notion as a key to his own diagnosis of the malaise of modernity – the separation of individual and Gemeinschaft – and how his attack on Kant turns around this very idea. -/- 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment. The chapter illustrates first the idea of deconstruction of the back-world of values. Nietzsche claims to be legitimate heir of the French moralists, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in so far as he allegedly carries out to its deepest implications their discovery of what lies behind traditional naïve belief in the existence of an objective realm of values just waiting for description by the philosopher. The two exemplars form which genealogy draws inspiration are the classical philologist’s historical reconstructions of lost meanings and the chemist’s decomposition of elements. Then the genealogy of the notions of good and evil carried out in the first dissertation of Genealogy of morals is illustrated with its paradoxical conclusion that will to power is in fact the only ‘genuine’ kind of goodness. The third point illustrated is the dialectic of ascetism and self-realization with its ambiguous outcome. The suggested interpretation of such outcome is that Nietzsche’s normative ethics is a kind of virtue ethics taking an aesthetic ideal as a normative standard -/- 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism. The chapter discusses the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences to reach, also in ethics, the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of the intuitionist philosophers, was what was worth considering as the expression of intuitionist ethics. In spite of a naïve positivist starting-point, Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus, Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a “new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. Then it reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, should be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. -/- 23. Edmund Husserl and the a-priori of action. The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl’s project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the a priori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy carried out in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach’s theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that basically sketches the very ideas ‘discovered’ later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section is dedicated to Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of ‘values’ – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler who claimed to Husserl’s legitimate heirs. -/- 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism. The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of ‘good’, its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with ‘emotive’ meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell’s ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of a rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson’s theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. Last of all, the discussion from the Forties about Hume’s law is described, mentioning Karl Popper’s argument and Richard Hare’s early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics. The chapter discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. A short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current is given trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot’s and Peter Geach’s critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre’s grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism. The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick’s and Moore’s fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine definitely refuted. A glimpse at this uproarious process is given through two examples. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of Utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This results in preference utilitarianism combined with a ‘Kantian’ version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare’s two-level preference utilitarianism where act utilitarianism plays the function of eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of action-guiding practical device. -/- 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy. The post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named ‘Rehabilitation of practical philosophy’ is described. Among the actors of such rehabilitation there were a few of Heidegger’s most brilliant disciples, and Hans-Georg Gadamer is chosen as a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle’s lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger’s lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the central role of the notion of phronesis. -/- 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics. Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This started, instead than the rehabilitation of prudence, with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. An examination of his argument is some detail is offered, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas’s elaboration on Apel’s theory. -/- 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics. Rawls’s distinction between a “political” and a “metaphysical” approach to one central part of ethical theory, namely the theory of justice, is interpreted as a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and neo-casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter, namely that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls’ view never will be close – on the basic criteria for judgment. -/- 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics. The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin’s new casuistry. -/- . (shrink)

Ex interiore ipso exeas. Preface. This book reconstructs the history of a still open dialectics between several ethoi, that is, shared codes of unwritten rules, moral traditions, or self-aware attempts at reforming such codes, and ethical theories discussing the nature and justification of such codes and doctrines. Its main claim is that this history neither amounts to a triumphal march of reason dispelling the mist of myth and bigotry nor to some other one-way process heading to some pre-established goal, but (...) instead to a chain of controversies where the partners’ will to win unintentionally yields a wealth of insights on human existence that has still something to teach us. -/- 1. The Hellenic moral tradition. -/- Two different traditions of morality in vi-v century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. -/- 2. Plato and the Good. -/- Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates rejoinder to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 3. Aristotle and practical philosophy. -/- Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistency in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater families, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics, is illustrated. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexes, or ‘dispositions’. Prudence, or better, practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with boùleusis or deliberation is discussed, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 4. Cynics and Stoics: ethics as therapy. -/- The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place that was given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of the science of well-being aiming, more than pleasure understood as in the popular view, the reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Roman and Imperial Moralists. -/- The chapter is dedicated to the reconstruction of a particular kind of literature, whose specific features have long been under-stressed, namely the Roman and Imperial moral literature. Cicero is treated at some length, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is given pride of place, stressing the novelty of his approach to ethics as cognitive therapy, in this case just following an already existing new wave of interest after nineteenth-century oblivion justified by alleged lack of authentic ‘philosophical’ character. -/- 6. The Hebrew moral tradition. -/- A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torah (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Levitic is stressed as the turning point when the stress on mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, starts being combined with legal tradition yielding the change in the sensibility of the Second Temple time. -/- 7. Second Temple Judaism. -/- This chapter describes the Long March leading from the post-exile Zadokite restoration to the first-century aevi vulgaris. The first topic reconstructed is the Zadokite theology of the double retribution. The second is the alternative Enochic tradition consistently rejecting the central role of the Temple, the Priesthood and worship as atonement for sins and offering as an alternative God’s unlimited mercy and preaching mercy, not sacrifice as the way of behaving requested by God. Wisdom literature, the third subject discusses, is a kind of third way, on the one hand increasingly critical towards the double retribution and ruling theology’s optimism facing the world as it is and on the other mocking at the Enochic current as a band of dreamers and visionaries. The third way consists in disenchantment facing the word as it is combined with a refusal of vain and childish hope of prizes for the righteous, suggesting instead the leading idea of right deeds for righteousness’s sake. Rabbi Hillel, Rabbi Yeshua and Philo of Alexandria are described as the three leading figures at the culminating point of such process of emergence of a new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This starting point consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, whose meaning is, arguably, more consistent than a long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine made us believe. And Christian morality, vis-à-vis allegedly legalist ‘Ancient Testament’ teachings, is less of a novelty than most early Christian writers announced. -/- 8. Talmudic moral doctrines and proto-Christian paraenesis. -/- The first three sections examine the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirke Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deot, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexes and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was "the tool by which the world was built"; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous, but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The last two sections examine first the various Christian currents and then Gnostic para-Christian or non-Christian currents as well as Manicheism. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure, purest Judaism. The last section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manicheism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. -/- 9. Christianity as “philosophy”. -/- The chapter reconstructs the stormy story of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and several rhetorical topics from the Stoic and Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua himself had been influenced by cynical preachers, is a proof of the necessity to translate the original Christian message in a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 10. Ethics in the Arabic-Islamic Philosophy. -/- The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on the retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince, had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries, a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with the disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 11. Ethics in the Jewish philosophy. -/- The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place for the first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed too a few traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Tora and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirke Avot could be translated. -/- 12. The practical philosophy revival in Latin Europe. -/- A reconstruction is carried out of a fresh start of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium rescuing a Platonic and Augustinian legacy, with Anselm and Peter Abelard. In this phase remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions, gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of a full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. -/- 13. Scholastic practical philosophy: Thomas Aquinas. -/- Aquinas’s ethics is theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to the repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave pure nature incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too ambitious, and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Prima Secundae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas was able to solve the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from the knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethics, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of the death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not the Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is no way an ethical ‘absolutism’, as both the traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularists tend to believe, but rather an ethic of prudential judgment on the individual case. Exceptions to this approach – or better the result of logical fallacies – are provided by the thesis of the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of so-called intrinsically evil acts, a thesis that would simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences that Thomas did not live long enough to draw. -/- 14. Scholastic practical philosophy: John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. A reconstruction is carried out of the ethical doctrines by both most authoritative Franciscan doctors. Their continuity with Aquinas is vindicated against prejudice carried by centuries of polemics within the Catholic Church and tendentious disparaging of both as forerunners of execrable Reformation. Besides aspects of continuity, also the important novelties are illustrated, first John’s abandonment of Aquinas’s and Augustine’s eudemonism, asserting righteousness for righteousness’s sake, and then William’s explicit defence of the philosopher’s virtues, that is, natural morality, and his solution to the dilemma of God’s omnipotence and the universal validity of natural law extending to God himself. -/- 15. Aristotelianism interpreted by the Magistri Artium. -/- A reconstruction of the until recently forgotten ethical doctrines by the Parisian Magistri Artium, falsely depicted as ‘Averroists’ and either deprecated as heretics or mistaken for predecessors of modern secularism. In fact, they illustrate a view of ‘natural’ virtue as may be understood by human reason without the assistance by Revelation. -/- Etiamsi daremus Deum non esse. Intermediate considerations. Three considerations may be suggested by the story told in the book. The first one is that intellectual histories have been mounted in the past with the same state of mind as one may mount a war chariot. Such constructions are not very helpful as tools for understanding the past. Wars waged in the past have left the field obstructed by ruins not easy to remove even by those historians who have animated by an impartial academic motivation. They have been influenced too by consequences of past emphasis on some authors and damnatio capitis suffered by others, by stratifications left on sources by secondary literature and translations, by allotment of originally close sources to different literary genres, by the monopolization of religious texts by churches with full cooperation by secular scholars who still fear contamination. The second one is that aware or unaware ethnocentrism has carried various calamities to our comprehension of the past. Their last vestiges have surfaced again in the semi-scholarly discussion on the idea of Europe occasioned by the debate on a project of a European Constitution. Mention of Europe’s Christian roots has been the clumsiest move. Proclamations of such roots were so obvious in what they affirmed as they were totally off-path concerning what they omitted, namely that he modern European moral tradition included legacies from Middle-Eastern wisdom, Hellenic philosophy, Roman Imperial legal literature, and, besides, a Jewish legacy in turn incorporating other more ancient Middle-Eastern legacies and which has been partly conveyed by Christianity. And the Islamic-Arabic philosophy too, in so far it made the Nicomachean Ethics available to Latin Christian scholars, is one more of Europe’s roots. The third is that religious traditionalists and secularist fundamentalists have gone hand in hand for a couple of centuries in either extolling or deprecating the allegedly Modern idea of Ethics without God, first formulated by Hugo Grotius with the claim that natural law would still be valid ‘etiamsi daremus – quod sine summo scelere dari potest – Deum non esse’. The facts are, firstly, that this is not an irreligious claim and Grotius was just a pious and meek Christian and, secondly, that it is not a ‘modern’ claim but rather one more formulation of the claim that there is a natural morality, independent of divine revelation, a claim shared by Moshe ben Maimon, Aquinas and William of Ockham. -/- . (shrink)

Drawing extensively on the whole range of Spinoza’s philosophical writing, Staring into the Void devotes twelve chapters to showing in detail how the architecture of reality as Spinoza saw it rises in stages from a theory of being to prophetically modern theories of the physical world, of causal law, of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, of determinism, of the roots of human motivation, and of the kinds of civil society that human nature is capable of sustaining. Professor Skulsky tries to (...) disarm the justifiably skeptical reader by showing why Spinoza’s thesis about the One Real Thing is as arguable as it is outrageous. The Spinoza of this intellectual portrait is a bleaker and more subversive figure than the hero of Enlightenment humanism now in general circulation. (shrink)

At the intersection of modern cultural and political history, security studies and debates about freedom of expression and international human-rights law, this article aims to contribute to a better understanding of political cartooning and its implications in multicultural societies of Europe, which have shifted in a geographical, cultural, normative, communicational, political and many other respects through the last two centuries. Through comparison of the Serbian cartoons from late nineteenth-century Croatia and the recent Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the article (...) reveals that both modern and postmodern European cartoons have been centred around equally discriminatory narratives: a 'clash of civilizations' and 'racialization of religion'. Since open racial stereotyping in cartoons became illegal in the postmodern international regulations, traditional discriminatory practices of cartooning have shifted towards subtle, 'liquid' racism. This decodes some of the twelve Danish cartoons as ambiguous strategies of racialization of Muslim immigrants in Europe but also as hate speech which is illegal in the European Union, and member states of the Council of Europe. The author concludes that the most current European and international regulations of hate speech, whether concerning offline media or online media, actually protect free speech. While a truly clear-cut regulation of liquid racism might remain problematic in Europe due to the lack of a universally accepted definition of hate speech, neither strict legal regulations nor different definitions of hate speech could diminish the role of political cartooning as a viable free speech platform in the multicultural landscape of Europe. Ultimately, what diminishes its viability is the enduring lack of diversity in the creation of visual satire, which could and should reflect the multicultural reality of communities, politics and societies in Europe. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

Preference, defined as “Considering something better, superior or im-portant than another, preferring it, weighing it up”, is one of the most im-portant elements that shape the lives of human beings. The different sources that people consume causes their mindsets to differ, and as a result, differ-ent opinions emerge. Preference also has an important function in Islamic sciences. In fiqh, fiqh methodology and hadith sciences, preference refers to a methodology frequently used when evaluating different opinions and nar-rations. Although not as important (...) as these sciences, preference also plays an important function in the science of tafsir. The basic element that re-quires choice in interpretation is the disagreements of commentators about a verse. However, the interpreter does not always have to make a choice be-tween different views, as in these sciences the preference is inevitable, espe-cially in conflicting issues regarding belief and practice. It is appropriate to date the phenomenon of preference in exegesis from the tadwin period when different interpretations of the verse were brought together in real terms. Ibn Juzay al-Kalbi is one of the commentators who gives systematic information about the phenomenon of preference in the introduction of his tafsir al-Tashīl and frequently applies preference among different interpreta-tions of the verses. Addressing the phenomenon of conflict and choice be-tween different views in the introduction of his commentary al-Tashīl, Ibn Juzay states that the following issues cause the difference in interpretation between the verses: To interpret with Quran, the hadith of the Prophet, with the interpretation of the majority of commentators, interpretation of the rightly guided caliphs and the prominant commentators such as Abbas b. Abbas (d. 68/687-88), with the data of the Arabic language; to resort to the meaning, to prioritize the meaning that comes to the mind at the first stage, to attribute the real meaning to metaphor, the general to the particu-lar, the absolute to the literal, the presentation of the apparent noun to the literal and the existing syntax of the word. Although Juzay mentions twelve criteria in the introduction of at-Teshîl, when the applications in his tafsir are examined, it is seen that the number of these criteria increases to twenty-five. In practice, Ibn Juzay also applies the criteria of before word, common meaning, absolute meaning, plausibility of the meaning, widespread use, compliance with the requirements, purpose of the verse, order of im-portance of the subject, to Meccan-Medinan, historical data, Arab custom and suitability for the prophet’s title of innocence. Although there are stud-ies in the Arab world that discuss Ibn Juzay's preferences on a sura basis, the fact that no study has been conducted those deals with his preference criteria in tafsir independently constitutes the main reason for writing this article. In this article, prepared using the document scanning technique of the qualitative research method, it is aimed to contribute to the literature by examining the preference criteria between different interpretations in tafsir of Ibn Juzay, a commentator belonging to the Andalusian tafsir tradition and to introduce readers to the principles that can form a basis for choosing between different interpretations of a verse. (shrink)

Although there are fundamental differences between Ahl al-Sunnah and Shī‘a on the issue of Mahdī, one of the controversial issues among Islamic sects, Shī‘a has attached much greater importance to the issue. In this study, after the information about Mahdiship in the primary sources of Islam is conveyed, the opinions of the Ahl al-Sunnah and Shī‘a will be given and an evaluation will be made about the evidence and opinions put forward by the two sects. The Shiites, who formed the (...) principles of belief based on the theory of imamate, explained the issue of Mahdism in the axis of imamate and gave it a religious dimension, but the Shi‘ī sects disagreed on the subject of Mahdī. Shi‘ī sources tried to show that the claim of Mahdiship is an important issue, which has preoccupied Muslims, by dating the claim of Mahdiship back to Ali ibn Abi Talib's son, Muhammad ibn Hanafiyah. In a very early period, it was claimed that Muhammad ibn Hanafiyya did not die but was still living on a mountain called Razva in Madinah, and he was the anticipated (muntaẓar) Mahdī. Most of the Zaydiyya did not consider the issue of Mahdiship an important fundamental basis of belief. Ismailiyya maintain that Muhammad ibn Ismail did not die and will come and amend the world one day. Imāmiyya believe that Hasan, whom they accept as the last imam, will reappear as the Mahdī in the latest days of the world, and in line with this belief, they have made great efforts to find proof from the Qur’ānic verses and hadiths and interpreted them. In this way, they attached more importance to the understanding of Mahdiship on the axis of imamate than the other Shi‘ī sects. According to Imāmiyya, since the world cannot be left without a prophet, an open, or a secret imam, Muhammad b. Hasan will remain hidden as long as he wants and appear as the Mahdī near the Doomsday. Based on the clear statement of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) that twelve caliphs would come after him, the Imāmiyya restricted the number of Imams from Ahl al-Bayt to twelve and claimed that the twelfth imam would come again as Mahdī. Although the Imāmiyya believe that the Mahdī will be from the Ahl al-Bayt, just like the other imams, they have not been able to provide valid evidence for the belief that the twelfth imam will be hidden and appear near Judgment Day. Although Imāmiya tried/have been trying to prove that it is possible for a person to live for centuries (more than a thousand years), which is called al-Ghaybat al-Kubrā by Imamiyya, it cannot be said that they have succeeded in doing so. (shrink)

In this study, the classification of Zaydī fuqahā’ that emerged in the mutaaḫḫirūn period of Zaydī fiqh and related terms are examined. The book named Bulūgh al-arab wa-kunūz al-dhahab fī-maʿrifat al-madhhab, which has great importance among the studies aiming to present the Zaydī fiqh accumulation as a uniform doctrinal structure was taken as a basis in the processing of the subject. After an introduction in which Zaydī fiqh studies are evaluated in their relationship with the subject, the issue is handled (...) under three main headings. In the first title, the author and his work are introduced, and in the second and third titles, the methods and terms used in the classification of the Zaydī fukahâ are examined. The author of the work is ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Shaharī (d. 1190/1776) who lived during the period of the Qāsimī dynasty (al-dawla al-Qāsimiyya) in Yemen. The most important feature of the work, which was prepared using many sources that were attributed importance among the Zaydī literature, is that it was the most comprehensive of all that had written on madhhab doctrine until then. The first part of the work explains that the right madhhab to be followed is Zaydiyya. In the second part, the classes of the Zaydī fuqahā’, which is the subject of our study, are explained. The fuqahā’ classes are primarily divided into two parts: al-salaf al-ṣāliḥīn and al-ḫalaf al-ṣāliḥīn. The first dates back to the beginning of the 3rd/10th century. This class is divided into two parts, as al-sābiqūn and al-mutaaḫḫirūn. The sābiqūn starts with ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, his two sons al-Ḥasan and Ḥusayn and ends with the sons of twelve imams who are their descendants. Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740) is one of the twelve imams. The most important of the faqīhs in the part of mutaaḫḫirūn, which started with al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/860), are the six imams called ahl-al-nuṣūṣ or aʾimma al-nuṣūṣ. The reason why they are named as such is that their words were taken as a basis in determining the views of the sect on the field of uṣūl and furūʿ l-fiqh. al-Qāsim al-Rassī is at a point where all the knowledge of the Prophet's family and the principles agreed upon by sābiqūn, reach him through many channels. al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911), grandson of al-Qāsim, is the most important imam in terms of his position in the madhhab. The ḫalaf al-ṣāliḥīn is also divided into two parts as ahl l-taḥṣīl and ahl l-naẓar. The first part also referred to as muḥaṣṣilūn or aʾimma al-taḥṣīl, has no subcategories. The second part is divided into two sub-sections as ahl l-taqrīr and mudhākirūn. The muḥaṣṣilūn class starts with those who catch up with the last class of ahl al-nuṣūṣ and ends with ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), one of the three important imams. Two other important imams of muḥaṣṣilūn are Aḥmad b. al-Huṣayn (d. 411/1020) and his brother Yahyā b. al-Husayn (d. 424/1032). It is the fiqh activity of the jurists of this class, called taḥṣīl l-madhhab, that brought Zaydī fiqh, which was fiqh of imams (madhāhib l-aʾimma) in its first period, into a single madhhab and to its classical form in the last period. Mudhākirūn jurists lived at the same time as the ahl-t-taqrīr. This period is about 700 years from the beginning of the 6th/12th century, which is the last century of the muḥaṣṣilūn class, to the end of the 12th/18th century, when Shaharī lived. The roles of the ahl al-taqrīr in the madhhab mostly consist of reviewing the works of the ahl-l tahṣīl, approving the correct ones, and correcting the wrong ones. That's why they are so named. The author of Kitāb l-Azhār, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā l-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), is one of the prominent jurists among the ahl l-taqrīr. The majority of Zaydi fuqahā’ belong to the muẕākirūn class. These are the lowest class of the ahl-al-naẓar. As an important result reached in the study, it is possible to express the following: There is a difference between some of the knowledge and opinions in modern Zaydī studies, which include the same subject as Shaharī's work, in terms of the classification of Zaydī fuqahā’ and the terms used. Therefore, the findings and conclusions based on this work should be confirmed by new studies on other Zaydī classics, and existing opinions on Zaydī jurisprudence should be reviewed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Proceedings of the 1998 International Buddhist-Christian Theological EncounterBarbara Fields Bernstein and Brian MuldoonThe 1998 International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter, the continuation of the Cobb-Abe group, met in Indianapolis, Indiana, from May 1 to 3, 1998. Following the reading of a statement from Prof. Masao Abe in which he stated his regret at not being able to attend this important gathering and his hope that the encounter would begin to address (...) the global crises facing humankind today, John Cobb provided a brief history of the encounter for the new participants.First Paper: “Buddhism and Ecological Ethics,” by Chatsumarn KabilsinghProf. Kabilsingh began the morning discussion by focusing on the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, which reveals the interconnectedness of all life, as the starting place for fashioning a response to the environmental crisis. Suggesting that the inner and outer worlds are necessarily related (“As the king is, so are the sun and the moon”), she recommended adopting certain monastic practices to create a more harmonious relationship with nature. This provoked a discussion about the need for concrete action in addressing the behaviors not so much of individuals as of institutions. Institutions are uniquely human, embodying human imperfection even as they shape who we are. Noting that both traditions tended to focus on individual awakening or redemption, the question was asked how the principles of individual enlightenment or salvation could be applied to a community or institution. Further, there needs to be some practical balance between the two traditions’ extreme views of civilization, one of which places it in the heart of the forest (the East) and the other that finds it in the marbled city (the West). This balance, which must restore the tree of life to the heart of the city, will require a new model of institutions as living organisms rather than lifeless monoliths or random encounters. The balance of the morning’s discussion addressed the relationship between community and institutions and the “eschatological hope” of both Christianity and Buddhism. Chatsumarn concluded the session by highlighting the principle of interrelationship as the common ground between Christianity and Buddhism. [End Page 193]Second Paper: “Self and Nature in Christianity (and Buddhism),” by Sallie McfagueMcFague’s paper generated a spirited discussion about a series of paired concepts: Self-other, individual-community, sacramental-prophetic, absolute-relative, commonality-distinctiveness, vertical-horizontal, thinking-feeling, and scientific-aesthetic. The observation that ethics must be based on empirical data led to an exploration of the relationship of the relative (concrete reality that can be described) and the absolute (that which cannot be described, but may or may not be expressed through that which is particular) levels of truth. Interdependence, in the Buddhist model, includes an appreciation of the particularity of each thing while also recognizing the sameness of all. Speakers agreed that we must think both relatively and absolutely (although a new way of applying language to these concepts is needed). Meaningful environmental ethics must be grounded in the sacramental, in scientific particularity as perceived through the heart of the aesthete in intimate relationship with the natural world. But how could we move from these theoretical reflections into a closer encounter with that world? Stephanie Kaza would provide the needed vehicle in her comprehensive overview of the environmental crisis in the next session.Third Paper: “Overcoming the Grip of Consumerism,” by Stephanie KazaIt is fair to say that Kaza’s paper catalyzed provocative directions for thought during the three-day encounter, both because it provided the factual data from which an ethical discussion might proceed and because it focused the conversation on the role of consumerism in the environmental crisis. Prof. Kaza provided a telling comparison of consumerism and liberation practice as paths to self-realization and fulfillment, showing how the twelve links of dependent origination are integral to both paths. Breaking the grip of consumerism requires breaking any one of these links, like an addiction. This generated a spirited discussion about the relationship between enlightenment—whether “sudden” or otherwise—and consumerism and the relationship between consumerism and the more fundamental human tendency toward the acceptance of suffering over practices that promote liberation. While education was obviously critical for a... (shrink)

Sacred texts are important sources for all religions. These resources have a variety of social functions, either implicit or explicit. Therefore, it is important to protect and transfer sacred texts in many cultures. For this reason, in many societies, it has become necessary to memorize these texts after they have been written down and to transfer them orally to the next generations. Thus, over time, various structures related to the memorization of these sacred texts have emerged. Being Ḥāfiẓ is an (...) important activity that emerged for the purpose of memorizing the Qur'an and transferring it in this way when necessary and gained historical and social qualities. People who are Ḥāfiẓ are respected Islamic societies. For this reason, many people make an effort to become a Ḥāfiẓ. In this process, reasons contributed to the spread of becoming Ḥāfiẓ, such as the Prophet Muhammed’s encouragement, and the accepting the memorization of the Qur’an as a virtuous activity for Muslims. The research is based on the lives and experiences of visually impaired Ḥāfiẓes. First of all, it aims to contribute to the relevant scientific literature. In addition to its academic contribution, it also aims to be a source for various social policies in order to reveal new options in line with the inclusion of visually impaired individuals in social life. The research is a qualitative descriptive study. It was conducted on the basis of the phenomenology design, which is one of the qualitative research designs. In this direction, it has been tried to understand how visually impaired hafizes ascribe meaning to their lives and how they evaluate the world, society and relationships. The study group of the research consists of twelve visually impaired Ḥāfiẓ residing in the provinces of Bingöl, Elazig, Diyarbakir and Mardin. During the interviews, it was concluded that the sample reached the saturation point due to the repetition of the data, and so the number of participants was limited to twelve. Snowball sampling technique was used in the research. The interviews were conducted with a semi-structured interview form created within the scope of the research. The interviews were conducted in places such as houses, parks, association offices and mosques. The study was carried out with the permission of Bingöl University Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Committee. Various results were obtained by analyzing the data obtained during the research process. Becoming Ḥāfiẓ is accepted as an important element that directly affects the lives of visually impaired participants. For the participants, it has features that make them at peace with themselves, the world and society, illuminate their dark world, and take them out of living within four walls and include them into life. Being an Ḥāfiẓ, playing role in condolences, reciting hymns in mawlids and similar religious ceremonies, giving voluntary Qur'an trainings in mosques or courses are important examples of social activities provided by the Ḥāfiẓes. The participants stated that being a Ḥāfiẓ provided them an important status in the social context and thus they gained respectability. It has been determined that some visually impaired Ḥāfiẓes are employed informally. Many of the participants earn income by reciting mawlids, hymns and eulogies in various religious ceremonies. They also recite the Qur'an in condolences and on some special days. Being Ḥāfiẓ is an important resource for visually impaired individuals to be included in social life. For this reason, the achievements of the visually impaired due to being a Ḥāfiẓ are an example of a model life for both the disabled and the parents with disabled children. In this direction, the visually impaired individuals should be supported in religious music-supported organizations, religious music associations should be established, and courses like mawlidhan, etc. should be organized. (shrink)

In 1859, Charles Darwin proposed a mechanism for biological evolution in his most famous work, On the Origin of Species. However, Origin makes little mention of humans. Despite this, Darwin thought deeply about humans and in 1871 published The Descent of Man, his influential and controversial book in which he applied evolutionary theory to humans and detailed his theory of sexual selection. February 2021 will mark the 150th anniversay of it's publication. In A Most Interesting Problem, twelve leading anthropologists, (...) biologists, and journalists revisit The Descent. Following the same organization as the first edition of Descent - less the large section on sexual selection -- each author reviews what Darwin wrote in Descent, comparing his words to what we now know now. There are chapters on evidence for human evolution, our place in the family tree, the origins of civilization, human races, intelligence, and sex differences. An introduction by Darwin biolographer and historian Janet Browne provides context for Descent and a conclusion by Science magazine journalist Ann Gibbons looks to the future of the study of human evolution. All the chapters are written with a broad audience in mind. Ultimately, readers learn that Darwin was remarkably prophetic in some of his predictions, such as that the earliest human fossils would be discovered in Africa. But he was wrong in other areas, particularly in regards to variations between the sexes and races. Thus, A Most Interesting Problem is not so much a celebration of Darwin as it is a tribute to how science works, how scientific ideas are tested, and the role of evidence in helping structure narratives of human origins. The reader is left with a view of how far we have come in our quest for understanding human origins, biological variation, behavior, and evolution. (shrink)

Using data from nonwestern, and chiefly nonliterate, groups but relating his material to utopian, revivalistic, and sectarian movements in western societies, the anthropologist author has analyzed over a dozen cases, having in common a group of people under cultural stress who, finding their lives unsatisfactory, form a new ideal of human integrity and combine to create a new man in a new social order. After identifying the key elements of these millenarian situations, the author defines and relates his terms. He (...) discusses various problematic aspects, such as the role of the prophet and the significance of money. Several kinds of explanation are sketched. In one he lays out a typical millenarian pattern, or sequence of events, and finds himself, having glimpsed a kind of millennium, embarked on the first phase of a millenarian movement. In another scheme, four general types of explanation are examined: the psycho-physiological, the ethnographic, the Marxist, and the Hegelian. Finally, four "primary situations" and twelve "oppositions" are suggested as possible components in a millenarian model, no particular case, of course, requiring the full set. At every point the book invites discussion, clarification, amplification. It is coherent and illuminating but always open-ended, admirably fulfilling its stated purpose of posing problems and stimulating thought, rather than providing answers. The current complex of rebellions is never mentioned, but no one could read it without thinking of those who proclaim new values and who feel that, if only they could smash our present social order, a new and perfect one would arise from the ashes. The book would provide an apt conceptual frame for a study of our troubled times.--L. G. (shrink)

People prefer prototypical stimuli over atypical stimuli. The dominant explanation for this prototype preference effect is that prototypical stimuli are processed more fluently. However, a more recent account proposes that prototypes are more strongly associated with their category’s valence, leading to a reversed prototype preference effect for negative categories. One critical but untested assumption of this category-valence account is that no prototype preference should emerge for entirely neutral categories. We tested this prediction by conditioning categories of dot patterns positively, negatively, (...) or neutrally. In line with previous findings on the category-valence account, prototype preference reversed for negatively conditioned categories. However, prototype preference was similarly strong for positive and neutral categories. These findings imply that prototype preferences do not only reflect a transfer of category valence to exemplars. Instead, the results suggest that prototype preference is a multi-process phenomenon arising from the activated category valence and a fluency-based process. We discuss further implications for theories on fluency and prototype preference. (shrink)

Modernity's Consciousness of Time and Its Need for Self- Reassurance In his famous introduction to the collection of his studies on the sociology of ...

The objective of this work is to show that the cognitive and ontological connections between Benjamin’s and Zambrano’s works, more than similarities and differences, are based on the exercise of their expressive action. Along with the image that appears in the writing, both thinkers cite old poetic forms, which allows them to update philosophical, political and theological figurations to configure an experience of thinking in work.

Michael Winters | : Dans cette contribution, on formule l’hypothèse qu’il y a deux styles de leadership dominants dans les discours épiscopaux qui émergent de nos jours aux États-Unis : un premier, plutôt agressif, qui adopte une attitude défensive vis-à-vis de la culture ambiante ; un second, plus traditionnel, qui se contente de relayer l’enseignement de l’Église et laisse les laïcs incarner cet enseignement dans la culture. | : In this paper, it will be argued that there are two dominant (...) styles of leadership which dominate in the United States today : one is the style of the culture warrior, who takes a defensive posture towards the dominant culture ; the other, more traditional, is that of the churchman, who teaches what the Church teaches, but lets the laity engage that teaching in the culture. (shrink)