Research has shown that individuals with high levels of psychopathic personality traits are likely to cause harm to others in the workplace. However, there is little academic literature on the potentially adaptive outcomes of corporate psychopathy, particularly because the “boldness” psychopathy domain has largely been under-acknowledged in this literature. This study aimed to elaborate on past findings by examining the associations between psychopathy, as operationalized using scales from the relatively new triarchic model of psychopathy, and both adaptive and maladaptive workplace (...) behaviors. Participants were 343 working community adults who completed a series of self-report questionnaires that measured psychopathy and various workplace behaviors, including counterproductive work behaviors, tactics of influence, unethical decision-making, leadership strategies, team play, and creativity. Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the associations between latent constructs of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition, and the eight different constructs related to workplace behaviors. It was found that boldness preferentially predicted the use of soft tactics of influence, adaptive leadership, and team play, and negatively predicted passive leadership. Meanness predicted unethical decision-making, poor team play, and hard tactics of influence. Disinhibition positively predicted CWB and passive leadership. Meanness also moderated the association between disinhibition and CWB, in that greater scores on both psychopathy domains indicated greater levels of CWB. These findings provide conceptual support for the triarchic model, including the “boldness” domain, which measures adaptive aspects of psychopathy in addition to maladaptive ones, as well as suggest that not all individuals high on psychopathy would be an overt menace to the workplace. The different psychopathy traits may also interact with each other to predict different types or levels of workplace behaviors. (shrink)

The administration or recognition of religious courts is a form of religious accommodation present in many constitutional states today commonly analysed in legal pluralism terms. This article contributes to the further analysis of the relationship between legal pluralism and rights in religiously diverse societies by examining the status of state religious courts and their interaction with state non-religious courts. In particular, I examine what Cover calls “jurisdictional redundancies” between the courts and conceptualize the allocation of power between religious and non-religious (...) courts as a potentially productive site of interlegality. In doing so, I support concurrent jurisdictional allocations, arguing that exclusive jurisdiction could result in what I call an interlegal gap, whereby instead of inter-penetration of norms and production of reconciliatory principles, there is a justice gap whereby litigants may find themselves unable to obtain appropriate legal recourse including when neither court is willing to assume jurisdiction over the matter. This requires us to see the relationship between religious courts and non-religious courts through the more mundane but more practical lens of jurisdictional overlaps and competition, rather than through the more abstract framing of normative or even civilizational clashes. Accordingly, I argue that concurrent jurisdiction and interlegality have greater potential to strike a balance between individual and group rights and could be more protective of religious diversity. In other words, I argue for a closer, rather than a more separate, relationship between religious and non-religious courts, while denying that a hierarchical relationship where religious courts are subordinated to non-religious courts is the only way to protect rights. (shrink)

In this paper, we respond to a recent article by Edwin Jesudason regarding the ethical problems associated with kindness in healthcare. Jesudason contends that kindness contributes to unkind outcomes such as discrimination and systemic problems in healthcare. We disagree with his above assertion by forwarding three arguments. First, we question his association of kindness with favouritism through his conflation of favour with favouritism. We counter that doing someone a favour does not necessarily mean that preferential treatment is involved. Second, we (...) object to his interpretation of discretionary kindness as possessing ‘circumscribed scope’, that is, doing favours to the ingroup and leaving out others. We maintain that the discretionary element of kindness does not denote inclusivity and instead refers to the judgement and prudence needed for a person to act kindly in specific circumstances. Our third argument concerns Jesudason’s emphasis on kindness as an action. By focussing on kind acts, he has inadvertently overlooked kindness as a moral value, attitude and inclination of a person. Overall, Jesudason has provided an inadequate explanation of kindness as a virtue. We suggest that a kind person does not promote or condone unkind outcomes such as prejudice, abuses and structural problems in healthcare. Instead, such a person goes beyond discrete kind acts and ingroup loyalty to actively demonstrate compassion, generosity and assistance towards those in need in a spontaneous and consistent manner. (shrink)

Facing the possibility of a surge of COVID-19-infected patients requiring ventilatory support in Intensive Care Units, the Singapore Hospice Council and the Chapter of Palliative Medicine Physicians forward its position on the guiding principles that ought to drive the allocation of ICU beds and its role in care of these patients and their families.

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In (...) this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism? (shrink)

Guided by Basic Psychological Need Theory, we investigated the combined associations between need satisfaction and need frustration and their relations with theoretically relevant correlates including mindfulness, physical literacy, physical activity enjoyment, and physical activity. The participants were Singapore-based school students who completed a cross-sectional survey. The results of the latent profile analysis identified four distinct need profiles: profile 1–average satisfaction and frustration ; profile 2–low satisfaction, above average frustration; profile 3–very high satisfaction, very low frustration ; and profile 4–high satisfaction, (...) very high frustration. Among these, profile 3 was the most adaptive one; it had the highest levels of mindfulness, physical literacy, physical activity enjoyment, and moderate-to-vigorous physical activity. Experiences of need satisfaction countered the negative effects of need frustration on these correlates. These findings enhance our understanding of students’ psychological need experiences and highlight the need for investigating the combined associations between need satisfaction and need frustration. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of (...) physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada, Almanya’da İslamofobi’nin artışında etkenler tespit edilmekte, bu etkenlerden biri olarak görülen Neo-selefî yapıların bu etkideki rolü analiz edilmektedir. İslamofobi, İslam dininden ve Müslümanlardan korkma, nefret etme, endişe duyma veya önyargılı olma olarak tanımlanabilir. Müslümanlardan korkma veya Müslümanlara düşmanlık besleme anlamında İslamofobi’nin kökenleri İslam’ın ilk dönemlerine kadar uzanmaktadır. Tarihi kökenlere bakıldığında bu düşmanlığın Kudüs’ün, Endülüs’ün ve Hristiyan dünyanın hüküm sürdüğü diğer toprakların Müslümanlar tarafından fethedilme süreçlerine kadar gittiği gözlemlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada ise son 20-30 yıllık süreç içerisinde görülen İslamofobi’nin artışındaki (...) etkenlere odaklanılmıştır. Burada dönüm noktasını Amerika’da bir grup terörist tarafından gerçekleştirilen 11 Eylül 2001 saldırıları oluşturmaktadır. Bu saldırı, İslamofobi endüstrisi tarafından bütün Müslümanların terörizm ile ilişkilendirilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Almanya, İslamofobi’nin en belirgin şekilde arttığı ülkelerden biridir. İslamofobi’nin artışı, Müslüman toplulukların günlük yaşamlarında karşılaştıkları ayrımcılık ve dışlanmayı artırırken, toplumsal uyum ve entegrasyon çabalarını zayıflatmaktadır. Bu olgunun Almanya’daki etkilerini anlamak, sadece Müslüman toplulukların karşılaştıkları zorlukları değil, aynı zamanda toplumun geneline yayılan etkileri de ortaya koymak açısından önemlidir. Bu çalışma ile amaçlanan, batılı ülkeler genelinde İslamofobi’nin artışındaki etkileri tespit ederken, özellikle Almanya ölçeğinde bu etkenler içerisinde yer aldığını düşündüğümüz Neo-selefî grupların nefret ve şiddet içeren eylem ve söylemlerinin bu artıştaki etkisinin tespit edilmesidir. Bu selefî söylemlerin kelâmî bağlamı da konu çerçevesinde önem arz etmektedir. Neo-selefî grupların söylem, eylem ve faaliyetlerinin, batılı ülkelerde yaşayan yerel halklar nezdinde nasıl karşılandığı, korku ve endişe uyandırıp uyandırmadığı, Müslümanların ötekileştirilip dışlanarak potansiyel bir düşman olarak algılanıp algılanmadığı gibi hususlar analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada, literatür taraması ve analitik yöntemler kullanılmıştır. İslamofobi, Selefîlik ve Neo-selefîlik kavramları kelâmî perspektifle detaylı bir şekilde ele alınmış, sonrasında ise İslamofobi’nin artışındaki temel etkenler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Tespit edilen etkenlerin analiz ve değerlendirmesi yapıldıktan sonra, özel olarak Almanya’da faaliyet gösteren radikal Neo-selefî grupların liderlerinin / vaizlerinin söylemleri çerçevesinde, toplumda bu gruplara yönelik algı tespit edilmeye çalışılmış ve bu olumsuz İslam imajının İslamofobi’nin artışındaki etkileri ortaya konulmuştur. Çalışmada, Almanya’da Neo-selefî grupların söylem ve faaliyetlerinin, İslamofobi’nin artışında önemli bir rol oynadığı tespit edilmiştir. Neo- selefî yapıların radikal ve dışlayıcı söylemleri, Almanya’da yaşayan Müslümanların toplumsal entegrasyonunu zorlaştırmakta ve yerel halk arasında Müslümanlara yönelik korku ve önyargıları beslemektedir. Özellikle Pierre Vogel ve Hasan Dabbağ gibi Neo-Selafi vaizlerin, sosyal medya ve diğer platformlar üzerinden yürüttükleri nefret söylemleri, Almanya’da İslamofobi’nin artmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu durum, Müslümanların genel olarak terörizmle ilişkilendirilmesine ve toplumsal kutuplaşmanın artmasına neden olmaktadır. (shrink)

The main focus of this essay is to closely engage with the role of scientist-subjectivity in the making of objectivity in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s book Objectivity, and Daston’s later and earlier works On Scientific Observation and The Moral Economy of Science. I have posited four challenges to the neo-Kantian and Foucauldian constructions of the co-implication of psychology and epistemology presented in these texts. Firstly, following Jacques Lacan’s work, I have argued that the subject of science constituted by the (...) mode of modern science suffers from paranoia. It is not the fear of subjectivity interfering with objectivity but the impossibility of knowing the truth of the real that causes paranoia. Here, I have argued that it is not the ethos of objectivity that drives epistemology as Daston and Galison suggest, but the pathos of paranoia. The second challenge builds upon Kant’s own denial that the perfect correspondence between the human will and the moral law is possible. Kant himself thought that an ethical human act is impossible without the component of “pathology.” This questions Daston and Galison’s argument that there is always ethical imperative at the core of epistemic virtue. The third challenge contests the way Daston and Galison take appearance for being in their application of the Foucauldian concept of technologies of the self in modeling the master scientist-self. The fourth challenge questions the notion of the psychological and unconscious in the making of epistemology in Daston’s later and earlier work. Against this background, I aim to make a claim that understanding and disclosing “entities” in the scientific domain presupposes an understanding of “being” in general. My goal is to open up the discussion for an alternative conception of the scientist-subject and thereby an affective and existential formulation of science. (shrink)

Contemporary neo-liberal society is ruled by the market. Davies, Chen and Lentin and Titley show that its objectification and categorization founds a competitive notion of agency that disables subjective construction of self and intersubjective understanding of the world. As the market's rules and norms are set by white patriarchy, its competitive paradigm structurally disadvantages others. Art too is objectified and categorized by neo-liberal institutions, equally embedded in white patriarchal market structures and severely limiting democratic public access to a diverse artistic (...) field, argue hooks, Mercer and Piper. Yet, Piper's artwork shows, art holds emancipatory potential. Defined as transforming experience, its ambiguity provides a structure for constituting agentic subjectivity and intersubjective signification processes, defying objective/objectifying market workings. Photography's specific qualities allow Piper to democratize access to the paradigm she proposes. Her artistic choices may thus found the potential to publicly construct a notion of aesthetic agency as resistance to the neo-liberal market. (shrink)

Robert Fogelin agrees that arguments for Cartesian sceptism carry a heavy burden of theoretical commitment, for they take for granted, explicitly or implicitly, the foundationalist's idea that experimental knowledge is in some fully general way 'epistemologically prior' to knowledge of the world. He thinks, however, that there is a much more direct and commonsensical route to scepticism. Ordinary knowledge-claims are accepted on the basis of justificatory procedures that fall far short of eliminating all conceivable error-possibilities. As a result, it is (...) always possible, by bringing new errorpossibilities into play, to raise the 'level of scrutiny' to which a given knowledge-claim is subject, so that it no longer seems adequately justified. Philosophical theories of justification can be seen as attempts to repair this fragility of ordinary knowledge. But they fail, all succumbing to the Pyrrhonian modes of assumption, circularity or infinite regress. I argue that Fogelin's conception of varying levels of scrutiny leads at most to fallibilism and not to radical scepticism. More importantly, I show that changing the range of relevant defeaters to a given knowledge claim can do more that impose stricter standards for justification: it can change the subject by altering the direction of inquiry. We see from this that the introduction of 'sceptical hypotheses' (such as that Descartes's Evil Deceiver) are not best seen as raising standards to some maximal level but as introducing a new kind of evaluation which, without commitment to what I call 'epistemological realism,' does nothing to impugn the justificational status of ordinary knowledge-claims entered in ordinary contexts. (shrink)

Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of (...) a priori rationality. In reply, Pust contends that some a priori propositions are beyond doubt and that fact can be used to support the overall reliability of reason. This paper challenges Pust’s argument. I argue that while Pust successfully undermines a radical skeptical view of reason, he does not refute a more modest skepticism. I conclude with some suggestions for Cartesian a priorists. (shrink)

This research article uses the theoretical framework of doctrine as believer's security to critique the theological framework behind the controversial activities reported amongst some South African neo-Pentecostal prophets, which include feeding congregants with grass, spraying them with insecticides and sexual violation of women congregants. The framework of the article falls within the discipline of systematic theology by raising the importance for South African Christians to develop a critical doctrinal framework for protecting themselves from controversial NPPs. The following main question is (...) answered by the article: from a systematic theological perspective, how can we evaluate the theological framework, which leads to the recent controversial activities reported amongst some NPPs in South Africa? Consequently, the article, firstly, describes the critical theological framework of the protective role of Christian doctrine. Secondly, it describes the South African NPPs and their controversial practices. Thirdly, this article analyses some of the theological problems in the current operative framework of NPPs. Fourthly, it argues for the need for doctrinally informed critical thinking as a safety measure against controversial NPPs. Finally, some steps that must be taken by NPPs to develop critical theological thinking in order to overcome doctrinally vacuous experientialism that promotes controversial religious activities are provided.CONTRIBUTION: From a systematic theological approach, this article attempts to demonstrate the importance of critical doctrinal thinking as a defence mechanism for protecting Christians from falling prey to harmful religious practices, such as those recently reported amongst some NPPs in South Africa. (shrink)

[ES] Gottlob Frege posiblemente era el primer filósofo analítico. La exégesis de su doctrina quedó durante varias décadas restringida casi naturalmente al ámbito de la filosofía analítica y angloparlante. El método que Frege heredó a la filosofía analítica se basa en el análisis abstracto y formal, y la aprehensión de su doctrina se desarrolló bajo el supuesto –tomado casi por autoevidente- que éste método es el único correcto para dar cuenta de los problemas filosóficos más fundamentales, muy particularmente el de (...) desarrollar una teoría de significado. Igualmente se asumía y asume todavía con cierto automatismo que las preocupaciones filosóficas de Frege son fundamentalmente las mismas de la filosofía analítica y las que no caben en este supuesto se desechan fácilmente como anacrónicas o absurdas. Este acercamiento al pensamiento de Frege exclusivamente bajo los supuestos de la filosofía analítica, sus méritos no obstante, no toma en cuenta el ambiente anti-naturalista y neo-kantiano en el cual Frege formó sus convicciones fundamentales. Algunos aspectos contenciosos como, por ejemplo, el principio de contexto, una posible jerarquía de sentidos indirectos o la suposición, casi tácita, de que la doctrina de Frege es una teoría sobre expresiones referenciales, aparecen en una luz diferente si nos damos cuenta de que su intento de construir un sistema es, en cuanto a filosofía, en el fondo una respuesta a problemas que Frege encontró en el sistema de Kant. [EN] Gottlob Frege was quite possibly the first analytical philosopher. For several decades the study of his teachings restricted itself almost naturally to the sphere of analytical and English speaking philosophy. The very method which Frege might have impressed upon analytical philosophy takes off with abstract and formal analysis and the apprehension of his doctrine developed under the assumption –taken to be almost self-evident- that this method is the only one capable of correctly accounting for the most fundamental philosophical problems, especially bringing forth a comprehensive theory of meaning. Hence it was taken for granted with certain automatism that the Frege´s philosophical worries were initially identical in its origins with those of contemporary analytical philosophy and those not amenable to easy adoptions are discharged as absurd anachronisms when viewed against current doctrines. Approaching Fregean thought exclusively under the assumptions of analytical philosophy, while having merit, does not take into account the anti-naturalist and neo-Kantian background which influenced the modelling of Frege’s fundamental convictions. Some contentious aspects like for example the context principle, a possible hierarchy of indirect senses or the almost tacit assumption that Frege’s doctrine is a theory about referential expressions appear in a different light, once we become aware that his attempt at system-construction, as far as it concerns philosophy, is fundamentally an answer to problems which Frege found in Kant’s system. (shrink)

Assyria can be described as the founder of the imperial model of kingship in the ancient Near East. The Assyrian court itself, however, remains poorly understood. Scholarship has treated the court as a disembodied, textual entity, separated from the physical spaces it occupied – namely, the palaces. At the same time, architectural analyses have examined the physical structures of the Assyrian palaces, without consideration for how these structures were connected to people’s lives and works. The palaces are often described as (...) secluded, inaccessible locations. This study presents the first model of the Assyrian court contextualized in its actual palaces. It provides a nuanced model highlighting how the court organized the immense flow of information, people and goods entering the palace as a result of the empire’s increased size and complexity. It argues that access to the king was regulated by three gates of control which were manned by specific types of personnel and a more situational organization that moved within the physical spaces of the palace and was contingent on the king’s activity. (shrink)

Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian meaning of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo-Kantian background.

Neo-Confucianism is a philosophically sophisticated tradition weaving classical Confucianism together with themes from Buddhism and Daoism. It began in China around the eleventh century CE, played a leading role in East Asian cultures over the last millennium, and has had a profound influence on modern Chinese society. -/- Based on the latest scholarship but presented in accessible language, Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction is organized around themes that are central in Neo-Confucian philosophy, including the structure of the cosmos, human nature, ways (...) of knowing, personal cultivation, and approaches to governance. The authors thus accomplish two things at once: they present the Neo-Confucians in their own, distinctive terms; and they enable contemporary readers to grasp what is at stake in the great Neo-Confucian debates. (shrink)

Where does Neo-Confucianismâe"a movement that from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries profoundly influenced the way people understood the world and responded to itâe"fit into our story of Chinaâe(tm)s history? This interpretive, at times polemical, inquiry into the Neo-Confucian engagement with the literati as the social and political elite, local society, and the imperial state during the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties is also a reflection on the role of the middle period in Chinaâe(tm)s history. The book argues that as (...) Neo-Confucians put their philosophy of learning into practice in local society, they justified a new social ideal in which society at the local level was led by the literati with state recognition and support. The later imperial order, in which the state accepted local elite leadership as necessary to its own existence, survived even after Neo-Confucianism lost its hold on the center of intellectual culture in the seventeenth century but continued as the foundation of local education. It is the contention of this book that Neo-Confucianism made that order possible. (shrink)

Addresses Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi’s neo-Confucianism from the perspective of contemporary ecological humanism. In this novel engagement with Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), Nicholas S. Brasovan presents Wang’s neo-Confucianism as an important theoretical resource for engaging with contemporary ecological humanism. Brasovan coins the term “person-in-the-world” to capture ecological humanism’s fundamental premise that humans and nature are inextricably bound together, and argues that Wang’s cosmology of energy (qi) gives us a rich conceptual vocabulary for understanding the continuity that exists (...) between persons and the natural world. The book makes a significant contribution to English-language scholarship on Wang Fuzhi and to Chinese intellectual history, with new English translations of classical Chinese, Mandarin, and French texts in Chinese philosophy and culture. This innovative work of comparative philosophy not only presents a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of Wang’s thought but also shows its relevance to contemporary discussions in the philosophy of ecology. “This is a fine study of Wang Fuzhi’s complex and fascinating neo-Confucian cosmology. I learned an immense amount about one of China’s last great Confucian intellectuals.” — John Berthrong, author of Expanding Process: Exploring Philosophical and Theological Transformations in China and the West. (shrink)

The neo-logicist argues tliat standard mathematics can be derived by purely logical means from abstraction principles—such as Hume's Principle— which are held to lie 'epistcmically innocent'. We show that the second-order axiom of comprehension applied to non-instantiated properties and the standard first-order existential instantiation and universal elimination principles are essential for the derivation of key results, specifically a theorem of infinity, but have not been shown to be epistemically innocent. We conclude that the epistemic innocence of mathematics has not been (...) established by the neo-logicist. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism is a modern attempt at naturalizing ethics using ideas from Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics. Proponents of this view argue that moral virtue in human beings is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the realm of non-human living things. Many critics question whether neo-Aristotelian naturalism is tenable in light of modern evolutionary biology. Two influential lines of objection have appealed to an evolutionary understanding of human nature and natural teleology to argue against (...) this view. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of these two seemingly different lines of objection as raising instances of the same dilemma, giving neo-Aristotelians a choice between contradicting our considered moral judgment and abandoning metaethical naturalism. I argue that resolving the dilemma requires showing a particular kind of continuity between the norms of moral virtue and norms that are necessary for understanding non-human living things. I also argue that in order to show such a continuity, neo-Aristotelians need to revise the relationship they adopt with empirical science and acknowledge that the latter is relevant to assessing their central commitments regarding living things. Finally, I argue that to move this debate forward, both neo-Aristotelians and their critics should pay attention to recent work on the concept of organism in evolutionary and developmental biology. (shrink)

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz’s belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz’s later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant’s work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel’s phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant (...) or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian naturalism purports to explain morality in terms of human nature, while maintaining that the relevant aspects of human nature cannot be known scientifically. This has led some to conclude that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is not a form of ethical naturalism in the standard, metaphysical sense. In this paper, I argue that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is in fact a standard form of ethical naturalism that is committed to metaphysical naturalism about moral truths and presents a distinctive and underappreciated argument for it. I (...) reconstruct the neo-Aristotelian argument for ethical naturalism in terms of a continuity between the ethical domain and the natural domain of life. I argue that clarifying the meta-ethical import of neo-Aristotelian naturalism not only helps to situate it among other positions in meta-ethics, but also facilitates better critical engagement with the view. (shrink)