God, at least as an active agent, is excluded from today’s scientific worldview -- including the worldview of the humanities. This creates a gulf between a godless science and believers in God’s active presence in the world, a gulf that I argue is unbridgeable. I resist four temptations to take easy ways out of a real dilemma: whether to accept or dismiss this and similar miracle accounts. The first is to explain evidence and refuse to consider the events about which (...) the evidence reports; the second, to deny that reports of miracles represent a problem since biblical actors and authors lacked Hume’s concept of inviolable laws of nature; the third, to become resigned to a putative epistemological gap that renders impossible any dialogue on religion with actors from the early modern period; the fourth, to restrict our studies to asking what the events meant to the historical actors without passing judgment on the truth value of their beliefs. I suggest that when doing historical researc. (shrink)

This paper probes the explanatory value of mentality as a social emergent in general and of the Zeitgeist in particular. Durkheim’s contention that social facts have emergent properties is open to the charge that it implies logically inconsistent “downward causation.” On the basis of an analogy with the brain–mind dilemma and mental emergentism, the first part of the essay discusses and dismisses the notion of social emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of their component parts—individuals—and their internal (...) relations. However, ontological individualism need not compel us to methodological individualism. The second part introduces two challenges to methodological individualism. The most radical is Rajeev Bhargava’s assertion that the meaning of a belief is determined not by the individual holding the belief but by the entire linguistic community. Bhargava’s “contextualism” is closely related to the structural demand that we focus on discourse as a communal entity instead of continuing a delusive quest for the intentions of individual speakers. A more modest alternative is Margaret Gilbert’s plea for using “plural subjects”—social groups in which “participant agents” act jointly or have a jointly accepted view—in the practical syllogisms that are central to rationalizing action explanation. The notion of plural subjects lends credence to, and is reinforced by, “situationist” social psychology, which shows how people conform to peer groups, authorities, and roles. Building on Wesley Salmon’s and Peter Railton’s ecumenical accounts of explanation, the essay argues that both individual rationalizing action explanations and explanations based on plural agents can give explanatory information: we need not choose one or the other. The third part discusses how the Zeitgeist can provide added explanatory value in an analysis of the New Left. This is possible if the “spirit of the sixties” is seen as representing the values and worldviews of the “sixties generation” as a social group in Gilbert’s terms. Radical youth would suspend judgment and pool their wills to conform to what they perceived were the views of the imagined “sixties community” or—rendering more explanatory force—to smaller parts of it in the guise of peer groups and organizations. (shrink)

This reply aims both to respond to Gregory and to move forward the debate about God’s place in historiography. The first section is devoted to the nature of science and God. Whereas Gregory thinks science is based on metaphysical naturalism with a methodological corollary of critical-realist empiricism, I see critical, empiricist methodology as basic, and naturalism as a consequence. Gregory’s exposition of his apophatic theology, in which univocity is eschewed, illustrates the fissure between religious and scientific worldviews—no matter which basic (...) scientific theory one subscribes to. The second section is allotted to miracles. As I do, Gregory thinks no miracle occurred on Fox Lakes in 1652, but he restricts himself to understanding the actors and explaining change over time, and refuses to explain past or contemporary actions and events. Marc Bloch, in his book The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France, is willing to go much further than Gregory. Using his superior medical knowledge to substitute his own explanation of the phenomenon for that of the actors, Bloch dismisses the actors’ beliefs that they or others had been miraculously cured, and explains that they believed they saw miraculous healing because they were expecting to see it. In the third section, on historical explanation, I rephrase the question whether historians can accommodate both believers in God and naturalist scientists, asking whether God, acting miraculously or not, can be part of the ideal explanatory text. I reply in the negative, and explicate how the concept of a plural subject suggests how scientists can also be believers. This approach may be compatible with two options presented by Peter Lipton for resolving the tension between religion and science. The first is to see the truth claims of religious texts as untranslatable into scientific language ; the other is to immerse oneself in religious texts by accepting them as a guide but not believing in their truth claims when these contradict science. (shrink)

Philosophy of history is currently dominated by postmodernist anti-realists who claim that historiography can never provide true accounts of the past. The Poverty of Anti-realism exposes the faulty premises and reasoning behind such assertions and shows that anti-realism has political implications unforeseen and unwanted by its adherents.

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend (...) the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with “anything goes”: we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown. (shrink)

Intuitionistic sentential logic is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a semantics centered around extensions of atomic bases (i.e. sets of inference rules for atomic sentences). The result is made possible through a non-standard interpretation of disjunction, whereby, roughly speaking, a disjunction is taken to hold just in case every atomic sentence that follows from each of the disjuncts separately holds; it is argued that this interpretation makes good sense provided that rules in atomic bases are conceived (...) of as being accepted hypothetically rather than categorically. (shrink)

As John Casti wrote, "Finally, a book that really does explain consciousness." This groundbreaking work by Denmark's leading science writer draws on psychology, evolutionary biology, information theory, and other disciplines to argue its revolutionary point: that consciousness represents only an infinitesimal fraction of our ability to process information. Although we are unaware of it, our brains sift through and discard billions of pieces of data in order to allow us to understand the world around us. In fact, most of what (...) we call thought is actually the unconscious discarding of information. What our consciousness rejects constitutes the most valuable part of ourselves, the "Me" that the "I" draws on for most of our actions--fluent speech, riding a bicycle, anything involving expertise. No wonder that, in this age of information, so many of us feel empty and dissatisfied. As engaging as it is insightful, this important book encourages us to rely more on what our instincts and our senses tell us so that we can better appreciate the richness of human life. (shrink)

Semantic justifications of the classical rules of logical inference typically make use of a notion of bivalent truth, understood as a property guaranteed to attach to a sentence or its negation regardless of the prospects for speakers to determine it as so doing. For want of a convincing alternative account of classical logic, some philosophers suspicious of such recognition-transcending bivalence have seen no choice but to declare classical deduction unwarranted and settle for a weaker system; intuitionistic logic in particular, buttressed (...) by assertion-conditional semantics, is often considered to enjoy a degree of meaning-theoretical respectability unattainable by classical logic.The decision to forgo the classical inference rules is not always made lightly. Thus, Dummett: " In the resolution of the conflict between [the view that generally accepted classical modes of inference ought to be theoretically accommodated, and the demand that any such accommodation be achieved without recourse to bivalence] lies, as I see it, one of the most fundamental and intractable problems in the theory of meaning; indeed, in all philosophy. "The present article ventures to suggest that the conflict need not be irresoluble. Helping ourselves only to such conceptual resources as are standardly invoked by proponents of intuitionistic logic, we shall formulate a rudimentary meaning theory for a selection of logical constants, define a relation of valid inferability, and prove that the latter includes all of classical first-order logic. The result is essentially that reported in Sandqvist as Theorem 2.20.2. TheoryWe will be considering a standard-syntax first-order language with ⊃, ⊥ and ∀ as its only primitive logical constants. We assume countable supplies of individual constants, individual functors , and predicates , as well as a denumerably infinite set of individual variables. By a basic 1 formula we will mean one that …[Full Text of this Article]. (shrink)

Organization in a tangled world -- Process views of organization -- Alfred North Whitehead on process -- Bruno Latour on relativizing the social, and the becoming of networks -- Niklas Luhmann on autopoiesis and recursiveness in social systems -- James March on decision processes and organization : a logic of streams -- Karl Weick on organizing and sensemaking -- A scheme for process based organizational analysis -- Some implications for organizational analysis.

The author scrutinizes the special application of arne naess's model for the semantical interpretation of texts which was made by laura grimm in her book, "definition in plato's meno". (staff).

It seems plausible, even truistic, that when an agent is faced with the choice of giving up one belief or another, the decision should be based on the relative strengths of these beliefs along some dimension of doxastic merit. This said, however, two non-trivial questions arise: (1) Which dimension? (2) How should the contraction outcome be affected by the distribution of beliefs along this dimension?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentaryTor Phern Chern, Associate ConsultantThe case scenario describes a difficult clinical and ethical challenge of a psychiatric patient refusing treatment in the context of a treatment-resistant condition that may be affecting her capacity to refuse treatment.The patient described in the case scenario displayed partial treatment refusal as evidenced by her refusal of ECT and adherence with medication and her voluntary hospital admission. Partial treatment refusal is generally more (...) common than absolute treatment refusal1 and can be sporadic, time-limited, periodic or continuous. It is important for the medical team to clarify which category of treatment refusal this patient’s refusal falls under. These broad categories include the doctor-patient relationship, religion, secondary gain, treatment- or illness-based refusals.2 The proper identification of category of treatment refusal will guide subsequent management.Refusal of treatments may be in response to reality-based transference issues like fear, distrust or pressure from the patient’s family. In this particular case, there is little data about her relationship with her treating psychiatrist, but the lack of a trusting doctor-patient relationship could be a factor for treatment refusal. The treating psychiatrist at the inpatient setting could be different from the patient’s routine outpatient psychiatrist and this could result in the lack of a trusting doctor-patient relationship. The remedy for this would be to develop a trusting relationship between her treating psychiatrist and the patient via understanding the patient’s needs and concerns. A useful adjunct would be to identify someone with whom the patient has a trusting relationship and recruit that person to help develop trust in the doctor-patient relationship. On this point, it is interesting to note that the patient’s family was noted to be highly supportive and influential in previous treatment decisions, agreed [End Page 235] with the treating psychiatrist’s treatment recommendation and yet both the treating psychiatrist and the patient’s family were unable to convince her to accept ECT. One possibility is that the patient may see her family’s support of the treating psychiatrist’s recommendation as one reason to refuse treatment. This possibility warrants deeper explorations of her premorbid underlying cultural and religious beliefs and attitudes towards her family and her perceived role in her community.Religion-based refusals of treatment (e.g. blood transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses) are less prominent in psychiatry than in general medicine but may manifest in treatment refusal due to advice from religious leaders on the need for spiritual solutions to the patient’s challenges. Religion-based refusals need to be distinguished from an illness-based refusal but if truly present will require the support of appropriate religious leaders to allow the patient more management options other than spiritual support for her psychiatric disorder. There is no specific information about the patient’s religion and religion-based refusals of ECT are not particularly common so this is unlikely to be a major reason for treatment refusal in this case.Treatment-based refusals of care are related to the specific treatment modality being offered and are often motivated by concerns about the side effects of treatment or past traumas that the treatment elicits. In this particular case, the patient has demonstrated some degree of treatment resistance as evidenced by the relapse of her bipolar disorder despite adherence to medication, and a change in management is certainly warranted. However, a change in medication management may be possible before proceeding to ECT in view of the patient’s acceptance of medication and no clear evidence of violent or disturbed behaviour in the ward. The occasional refusal of food and water is worrying, but if the patient can be coaxed to continue oral nutrition, there is no absolute indication to have ECT for rapid treatment response. Other options that may be acceptable to the patient are to optimise the dosage of current medications, switch medications or add augmenting pharmacological agents before proceeding to ECT. A change in pharmacotherapy must take into account her past treatment response and side effects to individual medications. Psychotherapy may also be considered to augment treatment response before ECT is considered.3Illness-based refusals are the most challenging category and... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Like many writers after the Renaissance, Hooker was influenced by a number of classical and Neo-Platonic texts, especially by Cicero, Seneca, Hermes Trimegistus, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Hooker’s regular allusions to these thinkers help illuminate his own work but also his place within the broader European context and the history of ideas. This paper addresses in turn the reception of Cicero and Seneca in the early Church through the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Hooker’s use of Ciceronian and Senecan ideas, and finally (...) Hooker’s use of Neo-Platonic texts attributed to Hermes Trismegistus and Dionysius the Areopagite. Hooker will be shown to distinguish himself as a sophisticated and learned interpreter who balances distinctive motifs such as Scripture and tradition, faith, reason, experience, and ecclesiology with a complex appeal to pagan and Christian sources and ideas. (shrink)

This article examines adult online education by investigating the complex relationship between technology and community. The aim was to explore online teaching in relation to the handbook dilemma teachers meet in their teacher profession by focusing on participation and sharing opportunities. This study analysed several handbooks that aim to help teachers design and implement online education. The advice in the handbooks was contrasted against two empirical cases. Specifically, the study examined how two cases – online adult education courses and special (...) needs teacher training courses – implemented online education with respect to participation and sharing. The analysis suggests that pedagogy is the crucial point and a planned pedagogy is absolutely necessary for designing and implementing effective online education, education that encourages participation and sharing. The findings showed that some handbooks offer meaningful guidance regarding the development of online education, but other publications were not helpful which creates a dilemma for teachers. (shrink)

Sextus’ interpretation of Xenophanes’ scepticism in M 7.49–52 is often cited but has never been subject to detailed analysis. Such analysis reveals that Sextus’ interpretation raises far more complex problems than has been recognised. Scholars invariably assume one of two ways of construing his account of Xenophanes B34, without observing that the choice between these two alternatives poses an interpretive dilemma. Some scholars take it that Sextus ascribes to Xenophanes the view that one may have knowledge without knowing that one (...) has knowledge. Others take it that he ascribes to Xenophanes the view that one may have true belief without knowing that one has true belief. A close examination of Sextus’ paraphrase exposes a crucial but overlooked complication. Sextus elides Xenophanes’ pivotal distinction between knowing “the clear and certain” and believing “what has been fulfilled” . He eliminates altogether tetelesmenon from his analysis of B34, and expands the role of to saphes. I demonstrate that, as a result, Xenophanes B34, as interpreted by Sextus, does not consistently and straightforwardly express either view or view . Sextus, I argue, in fact develops a fundamentally incoherent interpretation of Xenophanes B34. On Sextus’ interpretation, Xenophanes justifies the proposition “No human knows” by arguing that, even if a human does, in fact, know, he does not know that he knows. Finally, I argue that Sextus’ incoherent account reflects not unthinking negligence, but a sophisticated if ultimately doomed attempt to interpret the logical structure of Xenophanes B34 in line with later models of second-order scepticism. (shrink)

William F. Lynch, S. J. An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides, Georgetown University Press, 1959, 255 pp. $ 6.00 Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides, Yale University Press, New Haven 1961, 365 pp. $ 6.50.

This article argues that Empedocles’ trust in Strife (DK31 B115.14 = LM22 D10.14) is not, as the prevailing interpretation has it, only a past misjudgement and failure. Rather, trust in Strife still, and to his own lament, infects Empedocles’ mind and informs his life. This detail then offers a fresh perspective on Empedocles’ self-conception and on how, through the daimōn’s cosmic peregrinations, Empedocles raises and pursues questions of agency and responsibility. Furthermore, it sheds light on Empedocles’ understanding of his own (...) ethical standing: common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding, he does not see himself as an unqualifiedly successful embodiment of his own ideals. (shrink)

This fascinating and timely volume explores current thinking on vital topics in moral psychology, spanning the diverse disciplines that contribute to the field. Academics from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, anthropology, philosophy, and political science address ongoing and emerging questions aimed at understanding the thought processes and behaviors that underlie our moral codes-and our transgressions. Cross-cutting themes speak to individual, interpersonal, and collective morality in such areas as the development of ethical behavior, responses to violations of rules, moral judgments in the (...) larger discourse, and universal versus specific norms. This wide-angle perspective also highlights the implications of moral psychology research for policy and justice, with cogent viewpoints from: Philosophy: empiricism and normative questions, moral relativism. Evolutionary biology: theories of how altruism and moral behavior evolved. Anthropology: common moral values seen in ethnographies from different countries. Cognitive and neural sciences: computational models of moral systems and decision-making. Political science: politics, governance, and moral values in the public sphere. Advice on moral psychology research-and thoughts about its future-from prominent scholars. With the goal of providing a truly multidisciplinary forum for moral psychology, this volume is sure to spark conversations across disciplines and advance the field as a whole. Sampling the breadth and depth of an equally expansive and transformative field, Moral Psychology: A Multidisciplinary Guide will find an engaged audience among psychologists, philosophers, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, political scientists, neuroscientists, lawyers, and policymakers, as well as a more general audience interested better understanding the complexity of moral psychology research. (shrink)

This book demonstrates that we need not choose between seeing so-called Presocratic thinkers as rational philosophers or as religious sages. In particular, it rethinks fundamentally the emergence of systematic epistemology and reflection on speculative inquiry in Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Shaul Tor argues that different forms of reasoning, and different models of divine disclosure, play equally integral, harmonious and mutually illuminating roles in early Greek epistemology. Throughout, the book relates these thinkers to their religious, literary and historical surroundings. It is (...) thus also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other early Greek attitudes to the relations and interactions between mortal and divine. The engagements of early philosophers with such religious attitudes present us with complex combinations of criticisms and creative appropriations. Indeed, the early milestones of philosophical epistemology studied here themselves reflect an essentially theological enterprise and, as such, one aspect of Greek religion. (shrink)

Part 1. Some problems of organization theory and the potential of process organization theory -- Why assumptions in organization theory do not work for explaining organizing in a world on the move -- Assumptions for organizing in a world on the move -- Part 2. Toward a process theory of organization -- Temporality and process -- Organization, meaning structures, and time -- Articulatory models and agency -- Part 3. Process theory and selected aspects of organization management -- Process theory, organizational (...) continuity, and change -- Managing and leading in time -- Organizational culture, identity, and institutions -- Some thoughts on studying process -- A plea for mystery. (shrink)

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen (...) masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically. (shrink)

Well-being can be promoted in two ways. Firstly, by affecting the quantity, quality and allocation of bundles of consumption (the Resource Approach), and secondly, by influencing how people benefit from their goods (the Taste Approach). Whereas the former is considered an ingredient of economic analysis, the latter has conventionally not been included in that field. By identifying the gain the Taste Approach might yield, the article questions whether this asymmetry is justified. If successfully exercised, the Taste Approach might not only (...) enable people to raise their wellbeing, but also provide solutions to a number of issues such as sustainable development and global justice. The author argues that recently developed accounts such as Happiness Economics (HE) and Libertarian Paternalism (LP) both can be considered specifications of the Taste Approach. Furthermore a third specification is identified: Inexpensive Preference Formation (IPF). Whereas LP suggests that choice architecture should be exercised when rationality fails, IPF holds that governance in certain instances should improve choices also in absence of no such failure. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 3 - 39 This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between Alētheia and Doxa. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides’ impetus for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to Doxa’s investigations and to those in Alētheia, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect (...) of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Alētheia by momentarily coming to think with—or as—his divine soul. (shrink)

The Russian Cards Problem has been extensively studied as an example of a problem of an unconditionally secure protocol where the sender and receiver are able to transmit secret information safely over a public non-secure channel without the secret being learned by a third party with access to the channel. Epistemic logic in general and public announcement logic in particular have been very useful in this study, as it involves careful analysis of subtle properties of nested knowledge. A long standing (...) open problem is whether or not there exist protocols of length strictly greater than two for the original problem. In this paper we finally settle this problem, answering the question in the affirmative, by presenting a new solution to the original Russian Cards Problem that involves more than two steps. It starts with an initial announcement with so-called crossing hands, after which it is not common knowledge that the protocol can terminate in one more step. (shrink)

This Handbook presents key ideas of philosophers and social theorists whose ideas inform process approaches to organization studies. Each chapter addresses the background and context of this thinker, their work (with a focus on the processual elements), and the potential contribution to organization and management research.

The objective of this article is to explore people’s attitudes toward responsibility in the allocation of public health care resources. Special attention is paid to conceptualizations of responsibility involving blame and sanctions. A representative sample of the Norwegian population was asked about various responsibility mechanisms that have been proposed in the theoretical literature on health care and personal responsibility, from denial of treatment to a tax on unhealthy consumer goods. Survey experiments were employed to study treatment effects, such as whether (...) fairness considerations affect attitudes about responsibility. We find that, overall, a substantial minority of the respondents find it fair to let the health care system sanction people—in one way or another—for voluntary behaviors that increase the risk of becoming ill. Quite surprisingly, we find that people are more prone to report that they should themselves be held responsible for unhealthy lifestyles than others. (shrink)

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...) are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)