We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.

A new theoretical approach to Aristotelian Logic based on three axioms has been recently introduced. This formalization of the theory allowed for the unification of its uncommunicated traditional branches, thus restoring the theoretical unity of AL. In this brief paper, the applicability of the three AL axioms to Propositional Logic is explored. First, it is shown how the AL axioms can be applied to some simple PL arguments in a straightforward manner. Second, the development of a proof method for PL (...) inspired by the AL axioms is presented. This method mimics the underlying mechanics of the proof method from AL, and offers a complementary alternative to proof methods such as truth trees. (shrink)

With the emergence of Olympic internationalism, scholarly networking in East Central Europe came to be dominated by the idea of scholars representing their nations, which replaced the previously leading pattern of private elite scholars with extensive international contacts. This also formalised trans-border contacts, which became increasingly seen as international. In this article, we trace the relationship between these formal and informal networks from the late 19th century to the end of the socialist period, showing that even as formalisation grew, it (...) depended heavily on a variety of informal connections. Even during the period of socialism, when the state sought to control international exchange, scholars used informality to circumvent politically determined constraints. Nevertheless, these informal contacts were not outside the system, but were an integral part of it and depended on formal preconditions. Concentrating on Czechoslovak-Polish relations we argue that in addressing the issue of the relationship between the formal and the informal, a combination of sources must be used, which should then be scrutinised for the stories their authors wish to tell. While archival sources are used for the formal part, oral histories or memoirs reveal the informal part. In East Central Europe, formal sources are likely to ignore informality, especially when it was associated with illegality, whereas ego-documents, especially those produced after 1989, are likely to ignore or downplay connections to the state and overemphasise informality as a means of acting outside politics. Thus, writing the history of informality in socialist scholarship, not only in terms of international contacts but also in terms of everyday practices, is a way of developing counter-narratives to the state-centeredness of current research, which must be linked to a critical study of the contemporary memory of socialist scholarship that shapes the narratives told in oral history. (shrink)

In this work three recent proposal of analysis of the concept of ‘religion’ are discussed. There is a strong convergence between these three proposals in several points: all of them maintain that a religion should be the belief of something –a set of propositions, the object of a propositional attitude like a belief–, all of them maintain that the object of the belief should be a theory about the good, and all of them maintain that a religion should have important (...) normative and practical consequences. It is argued here that there are at least two problems with the general conception that results from these analyses. In the first place, attributing to a religion the conditions of identity of an act of belief leads to absurd consequences. In the second place, it seems much better to analyze a religion as a theory about God or some gods. (shrink)

EI objetivo de este artículo es analizar ciertas críticas a la aplicación de la nocion de informacíon en biología, teniendo en cuenta tanto la historia del concepto como las diferentes posiciones actuales. Creemos que la motivacíon principal de las críticas es negar que los genes sean un factor causal excepcional en el desarrollo, y favorecer la imagen de la vida como un sistema organizado que requiere diferentes recursos. Aunque compartimos el rechazo deI reduccionismo genetico, argumentamos que éste no es atribuible (...) a la analogía informacional y que, por tanto, no es necesario abandonarla completamente.The goal of this article is to analize certain criticisms to the notion of information in biology, taking into account both the history of the concept and some recent positions. We think that the main motivation behind the criticisms is to deny that genes are an exceptional cause in development, and to favor an image of life as an organized system that requires diffirent resources. While we share the rejection of genetic reductionism, we argue that it is not entirely due to the informational analogy and that, therefore, it is not necessary to abandon this analogy. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute el argumento presentado por Carmichael (2010) para justificar la existencia de universales trascendentes, esto es, universales que no requieren instanciaciones para existir. Se sostiene en este trabajo que una proposición puede describir correctamente un mundo posible sin existir como una parte de ese mundo, esto es, que una proposición puede ser verdadera de un mundo posible, sin ser verdadera en un mundo posible. Se sostiene, además, que las mismas premisas usadas por Carmichael permiten justificar el necesitismo.

This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. (...) While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations. (shrink)

Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. (...) But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. (shrink)

In this work it is proposed that the conditions of identity for biological organisms are given by the following principle: for all organisms x and y, x = y if and only if x has been caused by the self-preserving activity of y. This principle determines both the inter-temporal identity of organisms and the identity of organism in different possible worlds. It unifies what can be supposed about conditions of identity coming from —at least— three different conceptions about the nature (...) of biological organisms, those of RobertWilson, Thomas Pradeu and Ellen Clarke. These conceptions are presented and compared. (shrink)

Groove—defined as the pleasurable urge to move to a rhythm—depends on a fine-tuned interplay between predictability arising from repetitive rhythmic patterns, and surprise arising from rhythmic deviations, for example in the form of syncopation. The perfect balance between predictability and surprise is commonly found in rhythmic patterns with a moderate level of rhythmic complexity and represents the sweet spot of the groove experience. In contrast, rhythms with low or high complexity are usually associated with a weaker experience of groove because (...) they are too boring to be engaging or too complex to be interpreted, respectively. Consequently, the relationship between rhythmic complexity and groove experience can be described by an inverted U-shaped function. We interpret this inverted U shape in light of the theory of predictive processing and provide perspectives on how rhythmic complexity and groove can help us to understand the underlying neural mechanisms linking temporal predictions, movement, and reward. A better understanding of these mechanisms can guide future approaches to improve treatments for patients with motor impairments, such as Parkinson’s disease, and to investigate prosocial aspects of interpersonal interactions that feature music, such as dancing. Finally, we present some open questions and ideas for future research. (shrink)

A ‘state of affairs’ is understood here as any kind of concrete entity that can play the role of truthmaker. Different ontologies propose different structures of entities to work as ‘states of affairs’ in this sense. Defenders of universals will propose for the role non- mereological structures of universals, objects and times. Defenders of tropes will propose tropes, either with or without universals and objects. Resemblance nominalists will propose primitive ontological facts of resemblance between objects in time. In any of (...) these cases, times are an essential component of a state of affairs. Any ontology of states of affairs, then, should clarify what times are in order to clarify what states of affairs are. An examination of the dominant reductivist conceptions of times shows that these connections have not yet been thought through carefully. In any of the dominant reductivist conceptions, times are entities that either include or describe everything that happens simultaneously at a given instant. Even in some cases they include the description of everything that happens at any time. If one introduce times taken as they are in any of these reductivist conceptions, it will be essential to a state of affairs everything that happens simultaneously with it, or even everything that happens at any time. Under some assumptions the internal relation of every state of affairs with every other state of affairs expands to the internal relation of everything with everything. This is an unhappy theoretical situation that calls for a more careful consideration of some central tenets in our ontology of time. (shrink)

Resumen: Husserl propone dos descripciones fenomenológicas diferentes de los universales: la primera en Investigaciones lógicas y la segunda en Experiencia y juicio. En este trabajo se presentan y discuten estas dos descripciones fenomenológicas. Resulta que la perspectiva de Experiencia y juicio parece tener que ver con un acceso hermenéutico a los universales, mediado por un lenguaje y una tradición cultural, mientras que la perspectiva de Investigaciones lógicas parece estar centrada en un fenómeno pre-lingüístico más originario. Este segundo fenómeno de los (...) universales parece ser más fundamental. En ambas perspectivas, sin embargo, los universales son dados en nuestras experiencias ordinarias. Entonces, uno debería aceptar universales en principio –dada la evidencia fenomenológica– a menos que otras razones de orden teórico recomienden lo contrario. (shrink)

The term etonism is from «Etona» that means flag, marks, evidence, and reason in Kikôngo. The variants in Umbûndu: etonolo or etonuilo means, allegations, reasons, indulgence (tolerance). The Nyaneka form is etŏnya: 1) reasons, 2) allegations, 3) indulgence and 5) the justice and the tolerance. Etona is Angolan artist (sculptor/painter). In his sculpture they are morphologically evidenced three treatments in the surface of the matter, namely 1) flat treatment; 2) rude treatment and finally 3) accidental treatment. Each one is a (...) code: #1. The flat treatment indicates well-knowledge; a man of superior class; race or tribe or religion of majority; thought well-organized and structured. In painting, the hot intensity indicates dominance, prosperity, energy, intense desires; #2. The rude treatment reveals an acquired knowledge without academism, self-taught; medium class men; speech out of the scientific perimeters but with certain admissibility; race, tribe or religion of lot of people, but not of majority. In his painting, the neutral intensity marks the balance and inspires recomfort nurtured from two opposed poles (hot and cold); #3. The accidental part of the sculpture indicates some knowledge’s lack (pure empiricism); inferior class; race, tribe, religion of minority. In the painting, the cold intensity is naturally contrary of #1. Etonism is the tolerant reason between #1=I, #2=YOU and #3=HE. All of them form the coherent society that we call WE: the Etonian jusphilosophy that African peoples need for stability of their democracies and finishing their War. (shrink)

Varios filósofos han propuesto un enfoque “algebraico” de los universales de acuerdo con el cual hay operaciones de universales a universales. No es obvio, sin embargo, cómo estas operaciones deban ser interpretadas y qué impacto tengan para las condiciones de identidad de los universales. Hay dos interpretaciones principales del álgebra de universales. Por una parte, se ha interpretado como formas de “construir” universales complejos. Por otra, ha sido interpretada como “morfismos” o “mapeos” entre universales, pero no como algo que “construye” (...) universales complejos desde otros más básicos. En este trabajo se evalúan las ventajas comparativas de las dos concepciones, y se ofrecen razones para preferir la segunda. (shrink)

El trabajo presenta la conjetura de que los mundos posibles son universales estructurales máximos. En primer lugar, se explican brevemente las diferentes concepciones actualistas existentes sobre los mundos posibles y los problemas sistemáticos que deben enfrentar. Se argumenta que la conjetura presentada muestra cómo todas esas concepciones pueden ser unificadas en una teoría única y simple. En segundo lugar, se explica por qué la mejor alternativa para la constitución del espacio modal son los universales trascendentes. Finalmente, se indican brevemente algunas (...) dificultades para la concepción presentada. Una justificación definitiva de la conjetura deberá consistir principalmente en la solución de esas dificultades. The work presents the conjecture that possible worlds are maximal structural universals. First, the paper explains roughly the different actualist extant conceptions of possible worlds and the systematic problems they have to face. It is argued that the conjecture presented shows how all those different conceptions can be unified in a single simple theory. Second, it is explained why the best alternative for the constitution of the modal space is a domain of transcendent universals. Finally, some difficulties for the conception are briefly indicated. A definitive justification of the conjecture presented should consist mainly in tackling those difficulties. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute varias formulaciones diferentes del principio de causalidad considerando la función que tales principios pueden cumplir en argumentos cosmológicos. Se argumenta que el principio se comprende mejor como requiriendo una causa para todos los estados de cosas contingentes, en vez de requiriendo una explicación para todas las proposiciones verdaderas contingentes. Se argumenta, también, que el requerimiento de una causa para un estado de cosas no debe ser visto como el requerimiento de algo que hace necesaria la ocurrencia del (...) efecto. Varias dificultades bien conocidas pueden ser evitadas con causas que no hacen necesarias sus producciones. Se argumenta, luego, que en las teorías combinatorias de la modalidad, donde todo puede existir con o sin cualquier otro existente diferente, las formulaciones fuertes del principio de causalidad parecen falsas, pero las formulaciones débiles, donde sólo se postula una causa posible para todo estado de cosas, parecen verdaderas. Por otro lado, tanto las formulaciones fuertes como las débiles parecen verdaderas en las concepciones causales de la modalidad. Sin embargo, en las teorías causales de la modalidad la fase II del argumento cosmológico resulta mucho más difícil, esto es, parece mucho más complicado justificar que el objeto concreto necesario al que se hace referencia es omnisciente, omnipotente y moralmente perfecto. This work discusses several different formulations of the principle of causality considering the function that those principles might play in cosmological arguments. It is argued that the principle is best understood as requiring a cause for all contingent states of affairs, instead of as requiring an explanation for all contingent true propositions. It is also argued that the requirement of a cause for a state of affairs should not be seen as the requirement for something that necessitates the effect. Several well-known difficulties haunting the principle can be avoided with non-necessitating causes. It is then argued that in combinatorial theories of modality, where everything can exist with or without any other different existent, the strong formulations of the principle of causality seem false, but the weak formulations, where only a possible cause for every contingent state of affairs is postulated, seem true. On the other hand, both strong and weak formulations of the principle seem true on the causal conceptions of modality. Nevertheless, in causal theories of modality phase II of the cosmological argument turns out to be much more difficult, i. e., it seems much harder to justify that the necessary concrete object referred to is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect. (shrink)