A contemporary of Giordano Bruno and Galileo, Tommaso Campanella was a controversial philosopher, theologian, astrologer, and poet who was persecuted during the Inquisition and spent much of his adult life imprisoned because of his heterodox views. He is best known today for two works: _The City of the Sun_, a dialogue inspired by Plato’s _Republic_, in which he prophesies a vision of a unified, peaceful world governed by a theocratic monarchy; and his well-meaning _Defense of Galileo_, which may have (...) done Galileo more harm than good because of Campanella’s previous conviction for heresy. But Campanella’s philosophical poems are where his most forceful and undiluted ideas reside. His poetry is where his faith in observable and experimental sciences, his astrological and occult wisdom, his ideas about deism, his anti-Aristotelianism, and his calls for religious and secular reform most put him at odds with both civil and church authorities. For this volume, Sherry Roush has selected Campanella’s best and most idiosyncratic poems, which are masterpieces of sixteenth-century Italian lyrics, displaying a questing mind of great, if unorthodox, brilliance, and showing Campanella’s passionate belief in the intrinsic harmony between the sacred and secular. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper examines the role of shame as a motivator to engage in social struggles. The author first introduces a distinction between social and moral shame arguing that, while the former can lead to a passive submission to injustice, the latter usually works as a motivating force to resist it. He subsequently discusses three cases of injustice, in which the subject is respectively the victim, the actor, and the witness. The main thesis of the paper is that in all (...) three cases the subject may feel moral shame for tolerating injustice and therefore be motivated to resist it. The conditions under which moral shame arises are discussed, while the absence of moral shame is attributed, through reference to clinical studies, to psychic defence mechanisms, such as negation and rationalisation, which allow the subject to tolerate injustice when it would be too costly to fight it. Throughout the paper, the author engages in a discussion of Honneth’s theory of social struggles, reassessing the role of recognition within the moral grammar of social struggles while attributing the due importance to the desire to live up to one’s self-ideal. (shrink)

Tommaso Campanella’s dignitas hominis acquires its own autonomous and innovative historiographical value in recognizing the connection between mens and religion as a distinctive element of human be...

Cognitive niche theories consist in a theoretical framework that is proving extremely profitable in bridging evolutionary biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and anthropology by offering an inter-disciplinary ground, laden with novel approaches and debates. At the same time, cognitive niche theories are multiple, and differently related to niche theories in theoretical and evolutionary biology. The aim of this paper is to clarify the theoretical and epistemological relationships between cognitive and ecological niche theories. Also, by adopting a constructionist approach we will try (...) to explain the shift from ecological to cognitive niches and their actual and theoretical overlaps. In order to do so, we will take two concepts expressing loose forms of causation in the interaction between organisms and their environment: the biological notion of “enablement” and the psycho-cognitive one of “affordance”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this study, we investigate how different internal and external stakeholders influence the innovation strategy of a social enterprise to adopt product, process, and partnership innovations that impact either social or commercial performance. Relying on survey data from a sample of work integration social enterprises, we find that in situations of turbulence, administrative leaders do not significantly influence the innovation strategy of a social enterprise. Instead, board members and external stakeholders seem to play a role. Our study contributes to strategic (...) and business ethics research on social enterprises and, more broadly, to the literature that explores how business organizations combine social value creation and wealth generation. (shrink)

This article introduces the key issues and themes that the articles in the Special Issue aim to apply and develop in greater detail. First, we argue that the field of collective remembering can be conceived as a site of active contestation, rather than simply a means of communicating a historic past or our deontic position in relation to these pasts. Approaching collective remembering as a Lieu de Dispute allows us, in turn, to foreground three consequential dimensions of remembrance, which the (...) articles in the issue examine in different ways: that collective remembering is an interpersonal, political and affective practice. This introduction discusses these three dimensions to collective remembering in greater detail, before outlining the remaining contents of the Special Issue. (shrink)

This study explores social enterprises’ strategies for addressing mission drift. Relying on an inductive comparative case study of two Italian social enterprises, we show how stakeholder engagement combined with social accounting can successfully support a social venture to re-balance its positioning between wealth generation and social value creation. Indeed, stakeholder engagement helps the internal actors of a social enterprise to rationalize and embody pro-social values previously abandoned, while social accounting reinforces this embodiment process by showing the reintroduced social commitment of (...) the social enterprise to external audiences. Conversely, strategies focused only on social accounting and without significant engagement of external stakeholders prove to be unsuccessful in counterbalancing mission drift because they fail to activate the necessary process of internal re-introduction and operationalization of pro-social values and objectives. (shrink)

Several studies have lately revealed that social media conceal at least three dangerous pitfalls. Firstly, social media can negatively impact sociopolitical processes in advanced liberal democracies by becoming vehicles for the spread of false information that augments political polarization (Lee et al. 2017; Ostillio 2018). Secondly, as a result of the first point, social mediacan rapidly become a source of incorrect beliefs for those subjects with low digital literacy (Guess et al. 2019). Thirdly, because of the first and second points, (...) intentionally deceitful manipulations of social media content are potent generators of information cascades that increase group polarizations across groups of vulnerable social media users (Jang and Kim2018, Wang et al. 2018, Colliander 2019). These findings support the claim that the circulation of biased content on social media potentially threatens sociopolitical stability in liberal Western democracies (Duffy 2018; Sunstein 2018). Although this claim is far from being speculative, as shown by the FacebookFile investigations (Wall Street Journal 2019) and the center for humane technology’s recen tresearch, it introduces a thorny dilemma regarding the founding principles of liberal Western democracies. Namely, should Western legislators limit free speech by introducing severe penalties for those who spread fake news and the likes on social media? Or should they let the free market autonomously produce efficient technology allowing people to identify biased social media content?In other words, is a libertarian solution to the plight of online fake news and the like preferable to adequate legislation that punishes those who spread such content? Though appealing, it is unrealistic to believe that the free market can resolve this problem. On the other hand, it is realistic to suppose that Western governments should engage in a merciless battle against biased social media content. For instance, following the publication of the Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation in 2018, the European Union introduced new directives to limit the spread of fake news online in 2021, when the Covid19 pandemic started fading. Although initiatives as such might look like limitations of free speech, there is solid philosophical ground to defend such initiatives. To prove this contention, we resort to Hobbes’s (1651, Part II, §18 and §29) argument that humans can avoid falling back into the Hobbesian state of war only if they stipulate a covenant. Specifically, we appeal to Hobbes’s (1651) argument in favor of bestowing the sovereign the right to ban those seditious doctrines that might undermine peace and sociopolitical stability in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. In this regard, we show that the Hobbesian covenant resolves conflict among humans in the same way a correlated equilibrium limits noncooperation in game theory. Namely, like game theory players, citizens enjoy greater welfare whenever they observe rules that mitigate conflict (Slomp 2010). Accordingly, we argue that citizens would be better off only if Western governments introduced severe penalties for those who intentionally spread fake news. Notably, we argue that effective regulation would create disincentives for spreading biased content and incentives for spreading truthful content. Furthermore, we argue that effective regulation against online fake news would assuage the polarizing effects of online availability cascades on social networks. Importantly, we provide empirical evidence supporting these claims by showing that the lack of effective regulation led the American government to miserably fail to contain the devasting effects of the online infodemic (i.e., the epidemic of false online information)that took place during the first two waves of the Covid19 pandemic (Evanega et al. 2020, Milosh et al. 2020). (shrink)

A quasivariety of algebras has the joint embedding property (JEP) if and only if it is generated by a single algebra A. It is structurally complete if and only if the free ℵ0‐generated algebra in can serve as A. A consequence of this demand, called ‘passive structural completeness’ (PSC), is that the nontrivial members of all satisfy the same existential positive sentences. We prove that if is PSC then it still has the JEP, and if it has the JEP and (...) its nontrivial members lack trivial subalgebras, then its relatively simple members all belong to the universal class generated by one of them. Under these conditions, if is relatively semisimple then it is generated by one ‐simple algebra. We also prove that a quasivariety of finite type, with a finite nontrivial member, is PSC if and only if its nontrivial members have a common retract. The theory is then applied to the variety of De Morgan monoids, where we isolate the sub(quasi)varieties that are PSC and those that have the JEP, while throwing fresh light on those that are structurally complete. The results illuminate the extension lattices of intuitionistic and relevance logics. (shrink)

Although scholars acknowledged that Avicenna’s science of the soul stands at the crossroads between natural philosophy and metaphysics, thus combining an overall physical investigation of all sublunary souls with a trans-physical (or proto-metaphysical) inquiry into the human rational soul, this paper aims to show a further disciplinary entanglement within Avicenna’s science of the soul, which features in the aforementioned physical investigation and helps to frame it, that is, the interaction between natural philosophy and medicine. Despite the strict division between these (...) two disciplines in Avicenna’s system of science, medicine seems to decisively contribute to accounting for the bodily functions of living beings. For this reason, Avicenna refers to medicine several times in his exposition on the soul. This paper approaches the disciplinary entanglement between natural philosophy and medicine in psychology by focusing on the medical concept of pneuma (rūḥ), which prominently features in the exposition of three main issues in psychology, i.e., body ensoulment, powers differentiation, and emotions. (shrink)

This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...) don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty. (shrink)

La lettura non è un'invariante antropologica. Essa è invece una pratica che muta secondo i tempi, i luoghi, i contesti, e si dimostra strettamente legata da una parte alle competenze culturali di chi legge, le quali determinano maniere di lettura differenziate, e da un'altra parte alle intenzioni, consuetudini, situazioni entro cui si iscrive l'atto di lettura e che vengono ad esprimersi e a definirsi come modalità, positure fisiche, gesti. Un ruolo fondamentale giocano le forme materiali che lo scritto assume e (...) con le quali il lettore entra in contatto: un testo non esiste di per sé, svincolato da ogni materialità e dunque dal supporto che lo offre alla lettura (o all'ascolto) o dalle circostanze in cui esso viene letto (o ascoltato). Gli autori scrivono testi che diventano oggetti scritti con i quali i lettori instaurano rapporti d'indole varia. I testi possono essere letti diversamente da lettori che non condividono le medesime tecniche o abitudini intellettuali, che non intrattengono una medesima relazione con lo scritto, che non attribuiscono il medesimo significato o il medesimo valore alla lettura, che non iscrivono nelle medesime convenzioni l'atto di leggere. Quando la lettura è ad alta voce, è quest'ultima che fa emergere il senso del testo, e può trasformarsi, nel caso di lettura collettiva, in una performance, nella quale i lettori diventano ascoltatori. Ma la lettura ad alta voce e collettiva ha la funzione non solo di comunicare il contenuto di uno scritto, ma anche quello di cementare solidarietà di gruppo che nella comune cerimonia della performance si riconoscono. Un altro rapporto che può instaurarsi con il libro è quello di una lettura tutta individuale, intima, che può essere tacita o a fior di labbra: una lettura che, se eseguita con la penna in mano, si effettua all'incrocio di lettura e scrittura, giacché può dar luogo ad escerti, parafrasi, trascrizioni, marginalia. O ancora, il rapporto con il libro può risolversi, soprattutto nel caso di lettori “deboli” e privi di strumenti critici, in una maniera di lettura in superficie, che coglie soltanto i significati più semplici e immediati del testo. Tutto questo vale anche per le pratiche di lettura a Bisanzio: ritrovarne alcune tracce è l'intento di questo contributo. (shrink)

In this work, I investigate the implications of reversing the common assumption of rationality on behalf of human agents typically underlying philosophical research. Instead, I assume that human agents can become rational only if they learn to edge against their dumbness. Specifically, I show that intelligence cannot be considered the opposite of dumbness. To this end, I embrace the difference among System 1, System 2, and System 1.5. On these grounds, I argue that System 2 can be considered the system (...) of intelligence, whereas Systems 1 and 1.5 can be viewed as the systems of rationality. More precisely, I argue that System 2 concerns theoretical reasoning, whereas System 1 and 1.5 concern practical reasoning. Accordingly, I show that people are dumber whenever they fail to have rational control over System 1 via System 1.5, whereas people become more rational whenever they manage to have rational control over System 1 via System 1.5. Interestingly, both cases can be considered the causes of two distinct social processes. On one side, when dumbness increases among individuals, social groups achieve coordination that detriments general welfare. On the other, when dumbness decreases among individuals, social groups achieve coordination that maximizes general welfare. (shrink)

Il volume analizza il pensiero trascendentale di Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) nei suoi elementi costitutivi. In particolare viene messo in evidenza che l’intento principale della filosofia fichtiana è quello di edificare un “sistema della libertà”, fondato sul primato del pratico (das Praktische) e dei costitutivi pratici della coscienza umana: l’intuizione intellettuale, l’immaginazione produttiva, lo Streben ed in primis il volere. Viene quindi sottolineato che uno dei vertici della speculazione di Fichte è rappresentato dal concetto di “volere puro” che costituisce il (...) fondamento del conoscere e dell’agire, determinando la natura stessa dell’uomo e dell’assoluto. Nel volume vengono ampiamente utilizzati i nuovi testi messi a disposizione dall’edizione critica delle opere fichtiane curata da Reinhard Lauth: particolare attenzione viene data ai manoscritti di lezioni Dottrina della scienza nova methodo (1796-99) e all’epistolario intercorso tra Fichte e F.H. Jacobi sul rapporto tra la riflessione filosofica e la fede religiosa. Nella parte finale del libro compaiono due Appendici: la prima è dedicata al filosofo bretone Jules Lequier (1814-1862), autore che - ispirandosi a Fichte - elabora una filosofia della libertà tesa a superare una concezione della natura umana deterministica e positivistica; la seconda Appendice è incentrata sull’originale interpretazione del pensiero cartesiano data da Reinhard Lauth (1919-2007): quest’ultimo scorge nel cogito cartesiano il fondamento di una filosofia trascendentale ante litteram che anticipa le posizioni di Kant e di Fichte e che pone le basi per un “pensiero trascendentale della libertà”. -/- AUTORE Tommaso Valentini (Spoleto, 1979) è professore associato di “Filosofia politica” presso l’Università degli Studi “Guglielmo Marconi” di Roma, dove insegna anche “Storia della filosofia moderna”. È docente incaricato di “Ermeneutica filosofica” presso la Pontificia Università Antonianum. Nel 2003 si è laureato in Filosofia sotto la guida del Prof. Armando Rigobello; nel 2008 ha conseguito il titolo di Dottore di ricerca (PhD) in “Etica e antropologia filosofica” presso l’Università degli Studi del Salento. Dal 2006 al 2008, grazie ad una borsa di studio, ha condotto le sue ricerche sul pensiero classico tedesco a Monaco di Baviera presso la Ludwig-Maximilians Universität e la Fichte-Kommission dell’Accademica Bavarese delle Scienze. Dal 2015 è membro del Consiglio nazionale dell’ADIF (Associazione Docenti Italiani di Filosofia). È co-direttore della rivista scientifica on line «Aretè. International Journal of Philosophy, Human & Social Sciences». Ha pubblicato numerosi articoli su Kant, J.G. Fichte, il personalismo e l’ermeneutica filosofica (in particolare Paul Ricoeur). Tra le sue pubblicazioni: Soggetto e persona nel pensiero francese del Novecento, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2011; I fondamenti della libertà in J.G. Fichte, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2012; Filosofia e cristianesimo nell’Italia del Novecento, Drengo Edizioni, Roma 2012; nel 2015 è stato curatore del volume Natura umana, persona, libertà. Prospettive di antropologia filosofica ed orientamenti etico-politici, LEV, Roma 2015; nel 2017 è stato curatore (con il Prof. Luca Mencacci) del volume collettaneo dal titolo “La dialettica esaurita? A 100 anni dalla Rivoluzione d’Ottobre. Interpretazioni politiche, filosofiche, estetiche”, Presentazione del Prof. Rocco Pezzimenti, Drengo Edizioni, Roma; per la rivista «Aretè» ha curato (con il Prof. Andrea Gentile) due numeri monografici: nel 2017 il volume dal titolo “A partire da Kant: interpretazioni e metamorfosi del trascendentale”, nel 2019 il volume dal titolo “Dialettica. Sui molteplici significati di un concetto teoretico e storico-politico”. (shrink)

Cyber-bullying, and other issues related to violence being committed online in prosocial environments, are beginning to constitute an emergency worldwide. Institutions are particularly sensitive to the problem especially as far as teenagers are concerned inasmuch as, in cases of inter-teen episodes, the deterrent power of ordinary justice is not as effective as it is between adults. In order to develop the most suitable policies, institution should not be satisfied with statistics and sociological perspectives on the phenomenon, but rather seek a (...) deep ethical understanding—also referring to the biological and evolutionary past of human beings. The aim of this paper is to show a way to fill this theoretical gap, offering some answers that can illuminate future policy-oriented research and reflection. In order to do so, we will start by connecting our argument to evolutionary studies carried out in the past two decades, focusing on gossip as a tool for social assortment, thus endowed with a dual function: protect the group from free riders, intruders and bullies but also bully the deviant members. In the “Mediating gossip through social networks” section, we will see which aspects of gossip, vital for bullying, are co-opted by social network scenarios. A fundamental trait of human social life, that is the subdivision in smaller coalitions, or sub-groups, will be shown as missing in social networks dynamics—therefore constituting themselves as structurally violent. The “Why and how do social networks empower bullying?” section will deal with techno-ethical and epistemological concerns regarding how gossip, mediated by SN, manages to empower cyber-bullying. The “Self-gossip and self-mobbing in the light of the disruption of sub-moralities” section will characterize cyber-bullying as often sparked by self-gossip in a scenario where familiar sub-groups, which also mediate defense and mutual understanding, are disrupted. The “Discussion and conclusion” section will consist of a philosophical summary, divided in two parts: a pars destruens analyzing whether SN, in their actual configurations, are fit for being used by humans-like-us, and a pars construens examining the broad potential consequences of highly enforced regulation aimed at contrasting cyber-bullying. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a Kierkegaardian critique of Roy A. Rappaport’s classic treatment of religious rituals. It discusses Rappaport’s claim that public and outward acceptance of a religious ritual is sufficient for successfully enacting it – even where such acceptance is devoid of any personal commitment on the participants’ part. To interrogate Rappaport, the paper develops Jonathan Lear’s reading of Kierkegaard and builds on the Danish theologian’s remarks on the Christian sacraments to argue that, pace Rappaport, personal engagement is necessary to (...) the successful enactment of religious rituals. In this sense, I will show with Kierkegaard how inner belief is a necessary pre-requisite for the performance of any religious ritual whereas in Rappaport’s view it is ritual action itself which creates a posteriori the possibility for personal religious faith. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to examine recent contributions to Schelling research that appeared in three miscellanies in 2020. Their common thread is Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which, because of its dynamic and processual characteristics, is considered relevant in the debate on realism, philosophy of biology and environmental ethics. In the historical-philosophical field, many contributions highlight Schelling’s debt to Kant and Spinoza and his close relationship with the Romantic movement. Lastly, the essay analyses contributions concerning the Spätphilosophie, showing how (...) Schelling’s philosophy is to be considered first and foremost as historical philosophy. (shrink)

Este trabajo incluye algunas reflexiones sobre los desafíos a los derechos que derivan del populismo, de la tecnología y de la geopolítica.

You reach for the bowl with ‘sugar’ written on it only to discover, from the bad taste of your coffee, that it contained salt. Mundane experiences like these show that epistemic justification does not necessarily hold stable across possible changes of information. One can be justified in believing a proposition at a certain time (that the bowl contains sugar) and cease to be justified at a later time, as one enlarges one’s epistemic perspective (as one drinks a salty coffee). When (...) this happens, one’s justification has been defeated. An epistemic defeater, broadly speaking, is that in terms of which the defeat of justification proceeds. The notion of an epistemic defeater is mostly associated with J. Pollock’s work on reasoning and inference. Pollock has provided the canonical definition of an epistemic defeater and proposed an influential taxonomy in terms of the way different types of defeaters induce their characteristic effects. The notion of an epistemic defeater has acquired a broader meaning in current epistemology, and several distinctions have been introduced that have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of defeat as well as to complement Pollock’s original taxonomy. The correlated notion of a propositional defeater, defined in terms of would-be defeat of justification, is appealed to by the proponents of the defeasibility theory in the parallel debate about knowledge to explain what prevents a justified true belief from constituting knowledge in Gettier cases. (shrink)

Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...) the classical Dutch Book method. (shrink)

In this note, I argue that McCain and Moretti’s account of non-inferential justification is subject to the subjective point of view objection, and that for this reason, it does not provide an internalistically acceptable alternative to the account of this justification supplied by Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Moreover, I contend that PC’s account is not afflicted by the same problem and that it does not generate the over-intellectualization and regress problem. Finally, contra McCain and Moretti, I argue that the non-inferential (...) justification described by PC does not engender a form of vicious epistemic circularity, and so that it does not raise the reflective awareness problem. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the existing philosophical literature on the Knobe Effect (KE) in two main ways: first, this paper disconfirms the KE by showing that the latter does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes; second, this paper shows that KE is strongly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. In particular, this paper presents two main findings from three empirical tests carried out between 2016 and 2018: the first finding concerns the fact that if the issuer of a decision (...) with consequences on third parties is unlikely to be perceived as unfriendly, then KE is reduced or absent; the second finding regards instead the fact that if an action has two possible outcomes (one likely to obtain with strong intensity and one likely to obtain with less intensity), then KE does not obtain for decisions whose side-effects have limited consequences on third parties. (shrink)