In his 2005 French production Hidden, Michael Haneke continues disturbing his audience with poignant and stirring images. When Georges and Anne Laurent keep finding on their doorstep videotapes showing the exterior of their house filmed with a hidden camera, they do not realize that trying to trace the identity of the photographer will lead Georges back to his deeply concealed childhood atrocity and gravely affect their present life. With Hidden, Haneke presents a provocative case of Freudian return of the repressed (...) and probes the uncertain grounding and pretentiousness of French national self-importance. The article attempts an analysis of Hidden from two interconnected perspectives, provided by the use of the Lacanian category of the gaze in relation to film studies and by the application of certain categories derived from post-colonial theory. The discussion ventures to demonstrate that the camera-eye "hidden" in its impossible position can be interpreted as a gaze imagined by Georges in the field of the Other. The voyeuristic act of filming also suggests the question of colonial surveillance, which relates to the racial issue underlying the conflict repressed by Georges. Haneke investigates the way in which the symbolic power bestowed on the authority of the French state facilitates discrimination. Georges, a model representative of the civil/civilized society, is shown as rent by primal fears of imaginary savage "terror," desperately trying to fortify his dominion against Algerian aggressors who are otherwise a necessary part of the structure. (shrink)

In this paper, we study natural language constructions which were first examined by Barwise: The richer the country, the more powerful some of its officials. Guided by Barwise’s observations, we suggest that conceivable interpretations of such constructions express the existence of various similarities between partial orders such as homomorphism or embedding. Semantically, we interpret the constructions as polyadic generalized quantifiers restricted to finite models. We extend the results obtained by Barwise by showing that similarity quantifiers are not expressible in elementary (...) logic over finite models. We also investigate whether the proposed readings are sound from the cognitive perspective. We prove that almost all similarity quantifiers are intractable. This leads us to first-order variants, which only approximate the strong readings, but are cognitively more plausible. Driven by the question of ambiguity, we recall Barwise’s argumentation in favour of strong readings, enriching it with some arguments of our own. Given that Barwise-like sentences are indeed ambiguous, we use a generalized Strong Meaning Hypothesis to derive predictions for their verification. Finally, we propose a hypothesis according to which conflicting pressures of communication and cognition might give rise to an ambiguous construction, provided that different semantic variants of the construction withstand different pressures involved in its usage. (shrink)

In this paper, we apply relating semantics to the widely discussed problem of free choice between permitted actions or situations in normative systems. Leaving aside contexts in which the free choice principle is obviously unacceptable or uncontroversially valid, we concentrate on free choice for explicit permissions. In order to construct a formal representation of explicit permissions, we introduce a special constant, $\texttt {permit}$, which is analogous to the constant $\texttt {violation}$ used in the Andersonian–Kangerian approach to deontic logic with respect (...) to prohibition and obligation. Consequently, we define a permission operator on the basis of the $\texttt {permit}$ constant and a relation of legitimization. The general idea is that $P \varphi $ is true if and only if $\texttt {permit}$ is true, which means that a permission is actually issued and $\varphi $ is legitimized by $\texttt {permit}$. The intuitive notion of legitimization is formally represented by an operator of relating implication: a non-classical implication that is semantically defined by adding a constraint to the classical meaning of implication to the effect that arguments are related by a special relation. The properties of this relation are based on an informal, intuitive meaning of legitimization and determine the properties of the permission operator. We show that the resulting permission operator possesses the free choice property and avoids certain unwanted consequences that follow from alternative approaches. (shrink)

Suppose that we have a method which estimates the conditional probabilities of some unknown stochastic source and we use it to guess which of the outcomes will happen. We want to make a correct guess as often as it is possible. What estimators are good for this? In this work, we consider estimators given by a familiar notion of universal coding for stationary ergodic measures, while working in the framework of algorithmic randomness, i.e., we are particularly interested in prediction of (...) Martin-Löf random points. We outline the general theory and exhibit some counterexamples. Completing a result of Ryabko from 2009 we also show that universal probability measure in the sense of universal coding induces a universal predictor in the prequential sense. Surprisingly, this implication holds true provided the universal measure does not ascribe too low conditional probabilities to individual symbols. As an example, we show that the Prediction by Partial Matching measure satisfies this requirement with a large reserve. (shrink)

By a pure modal logic of names we mean a quantifier-free formulation of such a logic which includes not only traditional categorical, but also modal categorical sentences with modalities de re and which is an extension of Propositional Logic. For categorical sentences we use two interpretations: a “natural” one; and Johnson and Thomason’s interpretation, which is suitable for some reconstructions of Aristotelian modal syllogistic :271–284, 1989; Thomason in J Philos Logic 22:111–128, 1993 and J Philos Logic 26:129–141, 1997. In both (...) cases we use Johnson-like models. We also analyze different kinds of versions of PMLN, for both general and singular names. We present complete tableau systems for the different versions of PMLN. These systems enable us to present some decidability methods. It yields “strong decidability” in the following sense: for every inference starting with a finite set of premises we can specify a finite number of steps to check whether it is logically valid. This method gives the upper bound of the cardinality of models needed for the examination of the validity of a given inference. (shrink)

In this interview, Tomasz Zarębski speaks with Allan Janik, co-author of _Wittgenstein’s Vienna_ (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), on the occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the publication of this pathbreaking book. The conversation concerns the circumstances, motivations and reasons for his undertaking the work on the book, as well as its reception and place in Wittgenstein scholarship. A large part of the discussion refers to his perspective of Wittgenstein, Toulmin’s philosophical writings, and Janik’s own vision of philosophy. The (...) interview took place in Innsbruck on 23 rd and 25 th August 2023. (shrink)

Artykuł prezentuje wyniki analizy ilościowej i jakościowej zawiadomień o retrakcji w publikacjach z zakresu filozofii (o zasięgu globalnym) zawartych w Retraction Watch Database, z punktu widzenia zaleceń Komisji Etyki Publikacji. Pod względem ilościowym próba wynosi jedynie 0,48% rekordów w całej bazie, przez co trudno uznać ją za reprezentatywną dla dyscypliny, a tym bardziej niemożliwe jest uogólnienia wniosków na całą aktywność naukową. Statystyka wycofań publikacji może być jednak podstawą do studium przypadków. Treść zawiadomień jest często niekompletna lub niejednoznaczna. Normatywne uregulowania retrakcji (...) publikacji w odniesieniu do przedmiotu badań należy uznać za nie w pełni adekwatne do specyfiki praktyki wydawniczej w filozofii. (shrink)

SummaryThe aim of the study was to assess the relationship between adverse life events, a tendency to respond with a high level of anxiety, and height and adiposity of adolescents. The sample included 575 persons aged 10–15 from the Wielkopolska region of Poland. The influence of adverse events during the 6 months before the examination and anxiety trait, as assessed with a STAIC questionnaire, on body height and BMI was analysed. Also sex, age, chronic diseases and socioeconomic status indicators were (...) assessed. One-way and two-way ANOVA was used for assessment of relationships. Adverse events had no influence on body height and BMI. Subjects with a high level of anxiety trait were shorter than subjects with a normal level of anxiety trait. The association of anxiety trait and body height was significant after adjustment for sex, age, chronic diseases and history of adverse life events. The analysis showed no statistically significant influence of adverse life events on height and BMI and a significant relationship between the general tendency to respond with anxiety and body height of adolescents. This suggests that psychological characteristics associated with the cognitive tendency to interpret events as threatening, and consequently, to respond with stress, may be involved in the variability of biological traits regardless of the objective harmfulness of the situation. (shrink)

We show that Pitts' modeling of propositional quantification in intuitionistic logic (as the appropriate interpolants) does not coincide with the topological interpretation. This contrasts with the case of the monadic language and the interpretation over sufficiently regular topological spaces. We also point to the difference between the topological interpretation over sufficiently regular spaces and the interpretation of propositional quantifiers in Kripke models.

Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties can (...) possess the same stimuli and manifestations. Moreover, Bird's argument can be used to support the mixed view by relieving it of its commitment to quidditism. I briefly analyse an alternative defence of dispositional essentialism based on Leon Horsten's approach to the problem of circularity and impredicativity. I conclude that the best option is to choose Bird's solution but amend the dispositional perspective on properties. According to my proposal, the essences of dispositions are determined not directly by their stimuli and manifestations but by the role each property plays in the structure formed by the stimulus/manifestation relations. (shrink)

The paper extends the framework of outcomes in branching space-time (Kowalski and Placek [1999]) by assigning probabilities to outcomes of events, where these probabilities are interpreted either epistemically or as weighted possibilities. In resulting models I define the notion of common cause of correlated outcomes of a single event, and investigate which setups allow for the introduction of common causes. It turns out that a deterministic common cause can always be introduced, but (surprisingly) only special setups permit the introduction of (...) truly stochastic common causes. I analyse next the Bell-Aspect experiment and derive the Bell-CH inequalities. I observe that we postulate there not a common cause for outcomes of a single event but rather a common common cause that accounts for outcomes of many events, where 'events' mean 'measurements with (different) directions of polarization'. Since the inequalities are violated, I claim that no causal story can be told about the Bell correlations, where causality is subliminal and restricted by screening-off condition. Similarly, given certain intuitive principles, no deterministic story can be told about these correlations. (shrink)

Boris Kment formulates two challenges to anti-haecceitism: one based on the concept of chance, and the other involving counterfactuals. In this paper I refute the chance-based argument by appropriately reformulating its premises in a non-individualistic language. Regarding the argument from counterfactuals I consider three strategies of defense. The strategy that is ultimately accepted as most promising is a revamped approach based on the distinction between possible worlds and possibilities. I counter Kment’s claim that the introduction of fine-grained possibilities within possible (...) worlds is haecceitism in disguise. My conclusion is that anti-haecceitism survives the criticism, and is an overall more attractive position than its competitor. (shrink)

In this paper we show that a variety of modal algebras of finite type is semisimple iff it is discriminator iff it is both weakly transitive and cyclic. This fact has been claimed already in [4] (based on joint work by the two authors) but the proof was fatally flawed.

Autor wylicza problemy, którymi zajmuje się terapia filozoficzna i podejmuje próbę podania jej definicji. W tekście znajdziemy odwołania do psychologii homeryckiej, współczesnych nurtów terapeutycznych oraz przykładów zastosowania terapii filozoficznej. W artykule ukazany został związek terapii filozoficznej ze starożytnym pojmowaniem filozofii. Główną osią, wokół której prowadzone są rozważania jest zastosowanie terapii filozoficznej w procesie stawania się osobą.

In this article I briefly discuss two problems of ontology of states of affairs: the issue of negative states of affairs and the so-called slingshot argument. In particular, I consider several objections against negative states of affairs, including this one: if one accepts the existence of negative states of affairs, why not accept the existence of conjunctive states of affairs (or, alternatively, Shefferian ones, or even binegative ones), which results, it seems, in the acceptance of the existence of states of (...) affairs of any logical form. I argue that regardless of this doubt, at least some negative sentences have (non-trivial) ontological correlates. As for the slingshot argument, I argue that it is not the implicated Principle of Extensionality that is at fault, but the principle of the identity of the correlates of logically equivalent sentences (often called ‘Wittgenstein’s Principle’), which is simply false since ‘2+2=4’ and ‘8-5=3’ are just logically equivalent. (shrink)

Ongoing long-time research into the courts of rulers, their spouses, and their children clearly demonstrates the enduring presence of clergy in their midst. Priests performed various functions in religious practices or worked in the court chancellery. The aim of this article is to show the presence of clergy at the court of Elizabeth of Austria, wife of King Casimir IV, and their youngest daughter Elizabeth Jagiellon. The reconstruction of this environment was possible on the basis of an analysis of a (...) very broad source base, due to its fragmentary nature and incidental occurrence of references to clergy, often in anonymized form. In the case of both Elizabeths, the clergy functioning at their courts were associated with the capella and the chancellery, but they also performed duties as medics or stewards. There are still issues without satisfactory answers, which require further studies and analyses of scattered source material, for instance the question of the queen and her daughter’s relations with the Krakow cathedral and city clergy, both lay and monastic, or the question of the influence of the two Elizabeths’ knights on the assumption of benefices connected with their courts by the clergy). (shrink)

Here, we discuss historical, philosophical and technical problems associated with relating logic and relating semantics. To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, Section 1 is devoted to providing an introduction to both relating logic and relating semantics. Second, we address the history of relating semantics and some of the main research directions and their philosophical applications. Third, we discuss some technical problems related to relating semantics, particularly whether the direct incorporation of the relation into the language of relating (...) logic is needed. The starting point for our considerations presented here is the 1st Workshop On Relating Logic and the selected papers for this issue. (shrink)

Standard deontic logic (SDL) is defined on the basis of possible world semantics and is a logic of alethic-deontic modalities rather than deontic modalities alone. The interpretation of the concepts of obligation and permission comes down exclusively to the logical value that a sentence adopts for the accessible deontic alternatives. Here, we set forth a different approach, this being a logic which additionally takes into consideration whether sentences stand in relation to the normative system or to the system of values (...) under which we predicate the deontic qualifications. By taking this aspect into account, we arrive at a logical system which preserves laws proper to a deontic logic but where the standard paradoxes of deontic logic do not arise. It is a logic of strictly-deontic modalities DR. (shrink)

Deutsch 2010 (The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 447–460) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with (...) intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, I argue that one would find these arguments persuasive if and only if one is already disposed to exhibit the relevant intuition. (shrink)

Reclamation of a slur involves the creation of a new, positively-valenced meaning that gradually replaces the old pejorative meaning. This means that at a critical stage, the slur is ambiguous. It has been claimed that this ambiguity is polysemy. However, it is far from clear whether the view can explain why the introduction of the new meaning forces the old one out of existence. I argue that this datapoint can be explained by invoking the mechanism of homonymic conflict, and, therefore, (...) that the ambiguity involved in reclamation is homonymy. One generalization that follows from my account is that conventionalized verbal irony, unlike conventionalized metonymy and metaphor, begets homonymy. Along the way, I criticize the standard ways of drawing the distinction between polysemy and homonymy in terms of semantic and etymological relatedness. If the notions of polysemy and homonymy are to be invoked in explanations, they should be understood in terms of how meanings are stored in the mental lexicon. My account also provides an elegant way of conceptualizing the difference between two types of conceptual engineering, namely reclamation and amelioration. (shrink)

Consider how we evaluate how normal an object is. On the dual-nature hypothesis, a normality evaluation depends on the object’s goodness and frequency. On the single-nature hypothesis, the evaluation depends solely on either frequency or goodness. To assess these hypotheses, I ran four experiments. Study 1 shows that normality evaluations vary with both the goodness and the frequency assessment of the object. Study 2 shows that manipulating the goodness and the frequency dimension changes the normality evaluation. Yet, neither experiment rules (...) out that some people evaluate normality solely based on frequency, and the rest evaluate normality solely based on goodness. Whence two more experiments. Study 3 reveals that when scenarios are contrasted—presented one after another—only frequency matters. But, as study 4 shows, when scenarios are evaluated alone, both frequency and goodness influence normality evaluations in a single person, although the more a person is sensitive to one dimension, the less she’s sensitive to the other. The dual-nature hypothesis seems thus true of uncontrasted applications of the concept of normality, whereas the single-nature hypothesis seems true of contrasted applications. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of bisimulation for first-order Kripke models. It is defined as a relation that satisfies certain zig-zag conditions involving back-and-forth moves between nodes of Kripke models and, simultaneously, between the domains of their underlying structures. As one of our main results, we prove that if two Kripke models bisimulate to a certain degree, then they are logically equivalent with respect to the class of formulae of the appropriate complexity. Two applications of the notion introduced in the paper (...) are given. First, we consider bisimulations in the context of Kripke models of Heyting Arithmetic. Next, we discuss the notion of elementary submodel of a Kripke model and provide a suitable example. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of the departure from examining real behaviours in a real environment, a trend in social psychology which has been observed going back several years, and the impact of this phenomenon for social psychology as a scientific discipline. The article presents two studies on the well-known and explored “bystander effect”. This phenomenon is examined in two ways – once by way of a “traditional” field experiment conducted in natural conditions, and once through a survey. As it (...) turned out, the results generated by the two studies were diametrically opposite, and only in the field experiment were we able to achieve a pattern of results consistent with those in the original studies. (shrink)

The paper develops a theory of branching spatiotemporal histories that accommodates indeterminism and the insights of general relativity. A model of this theory can be viewed as a collection of overlapping histories, where histories are defined as maximal consistent subsets of the model's base set. Subsequently, generalized manifolds are constructed on the theory's models, and the manifold topology is introduced. The set of histories in a model turns out to be identical with the set of maximal subsets of the model's (...) base set with respect to being Hausdorff and downward closed. Further postulates ensure that the topology is connected, locally Euclidean, and satisfies the countable sub-cover condition. (shrink)

Keith DeRose zauważył, że niezmienności kontekstowej atrybucji wiedzy można bronić za pomocą tzw. manewru z zasadnej stwierdzalności. Stosujący ten manewr inwariantyści (jak np. Tim Black) utrzymują, że wartość logiczna określonej atrybucji wiedzy nie zmienia się wraz ze zmianą kontekstu jej asercji; może się jednak zmieniać to, co takie asercje konwersacyjnie implikują, skutkując poczuciem, że zmienia się wartość logiczna samej atrybucji. Z podobnym manewrem mamy do czynienia w innych sporach filozoficznych. Niektórzy autorzy (m.in. Fred Adams) utrzymują, że zdania fikcjonalne pozbawione są (...) wartości logicznej; jeżeli zdania takie wydają się ją mieć, to tylko za sprawą tego, że wypowiadając takie zdania, implikuje się konwersacyjnie sądy logiczne. Inni badacze (Emery i Hill) argumentują, że za poczucie fałszywości nierzeczywistych okresów warunkowych z niemożliwym poprzednikiem odpowiedzialne są fałszywe implikatury konwersacyjne generowane przez asercje trywialnie prawdziwych zdań tego typu. Z kolei niektórzy, jak Alan Hazlett, twierdzą, że z éA wie, że pù nie wynika to, że p; ale to, że p jest jedynie implikaturą konwersacyjną takiej atrybucji wiedzy. Merytoryczna wartość tego rodzaju argumentacji zależy więc od tego, czy asercje rozważanych zdań rzeczywiście generują określone implikatury konwersacyjne. W pracy wykazałem, że można mieć co do tego wątpliwości. W tym celu identyfikuję i opisuję własność implikatur konwersacyjnych, której – jak pokazuję – nie mają jednak sądy mające być w opinii wspomnianych badaczy implikaturami konwersacyjnymi asercji rozważanych zdań. Własność ta polega na tym, że implikatura konwersacyjna jest wrażliwa na tzw. dociekliwe pytania rozstrzygnięcia – odpowiedź twierdząca na takie pytanie nie generuje implikatury konwersacyjnej, którą asercja takiego zdania mogłaby mieć w innym kontekście. (shrink)

Advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMP) offer hope for health benefits in all situations where traditional methods of therapy fail or cannot be used for various reasons. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the concept of innovation as applied to the biotechnologies employed in ATMP. In the analysis of the concept, five main contexts of meaning that contribute to its understanding will be distinguished: a change in the way of thinking about the available spectrum of medical procedures, the (...) short time of recognition of technologies in the experimental and theoretical models, lack of clinical data in advance of used technologies, increase of technologies’ complexity and diversity of substrates used in them. The conducted analysis indicates the need to adopt an attitude of far-reaching caution in the evaluation of the safety of ATMP therapies in which innovative biotechnologies are used. (shrink)

O pewnym językowym rozszerzeniu logiki MR: podejście semantyczne i tabelau W artykule przedstawiamy rozszerzenie minimalnej, normalnej logiki pozycyjnej, czyli logiki z operatorem realizacji. Logika pozycyjna to logika filozoficzna, która umożliwia odniesienie zdań do kontekstów, które można rozumieć na wiele sposobów. Wzbogacamy podstawowy język minimalnej logiki pozycyjnej o dodatkowe wyrażenia zbudowane z predykatów i stałych pozycyjnych. Akceptujemy również wyrażenia zbudowane z operatorem realizacji oraz wiele pozycji, takich jak: Dzięki temu zwiększyliśmy wyrazistość minimalnej logiki pozycyjnej. W artykule wskazujemy na wiele przykładów na (...) to, że dzięki tej niewielkiej zmianie mogą powstać złożone teorie oparte na proponowanym rozszerzeniu. Jako teorię dowodu dla naszej logiki zakładamy metody tableau, pokazujące twierdzenia o poprawności i zupełności. Na koniec jednak pokazujemy, że badana tutaj logika jest tylko rozszerzeniem językowym MR: wszystkie twierdzenia o przedłużeniu mają swoje odpowiedniki w czystych twierdzeniach MR. Jednak teorie oparte na proponowanym rozszerzeniu mogą wyrazić znacznie więcej niż teorie oparte na czystej MR. (shrink)

This is an extended critique of comments made by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein on Henry Stapp’s proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics. Although I claim that ultimately Stapp’s proof does not establish its purported conclusion, yet Shimony and Stein’s criticism contains a number of weak points, which need to be clarified.

Bell’s theorem in its standard version demonstrates that the joint assumptions of the hidden-variable hypothesis and the principle of local causation lead to a conflict with quantum-mechanical predictions. In his latest counterfactual strengthening of Bell’s theorem, Stapp attempts to prove that the locality assumption itself contradicts the quantum-mechanical predictions in the Hardy case. His method relies on constructing a complex, non-truth functional formula which consists of statements about measurements and outcomes in some region R, and whose truth value depends on (...) the selection of a measurement setting in a space-like separated location L. Stapp argues that this fact shows that the information about the measurement selection made in L has to be present in R. I give detailed reasons why this conclusion can and should be resisted. Next I correct and formalize an informal argument by Shimony and Stein showing that the locality condition coupled with Einstein’s criterion of reality is inconsistent with quantum-mechanical predictions. I discuss the possibility of avoiding the inconsistency by rejecting Einstein’s criterion rather than the locality assumption. (shrink)

W artykule omówione zostały sprawy organizacyjne, przebieg i znaczenie polityczne pobytu elektora saskiego Fryderyka Augusta w Opolu w dniach 15 grudnia 1733 r. – 3 stycznia 1734 r. Jest to ważny epizod tak w dziejach miasta, jak i Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, pomijany jednak do tej pory w historiografii. Tymczasem na przełomie 1733 i 1734 r. o wizycie przyszłego króla polskiego w Opolu było stosunkowo głośno w Europie, a notatki informujące o tym publikowane były w prasie wydawanej w Austrii, Rzeszy Niemieckiej, (...) Rosji czy Wielkiej Brytanii. W artykule wykorzystano doniesienia gazetowe, a przede wszystkim relacje z podróży elektora, jego żony Marii Józefy i dworu saskiego, dokumenty logistyczne oraz korespondencję i rachunki przechowywane w archiwach saskich, austriackich oraz w Archiwum Państwowym w Opolu. (shrink)