Este artigo pretende fazer uma leitura do filme Beleza Americana utilizando-se da filosofia hegeliana, mais especificamente, da assim chamada dialética do senhor e do escravo. Para realizar essa tarefa dividimos nosso texto em três momentos: 1 – analisamos alguns aspectos de como se instaura uma relação entre consciências de si na vida criando, portanto, relações de dominância e subordinação em relações intersubjetivas. A contraposição entre os dois elementos determina que, para que haja reconhecimento, uma consciência de si deve subjugar a (...) outra segundo sua vontade, ou seja, uma vontade é reconhecida enquanto a outra é reconhecedora. 2 – uma apresentação de elementos centrais do filme como pano de fundo para nossa análise. 3 – tecemos um comentário do filme baseado nos elementos conceituais apresentados no item um, demonstrando como o filme pode ser compreendido como uma tentativa do protagonista de sair da indiferenciação total, estabelecer uma luta para ser reconhecido e, finalmente, sendo reconhecido em seus desejos. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer (...) by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

In a discussion of Sherlock Holmes’ “science of deduction” and the related “method of exclusion,” I show that Holmes’ claim that his inferences are deductive makes sense, if we consider his theoretical presuppositions. So, it is more accurate to say that he tries to reduce abduction to deduction than that he confuses them. His theoretical framework, albeit inadequate as a theory of empirical reasoning, can be seen as a basic model of classical (symbolic) AI. The main problems of this approach (...) are surveyed, and abduction is brought into play as both a better characterization of Holmes’ inferences and a better guide for building AI systems. This is a good background for raising the question of creativity because, according to Peirce, it relates to abduction in a substantial way. Is Sherlock Holmes creative? Can machines be creative? An affirmative answer to the second question might be given by a “logic of discovery” but the problem remains that inventing such a logic already presupposes creativity. (shrink)

The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The (...) main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness. (shrink)

‘Gender identity’ was clearly defined sixty years ago, but the dominant conceptions of gender identity today are deeply obscure. Florence Ashley’s 2023 theory of gender identity is one of the latest attempts at demystification. Although Ashley’s paper is not fully coherent, a coherent theory of gender identity can be extracted from it. That theory, we argue, is clearly false. It is psychologically very implausible, and does not support ‘first­person authority over gender’, as Ashley claims. We also discuss other errors and (...) confusions in Ashley’s paper. (shrink)

We argue that prediction success maximization is a basic objective of cognition and cortex, that it is compatible with but distinct from prediction error minimization, that neither objective requires subtractive coding, that there is clear neurobiological evidence for the amplification of predicted signals, and that we are unconvinced by evidence proposed in support of subtractive coding. We outline recent discoveries showing that pyramidal cells on which our cognitive capabilities depend usually transmit information about input to their basal dendrites and amplify (...) that transmission when input to their distal apical dendrites provides a context that agrees with the feedforward basal input in that both are depolarizing, i.e., both are excitatory rather than inhibitory. Though these intracellular discoveries require a level of technical expertise that is beyond the current abilities of most neuroscience labs, they are not controversial and acclaimed as groundbreaking. We note that this cellular cooperative context-sensitivity greatly enhances the cognitive capabilities of the mammalian neocortex, and that much remains to be discovered concerning its evolution, development, and pathology. (shrink)

This text deals with convergence and divergence in relation to the formation of images of inhumanity in Slovak Roma settlements. Slovak media, social networks, and television reports often contain negative images emphasizing the Roma’s backwardness, irrationality, superstition, and cruelty, and aiming to highlight their inhumanity. This approach has become prevalent even among official state authorities such as the police of the Slovak Republic, shaping the perception of the Roma as monsters. It represents a mobilization strategy that connects and disconnects various (...) disciplinary apparatuses, forming concrete images of monsters. By examining moments of convergence and divergence, which mainly focus on the killing and consumption of canines, the text clarifies the social and material ordering that contributes to the particular arrangement of significance used by the Slovak media and other officials. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I examine two ways to approach Anselm’s argument: as a logical demonstration and as a persuasive piece of reasoning—one that notably persuaded Anselm himself. First, I follow Ermanno Bencivenga and argue that Anselm’s argument is a logical illusion. The deduction is not simply invalid, nor is it simply unsound; instead, it appeals to two mutually inconsistent sets of assumptions, each of which is rationally defensible. Consequently, the argument emerges as either valid or sound, but not both simultaneously. (...) I also argue that this peculiar piece of reasoning should not be classified as an “ontological” argument. When interpreted as a persuasive piece of reasoning, the argument appeals to experience—an experience of something alluded to by the phrase “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” Here, the logical apparatus primarily serves to channel and refine contemplation on this experience. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal (...) logicians are in no way committed by the nature of their discipline. (shrink)

According to informal logic, the possibilities of deductive logic as a tool for analysing and evaluating ordinary arguments are very limited. While I agree with this claim in general, I question it in the case of the argument from cause to effect. In this paper I first show, on the basis of carefully chosen examples, that we usually react differently to falsification of the conclusion of the argument from cause to effect than we do to the falsification of the conclusion (...) of other defeasible arguments. I then identify general conditions and assumptions under which the causal argument from cause to effect can be reconstructed as deductive. Finally, I compare the causal argument with the expert argument, which is a typical example of a defeasible argument in the narrower sense. (shrink)

In this work three recent proposal of analysis of the concept of ‘religion’ are discussed. There is a strong convergence between these three proposals in several points: all of them maintain that a religion should be the belief of something –a set of propositions, the object of a propositional attitude like a belief–, all of them maintain that the object of the belief should be a theory about the good, and all of them maintain that a religion should have important (...) normative and practical consequences. It is argued here that there are at least two problems with the general conception that results from these analyses. In the first place, attributing to a religion the conditions of identity of an act of belief leads to absurd consequences. In the second place, it seems much better to analyze a religion as a theory about God or some gods. (shrink)

Contract cheating is currently one of the most serious academic integrity issues around the globe. Numerous studies have been conducted, mostly in English speaking countries. So far, no such research has been conducted in Czechia, and consequently there have been no specific data available on Czech students’ fraudulent behaviour. For this study, we created a questionnaire to obtain primary data on student usage of essay mills and their self-reported exposure to contract cheating. The questionnaire focused on students and graduates of (...) Czech universities and collected a total of 1016. Of that number, 8% of respondents admit having engaged in contract cheating. The questionnaire responses yielded useful information and insight into students’ attitudes regarding contract cheating and the extent of this phenomenon in Czechia. We now know more about their reasons for contract cheating and have insight into their thoughts regarding possible discovery. (shrink)

In this article we investigate infinitary propositional logics from the perspective of their completeness properties in abstract algebraic logic. It is well-known that every finitary logic is complete with respect to its relatively subdirectly irreducible models. We identify two syntactical notions formulated in terms of intersection-prime theories that follow from finitarity and are sufficient conditions for the aforementioned completeness properties. We construct all the necessary counterexamples to show that all these properties define pairwise different classes of logics. Consequently, we obtain (...) a new hierarchy of logics going beyond the scope of finitarity. (shrink)

According to Ted Nannicelli, ethical disputes about art today often concern not the controversial attitudes expressed by the works but the ways in which they have been created, that is, as well as interpretation-oriented ethical criticism of art, we find production-oriented ethical criticism. The main question that I explore in this article is: are the interpretation- and production-oriented approaches to ethical art criticism essentially disconnected or can there be a connection between them? I argue that in the disjunctivist view, the (...) two approaches are disconnected, for ethical flaws in the production of artworks are never conditioned by ethical flaws in the attitudes expressed by those works and vice versa. I show that disjunctivism is mistaken and defend what I call contextual conjunctivism. In this view, the two approaches can be connected since attitudinal ethical flaws in artworks can indeed cause ethical flaws in their production and vice versa depending on context. I support this view using several examples of controversies about contemporary art. (shrink)

We show in ZFC that the existence of completely separable maximal almost disjoint families of subsets of $\omega $ implies that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4.1.2}$ is complete with respect to the Čech–Stone compactification of the natural numbers, the space $\beta \omega $. In the same fashion we prove that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4}$ is complete with respect to the space $\omega ^*=\beta \omega \setminus \omega $. This improves the results of G. Bezhanishvili and J. Harding in [4], where (...) the authors prove these theorems under stronger assumptions. Our proof is also somewhat simpler. (shrink)

I begin by retracing an argument from Aristotle for final causes in science. Then, I advance this ancient thought, and defend an argument for a stronger conclusion: that no scientific explanation can succeed, if Naturalism is true. The argument goes like this: (1) Any scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity. Next, I argue that (2) any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks (...) one. From (1) and (2) it follows that (3) a scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity, and this regularity does not call out for explanation while lacking one. I then argue that (4) if Naturalism is true, then all natural regularities call out for explanation but lack them. From (3) and (4) it follows that (5) if Naturalism is true, then no scientific explanation can be successful. If you believe that scientific explanation can be (indeed, often has been) successful, as I do, then this is a reason to reject Naturalism. (shrink)

The film Nosferatu (1922) has graffiti created by the character of the madman Knock on the walls of his cell. This motif, which I call the ‘madman’s wall’, has accompanied depictions of lunatics since the beginning of the eighteenth century. This article examines the origin, transformations and functions of this motif. The popularisation of the motif originates with the longitude diagram in the last plate of A Rake’s Progress (1735) by William Hogarth, which subsequently found its way into the works (...) of Hogarth’s plagiarists and influenced illustrations of asylum interiors in the first half of the nineteenth century. The madman’s wall also appears in literature, such as the popular novel The Father and Daughter (1801) by Amelia Opie, which was plagiarised and dramatised, and the legend of the poet Charles Smart, who allegedly wrote his poem on the walls of his cell. The main prerequisite for the madman’s wall is the dungeon-like image of the asylum—presenting it as a prison. It is usually the author of the graffiti who displays the signs of madness, not the wall itself. As society distanced itself from the image of the asylum as a dungeon, the madman’s wall disappeared after the 1850s. Paradoxically, many reports about the authentic wall art of asylum patients emerged in the press after the 1850s. The madman’s wall in Nosferatu is the first example after an approximately seventy-year absence and could be a product of the period interest of avant-garde artists in the art of the mentally ill. (shrink)

Critical congenital heart disease screening is rapidly becoming the standard of care in the United States after being added to the Recommended Uniform Screening Panel in 2011. Newborn screens typically do not require affirmative parental consent. In fact, most states allow parents to exempt their baby from receiving the required screen on the basis of religious or personally held beliefs. There are many ethical considerations implicated with allowing parents to exempt their child from newborn screening for CCHD. Considerations include the (...) treatment of religious exemptions in our current legal system, as well as medical and ethical principles in relation to the rights of infants. Although there are significant benefits to screening newborns for CCHD, when a parent refuses for religious or personal beliefs, in the case of CCHD screening, the parental decision should stand. (shrink)

Lidé s různými politickými názory interpretují klíčové pojmy politiky odlišně. Mají různé koncepce těchto pojmů, protože mají různou odpověď na politickou otázku: Co dělat? Mít stejný pojem znamená idenfikovat stejnou praktickou otázku, mít různé koncepce tohoto pojmu pak znamená mít jinou teorii toho, co je správná odpověď na tuto otázku, tedy jinou teorii toho, co máme dělat. People of different political persuasions interpret key concepts of politics in different ways. They have different conceptions of these concepts because they answer differently (...) on the political question: What to do? To have the same concept means to identify the same practical question, to have different conceptions of this concept means to have another theory of the right answer for this question. (shrink)

La biografía griega puede asociarse a dos polos principales: en uno predomina el eje sintagmático, con sucesión, y en el otro el paradigmático, sin sucesión. El primero se relaciona con la historiografía, tiene un método cercano a la investigación o ἱστορία y tiene su tipo ideal más difundido en la biografía energética o peripatética ; el segundo se liga a la retórica demostrativa, su método es próximo al del anticuarianismo y aparece en la biografía alejandrina. Esta contribución sugiere que en (...) la hagiografía típica esta oposición se verifica en un tratamiento relativamente separado de “vida” y “conducta” –sintetizada habitualmente en los títulos como Βίος καὶ πολιτεíα–: la sucesión de hechos situados en el tiempo en los que se manifiesta un carácter más o menos intemporal. Para ello, discute las características principales de la biografía; expone el sistema de F. Leo sobre la biografía clásica; se detiene en el cronotopo de M. Bajtín sobre biografía y autobiografía antigua, y en su deuda con autores como Leo o G. Misch; expone ciertas características del discurso hagiográfico y de su particular cronotopo; ofrece una breve conclusión. (shrink)

Human life ends with death, but not necessarily in all its forms. In the paper, I recall two basic ways in which it does not end and discuss in detail one in particular which persists in the further development of the projects, ideas and events which the dead person was identified with during his lifetime. I then show how this possible form of afterlife is ambivalently present in Patočka’s thought: Patočka specifies that what we have after death is a metaphysical (...) quality of the dead, while on the other hand he calls for the interpretative decipherment of the life of the dead, that is, against an unchanging core of the deceased (a metaphysical essence), he acknowledges an interpretation that implies the possible change or development of the dead person. In the next section, I support the discussion of the form of postmortal life by mentioning a sketch of the concept of man in process philosophy and ancient Greek thought (using an interpretation advocated by Patočka himself). Finally, I revisit some death-related motifs in Patočka’s Heretical Essays, with the help of Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of these essays. (shrink)

School bullying among young adolescents is a globally pervasive problem, but is less common when bystanders are motivated to defend victims. Thus, the focus of this experimental study is on motivation to defend victims of bullying.Methods: A total of 388 students from two Turkish public schools participated in a vignette experiment. Students were randomized to one of two vignettes. Self-report measures of motivation to defend, trait anxiety, depression, and identification with the victim or bully were used.Results: Participants reported more autonomous (...) motivation in the cyberbullying condition, while those who witnessed direct bullying reported higher anxiety and depression.Results also revealed that this type of condition was associated with anxiety and depression, while anxiety was associated with autonomous motivation to defend. Finally, participants in the direct bullying condition were more likely to identify with the bully.Conclusion: Findings advance our understanding of when and why adolescents are motivated to help victims of bullying because they give a richer picture of what they assess when deciding whether or not they should intervene. (shrink)

Znásilnění můžeme předběžně chápat jako nekonsenzuální sex, to znamená sex bez souhlasu. Nabízí se otázka, zda je správné, abychom i dosažení sexu na základě podvodného překroucení nebo zamlčení relevantních a významných faktů kvalifikovali jako znásilnění, tedy jako něco trestuhodného. Myslím, že bychom měli rozlišovat podvod, jehož účelem je dosažení sexu bez souhlasu, a podvod, jehož účelem je dosažení souhlasu k sexu.

The paper critically examines C.A.J. Coady's analysis of testimony, concentrating on his interpretation of the views of David Hume. The author tries to show that not only is Coady's interpretation of Hume inadequate, but that Hume's conception of testimony is in fact superior to that of Coady. Coady sees Hume as the originator of the individualistic, first-person, view of testimony, according to which the reports of other people must be confirmed on the basis of an individualistically interpreted perception. Coady argues (...) against the first-person view that it undermines the very possibility of communication. Drawing on the ideas of Davidson and Wittgenstein, he argues that a good many beliefs must be true for the communication to be possible. The author provides evidence that Hume was a third-person theorist himself, even if he did not think that the truth of the majority of beliefs must be presupposed. Moreover, Wittgenstein and perhaps Davidson are also Humean in their belief that it suffices for beliefs to be generally correct rather than true. (shrink)

Dealing with phonological variations is important for speech processing. This article addresses whether phonological variations introduced by assimilatory processes are compensated for at the pre-lexical or lexical level, and whether the nature of variation and the phonological context influence this process. To this end, Swedish nasal regressive place assimilation was investigated using the mismatch negativity component. In nasal regressive assimilation, the coronal nasal assimilates to the place of articulation of a following segment, most clearly with a velar or labial place (...) of articulation, as in utan mej “without me” > [ʉːtam mɛjː]. In a passive auditory oddball paradigm, 15 Swedish speakers were presented with Swedish phrases with attested and unattested phonological variations and contexts for nasal assimilation. Attested variations – a coronal-to-labial change as in utan “without” > [ʉːtam] – were contrasted with unattested variations – a labial-to-coronal change as in utom “except” > ∗[ʉːtɔn] – in appropriate and inappropriate contexts created by mej “me” [mɛjː] and dej “you” [dɛjː]. Given that the MMN amplitude depends on the degree of variation between two stimuli, the MMN responses were expected to indicate to what extent the distance between variants was tolerated by the perceptual system. Since the MMN response reflects not only low-level acoustic processing but also higher-level linguistic processes, the results were predicted to indicate whether listeners process assimilation at the pre-lexical and lexical levels. The results indicated no significant interactions across variations, suggesting that variations in phonological forms do not incur any cost in lexical retrieval; hence such variation is compensated for at the lexical level. However, since the MMN response reached significance only for a labial-to-coronal change in a labial context and for a coronal-to-labial change in a coronal context, the compensation might have been influenced by the nature of variation and the phonological context. It is therefore concluded that while assimilation is compensated for at the lexical level, there is also some influence from pre-lexical processing. The present results reveal not only signal-based perception of phonological units, but also higher-level lexical processing, and are thus able to reconcile the bottom-up and top-down models of speech processing. (shrink)

By considering Davidson’s analysis of prepositions as defining individual events predicates, I argue against his semantics for action sentences and stress some logico-linguistic puzzles concerning both the interpretive pretension and the referential indifference of this proposal. Inspired by Evans as well as by Grice, I advance another interpretive semantics for those cases which does not take as assumption the individual character of events and argue for a constructivist approach to events in action discourse.

El artículo intenta abordar una evaluación del modelo normativo de relaciones internacionales bosquejado recientemente por John Rawls. Para ello subraya sus virtudes y sus defectos mediante el contraste con la propuesta de otro teórico político contemporáneo que también bebe de las fuentes kantianas del ideal cosmopolita: Jürgen Habermas. El autor concluye con una propuesta en la que la diversidad cultural y los ideales normativos cosmopolitas son integrados más allá de la completa aceptación de la facticidad y de la total abstracción (...) uníversalista insensible al contexto. (shrink)

The Purpose in Life Test is a measure of purpose in life widely used in many cultures and countries; however, cross-cultural assessments are scarce. The present study aimed to evaluate the cross-cultural measurement invariance of the PIL in the general population of seven Latin American countries. A total of 4306 people participated, selected by non-probabilistic convenience sampling, where Uruguay has the highest mean age ; while Ecuador has the lowest mean age. Furthermore, in each country, there is a higher proportion (...) of women than men. Using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis, the factorial structure does not show evidence of invariance among the included countries. However, based on the Multi-Group Factor Analysis Alignment, there is evidence that a three-dimensional structure of the PIL is the same in the participating countries. Results based on item response theory indicate that most PIL items can significantly differentiate responses according to the level of life purpose. In addition, people with low life purpose will tend to choose the lower response alternatives on the PIL; while people with higher life purpose will choose higher response alternatives. The findings indicate that the PIL has the potential to increase knowledge about how people conceive and experience their purpose in life in different countries. (shrink)

We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.

Neuropeptides are key modulators of adult neurocircuits, balancing their sensitivity to both excitation and inhibition, and fine‐tuning fast neurotransmitter action under physiological conditions. Here, we reason that transient increases in neuropeptide availability and action exist during brain development for synapse maturation, selection, and maintenance. We discuss fundamental concepts of neuropeptide signaling at G protein‐coupled receptors (GPCRs), with a particular focus on how signaling at neuropeptide GPCRs could underpin neuronal morphogenesis. We use galanin, a 29/30 amino acid‐long neuropeptide, as an example (...) for its retrograde release from the dendrites of thalamic neurons to impact the selection and wiring of sensory afferents originating at the trigeminal nucleus through galanin receptor 1 (GalR1) engagement. Thus, we suggest novel roles for neuropeptides, expressed transiently or permanently during both pre‐ and postnatal neuronal circuit development, with potentially life‐long effects on circuit layout and ensuing behavioral operations. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute el argumento presentado por Carmichael (2010) para justificar la existencia de universales trascendentes, esto es, universales que no requieren instanciaciones para existir. Se sostiene en este trabajo que una proposición puede describir correctamente un mundo posible sin existir como una parte de ese mundo, esto es, que una proposición puede ser verdadera de un mundo posible, sin ser verdadera en un mundo posible. Se sostiene, además, que las mismas premisas usadas por Carmichael permiten justificar el necesitismo.