This article develops an unconventional perspective on the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill in at least four areas. First, it is shown that both authors conceived of utility as irreducibly multi-dimensional, and that Bentham in particular was very much aware of the ambiguity that multi-dimensionality imposes upon optimal choice under the greatest happiness principle. Secondly, I argue that any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behaviour violates the first principles of Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism, and that this (...) renders both authors immune to the claim by G. E. Moore that they committed a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Thirdly, in light of these contentions, I find no flaw in Mill's ‘proof of utility’. Fourthly, I use the notion of intrapersonal utility weights to provide an interpretation of Mill's qualitative hedonism that is entirely consistent with his value monism. (shrink)

This book defends Aestheticism- the claim that everything is aesthetically valuable and that a life lived in pursuit of aesthetic value can be a particularly good one. Furthermore, in distilling aesthetic qualities, artists have a special role to play in teaching us to recognize values; a critical component of virtue. I ground my account upon an analysis of aesthetic value as ‘objectified final value’, which is underwritten by an original psychological claim that all aesthetic values are distal versions of practical (...) values. This is followed by systematic accounts of beauty, sublimity, comedy, drama, and tragedy, as well as appendix entries on the cute, the cool, the kitsch, the uncanny, the horrific, the erotic, and the furious. (shrink)

: Phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement have led writers in ethics to two antithetical conclusions: Either valid moral distinctions hold universally or they hold relative to a particular and contingent moral framework, and so cannot be applied with universal validly. Responding to three articles in this issue of the Journal that criticize his previously published views on the common morality, the author maintains that one can consistently deny universality to some justified moral norms and claim universality for others. Universality (...) is located in the common morality and nonuniversality in other parts of the moral life, called "particular moralities." The existence of universal moral standards is defended in terms of: (1) a theory of the objectives of morality, (2) an account of the norms that achieve those objectives, and (3) an account of normative justification (both pragmatic and coherentist). (shrink)

This article poses a challenge to Schurz’s proposed metainductive justification of induction. It is argued that Schurz’s argument requires a notion of optimality that can deal with an expanding pool of prediction strategies.

This article uses the current post-truth crisis to level a charge against deflationism. It argues that a post-truth society rejects the normativity of truth, thereby deflating truth, by treating disagreements about, say, scientific facts, as mere disagreements of taste. To have substantive disagreements, the notion of truth at stake must be substantive as well. To ward off the perils of post-truth politics, truth must be taken to be more than what deflationists can account for. If we want our disagreements to (...) amount to more than mere differences of opinion, we should have an inflated notion of truth. The article concludes with putting this claim within the context of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This volume of seminal and recent articles by philosophers in the distributive justice debate covers a range of representative positions, including libertarian, egalitarian, desert and welfare theories. The introduction and articles are designed to allow students and professionals to see some of the most influential pieces that have shaped the field, as well as some key critics of these positions. The articles intersect in such a way as to develop an appreciation of the types of theories and the central issues (...) addressed by theories of distributive justice. (shrink)

The key role that animals play in our aesthetic appreciation of the natural world has only gradually been highlighted in discussions in environmental aesthetics. In this article I make use of the phenomenological notion of ‘perceptual sense’ as developed by Merleau-Ponty to argue that open-ended expressive-responsive movement is the primary aesthetic ground for our appreciation of animals. It is through their movement that the array of qualities we admire in animals are manifest qua animal qualities. Against functionalist and formalist accounts, (...) I defend and develop an account of expressive-responsive movement as the primary perceptual sense of animals. I go on to suggest that the primacy of movement in the aesthetic appreciation of animals is also the primary sense of animal ‘wildness’, and that a key part of the rewilding paradigm should be the development of such appreciation. (shrink)

In this paper I present an account of musical arousal that takes into account key demands of formalist philosophers such as Peter Kivy and Nick Zangwill. Formalists prioritise our understanding and appreciation of the music itself. As a result, they demand that any feelings we have in response to music must be directed at the music alone, without being distracted by non-musical associations. To accommodate these requirements I appeal to a mechanism of contagion which I synthesize with the expectation-based arousal (...) mechanism proposed by Leonard Meyer. This account connects musical expressivity and arousal in a way that formalists have rejected, but I argue that it provides the best explanation of our observations of listener responses while also focusing on the music itself. (shrink)

This paper explores ethical issues raised by whole slide image-based computational pathology. After briefly giving examples drawn from some recent literature of advances in this field, we consider some ethical problems it might be thought to pose. These arise from the tension between artificial intelligence research—with its hunger for more and more data—and the default preference in data ethics and data protection law for the minimisation of personal data collection and processing; the fact that computational pathology lends itself to kinds (...) of data fusion that go against data ethics norms and some norms of biobanking; the fact that AI methods are esoteric and produce results that are sometimes unexplainable and the fact that computational pathology is particularly dependent on scanning technology manufacturers with interests of their own in profit-making from data collection. We shall suggest that most of these issues are resolvable. (shrink)

The Anthropocene, a concept to describe the planetary consequences of human culture, demands that we imagine the earth itself as an image-recording medium. It is a concept that confronts the entangled histories of industrialization and abstraction, revealing the thoroughly mediated circumstances from which perceptions of ‘nature’ emerge. This article considers an accelerated form of abstraction induced by technological capitalism, a form with thoroughly material consequences described by McKenzie Wark as ‘vectoral’. If the age of the human is recorded on the (...) earth, the vector is the tool of its stratigraphic inscription. Taking Tom McCarthy’s novel Satin Island as an example, this article speculates on a photographic practice immanent to the vector. In Satin Island, photographic images do not reinforce a human world but instead provoke a growing awareness of otherworldliness. These images confront the more radical and paradoxical consequences of the Anthropocene, an era that in fact names the end of the very category of human. (shrink)

Some of the early‐modern changes in the social framing of science, while often believed to be essential, are shown to be contingent. They contribute to the flawed public narrative around science today, and especially to the misconceptions around science and religion. Four are examined in detail, each of which contributes to the demise of the contemplative stance that science both requires and offers. They are: (1) a turn from an immersed subject to the pretense of a pure objectivity, (2) a (...) turn from imagination as a legitimate pathway to knowledge, (3) a turn from shared and participative science to a restricted professionalism, and (4) an overprosaic reading of the metaphor of the “Book of Nature.” All four, but especially the imperative to consider reading nature as poetry, and a deeper examination of the entanglements between poetry and theoretical science, draw unavoidably on theological ideas, and contribute to a developing “theology of science.”. (shrink)

Two rival paradigms permeate bioethics. One generally favors eugenics, euthanasia, assisted suicide and other methods for those with severely restricting physical and cognitive attributes. The other typically opposes these and favors instead ample support for "persons of difference" and their caring families or loved ones. In an attempt to understand the relation between these two paradigms, this article analyzes a publicly reported debate between proponents of both paradigms, bioethicist Peter Singer and lawyer Harriet McBryde Johnson. At issue, the article concludes, (...) are two distinct axiomatic sets of values resulting in not simply different styles of rhetoric but different vocabularies, in effect two different languages of ethics. (shrink)

Whether people possess free will has been a long-lasting philosophical debate. Recent attention in social psychology has been given to the behavioral consequences of believing in free will. Research has demonstrated that manipulating free will beliefs has implications for many social behaviors. For example, free will belief manipulations have been associated with cheating, aggressiveness, and prejudice. Despite this work, some of these findings have failed to replicate. Testing theoretical predictions, such as whether believing in free will influences behavior, depends on (...) theoretical, auxiliary, statistical, and inferential assumptions (TASI). In this paper we apply the TASI category of assumptions to the free will belief debate. In doing so we demonstrate why these assumptions should be considered when appraising the influence of free will belief manipulations on free will beliefs and behavior. To provide a nuanced view of free will beliefs, we believe researchers should pay careful attention to these critical assumptions. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the theoretical possibility of a universal method of prediction. A prediction method is universal if it is always able to learn from data: if it is always able to extrapolate given data about past observations to maximally successful predictions about future observations. The context of this investigation is the broader philosophical question into the possibility of a formal specification of inductive or scientific reasoning, a question that also relates to modern-day speculation about a fully automatized (...) data-driven science. I investigate, in particular, a proposed definition of a universal prediction method that goes back to Solomonoff and Levin. This definition marks the birth of the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, and has a direct line to the information-theoretic approach in modern machine learning. Solomonoff's work was inspired by Carnap's program of inductive logic, and the more precise definition due to Levin can be seen as an explicit attempt to escape the diagonal argument that Putnam famously launched against the feasibility of Carnap's program. The Solomonoff-Levin definition essentially aims at a mixture of all possible prediction algorithms. An alternative interpretation is that the definition formalizes the idea that learning from data is equivalent to compressing data. In this guise, the definition is often presented as an implementation and even as a justification of Occam's razor, the principle that we should look for simple explanations. The conclusions of my investigation are negative. I show that the Solomonoff-Levin definition fails to unite two necessary conditions to count as a universal prediction method, as turns out be entailed by Putnam's original argument after all; and I argue that this indeed shows that no definition can. Moreover, I show that the suggested justification of Occam's razor does not work, and I argue that the relevant notion of simplicity as compressibility is already problematic itself. (shrink)

Hume wrote about fundamental similarities and dissimilarities between human and nonhuman animals. His work was centered on the cognitive and emotional lives of animals, rather than their moral or legal standing, but his theories have implications for issues of moral standing. The historical background of these controversies reaches to ancient philosophy and to several prominent figures in early modern philosophy. Hume develops several of the themes in this literature. His underlying method is analogical arg ument and his conclusions are generally (...) favorable regarding the abilities in animals. Hume does not attribute a moral sense or capacity of judgment to animals, but he does suggest that their actions exhibit moral qualities, such as other-regarding instincts. Hume allows in-kind differences in both demonstrative reason and moral judgment, but in the domains of both causal reason and moral agency he believes there are differences of degree rather than of kind. Hume's most significant philosophical contribution was to move as far as anyone before him to a naturalistic explanation of human and nonhuman minds that invited psychological and epistemological examination of minds by using the identical methods and categories for man and beast. (shrink)

an article written with Tom Imbo for the forthcoming Compendium of Quantum Mechanics.

The construct of flexibility has been a focus for research and theory for over 100 years. However, flexibility has not been consistently or adequately defined, leading to obstacles in the interpretation of past research and progress toward enhanced theory. We present a model of socioemotional flexibility—and its counterpart rigidity—at three time scales using dynamic systems modeling. At the real-time scale (micro), moment-to-moment fluctuations in affect are identified as dynamic flexibility. At the next higher meso-time scale, adaptive adjustments to changes in (...) context are characterized as reactive flexibility. At the macro scale is flexibility that occurs across months or years, reflecting flexibility due to developmental or life transitions. Implications of the model and suggestions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

The frame or relevance problem is a classic problem in cognitive science and philosophy. We attempt to resolve this problem by appealing to predictive processing, a growing theory of cognition. As such, it ought to explain one of the central processes of cognition, that is, how an agent context-sensitively determines relevance. Our solution begins by appealing to Bayesian prior probabilities, which intuitively reflect relevance for a predictive agent. However, prior probabilities are necessary but insufficient for solving the problem with predictive (...) processing. We then turn to the broader predictive processing toolbox, leveraging the concepts of prediction, prediction error, and precision in order to explain relevance. This move reveals that the processes that optimize for prediction error minimization are crucial for realizing relevance. Although, they do not yet solve the entire problem, which also demands an agent select relevant actions, based on considerations about their consequences. By appealing to active inference, decision-making, and planning can be brought to bear on relevance, in addition to perceptual inference. With this final inclusion of action (as inference), we suggest predictive processing has the tools to comprehensively solve the problem of relevance. (shrink)

A discussion of the connection between activism and academia in bioethics, highlighting the author’s own trajectory, exploring the extent to which academics have an obliation to be ‘judges’ rather than ‘barristers’ (as explored by Jonathan Haidt) and asking questions about the relationship of disability to positions in bioethics.

Die Entdeckung des Straßburger Empedokles-Papyrus und seine 1999 erfolgte Publikation war für die Erforschung der antiken Philosophie ein einzigartiger Glücksfall. Die neu hinzugekommenen Texte ergänzten die fragmentarische Überlieferung von Empedokles’ naturphilosophischem Lehrgedicht Physika (so der in der Antike gebräuchliche Titel) an entscheidenden Stellen. Allerdings wurde das Potenzial des Papyrus zur Klärung ungelöster Interpretationsprobleme in der auf die Veröffentlichung folgenden Forschungsdiskussion noch nicht ausgeschöpft. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird auf der Basis einer kontinuierlichen inhaltlichen und sprachlichen Analyse des Textes eine Gesamtrekonstruktion (...) des empedokleischen Theoriegebäudes vorgelegt. Untersucht werden dabei vor allem die zyklische Struktur allen Werdens, die Funktionen von Liebe und Streit, die einzelnen Stadien von Kosmogonie und Zoogonie und das inhaltliche Verhältnis von Physika und einem weiteren Gedicht des Autors, den Katharmoi. Die Ergebnisse werden abschließend auch in einer neuen Übersetzung der durch Einbeziehung des Straßburger Papyrus wiedergewonnenen Teile des Gedichts zusammengeführt. (shrink)

Reviews show that comprehensive studies of international media ethics are necessarily incomplete because not all countries have either media codes or comparable measurement instruments. This article reviews major studies of international and national approaches to media ethics and describes contexts for global studies and comparisons. The three likely universals of truth, responsibility, and the drive for free expression are hypothesized, and codes are explored to see which patterns endured.

Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London * Corresponding author: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 28 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3JS, UK. Email: hschmidt{at}nuffieldbioethics.org ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract In November 2007, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics published the report Public Health: Ethical Issues . While the report has been welcomed by a wide range of stakeholders, there has also been some criticism. First, it has been suggested that it is not clear why, in developing its ‘stewardship (...) model’, the Council felt the need to go beyond the liberal position developed by John Stuart Mill—what is it that the stewardship model adds? Second, it is suggested that the Report is confused about the concept of paternalism. Third, it is argued that the discussion of the concept of stewardship is lacking in detail and substance. We clarify the Working Party's thinking regarding these three areas, which demonstrates the robustness of the framework set out in the report. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Some lines of poetry rhyme to certain readers and not to others because of how their words are pronounced in different accents. And because the accent in which a person speaks is tied in significant ways to aspects of their social identity (such as their age, race, gender, and class), some poems rhyme in the voices of the privileged and not in the voices of the disadvantaged. This paper argues that appreciators can incur aesthetic harms when they are excluded from (...) participating in aesthetic goods that are more fully available to others, and that these harms can constitute aesthetic injustices when they are part of a wider pattern of socio-economic hardship. Poems that embody objectionable gatekeeping practices can thus perpetuate aesthetic injustice. (shrink)

Diversity has become a watchword in American journalism as newspapers and TV stations strive to staff their newsroom with more women and minority journalists. But diversity must be thought of as more than numbers. Newsroom culture must change as it becomes more infused with this new wave of journalists who bring different backgrounds, perspectives, and values to the news mix. The new wave of diverse journalists are, in fact, in our classrooms today. Ethics courses preparing journalists for the 21st century (...) need to locate and articulate diverse philosophies to expand the traditional canon and to immerse students in experiences that provide practical applications of diversity to daily journalism. (shrink)

Ryan, Tom The year 2012 was characterized by extensive re-appraisal, nationally and internationally, of the Second Vatican Council occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of its opening in 1962. One aspect discussed by Ann N.C. Nolan is the language of the Council documents. In her investigation of John O'Malley SJ's work, she points out how he detects in them a clear shift from the scholastic and logical style to a literary and rhetorical mode aimed at persuasion and a deepening of conviction. (...) O'Malley claims the Vatican II documents' mode of discourse is 'epideictic' in character and it follows 'one of the literary forms of antiquity, the panegyric.'. (shrink)

Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and then say it. One way to argue for the thesis is to show that the content of a token thought cannot be fully represented by a token mental state before the production of the utterance which expresses it. I make an argument for that claim based on speech act theory. (...) Many inner speech utterances are inner speech acts; as such they are individuated by an amalgam of semantic content and illocutionary force, which only come together with the performance of the speech act. Call the performance of a speech act its meaning and call its meaning its content. Since a token thought is individuated by its content it follows that the content of the speech act is not represented by any token mental state before the speech act is performed. Metaphysically, a thought, when it is an inner speech act, is not an object of any kind, but an action – the action of performing the speech act. I illustrate my argument with the action of deciding something. (shrink)

Human moral rights place justified limits on what people are free to do to one another. Animals also have moral rights, and arguments to support the use of animals in scientific research based on the benefits allegedly derived from animal model research are thus invalid. Animals do not belong in laboratories because placing them there, in the hope of benefits for others, violates their rights.

This article articulates the Hippocratic medical ethic found in the Oath and the Christian medical ethic as exemplified in the parable of the Good Samaritan. It proposes that the Oath has a natural-law-based deontological character (as understood by Aquinas) that governs friendships of utility (as understood by Aristotle) between student and teacher and physician and patient. The article elaborates on the Samaritan’s conduct as exemplifying Christian agapeic-love. It contrasts agapeic-love with friendship-love, while noting that the Samaritan relies on friendship-love (as (...) found between the Samaritan and the innkeeper) to realize agapeic-love towards the robbers’ victim. It concludes with noting that the grace-based Christian medical ethic perfects the nature-based Hippocratic ethic not by destroying it, but, rather, by employing it. (shrink)

Affirmative action refers to positive steps taken to hire persons from groups previously and presently discriminated against. Considerable evidence indicates that this discrimination is intractable and cannot be eliminated by the enforcement of laws. Numerical goals and quotas are justified if and only if they are necessary to overcome the discriminatory effects that could not otherwise be eliminated with reasonable efficiency. Many past as well as present policies are justified in this way.

Consumers can sustain markets that are morally questionable. They can make immoral or morally suspect demands of individual businesses, especially small businesses. Even when they do not, the costs to firms of consumer protection can sometimes drive them to ruin. This paper presents cases where deference to the consumer is variously unwarranted, cases that may prompt second thoughts about some kinds of consumerism.

A personable teenager with Down's syndrome became a Canadian cause célèbre a few months ago when University Hospital in Edmonton, Alberta, denied him a position on the organ transplantation waiting list. Terry Urquart lacked “reasonable” intelligence, hospital officials said, a criterion for all transplant candidates at that hospital. Protests by the boy's family, and by groups active in the cause of those with developmental disabilities, became well-photographed stories on the nightly television news and in the nation's newspapers. It did not (...) hurt the Urquart cause one bit that the 17-year-old teenager had won a gold medal in skiing at the International Special Olympics. (shrink)

Is inner speech an intentional action, something we do, or a reaction, something that happens to us? This paper will argue that it can be both, (although not at the same time). Some inner speech utterances are reactive: they are spontaneous, they require no effort, and we are not in control of their occurring. These inner speech utterances fail to meet the traditional criteria for qualifying as intentional actions. But some inner speech ut- terances are intentional actions, performed deliberately, effortfully (...) and with as much control as any other intentional action. When we deliberate, for example, inner speech utterances are the basic actions by which we bring about the non-basic action of deliberating. (shrink)

Kantian legalism is now the dominant scholarly interpretation of Kant and an important approach to legal and political philosophy in its own right. One notable feature is its construal of the relationship between law and politics decisively in law’s favour: Law subordinates politics. Political judgment is constrained by and only permissibly exercised through law. This paper opposes this subordination through a close analysis of an ambiguity in Kant’s conception of sovereignty. Understanding this ambiguity requires seeing that, for Kant, law cannot (...) subordinate the sovereign’s political judgment because it is a condition which makes a legal system possible. Kant was not an exacting legalist, but a practical reasoner struggling with the pressures politics imposes on finite beings. Through discussion of a leading contemporary approach, and close engagement with its historical source, the paper raises new considerations about the relevance of political judgment in the relationship of law and politics. (shrink)

This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions, drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwo...

Some feminist philosophers criticize the idea of human rights because, they allege, it encapsulates male bias; it is therefore misguided, in their view, to extend moral rights to non-human animals. I argue that the feminist criticism is misguided. Ideas are not biased in favour of men simply because they originate with men, nor are ideas themselves biased in favour of men because men have used them prejudicially. As for the position that women should abandon theories of rights and embrace an (...) ethic that emphasizes care: women who made this choice would not so much liberate themselves from the patriarchy as they would conform to its representation of women as emotional, subjective and irrational. There is, then, no good reason to withhold ascribing rights to non-human animals, based on the criticisms of rights made by some feminists. (shrink)

This article argues that in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) Nietzsche defends “will to power” as a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, in the sense in which Kant considers, say, space, time, or the concepts of substance and causation to be such conditions. The article shows how Nietzsche’s engage-ment with the transcendental idealist arguments of his Kantian contemporaries leads him to reject naturalism and to adopt a peculiarly transcendental kind of skepticism, which rejects as unjustified the conditions that would make (...) objec-tivity possible. The article then turns to the argument for “will to power” in BGE 36, showing that it is best read as defending a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, and thus as responding to transcendental skepticism. The article concludes by elaborating on this understanding of “will to power,” particularly in relation to the sense of causality that Nietzsche invokes and in comparison with Kant’s own transcendental claims. (shrink)

Despite the growing influence of constitutional rights over the regulation of horizontal (private) relations, many aspects of this trend remain under-theorized. This article criticizes four ideal-typical constitutional horizontality models for failing to accommodate moral reasons that must shape this regulatory practice: the state action model ignores basic consequentialist aspects of political morality; the direct application model ignores basic relational aspects of interpersonal morality; the strong indirect model recognizes both but subordinates the latter to the former; and the partitioned indirect model (...) recognizes both but separates them too strongly. This article claims that a composite indirect model, which reflects basic features of the common law, can better realize constitutional rights through private law in conditions of moral pluralism: it can expose private law to constitutional rights-based and reform-oriented scrutiny without ignoring, eroding, or distorting the unique normativity of private relations and practices or their underlying values. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 9, September 2020, Page 29-31.