Consciousness is targeted by both philosophers and neuroscientists; but different methodological premises and even different conceptions about what conscious experience is and how the challenges and potential problems associated with consciousness research should be formulated underlie the different approaches. Namely, whereas empirical data and the constant refinement of experimental procedures to expand and modify this body of empirical data and resulting empirical theories are crucial to neuroscience, the significance of empirical knowledge to philosophy is less clear: Although empirical data certainly (...) can influence philosophical concepts, the latter are nonetheless prerequisites of empirical research itself and thus may themselves not be empirically testable. The present paper elaborates from a multidisciplinary, neuroscientist-philosopher’s perspective the relation of philosophical concepts and empirical research on consciousness, drawing on two exemplary controversies from the philosophy of mind – on the ontological status of experiential properties and on free will. Consequences from both the scientific and the philosophical standpoint are discussed. (shrink)

León and Zahavi (2023) have made a compelling case for the necessity of philosophy — and not only neuroscience — for investigating consciousness. In particular, they argue that any theory of consciousness cannot avoid philosophical enquiry and thus only can choose between good or bad philosophy. Also, the topics of self-consciousness and selfhood are highlighted as problems of consciousness sui generis next to the mind–body problem. I will try to elucidate a bit more the specific approaches to consciousness that philosophy (...) and neuroscience take and thus elaborate why the philosophy and the neuroscience of consciousness are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. (shrink)

David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take on both the (...) empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate. (shrink)

Researchers have explored important questions about employees’ prosocial motivation to impact others through their work and about employees’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Studies show that job seekers are attracted to CSR-engaged employers, but little is known about whether and why prospective employees are attracted by job roles that allow them to have positive social impact. We used prosocial motivation theory to develop hypotheses about processes through which a greater desire for social impact in work is associated with (...) being predisposed to it (due to trait-like prosocial motivation), being exposed to the possibility of it (through CSR-related educational choices), and both in partially mediated sequence. Analyses of data from 187 prospective employees provided support for most hypotheses. Our findings inform new directions for research on CSR and recruitment, the CSR education literature, and recruitment practices that leverage prospective employees’ desire for social impact through performing their regular work. (shrink)

Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere abundant causation. It is argued that the contrast between sparse and mere abundant causation allows us to resolve notorious philosophical issues having to do with negative causation, causation involving institutional properties and physical macro-causation in a way that is unified, intuitive and in line with scientific doctrines and practices.

I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.

An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold (...) that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts. (shrink)

This multi-methodological study applied functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate neural activation in a group of adolescent students ( N = 88) during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task. We related patterns of emerging brain activity and individual learning rates to socio-motivational (in-)dependence manifested in four different motivation types (MTs): (1) peer-dependent MT, (2) teacher-dependent MT, (3) peer-and-teacher-dependent MT, (4) peer-and-teacher-independent MT. A multinomial regression analysis revealed that the individual learning rate predicts students’ membership to the independent MT, or the peer-and-teacher-dependent (...) MT. Additionally, the striatum, a brain region associated with behavioral adaptation and flexibility, showed increased learning-related activation in students with motivational independence. Moreover, the prefrontal cortex, which is involved in behavioral control, was more active in students of the peer-and-teacher-dependent MT. Overall, this study offers new insights into the interplay of motivation and learning with (1) a focus on inter-individual differences in the role of peers and teachers as source of students’ individual motivation and (2) its potential neurobiological basis. (shrink)

Der soziale und medizinische Umgang mit „Transsexualität“ (Transidentität) stößt in zunehmendem Maße auf Kritik. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welches semantisch-begriffliche „Konzept“ von Transidentität in Deutschland vorherrscht und inwieweit die Konstituenten dieses Konzeptes den Denkhorizont, vor dem die ethischen Implikationen des Phänomens Transidentität verhandelt werden, begrenzen. Es lässt sich zeigen, dass der gegenwärtige Umgang mit Transidentität auf mehreren kaum hinterfragten, gleichwohl systematisch und ethisch problematischen Setzungen basiert. Zu diesen gehören (1) die Pathologisierung von Transidentität und deren weitgehende Überstellung (...) in den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Medizin, (2) die Behauptung eines Primats der chirurgischen Therapie (Vernachlässigung der postoperativen Phase), (3) das Paradigma „Bigenus“, (4) die terminologisch fassbare „Sexualisierung“ des vorliegenden Identitätsproblems und (5) die juristische Vorgabe, wonach der Personenstand an gonadal-morphologischen Kriterien festzumachen ist. Um das Ziel eines ethisch reflektierten und dadurch gesellschaftlich wie medizinisch verantwortungsvollen Umgangs mit Transidentität ernsthaft verfolgen zu können, ist es zunächst erforderlich, die bezeichneten Setzungen in einem offen geführten Diskurs auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Erst das Ergebnis einer solchen Prüfung kann den Weg für einen zeitgemäßeren, medizinethisch belastbaren (reflektierten) Umgang mit Transidentität ebnen. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: that if (...) “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly read as an “is” simpliciter; and that if “at t” is treated as being associated with the copula, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly understood as expressing a disjunction of tensed copulas. I end the paper by explaining the importance of the issue. I indicate the ramifications interpretation of the tenseless copula has for the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics. (shrink)

Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevolds enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269-283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe's paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106-114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69-74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.

David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take on both the (...) empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate. (shrink)

Words whose consonantal articulation places move from the front of the mouth to the back (e.g. BADAKA; inward) receive more positive evaluations than words whose consonantal articulation places move from the back of the mouth to the front (e.g. KADABA; outward). This in–out effect has a variety of affective, cognitive, and even behavioural consequences, but its underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Most recently, a linguistic explanation has been proposed applying the linguistic easy-first account and the so-called labial-coronal effect from developmental speech (...) research and phonology to the in–out effect: Labials (front) are easier to process than coronals (middle); and people prefer easy followed by harder motor components. Disentangling consonantal articulation direction and articulation place, the present three preregistered experiments (total N = 1012) found in–out effects for coronal-dorsal (back), and labial-dorsal articulation places. Critically, no in–out effect emerged for labial-coronal articulation places. Thus, the in–out effect is unlikely an instantiation of easy first. (shrink)

This volume includes 22 articles that provide an introduction to fundamental issues in the theory of fiction. It covers the most influential approaches used to demarcate the boundary between fictional and non-fictional media based on pragmatic, receptive, and contextual theories. The handbook explores core philosophical and psychological questions about the functions and the institutional history of fictionality since ancient times.

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...) theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed. (shrink)

When making a decision, humans consider two types of information: information they have acquired through their prior experience of the world, and further information they gather to support the decision in question. Here, we present evidence that data from search engines such as Google can help us model both sources of information. We show that statistics from search engines on the frequency of content on the Internet can help us estimate the statistical structure of prior experience; and, specifically, we outline (...) how such statistics can inform psychological theories concerning the valuation of human lives, or choices involving delayed outcomes. Turning to information gathering, we show that search query data might help measure human information gathering, and it may predict subsequent decisions. Such data enable us to compare information gathered across nations, where analyses suggest, for example, a greater focus on the future in countries with a higher per capita GDP. We conclude that search engine data constitute a valuable new resource for cognitive scientists, offering a fascinating new tool for understanding the human decision-making process. (shrink)

Biographische Informationen Tobias Cantz leitet die Arbeitsgruppe "Translationale Hepatologie und Stammzellbiologie" im Exzellenzcluster REBIRTH. Prof. Dr. Hans-Georg Dederer lehrt Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, Europarecht und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht an der Universität Passau. Prof. Dr. Thomas Heinemann lehrt "Ethik, Theorie und Geschichte der Medizin" an der Philosophisch-Theologischen Hochschule Vallendar.

A central method within analytic philosophy has been to construct thought experiments in order to subject philosophical theories to intuitive evaluation. According to a widely held view, philosophical intuitions provide an evidential basis for arguments against such theories, thus rendering the discussion rational. This method has been the predominant way to approach theories formulated as conditional or biconditional statements. In this paper, we examine selected theories of musical expressivity presented in such logical forms, analyzing the possibilities for constructing thought experiments (...) against them. We will argue that philosophical intuitions are not available for the evaluation of the types of counterarguments that would need to be constructed. Instead, the evaluation of these theories, to the extent that it can succeed at all, will centrally rely on inferential, non-immediate access to our subjective musical experiences. Furthermore, attempted thought experiments lose their methodological function because no proper distinction can be drawn between the persons figuring in the thought-experimental scenario and the evaluator of the scenario. Consequently, some of the central contributions to what is generally understood to be analytic philosophy of art are shown to represent a form of aesthetic criticism, offering much less basis for rational argumentation than is often thought. (shrink)

"Empirische Ästhetik hat heute Konjunktur. Doch sie ist keineswegs eine Erfindung der Gegenwart. Schon im späten 19. Jahrhundert wurden zahlreiche Versuche unternommen, wissenschaftlich exakte Methoden in die Untersuchung des Schönen einzuführen. Unter Anschluss an Disziplinen wie Physiologie, Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft wird Ästhetik um 1900 zu einer Wissensform, die in ihren materiellen Grundlagen, in ihrer diskursiven Organisation sowie in ihren theoretischen Konsequenzen neuartige Verbindungen zwischen Gefühl und Genauigkeit erzeugt. Die Beiträge des Bandes diskutieren diese Entwicklung anhand verschiedener Facetten und Spielformen empirischer (...) Ästhetik, die von den frühen Einfühlungstheorien über experimentelle Laborforschungen bis hin zu Poetik und Kunstwissenschaft reichen."--Front inside flap of dust jacket. (shrink)

I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.

"Phenomenology has primarily been concerned with conceptual questions about knowledge and ontology. However, in recent years the rise of interest and research in applied phenomenology has seen the study of political phenomenology move to a central place in the study of phenomenology generally. The Routledge Handbook of Political Phenomenology is the first major collection on this important topic. Comprising 35 chapters by an international team of expert contributors, the Handbook is organised into six clear parts, each with its own Introduction (...) by the editors: Founders of Phenomenology Existentialist Phenomenology Phenomenology of the Social and Political World Phenomenology of Alterity Phenomenology in Debate Contemporary Developments. Full attention is given to central figures in the phenomenological movement, including Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas as well as those whose contribution to political phenomenology is more distinctive, such as Arendt, De Beauvoir and Fanon. Also included are chapters on gender, race and intersectionality, disability, and technology. Ideal for those studying phenomenology, continental philosophy and political theory, The Routledge Handbook of Political Phenomenology bridges an important gap between a major philosophical movement and contemporary political issues and concepts"--. (shrink)

In this interview, Luce Irigaray talks about how two of her latest books, Towards a New Human Being and To Be Born, relate to her wider work and her most well-known theoretical contributions. Iriga...

BackgroundImplicit prejudice can lead to disparities in treatment. The effects of specialty and experience on implicit obesity and mental illness prejudice had not been explored. The main objective was to examine how specializing in psychiatry/general medicine and years of experience moderated implicit obesity and mental illness prejudice among Swiss physicians. Secondary outcomes included examining the malleability of implicit bias via two video interventions and a condition of cognitive load, correlations of implicit bias with responses to a clinical vignette, and correlations (...) with explicit prejudice. MethodsIn stage 1, participants completed an online questionnaire including a clinical vignette. In stage 2, implicit prejudice pre- and post- intervention was tested using a 4 × 4 between-subject design including a control group. In stage 3, explicit prejudice was tested with feeling thermometers and participants were debriefed. Participants were 133 psychiatrists and internists working in Geneva, hospital-based and private practice. Implicit prejudice was assessed using a Weight IAT and a Mental Illness IAT. Explicit feelings towards the obese and the mentally ill were measured using Feeling Thermometers. A clinical vignette assessed the level of concern felt for a fictional patient under four conditions: control, obese, depression, obese and depression. Linear regression was conducted to test for association of gender, experience, and specialty with responses to vignettes, pre-intervention IATs and explicit attitudes, and to test for association of interventions with post-intervention IATs and explicit attitudes. Reported effect sizes were computed using Cohen’s d. Two-tailed p < 0.05 was selected as the significance threshold. ResultsCompared to internists, psychiatrists showed significantly less implicit bias against mentally vs. physically ill people than internists and warmer explicit feelings towards the mentally ill. More experienced physicians displayed warmer explicit feelings towards the mentally ill and a greater level of concern for the fictional patients in the vignette than the less experienced, except when the patient was described as obese. ConclusionsSpecialty moderates both implicit and explicit mental illness prejudice. Experience moderates explicit mental illness bias and concern for patients. The effect of specialty on implicit prejudice seems to be based principally on self-selection. (shrink)