The advanced donation program was proposed in 2014 to allow an individual to donate a kidney in order to provide a voucher for a kidney in the future for a particular loved one. In this article, we explore the logistical and ethical issues that such a program raises. We argue that such a program is ethical in principle but there are many logistical issues that need to be addressed to ensure that the actual program is fair to both those who (...) do and do not participate in this program. (shrink)

Our exploratory study considers whether the internal audit function is an efficient “third line of defense” for risk management and control as proposed by The Institute of Internal Auditors. To that end, we interview chief audit executives and experienced internal auditors to examine whether CAEs manage the impressions of audit committee members in the annual accountability process. We also provide an illustration of impression management techniques through a documentary case that explores a unique and exclusive dataset consisting of the main (...) guidance, framework, and accountability documents of one of these organizations. Our analysis highlights how several macro- and microimpression management techniques were used to burnish the image of internal auditors and, more importantly, the management team. Rather than monitoring managers, the CAEs team up with them. Our findings cast doubts on the conceptualization of internal audit as the independent third line of defense envisioned to be a keystone of the governance mosaic. This study supports other research that questions the effectiveness of internal auditing as a governance mechanism. It also contributes to the impression management literature by exposing impression management practices that occur through a private reporting channel—the internal audit function’s annual accountability to the audit committee. Last but not least, significant ethical concerns are raised in regard to internal audit, and research is urged in that area. (shrink)

This article proposes three new decompositions of inequality measures, drawn from the framework of cooperative game theory. It allows the impact of players’ interactions, rather than players’ contributions to inequality, to be taken into consideration. These innovative approaches are especially suited for the study of income inequality when the income has a hierarchical structure: the income is composed of several primary sources, with the particularity that each of them is also composed of secondary sources. We revisit the Shapley–Owen value that (...) quantifies the importance of each of these secondary sources in the overall income inequality. Our main contribution is to decompose this importance into two parts: the pure marginal contribution of the considered source and a weighted sum of pairwise interactions. We then provide an axiomatic characterization of each additive interaction decomposable (AID) coalitional value considered in this paper. We give an application of these decompositions in the context of inequality theory. (shrink)

Live donor kidney transplantation is the best treatment option for most patients with late-stage chronic kidney disease; however, the rate of living kidney donation has declined in the United States. A consensus conference was held June 5-6, 2014 to identify best practices and knowledge gaps pertaining to live donor kidney transplantation and living kidney donation. Transplant professionals, patients, and other key stakeholders discussed processes for educating transplant candidates and potential living donors about living kidney donation; efficiencies in the living donor (...) evaluation process; disparities in living donation; and financial and systemic barriers to living donation. We summarize the consensus recommendations for best practices in these educational and clinical domains, future research priorities, and possible public policy initiatives to remove barriers to living kidney donation. (shrink)

While proponents of sustainability reporting believe in its potential to help corporations be accountable and transparent about their social and environmental impacts, there has been growing criticism asserting that such reporting schemes are utilized primarily as impression management tools. Drawing on Goffman’s self-presentation theory and its frontstage/backstage analogy, we contrast the frontstage sustainability discourse of a sample of large U.S. oil and gas firms to their backstage corporate political activities in the context of the passage of the American-Made Energy and (...) Good Jobs Act, also known as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Bill. The ANWR Bill was designed to allow oil exploration within the most sensitive environmental areas in the Refuge and this bill was vigorously debated in the United States Congress in 2005 and 2006. Our results suggest that the firms’ sustainability discourse on environmental stewardship and responsibility contrasts sharply with their less visible but proactive political strategies targeted to facilitate the passage of the ANWR Bill. This study thus contributes to the social and environmental accounting and accountability literature by highlighting the relevance of Goffman’s frontstage/backstage analogy in uncovering and documenting further the deceptive nature of the discourse contained in stand-alone sustainability reports. In addition, it seeks to contribute to the overall understanding of the multifaceted nature of sustainability reporting by placing it in relation to corporate political activities. (shrink)

Astroturf organizations are fake grassroots organizations usually sponsored by large corporations to support any arguments or claims in their favor, or to challenge and deny those against them. They constitute the corporate version of grassroots social movements. Serious ethical and societal concerns underline this astroturfing practice, especially if corporations are successful in influencing public opinion by undertaking a social movement approach. This study is motivated by this particular issue and examines the effectiveness of astroturf organizations in the global warming context, (...) wherein large corporate polluters have an incentive to set up astroturf organizations to undermine the importance of human activities in climate change. We conduct an experiment to determine whether astroturf organizations have an impact on the level of user certainty about the causes of global warming. Results show that people who used astroturf websites became more uncertain about the causes of global warming and humans’ role in the phenomenon than people who used grassroots websites. Astroturf organizations are hence successful in promoting business interests over environmental protection. In addition to the multiple business ethics issues it raises, astroturfing poses a significant threat to the legitimacy of the grassroots movement. (shrink)

Humanity stands at a precipice. -/- Our species could survive for millions of generations — enough time to end disease, poverty, and injustice; to reach new heights of flourishing. But this vast future is at risk. With the advent of nuclear weapons, humanity entered a new age, gaining the power to destroy ourselves, without the wisdom to ensure we won’t. Since then, these dangers have only multiplied, from climate change to engineered pandemics and unaligned artificial intelligence. If we do not (...) act fast to reach a place of safety, it may soon be too late. -/- The Precipice explores the science behind the risks we face. It puts them in the context of the greater story of humanity: showing how ending these risks is among the most pressing moral issues of our time. And it points the way forward, to the actions and strategies we can take today to safeguard humanity’s future. (shrink)

The spectrum argument purports to show that the better-than relation is not transitive, and consequently that orthodox value theory is built on dubious foundations. The argument works by constructing a sequence of increasingly less painful but more drawn-out experiences, such that each experience in the spectrum is worse than the previous one, yet the final experience is better than the experience with which the spectrum began. Hence the betterness relation admits cycles, threatening either transitivity or asymmetry of the relation. This (...) paper examines recent attempts to block the spectrum argument, using the idea that it is a mistake to affirm that every experience in the spectrum is worse than its predecessor: an alternative hypothesis is that adjacent experiences may be incommensurable in value, or that due to vagueness in the underlying concepts, it is indeterminate which is better. While these attempts formally succeed as responses to the spectrum argument, they have additional, as yet unacknowledged costs that are significant. In order to effectively block the argument in its most typical form, in which the first element is radically inferior to the last, it is necessary to suppose that the incommensurability is particularly acute: what might be called radical incommensurability. We explain these costs, and draw some general lessons about the plausibility of the available options for those who wish to save orthodox axiology from the spectrum argument. (shrink)

Shamatha, Transcendental, and Stillness Meditation are said to aim for “contentless” experiences, where mental content such as thoughts, perceptions, and mental images is absent. Silence is understood to be a central feature of those experiences. The main source of information about the experiences is texts by experts from within the three traditions. Previous research has tended not to use an explicit scientific method for selecting and reviewing expert texts on meditation. We have identified evidence synthesis as a robust and transparent (...) method that is suitable for this purpose. In this paper we use evidence synthesis based on expert texts to examine silence/quietness as a feature of the contentless experiences in the three practices. Objective criteria were used to select a sample of 135 expert texts. A database containing the expert descriptions of the meditation techniques and experiences was produced by extracting the relevant material from the publications and coding that material to differentiate individual features. The database, which forms part of the Supplementary Material for this paper, identifies each feature of the contentless experiences referred to in the expert texts, including silence/quietness. Our key finding is that the experts indicate silence/quietness has a particular connection with stillness, and the absence of concepts, mental activity/noise, thoughts, and disturbance. Further analysis leads to the following insights. The silence/quietness reflects the absence of thoughts and sounds, and this fits neatly with a conception of silence/quietness as the absence of internal and external noise. In some cases the terms silence and quietness may also reflect the absence of other disturbances such as non-auditory perceptions, mental images, and negative feelings. That would fit with a conception of silence/quietness as complete calm or absence of disturbance. It is not clear from the expert texts how silence/quietness is distinct from other features such as stillness that also reflect the absence of disturbances. As a separate matter, silence/quietness has connections with all the other features of the contentless experiences, but the closeness of the connections varies. Our work uncovers fine distinctions and ambiguities which lead to new research questions that can be explored in future studies. (shrink)

Lewis’s original Best Systems Account of laws was not motivated much by pragmatics. But recent commentary on his general approach to laws has taken a ‘pragmatic turn’. This was initiated by Hall’s defence against the charge of ‘ratbag idealism’ which maintained that best systems accounts should be admired rather than criticised for the inherent pragmatism behind their choice of desiderata for what counts as ‘best’. Emboldened by Hall’s pragmatic turn, recent commentators have proposed the addition of pragmatically motivated desiderata to (...) complement or replace the canonical desiderata of strength and simplicity. This, they hope, will allow their revisionary BSAs to respond better to various counterexamples against the original account. While the pragmatic turn itself is well taken, here I problematise these revisionary approaches. First, there are reasonable responses to the counterexamples from within the canonical BSA. Second, while actual laws may satisfy the newly proposed desiderata, there are reasons to think these desiderata cannot be constitutive of laws. By comparison, the canonical desiderata appear to be relevant to explaining why and when the revisionary desiderata will reflect pragmatic features of the laws and better reflect the motives behind practitioners of fundamental physics. (shrink)

In providing a good foundation for mathematics, set theorists often aim to develop the strongest theories possible and avoid those theories that place undue restrictions on the capacity to possess strength. For example, adding a measurable cardinal to $ZFC$ is thought to give a stronger theory than adding $V=L$ and the latter is thought to be more restrictive than the former. The two main proponents of this style of account are Penelope Maddy and John Steel. In this paper, I’ll offer (...) a third account that is intended to provide a simple analysis of restrictiveness based on the algebraic concept of retraction in the category of theories. I will also deliver some results and arguments that suggest some plausible alternative approaches to analyzing restrictiveness do not live up to their intuitive motivation. (shrink)

The ubiquitous schema ‘All Fs are Gs’ dominates much philosophical discussion on laws but rarely is it shown how actual laws mentioned and used in science are supposed to fit it. After consideration of a variety of laws, including those obviously conditional and those superficially not conditional, I argue that we have good reason to support the traditional interpretation of laws as conditionals of some quantified form with a single object variable. I show how this conclusion impacts on the status (...) of ‘system laws’ and the significance of having only one object variable with regard to the relationship between laws and causal relations. (shrink)

The orthodox view of the metaphysics of desert is that desert is a triadic relation that obtains between a subject, an object and a desert base. Not only is this view lacking in motivation, but conceiving of the desert base as part of the desert relation renders the concept of desert incoherent. Instead, desert should be thought of as a dyadic relation between a subject and an object, where desert bases are simply the grounds for dyadic desert facts.

In this report I provide an introduction to the burgeoning field of hypercomputation – the study of machines that can compute more than Turing machines. I take an extensive survey of many of the key concepts in the field, tying together the disparate ideas and presenting them in a structure which allows comparisons of the many approaches and results. To this I add several new results and draw out some interesting consequences of hypercomputation for several different disciplines.

In his article "The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy" (1982), Dudley Shapere argues for an analysis of what it is for an object to be directly observed (observable). He does so by presenting two contrasting ways of observing the center of the sun. However, his examples, which are probabilistic in nature, are at odds with his analysis, which is absolute. I argue that of the three features of the examples which could serve as the basis for the analysis (...) only one--the amount of alteration to the information being transmitted--can plausibly do so. Having reworked Shapere's analysis on the basis of this feature, I show that the analysis still fails to provide a sufficient condition for observation. (shrink)

Interpretation is commonly used in mathematical logic to compare different theories and identify cases where two theories are for almost all intents and purposes the same. Similar techniques are used in the comparison between alternative logics although the links between these approaches are not transparent. This paper generalizes theoretical comparison techniques to the case of logical comparison using an extremely general approach to semantics that provides a very generous playing field upon which to make our comparisons. In particular, we aim (...) to develop the useful idea that interpretations should determine inner models. (shrink)

The Portuguese elections occurred this March, and the left’s decline has accompanied the far-right’s growth, as in previous elections. Explanations for such phenomena are often carried out using quantitative and qualitative methods. Philosophical conceptual analysis, in contrast, is frequently dismissed as a method for analysing political change. In this paper, I will show how, by using conceptual analysis, it is possible to assist in explaining voting behaviour from the left on the far-right party Chega in Portugal. This methodology resembles philosophers (...) and political theorists using concepts like ‘class’ and ‘authoritarianism’ to assist in explaining socio-political changes. I will use concepts, such as ‘complex ideology’ and ‘anti-power/anti-system politics’, which have helpful explanatory power to the phenomenon I address. Particularly, I argue that the right-wing party Chega can attract voters from the left because of its anti-system ideology, an ideological characteristic of left voters in Portugal. Thus, I argue that the rise of the far-right partly relates to the changing politics of some smaller left parties with parliamentary representation. These political changes within these parties create a space for specific anti-system ideologies that the far-right, in the case of Portugal, can fill. (shrink)

Assessing mastery of bioethics in a graduate program requires careful attention not simply to the content knowledge and skill development of students but also to the principles of sound assessment processes. In this article, we describe the rationale, development process, and features of the comprehensive exam we created as a culminating experience of a master’s program in bioethics. The exam became the students’ opportunity to demonstrate the way they were able to integrate course, textual, and practical knowledge gained throughout the (...) experience of the program. Additionally, the exam assessed students’ proficiency in the field of bioethics and their ability to critically and constructively analyze bioethical issues. In this article, we offer tips to other exam creators regarding our experiences with question and answer development, scoring of the exam, and relationships between coursework and exam preparation and completion. We also include a sample rubric for others to see how we determined which student answers were satisfactory. (shrink)

Most Anglophone just war theory has been written from the point of view of Western philosophy. Nevertheless, other philosophical traditions outside the West have also produced sophisticated and innovative ideas about the morality of war, although they have been largely neglected. In this article, I overview for the first time the literature regarding jus ad bellum in contemporary African thought and contend that there are four kinds of arguments regarding the justification to initiate a war. Namely, these are arguments that (...) justify resourcing war on consequentialist grounds; therapy rationales; rebutting wrong justifications; and arguments based on consensus and negotiation. (shrink)

The Church-Turing Thesis is widely regarded as true, because of evidence that there is only one genuine notion of computation. By contrast, there are nowadays many different formal logics, and different corresponding foundational frameworks. Which ones can deliver a theory of computability? This question sets up a difficult challenge: the meanings of basic mathematical terms are not stable across frameworks. While it is easy to compare what different frameworks say, it is not so easy to compare what they mean. We (...) argue for some minimal conditions that must be met if two frameworks are to be compared; if frameworks are radical enough, comparison becomes hopeless. Our aim is to clarify the dialectical situation in this bourgeoning area of research, shedding light on the nature of non-classical logic and the notion of computation alike. (shrink)

Just war theory is a difficult, even paradoxical, philosophical topic. It is not just that warfare involves large-scale, organised, deliberate killing, and hence might seem the very paradigm of immorality. The just war tradition sharply divorces the question of whether or not it is permissible to resort to war – the question of jus ad bellum – from the question of how and against whom one may inflict harm once at war – the question of jus in bello. As Michael (...) Walzer notes,1 this separation of jus in bello from jus ad bellum means that we can meaningfully talk of an unjust war being fought justly, and vice versa: soldiers defending against aggression might nevertheless be criminals for the way in which they do it; while soldiers prosecuting an aggressive war, provided they fight it in the right way, are without culpability. This paper will draw upon the morality of individual self-defence to explain certain important features of the traditional jus in bello: the permissibility of killing, even by soldiers who lack justice on their side; the principles that govern surrender and the taking of prisoners of war; and the principle of discrimination between soldiers and civilians. Our explanation will not leave all aspects of the jus in bello undisturbed: it has consequences that are revisionary in at least some respects, this being the upshot of trying to explain the jus in bello in individualist terms. Partly because of such consequences, approaching the morality of war in individualist terms is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial.2 But we are prepared to accept.. (shrink)

In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...) show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings. (shrink)

Nietzsche offers us an account of how different drives interact with one another; it is rich but also appears to risk the homunculus fallacy. Competing attempts to deflect this charge on his behalf share an implicit consensus about the ‘epistemic ends’ of the account: they assume Nietzsche is trying to provide true explanations of psychological phenomena. I argue against this consensus. I claim that Nietzsche's characterisations of drive interaction are to be taken as fictive and are not intended to have (...) explanatory value. They nevertheless facilitate genuine epistemic achievement. Drawing on Catherine Elgin's account of the epistemic role of idealised models in science, I argue that Nietzsche's account of drive interaction is a ‘model of the mind’ that, despite relying on falsehoods, can exemplify features of our psychology that aid us in making novel predictions. We then see that Nietzsche neatly sidesteps the homunculus fallacy; we can further understand more fully what Nietzsche hopes his drive psychology will teach us. We can now resolve, for example, outstanding interpretative puzzles about the relationship between psychic integration and Nietzsche’s distinctive notion of spiritual health. (shrink)

As a response to climate change, geoengineering with solar radiation management has the potential to result in unjust harm. Potentially, this injustice could be ameliorated by providing compensation to victims of SRM. However, establishing a just SRM compensation system faces severe challenges. First, there is scientific uncertainty in detecting particular harmful impacts and causally attributing them to SRM. Second, there is ethical uncertainty regarding what principles should be used to determine responsibility and eligibility for compensation, as well as determining how (...) much compensation ought to be paid. Significant challenges loom for crafting a just SRM compensation system. (shrink)

This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth \ as an extension of the Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic \. \ is a slightly modified version of the logic \, presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues. While \ is equipped only with a classicality operator \, \ is equipped with a non-classicality operator \ as well, dual to \. Both \ and \ are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness in which the operator \ recovers classical logic for propositions in its scope. (...) Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence for a proposition \ even if \ is not true. As well as \, \ is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for \ where statements \\) and \\) express, respectively, the amount of evidence available for \ and the degree to which the evidence for \ is expected to behave classically—or non-classically for \ \). A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when \ + P 1\), and in both cases, \ < 1\). If \ = 1\), or \ = 0\), classical probability is recovered for \. The proposition \, a theorem of \, partitions what we call the information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of known results of standard probability theory. (shrink)

Prioritarianism is the moral view that a fixed improvement in someone's well-being matters more the worse off they are. Its supporters argue that it best captures our intuitions about unequal distributions of well-being. I show that prioritarianism sometimes recommends acts that will make things more unequal while simultaneously lowering the total well-being and making things worse for everyone ex ante. Intuitively, there is little to recommend such acts and I take this to be a serious counterexample for prioritarianism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?Toby Williamson (bio)"Service users, carers, and professionals disagree about the nature of mental disorder in startling new revelation!" On first appearances Fulford and Colombo's use of linguistic-analytic and empirical methods to demonstrate this point may not seem as if it is telling those in the mental health world anything that they do not already know. The bipolar/dialectical axis (choose your preferred term depending on (...) your ideological position) with the anti-psychiatry movement at one end and the biogeneticists at the other is both well-known and well-documented. Yet it is precisely that flippancy, and the practical implications that flow from it, that make this work so fundamentally important to the theory, application, and experience of mental health practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century.Discussions about different models of mental disorder usually play themselves out in arguments within services, or between services and service users and informal carers, about the most appropriate approach to take in addressing a service users needs, or in abstract discussions (often over a drink after work) about the nature of mental health and mental health problems. From blood and fur flying in the bull pit, to swallows endlessly chasing their tails high in the sky. Sadly, the results of this all too often are bitter and unresolved conflicts, different parties digging themselves even further into defensive, entrenched positions, and the least powerful (usually service users) suffering the most as a consequence. Both sides believe the other to be wrong yet cannot convince them of this; an example, albeit with slight variation, of two wrongs not making a right. Rarely are the debates grounded in a constructive, creative, and problem-solving approach on a day-to-day basis, partly because hitherto there does not seem to have been either sufficient empirical evidence to base this upon, or the conceptual as well as practical tools with which to grapple with the issues.Generally speaking, mainstream research in mental health has tended to focus on issues such as symptoms and treatment interventions (James and Burns 2002). However, surveys of service users' views still show considerable problems in the way services are received and experienced by users (Rose 2001). Other surveys, together with user-led research, such as Strategies for Living at the Mental Health Foundation, have also shown how the focus of users' concerns maybe very different to that of service providers (Faulkner and Layzell 2000; Nicholls et al, 2003; Repper 2000). Indeed, a piece of research carried out in the 1990s, which would probably still hold true today, showed that service users prioritized practical issues such as personal finance, housing, and social support, whereas professionals saw issues such as treatment and monitoring as being the highest priority (Shepherd, Murray, and Muijen 1995). Combining this, one might well argue that there is fairly clear evidence of the [End Page 159] differences in value bases and models of mental disorder deployed by service users and mental health professionals. However, actually trying to scientifically map this, and taking into account differences between professions, not to mention the views of informal carers, would appear to be a gargantuan task. Yet Fulford and Colombo appear to have very successfully done this in the research supporting this article, as well as the article itself. Their discussion of the concept of mental disorder, and the difficulties of defining it, not only effortlessly demonstrates the theoretical and philosophical problems that lie at the heart of psychiatry and mental health systems, of which Professor Fulford along with others has already written extensively (Dickenson and Fulford 2000), but also should resonate at a very practical level for most people who have been at the providing or receiving end of mental health services. But going beyond this they also provide perhaps the simplest, yet most effective solution—to embrace diversity and find ways of working with it, rather than running shy of it or even worse, attempting to homogenize it. As they say, "the difficulties in use presented by the concept of mental disorder are not a liability, heuristically speaking, but an asset" (Fulford and Colombo 2004, 132).The article is also very timely because... (shrink)

Graham Priest has argued that the fruits of classical set theory can be obtained by naive means through a puzzling piece of reasoning often known as the bootstrapping argument. I will demonstrate that the bootstrapping involved is best understood as viciously circular and thus, that these fruits remain forbidden. The argument has only one rehearsal in print and it is quite subtle. This paper provides reconstruction of the argument based on Priest and attempts some fixes and alternative construals to get (...) around some elementary problems. Despite these efforts, the argument remains unconvincing. (shrink)

Some authors have called for increased research on various forms of geoengineering as a means to address global climate change. This paper focuses on the question of whether a particular form of geoengineering, namely deploying sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to counteract some of the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations, would be a just response to climate change. In particular, we examine problems sulfate aerosol geoengineering (SAG) faces in meeting the requirements of distributive, intergenerational, and procedural justice. We argue (...) that SAG faces obstacles to meeting the requirements of all three considered kinds of justice, because its impacts can harm some persons and communities much more than others; it poses serious risks to future generations; and SAG is especially prone to unilateral implementation. While we do not claim that SAG ought not to be implemented, we argue that it is the responsibility of proponents of SAG to recognize and address these ethical obstacles before advocating its implementation. (shrink)

Ethics has powerful teeth, but these are barely being used in the ethics of AI today – it is no wonder the ethics of AI is then blamed for having no teeth. This article argues that ‘ethics’ in the current AI ethics field is largely ineffective, trapped in an ‘ethical principles’ approach and as such particularly prone to manipulation, especially by industry actors. Using ethics as a substitute for law risks its abuse and misuse. This significantly limits what ethics can (...) achieve and is a great loss to the AI field and its impacts on individuals and society. This article discusses these risks and then highlights the teeth of ethics and the essential value they can – and should – bring to AI ethics now. (shrink)

Subpart B of 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 (CFR) identifies the criteria according to which research involving pregnant women, human fetuses, and neonates can be conducted ethically in the United States. As such, pregnant women and fetuses fall into a category requiring “additional protections,” often referred to as “vulnerable populations.” The CFR does not define vulnerability, but merely gives examples of vulnerable groups by pointing to different categories of potential research subjects needing additional protections. In this paper, I (...) assess critically the role of this categorization of pregnant women involved in research as “vulnerable,” both as separate entities and in combination with the fetuses they carry. In particular, I do three things: (1) demonstrate that pregnant women qua pregnancy are either not “vulnerable” according to any meaningful definition of that term or that such vulnerability is irrelevant to her status as a research participant; (2) argue that while a fetus may be vulnerable in terms of dependency, this categorization does not equate to the vulnerability of the pregnant woman; and (3) suggest that any vulnerability that appends to women is precisely the result of federal regulations and dubious public perceptions about pregnant women. I conclude by demonstrating how this erroneous characterization of pregnant women as “vulnerable” and its associated protections have not only impeded vital research for pregnant women and their fetuses, but have also negatively affected the inclusion of all women in clinical research. (shrink)

As web instruction becomes more and more prevalent at universities across the country, instructors of ethics are being encouraged to develop online courses to meet the needs of a diverse array of students. Web instruction is often viewed as a cost-saving technique, where large numbers of students can be reached by distance education in an effort to conserve classroom and instructor resources. In practice, however, the reverse is often true: online courses require more of faculty time and effort than do (...) many traditional classes. Based on personal experience teaching an online course in health care ethics for students in the Allied Health Professions, it is evident that there are both benefits and challenges in teaching online courses, particularly in ethics. Examples of benefits are (1) the asynchronous nature of web instruction allows students to progress through the course at their own pace and at times that are convenient given their clinical responsibilities; (2) web courses allow for a standardization of content and quality of instruction over a diversity of programs; and (3) examples can be tailored to the differing experiences of students in the course. Some challenges to teaching online ethics courses include (1) the fact that online instruction benefits visual learners and disadvantages those lacking good reading comprehension or strong writing skills; (2) developing meaningful student-student and student-instructor interaction; and (3) teaching ethics involves teaching a process rather than a product. Allowing students to apply their knowledge to real-world cases in their disciplines and encouraging them to share experiences from clinical practice is an effective way to meet several of these challenges. Building an online community is another good way to increase the interaction of students and their engagement with the material. (shrink)

In “Bioethicists Today: Results of the Views in Bioethics Survey (VIBeS),” Pierson and colleagues describe the results of a survey inquiring into bioethicsts’ views on normative issues (Pierson et...

The paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence of our beliefs, we may not genuinely believe it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief fail because they involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or issue in (...) assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present propositions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The paper concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive consequences of our beliefs can be believed.1. (shrink)

This paper argues against Zoltán Szabó’s claim in “Compositionality as Supervenience” that we ought to understand the principle of compositionality as the idea that in natural language, the meanings of complex expressions strongly supervene on the meanings of their constituents and how the constituents are combined. The argument is that if we understand compositionality Szabó’s way, then compositionality can play no role in explanations of the acquirability of natural languages, because it makes these explanations circular. This, in turn, would undermine (...) the primary motivation for thinking that natural language is compositional, and would thus undermine the importance of the principle in natural language semantics. Thus, even if Szabó’s reading of the principle best accords with theorists’ intuitions about what sorts of languages are compositional—as he claims it does—there is good reason to reject that reading. Finally, the paper defends the claim that we ought to think of the principle as the idea that in natural language, the meanings of complexes weakly supervene on the meanings of their constituents and how they are combined. (shrink)

It is often claimed that from the moment of conception embryos have the same moral status as adult humans. This claim plays a central role in many arguments against abortion, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research. In what follows, I show that this claim leads directly to an unexpected and unwelcome conclusion: that natural embryo loss is one of the greatest problems of our time and that we must do almost everything in our power to prevent it. I examine (...) the responses available to those who hold that embryos have full moral status and conclude that they cannot avoid the force of this argument without giving up this key claim. (shrink)

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea (...) that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods. (shrink)