This is not your psychoanalyst's unconscious.

Is philosophy a unique discipline, or are its methods more like those of other sciences than many philosophers think? Timothy Williamson explains clearly and concisely how contemporary philosophers think and work, and reflects on their powers and limitations.

Knepper criticizes existing efforts in the philosophy of religion for being out of step with, and therefore useless to, the academic study of religion, then forwards a new program for philosophy of religion that is in step with, and therefore useful to, the academic study of religion.

Originally published in 1988, this landmark study develops its own positive account of the nature and foundations of moral judgement, while at the same time serving as a guide to the range of views on the matter which have been given in modern western philosophy. The book addresses itself to two main questions: Can moral judgements be true or false in that fundamental sense in which a true proposition is one which describes things as they really are? Are rational methods (...) available in ethics which can be expected to produce convergence on shared moral views on the part of those who use them intelligently? (shrink)

Four people with radically different views meet on a train and talk about what they believe. Each starts off convinced that he or she is right; then doubts creep in. Timothy Williamson uses a fictional conversation to explore the philosophical debate over whether one point of view can be right and the other wrong. He invites the reader to decide.

Examining a fragment of interaction that occurred during a surgery at a teaching hospital, we explore how particular instructed experiences are produced for two trainees, a surgeon in the residency program and a medical student in a surgical clerkship. We are concerned with what is produced as learnable in each case. Stated slightly differently, we are interested in the ways in which the attending surgeon uses demonstrations as instruction and the ways in which recipients of that instruction, in this case (...) the resident and the clerk, respond with enactments of those demonstrated actions. The recipients of this kind of instruction participate in a form of experiential learning in which they enact their own versions of the instructor’s demonstrated actions to be observed and assessed by the instructor. These enactments provide learners with experiential access to the instructor’s demonstrated actions. They are designed to be experiences that learners may draw upon to make experientially warranted claims at some later time. (shrink)

This book is intended as a philosophical introduction to geo-ontologies, in response to their increasing diffusion within the contemporary debate, where philosophy plays a fundamental, though still unexplored, role. Accordingly, the first part offers a short overview of the ontological background of geo-ontologies, which comprehends computer science, philosophy and geography. The second part is devoted to describe the ontology of geography, to define notions such as geographical entities and boundaries, and to trace some philosophical tools useful for spatial representation. The (...) third part investigates the emerging of geo-ontologies from the spatial turn and is concerned with a taxonomy for geo-ontologies grounded on some fundamental geographical distinctions. Finally, the last part presents the emergence of Digital Humanities and the consequent proliferation of geographical projects focused on the ancient world, in particular Greek and Roman. (shrink)

I. An argument is presented for the conclusion that the hypothesis that no one will ever decide a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent. II. A distinction between sentences and statements blocks a similar argument for the stronger conclusion that the hypothesis that I have not yet decided a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent, but does not block the original argument. III. A distinction between empirical and mathematical negation might block the original argument, and empirical negation might be modelled on Nelson''s (...) strong negation, but only on intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions. IV. Intuitionists may have to accept the original argument, and therefore be committed to a dubious view of time on which there cannot be merely inductive evidence for statements about the infinite future. (shrink)

Many commentators are unconvinced by Carl Schmitt's interpretation of Hobbes's political theory which, to their minds, remakes Hobbes in Schmitt's own authoritarian image. The argument advanced in this essay comprises three claims about Hobbes and Schmitt and the ways in which they are construed. The first claim is that certain commentators are bewitched by a picture of authority which biases their own claims about Hobbes, perhaps in ways that they may not fully appreciate. The second claim relates to Hobbes's individualism. (...) On Schmitt's account, it was this individualism that opened the barely visible crack in the theoretical justification of the state through which it was worm-eaten by liberalism. This essay argues that Hobbes's individualism is not what Schmitt or his critics take it to be. The individualism that figures in Hobbes's discussions of covenant and conscience, pace Schmitt, is an illusion, albeit one that lies at the very heart of his conception of the state and animates his understanding of the relationship between protection and obedience that sustains it. The essay concludes with some remarks about the wider implications of the argument it advances. (shrink)

Despite their recent development, geo-ontologies represent a complicated conundrum for the different experts involved in their design. Computer scientists use ontologies for describing the meaning of data and their semantics in order to make information resources built for humans understandable also for artificial agents. Geographers pursue conceptualizations that describe the domain of interest in a way that should be accessible, informative, and complete for their final recipients. In this context, philosophers are not required to sketch the historical background of ontology. (...) Rather, they should offer conceptual solutions for carving nature at the joints and choosing how best to categorize and classify the different entities belonging to the geographical domain in question. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to combine assumptions and requirements coming from these different areas of research in order to show what different categories might potentially complete the current domain of geo-ontologies. (shrink)

Timothy Smiley; I*—The Presidential Address: The Schematic Fallacy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 1–18, https.

The notion of accountability was introduced by Harold Garfinkel in the opening pages of Studies in Ethnomethodology as part of his ‘central recommendation’ for sociological inquiry. Though the term itself first appears in the Studies, it will be argued that elements of the idea were already discernible in earlier writings. The current article traces the development of the notion from its early emergence in the proto-ethnomethodological period, through its elaboration in the Studies, and, finally, to its refinement in certain later (...) works produced toward the end of the author’s career. In so doing, it reveals the centrality of the notion to ethnomethodologically-informed study and shows its enduring contribution to social theory. (shrink)

According to ontological perspectivism, there can be, in principle, multiple and alternative perspectives on the world that can be sliced, systematized, and conceptualized in different ways. Surely, such an ontological position has many categorial implications, which may vary depending on different disciplinary contexts. This paper explores parts of these implications in the realm of geography. In particular, it aims at discussing the ontological categories that one might use to describe the geographical world in an overarching perspective – that is, the (...) perspective that puts toether all the partial views coming from the different branches of the geographical investigation. We will see that if the overarching perspective is expected to include all the views on the geographical world, then such a perspective should be all-embracing in terms of contents and categories. This means that the overarching perspective might also comprehend inconsistencies that derive from how the various partial perspectives conceptualize differently the geographical world. (shrink)

We report the results of an experiment designed to determine the effects of psychological proximity—proxied by awareness of pain and friendship—on moral reasoning. Our study tests the hypotheses that a moral agent’s emphasis on justice decreases with proximity, while his/her emphasis on care increases. Our study further examines how personality, gender, and managerial status affect the importance of care and justice in moral reasoning. We find support for the main hypotheses. We also find that care should be split into two (...) components, one related to protection and the other to the preservation of relationships. Although gender does not affect moral reasoning directly, we find that it does so indirectly via personality, controlling for age, professional status, and professional background. We do not find a significant effect of managerial status on ethics of justice, but do find that holding a managerial position has a negative impact on ethics of care. Regarding personality, we detect significant positive effects of conscientiousness on ethics of justice and of neuroticism on ethics of care. (shrink)

This response takes up some of the editorial comments for further clarification and critique. My point has been that ‘politics’ is as much a modern invention as ‘religion’. We cannot understand the rhetorical function of ‘religion’ if we treat it as a stand-alone category referring to some supposed object or objects in the world. I am especially concerned here to keep in view the oscillating binary categories of which ‘religion' forms one parasitic half, and ‘politics' or ‘science' the other. This (...) critical problematization of the liberal categories of the understanding opposes and challenges their current institutionalization in the liberal academy, where they now serve the Neoliberal agenda and the reproduction of the dominant, globalising imperatives of private property. (shrink)

How does Frege's distinction between sense and reference apply to terms whose reference depends on context? The stakes are high; a good account of the sense of 'I' might constitute an analysis of self-consciousness. Frege's own remarks on this matter are notoriously unsatisfactory. In "Past, Space, and Self", John Campbell does better. The depth and freshness of his investigations are outstanding. He uncovers a wide variety of evidence, both logical and psychological, to which any account must do justice.

In the domain of information systems ontologies, the notion of completeness refers to ontological contents by demanding that they be exhaustive with respect to the domain that the ontology aims to represent. The purpose of this paper is to analyze such a notion, by distinguishing different varieties of completeness and by questioning its consistency with the open-world assumption, which formally assumes the incompleteness of conceptualizations on information systems ontologies.

The current (still limited) use of the notion of informativeness in the domain of information system ontologies seems to indicate that such ontologies are informative if and only if they are understandable for their final recipients. This paper aims at discussing some theoretical issues emerging from that use which, as we will see, connects the informativeness of information system ontologies to their representational primitives, domains of knowledge, and final recipients. Firstly, we maintain that informativeness interacts not only with the actual (...) representational primitives, but also with their variability over time. Secondly, we discuss the correspondence between representational primitives and domains of knowledge of those ontologies. Finally, we explore the possibility of an epistemological discrepancy between human beings and software systems on the understanding of ontological contents. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of scientific explanation that promises to resolve the apparent tension between his insistence on the veracity of such explanations, and his frequent attempts to impugn their cognitive reach. Nietzsche follows earlier nineteenth-century critiques of science in claiming that science yields only factual or “descriptive” knowledge, not understanding. The paper concludes that the conception of descriptive knowledge is robust and compatible with Nietzsche’s commitment to the truth and rigor of scientific theories. The (...) interpretation also sheds new light on Nietzsche’s oft-voiced claims that certain concepts “falsify” the world. (shrink)

Despite the fact that information systems ontologies [ISOs] support the mutual understanding between human beings and software applications, human beings and software applications do not understand ISOs' contents in the same way. The same applies to ontological integration. This paper attempts to account for such discrepancies by emphasizing that while human being can have access to entities represented in ISOs, software applications cannot.

The paper is a critique of Terry Horgan's transvaluationist theory of vagueness. It argues that Horgan's formulations equivocate between a semantic 'ought' and a semantic 'is'. On one reading, transvaluationism is trivially inconsistent. On another reading, it is consistent, but also consistent with an epistemic account of vagueness. In addition, the paper criticizes Horgan's attempt to recruit supervaluationism as a form of transvaluationism and his argument against vagueness in the world.

Two long-standing arguments in cognitive science invoke the assumption that holistic inference is computationally infeasible. The first is Fodor’s skeptical argument toward computational modeling of ordinary inductive reasoning. The second advocates modular computational mechanisms of the kind posited by Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber. Based on advances in machine learning related to Bayes nets, as well as investigations into the structure of scientific and ordinary information, I maintain neither argument establishes its architectural conclusion. Similar considerations also undermine Fodor’s decades-long diagnosis of (...) artificial intelligence research as confounded by an inability to circumscribe the amount of information relevant to inferential processes. This diagnosis is particularly inapposite with respect to Bayes nets, since one of their strengths as machine learning systems has been their capacity to reason probabilistically about large data sets whose size overwhelms the capacities of individual human reasoners. A general moral follows from these criticisms: Insights into artificial and human cognitive systems are likely to be cultivated by focusing greater attention on the structure and density of connections among items of information that are available to them. (shrink)

This anthology aims to present the fundamental philosophical issues and tools required by the reflection within and upon geography and Geographic Information Systems. It is an introduction to the philosophy for GIScience from an analytical perspective, which looks at GIS with a specific focus on its fundamental and most general concepts and distinctions. The first part of the book is devoted to explore some of the main philosophical questions arising from GIS and GIScience, which include, among others, investigations in ontology, (...) epistemology, linguistics and geometrical modeling. The second part concerns issues related to spatial and cartographical representations of the geographical world. The third part is focused on the ontology of geography, specifically in terms of geographical entities, objects and boundaries. Finally, in the fourth part, the topic of GIS constitutes a starting point for exploring themes such as quantum geography and disorientation, and for defining professional profiles for geographers with competences in GIS environment. This book on a new and unexplored field of research could be a fundamental point of reference for professional philosophers and geographers interested in the theoretical reflection about the foundational concepts of GIScience. It is also interesting reading material for students in philosophy, geography, applied ontology, GIScience, geomatics and computer science. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison‘s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate 'Doesn‘t Justify the Denial of a Defeater‘ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison‘s motivation for jointly offering their theories and recount counterexamples that others have offered against various theories that assert that knowledge is justified, true belief plus some (...) condition concerning essential reliance. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’ dispute with Dionysius of Halicarnassus over the study of Thucydides’ history allows us to understand both the ancient case for an ennobled public rhetoric and Hobbes’ case against it. Dionysius, concerned with cultivating healthy civic oratory, faced a situation in which Roman rhetoricians were emulating shocking attacks on divine justice such as that found in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue; he attempted to steer orators away from such arguments even as he acknowledged their truth. Hobbes, however, recommends the study of (...) Thucydides’ work for a new kind of political education, one that will benefit from Thucydides’ private, even ‘secret’, instruction, which permits the reader to admit to himself what vanity would otherwise hide from him. (shrink)

Thucydides and Aristophanes, austere historian and ribald comic playwright, lived in an Athens that had, since Themistocles, been moving from a regime of ancestral piety towards a secular empire. Thucydides suggests an agreement between his understanding and that of the pious Nicias — over and against this move. Aristophanes too is a vigorous proponent of peace, and the conclusions of many of his plays appear to suggest or encourage a conservative disposition towards ancestral piety or the rule of ancestral, divine (...) law.While these first impressions are not entirely misleading, a careful examination of the two thinkers’works, with attention to Nicias and the question of the gods, suggests a more complicated and revealing picture. Neither thinker is in agreement with Nicias, who proves to be representative of a fundamental human delusion. Each, however, sees that delusion as inescapable for political life, and so makes his appeal to more serious readers inconspicuously. (shrink)