The Philosophical Forum, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 47-61, Spring 2022.

In both his life and poetry, The Ruined Cottage marked a decisive breakthrough for Wordsworth, which resulted from his daring adoption and sustained use of a monistic idea. Though hitherto mostly dismissed or construed as a derivative of Platonism, Stoicism, Christian mysticism, and/or other conventional English and European concepts and usually seen as part of his supposedly quietist retreat from radical politics, the philosophy of One Life which Wordsworth promoted was in reality a recognizably unconventional conceptual innovation, which indeed made (...) possible his poetic and political innovations in The Ruined Cottage and beyond. In the larger context of ideas that extends well beyond England and Europe and involves in particular the Chinese cosmological belief in tianren heyi or humanity’s unity with heaven, this essay explores Wordsworth’s innovative use of monism in The Ruined Cottage and argues for a significantly different understanding of Wordsworth and the related rise of English Romanticism. (shrink)

Tianzhu Shiyi is the single most important proselytizing work of Matteo Ricci, the legendary founder of the early modern Jesuit China mission. Controversial since the early seventeenth century, it has been both praised and condemned for Ricci’s claim of a monotheistic affinity between Catholicism and Confucianism. Ricci’s gesture of friendship to Confucianism won him many Chinese friends and posthumously made him famous or notorious in Europe, but as this essay contends, it was never more than a tactical cover for him (...) during his lifetime. Since the real purpose of his cultural adaptation was his unobtrusive engagement with the ancient Chinese philosophical idea of tianren heyi, what is ultimately so instructive about Tianzhu Shiyi is the light cast on Ricci’s intricate relationship with his Chinese friends and on the ironic twists and turns of his complex legacy. (shrink)

Shaftesbury has long been celebrated as the early Enlightenment pioneer in English and European aesthetics. His aesthetic innovation, however, has hitherto been explained as merely a new way of saying or appreciating old things within his inherited European cultural traditions. To read him differently, it is crucial to pay attention to a spiritual crisis which he began to experience in the late 1690s. Both before and during it, he was influenced decisively by Pierre Bayle into utilizing information about China in (...) his works, particularly the Chinese monistic idea of tianren heyi or humanity’s unity with heaven. Fundamentally different from the Platonist and Neo-Platonist monism of his inheritance, that liberating conceptual framework from China can and should be seen in hindsight as what made possible Shaftesbury’s aesthetic breakthrough in The Sociable Enthusiast. (shrink)

This paper considers Chinese Communist Party policies in Tibet from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist perspectives. I first explain how these three traditions are unified in the sanjiao heyi, but I contend that this practice has been neglected in favor of state repression. I then elucidate Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism with respect to their general principles and application in Tibet. I conclude that a fuller embrace of the sanjiao heyi where Confucian tenets are balanced by insights from Daoism and (...) Buddhism would cultivate an anti-oppressive response to governmental control. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Bodyheartminding” (xin 心): Reconceiving the Inner Self and the Outer World in the Language of Holographic Focus and FieldRoger T. Amesin body consciousness: a philosophy of mindfulness and somaesthetics, Richard Shusterman expands upon a professional oeuvre in which his exploration of the phenomenon of “body consciousness” has effected nothing less than a somatic turn in the contemporary Western philosophical narrative.1 But his contribution does not end there. Over the (...) past two decades, the reach and influence of his “somaesthetics” has been extended to the gates of China. Indeed, it has become a theme engaged by scholars of China’s indigenous philosophical traditions, thus providing an opportunity for a further edifying conversation between the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions.2 And it is this conversation, as it has been inspired by Shusterman’s work, that I propose to join in this short essay.In Body Consciousness, Shusterman tells the story of how John Dewey advances the pragmatic project of not only understanding the body better, but indeed of applying the Alexander Technique as his way of using his own body properly.3 Just as Dewey has been a prominent resource for Shusterman in his development of somaesthetics, for Dewey in turn, it was William James’s Principles of Psychology that was a self-confessed inspiration for the development of his own evolving interpretation of pragmatism.4 Indeed, one way of reading Dewey’s philosophical career and his thirty-seven-volume opus is that it is a sustained effort to take the radical “stream-of-consciousness” insights developed in James’s Principles to their logical, systematic conclusion. In pursuing this project, while appreciative, Dewey is at times impatient with James’s dualistic lapses in which he continues to separate individuals from community, mind from body, emotions from intellect, agents from actions, and theory from practice. Dewey takes these unfortunate reversions to old ways of thinking as serving only to confound James’s holistic doctrines of pure experience and radical empiricism. Given Dewey’s own postulate of [End Page 100] immediate and continuous empiricism, one way of tracking his journey from having been inspired by James’s biological naturalism to achieving his own philosophical coherence is to register his unrelenting aversion to dualism in any form.But Dewey himself was not always consistent in this respect. Shusterman gives an account of the early neo-Hegelian Dewey who, affirming the familiar transcendent conception of soul we associate with idealism, unsurprisingly embraces a clear soul and body dualism. And in spite of the philosophically mature Dewey’s best efforts to think “process,” he has no choice but to use both a language and a grammar freighted with substance ontology that resists his more holistic insights. On occasion, even while trying to remain consistent in his thinking, Dewey seems to fall victim to terminology that if not dualistic is at best ambiguous. Dewey’s struggle against this problem of equivocation is particularly apparent in some of the language he appeals to in attempting to put the Humpty Dumpty of mind and body together again. In his effort to register the irreducible continuity and inseparability of the nonanalytic abstractions we differentiate as body and mind—the ontological givenness or “hadness” of “bodyminding”—Dewey still at times invokes terms such as “combination,” “integration,” “unity,” and so on, that take as their suppressed premise “two things becoming one.” By way of contrast, in the correlative vocabulary of Chinese process cosmology, expressions such as yinyang 陰陽, the natural/cultural and the human (tianren 天人), and knowing and doing (zhixing 知行), primacy is given to vital relationality and the continuity it entails. It is not putting two things together that is referenced with these binomials, but the deepening of the horizon of constitutive, internal relationships that transforms the two aspects of the same phenomenon qualitatively into harmonics (he 和) for yinyang, sagacity (sheng 聖) for tianren, and acting wisely (zhi 智) for zhixing. In each instance, the two aspects themselves are simply conceptual abstractions from a complex relational process. The proper and effective measure (du 度) sought in this Confucian cosmology is not quantitatively more or less of two distinct things—taking mind and body as our example—but rather a qualitative and transformative change that... (shrink)

This study reinterprets the core concept of bao 報 (reciprocity or recompense) within the Confucian tradition through the lens of yili zhi bian 義利之辨 (debate of righteousness and profit). It examines the relevant discourses of Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Zhou Dunyi, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming. By analyzing these discussions, the paper elucidates the transformations in the meaning of bao embedded in the moral principles and views on righteousness in Confucian thought. Furthermore, it systematizes the notion of “virtue” (dexing 德性) into (...) three categories: great virtue (dadexing 大德性), non-virtue (feidexing 非德性), and theological virtue (chaodexing 超德性), thereby uncovering the multidimensional implications of bao. Confucius and Mencius emphasized the primacy of moral principles, advocating for the pursuit of legitimate profit (li 利) grounded in righteousness (yi 義). They further concretized the ethical significance of bao by asserting that “requite kindness with kindness; requite resentment with justice.” Xunzi, on the other hand, stressed the regulation of human nature through ritual propriety and postnatal education, proposing that profit should be harmoniously controlled through righteousness. The Neo-Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties advanced the yili zhi bian to a metaphysical level. In particular, Wang Yangming sought to reconcile righteousness and profit by grounding them in inner conscience and virtue through his doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action” (zhixing heyi 知行合一). Consequently, the concept of bao evolved beyond mere reciprocity or transactional exchange, emerging as a principle of moral cultivation and ethical practice. This reinterpretation offers a foundation for moral reasoning in the face of contemporary ethical uncertainties, providing a basis for strengthening the moral fabric of modern society while fostering individual moral self-cultivation. (shrink)