Boethius is largely underrated in the history of Western thought. Scholarship often regarded him and his era Late Antiquity as mere intermediaries between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. This volume shows that Boethius and his time can be appreciated in their own right.".

Ist Geschichtsdarstellung ein transparentes Fenster zu einer faktischen Vergangenheit? Oder verlieren Fakten ihre Verbindlichkeit zugunsten der Repräsentation? Der vorliegende Band weist einen vermittelnden Weg zwischen diesen Extremen. Jenseits der positivistisch verstandenen historischen Fakten sowie der infolge des linguistic turn häufig behaupteten Unzugänglichkeit und Unentscheidbarkeit der faktischen Vergangenheit wird die Geschichtsdarstellung selbst als das eigentlich Greifbare zur Geltung gebracht. Geschichte ist demnach in ihrer Darstellung zu suchen – unabhängig davon, ob es sich um historiographische Quellen, literarische Texte, Gemälde oder um Museen (...) als mediale Darstellungsräume handelt. Die Beiträge gehen einem breiten Spektrum unterschiedlicher Dimensionen von Geschichtsdarstellung nach. Medien, Methoden und Strategien bilden dabei die zentralen Koordinaten, anhand derer Geschichtsdarstellung mit ihren narrativen und bildlichen Ausdrucksformen exemplarisch erörtert wird. Mit Beiträgen von Wolfgang Frühwald, Werner Goez, Thomas Kirchner, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Otto Gerhard Oexle, Antonios Rengakos, Hermann Schäfer, Jörg Schönert, Howard Weinbrot, Horst Wenzel und Gernot R. Wieland. (shrink)

In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. "Nonsense," says the sensible Bernard Suits: "playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Suits not only argues that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is a central (...) part of the ideal of human existence, so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. Originally published in 1978, The Grasshopper is now re-issued with a new introduction by Thomas Hurka and with additional material (much of it previously unpublished) by the author, in which he expands on the ideas put forward in The Grasshopper and answers some questions that have been raised by critics. (shrink)

Reflecting Alan Robinson's fundamental contribution to computational logic, this book brings together seminal papers in inference, equality theories, and logic programming. It is an exceptional collection that ranges from surveys of major areas to new results in more specialized topics. Alan Robinson is currently the University Professor at Syracuse University. Jean-Louis Lassez is a Research Scientist at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center. Gordon Plotkin is Professor of Computer Science at the University of Edinburgh. Contents: Inference. Subsumption, A (...) Sometimes Undervalued Procedure, Larry Wos, Ross Overbeek, and Ewing Lusk. The Markgraf Karl Refutation Procedure, Hans Jurgen Ohlbach and Jorg H. Siekmann. Modal Logic Should Say More than it Does, Melvin Fitting. Interactive Proof Presentation, W. W. Bledsoe. Intelligent Backtracking Revisited, Maurice Bruynooghe. A Science of Reasoning, Alan Bundy. Inductive Inference of Theories from Facts, Ehud Y. Shapiro. Equality. Solving Equations in Abstract Algebras: A Rule-based Survey of Unification, Jean-Pierre Jouannaud and Claude Kirchner. Disunification: A Survey, Hubert Comon. A Case Study of the Completion Procedure: Proving Ring Commutativity Problems, Deepak Kapur and Hantao Zhang. Computations in Regular Rewriting Systems I and II, Girard Huet and JeanJacques Levy. Unification and ML Type Reconstruction, Paris Kanellakis, Harry Mairson, and John Mitchell. Automatic Dimensional Analysis, Mitchell Wand. Logic Programming. Logic Programming Schemes and Their Implementations, Keith Clark. A Near-Horn Prolog for Compilation, Donald Loveland and David Reed. Unfold/Fold Transformations of Logic Programs, P. A. Gardner and J. C. Shepherdson. An Algebraic Representation of Logic Program Computations, Andrea Corradini and Ugo Montanari. Theory of Disjunctive Logic Programs, Jack Minker, Arcot Rajasekar, and Jorge Lobo. Bottom-Up Evaluation of Logic Programs, Jeffrey Naughton and Raghu Ramakrishnan. Absys, the First Logic Programming Language: A View of the Inevitability of Logic Programming, E. W. Elcock. (shrink)

Was kann Naturalismus in der gegenwärtigen Erkenntnistheorie heißen? Wie können wir antinaturalistische Argumente in der Erkenntnistheorie aus naturalistischer Sicht bewerten und klassifizieren? Hat der radikale Naturalist Quine etwa Recht mit seiner Provokation, dass Erkenntnistheorie angewandte Naturwissenschaft ist? "Die Studie enthält viele großartige Bausteine. Sukopp bietet ein Panorama von beeindruckender Breite und Tiefe. Ihre wichtigste Leistung liegt darin, dass sie es nicht bei Darstellungen und Gegenüberstellungen bewenden lässt, sondern sich durchgehend auf Argumente einlässt, auf fremde und eigene. Darin sehe ich die (...) eigentliche philosophische Leistung. Wer sich nicht nur über ein Spektrum von Meinungen informieren möchte, sondern über Argumente Pro und Kontra und über ihre Haltbarkeit, der wird hier nicht nur fündig: Er wird reich belohnt." Gerhard Vollmer. (shrink)

Migration and diversity are important factors in education of teachers around the globe. From an intercultural perspective, we shall analyse how metaphysical and religious assumptions overlap and enable teachers to motivate pupils from different religious-cultural backgrounds to understand in greater detail the facets of (minimal) universalism, relativism and other concepts that obtain in more or less open societies. We argue for a concept of Intercultural Human Rights Education that uses different texts in philosophy classes, includes controversial positions from different cultures, (...) and is methodologically versatile. According to this concept, we think that a) human dignity (as a typically Western concept) and human rights and b) one tradition of interpreting the Qur’an (renunciation of force and the Indian concept of ahimsā (nonviolence)), can motivate teachers to discuss the efforts and also the limits of an overlapping consensus about the intercultural perspective. Finally, we provide the outlines of a teaching unit plan in accordance with our theoretical insights. (shrink)

We support Webb's insights into the potential benefits of using robotic modeling to better understand biological behavior. We defend the major points put forward by Webb by presenting a specific case study in which robotic modeling of mobile ball catching has helped refine and clarify aspects of our understanding of biological interceptive behavior.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentaryThomas A. SuitsPaul Murgatroyd, ed. Tibullus: Elegies II. With introduction and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. xx + 305 pp. Cloth, $65.00.This is the companion volume to Murgatroyd’s Tibullus I (Pietermaritzburg, 1980) and with it forms the first detailed commentary on the poet since Kirby Flower Smith’s 1913 edition. The editor has been better served by the Clarendon than the University of (...) Natal Press in that the quality of production is superior and the layout less huddled. Users will want to have access to Tibullus I, however, since Murgatroyd makes regular reference to it. In the main, the new volume follows the pattern of its predecessor; but since the latter received relatively little critical notice in English-language periodicals, it seems appropriate to describe principal features, especially where they represent a change from Murgatroyd’s previous practice.General matters received attention in the introduction to Tibullus I, and so the introduction here is brief, addressing the question of the completeness of this extraordinarily short libellus, its structure, and its main characters. The text is essentially Postgate’s 1915 OCT, without apparatus but rather with the handful of departures discussed in a critical appendix.The commentary itself is bulky—254 pages on only 430 verses, or an average of more than a page per distich. (By way of comparison, the commentary in Tibullus I averages just over half a page per distich.) Each elegy has an introductory essay; each of the five to nine sections into which Murgatroyd divides a poem receives its own introduction; and each distich is discussed separately in detail. All this is rather daunting, and few, other than reviewers, are likely to work through the whole, but there is something to engage readers wherever they decide to dip into it. As befits a commentary on a poet whose Alexandrianism is becoming ever more appreciated, Murgatroyd’s work exhibits both sensitivity [End Page 498] and sophistication. In what follows I touch on some of the book’s leitmotifs, in an attempt to convey its general character.There is naturally a vast store of material illustrative of both language and subject matter, selected from predecessors (the debt to Smith is considerable, though he is not followed in his predilection for copious parallels from modern vernacular literatures) and augmented by the editor, in part through diligent use of the TLL and OLD. Unlike Tibullus I, this volume provides English translations for the relatively few Greek quotations. My extensive samplings suggest a rare degree of accuracy in the citations.In his interpretations, Murgatroyd will often leave open a number of possibilities: e.g., “may refer to... or... or... may denote... or... could be... or... may mean... or... if...” is the wording in one short paragraph on 2.3.1–2. Again, he will lay before the reader a whole menu of possible senses, as he does for nubilus (on 2.5.75–76); it is salutary to be reminded of the wide range of possible connotations, even where one seems to deserve clear preference.A similar lack of dogmatism characterizes Murgatroyd’s many attempts to describe rhythmic and sound effects. Conscious of how subjective these can be, he always couches them guardedly, as (on 2.4.7–10), “the sudden preponderance of spondees and assonance involving long vowels seem to me to have an air of dejection and weariness.” Likewise, he is appropriately cautious in his frequent suggestions of possible etymological plays (here building on F. Cairns, Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome [Cambridge 1979] 90–99); the general phenomenon, in any case, is clearly established, even if particular instances may be in doubt.Another recurrent type of note seeks to establish instances where Tibullus was the first to use a word in a new sense or to use a particular word combination (iunctura). Although the accidents of preservation make absolute claims in this area impossible, Murgatroyd makes an impressive case for Tibullus’ inventiveness. He is on more solid ground in his analyses of artistry in the word arrangement in individual lines and distichs. He has a very keen sense for this and demonstrates an impressive variety of... (shrink)

To discern the contours of a Berkeleian moral philosophy the article has been divided into four sections: the first introduces the moral importance of Berkeley’s new principle; in the second section the inter-dependence of morality and sociality is discussed; the third section identifies perennial moral problems and Berkeley’s success or failure in dealing with them; the fourth occupies itself with a notion of the common good that is socio-historical. Berkeley’s moral pragmatism is placed in relief in this way.

Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computational techniques to unearth philosophical insights that are either difficult or impossible to find using traditional philosophical methods. Computational metaphysics is computational philosophy with a focus on metaphysics. In this paper, we (a) develop results in modal metaphysics whose discovery was computer assisted, and (b) conclude that these results work not only to the obvious benefit of philosophy but also, less obviously, to the benefit of computer science, since the new computational techniques that (...) led to these results may be more broadly applicable within computer science. The paper includes a description of our background methodology and how it evolved, and a discussion of our new results. (shrink)

This series offers central philosophical treatises of Aquinas in new, state-of-the-art translations distinguished by their accuracy and use of clear and nontechnical modern vocabulary. Annotation and commentary accessible to undergraduates make the series an ideal vehicle for the study of Aquinas by readers approaching him from a variety of backgrounds and interests.

A new public philosophy began to emerge in the United States during the Progressive Era. Promoted by such intellectuals as John Dewey, William James, and the coUectivists of the New Republic magazine, it called for a citizenry trained in an experimental milieu, free of dogma and emancipated from sources of allegiance other than the new centralized democratic state then being forged. Catholics, however, neither capitulated to the new creed nor retreated into a self-righteous isolation. In a culture whose chief value (...) was pluralism they insisted on the uniqueness of the Church and the need for making value judgments based on a sound philosophy of man. (shrink)

The authors' attempt to explore the ability of animals to monitor how certain they are of their choice behavior, necessarily fails both in their effort to include “higher” mammals (such as monkeys and dolphins) in the class of metacognitive organisms (humans) and in their conclusion that “lower” organisms are not capable of similar behavior.

Scotus is notorious for occasionally making statements that, on their face at least, smack of voluntarism, but there has been a lively debate about whether Scotus is really a voluntarist after all. Now the debate is not over whether Scotus lays great emphasis on the role of the divine will with respect to the moral law. No one could sensibly deny that he does, and if such an emphasis constitutes voluntarism, then no one could sensibly deny that Scotus is a (...) voluntarist. As I am using the word, however, voluntarism is the view that (i) the goodness of almost all things, as well as the rightness of almost all acts, depends wholly on the divine will and (ii) what God wills with respect to those things and those acts is not in turn to be explained by reference to the divine intellect, human nature, or anything else. This is the view that Scotus’s critics decry and his defenders disclaim. Thus, his critics have seized on these passages and accused Scotus of believing that the moral law depends simply on “the arbitrary will of God.” His most sympathetic interpreters, however, have devoted great ingenuity to showing that Scotus did not mean anything unpalatable by these statements.1 What the critics and defenders apparently have in common is the view that voluntarism is an implausible and even discreditable doctrine. Interpreters who read Scotus as a voluntarist intend thereby to damn his moral views; interpreters sympathetic to his moral views feel compelled to mitigate his voluntarism. I wish to argue for a different approach. I agree with his defenders that Scotus’s moral philosophy ought to be taken seriously. But I think the best way to take any philosopher’s view seriously is to let him speak for himself, not to decide in advance that he must not have held a view that we find implausible. Let me suggest an analogy that will make my position clearer. Very nearly everyone finds immaterialism implausible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Appreciating Anorexia:Decisional Capacity and the Role of ValuesThomas Grisso (bio) and Paul S. Appelbaum (bio)Keywordscompetence, consent, anorexia, appreciation, decision makingTan and her colleagues (2006) reported that persons with anorexia nervosa typically manifest no difficulty satisfying the criteria for abilities associated with competence to consent to or refuse treatment. Their results led them to conclude that these patients generally had no problem grasping the nature of anorexia and its possible (...) consequences (understanding), typically did not have difficulty processing information when making treatment decisions (reasoning), and usually neither denied that they had a disorder nor manifested distorted beliefs about the potential consequences of treatment for the disorder.Nevertheless, these authors found, some anorexia patients said that they knew they might die and that they would rather die than suffer the alternative consequences (e.g., loss of identity, feeling of being disgusting). They point out that these beliefs, suggesting questionable competence, were not identified by the usual criteria for competence to consent to treatment. Therefore, they propose that we should consider a modification of the criteria for competence to consent to treatment. They argue for inclusion of "pathological values" as the basis for a finding of incompetence. Their notion of a pathological value (as we summarize it based on their Discussion) includes (a) a personal value (b) on which treatment refusal is based, that (c) is not authentic, and (d) is due to a mental disorder.Second, Tan and colleagues were concerned that the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), currently used widely to assess competence to consent to treatment, did not seem to take values into account when examining deficits related to lack of appreciation or reasoning. They point out that most patients with anorexia nervosa in their study had "pathological values" that influenced their thinking about treatment, yet they did not obtain poor scores on the instrument's appreciation scale, which assesses whether patients deny that they have the illness or offer reasons for accepting or refusing treatment that are based on delusional premises or a serious distortion of reality. Moreover, almost all of the anorexia patients in the study obtained adequate scores on reasoning, which examines the ability to process options and consequences when weighing a treatment decision. [End Page 293]Reasons for Caution in Altering Criteria for CompetenceA fundamental step in considering Tan and her co-worker's proposal is to examine whether it is necessary to add a concept of "pathological values" to the legal construct of competence to consent to treatment. Modifying the legal doctrine of consent is important if that is needed to improve its validity or reliability. But modifications of the doctrine would have considerable costs, including a long process of producing logical and empirical evidence for its necessity, developing methods to assess the new concept, and then a process of debate, persuasion, and education to change laws, ethical guidelines, and medical training. Moreover, principles of theory building urge parsimony. A theory should employ no more concepts or assumptions than are required to account for the phenomena that the theory seeks to organize or explain. So one must be sure that modifications are truly necessary before adding complexity to the theory of decisional competence.In addition, there is an inherent danger in altering a concept like competence to consent to treatment on the basis of the study of any one mental disorder. It is not at all clear how the modification might influence findings of competence when applied to other disorders. Using a study of patients with anorexia nervosa as the impetus for changing the competence concept runs this risk. For example, anorexia is one of a class of mental disorders that is characterized by a failure to abstain from behavior (here, limiting food intake and other behaviors designed to reduce weight) that has negative consequences for the person. Other conditions in this category might include substance abuse disorders and impulse control disorders (e.g., pathological gambling). Even if one concludes that revised criteria for competence would reduce false-positive findings of competence in this group of disorders, one would have to consider carefully its impact on the full range of disabling mental conditions.Moreover, the sensitivity... (shrink)