Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation (...) is not thwarted by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights provides a philosophically informed study of the methods of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. By drawing on Anglo-Americal legal, political and moral philosophy, the book also aims to provide a normative theory of the foundations of the ECHR rights.

Critics and artists claim the title of 'interpreter' for themselves. Scientists do not so readily describe themselves in this way. But is the formulation of explanatory hypotheses in science so different from the interpretive work of artists? Making Sense recognizes that whenever interpretation occurs there may be a plurality of competing successful interpretations. It offers a philosophical theory that views the interpretive enterprise as an attempt to make sense of things by representing them in ways that can be (...) accommodated within various significance-systems. (shrink)

Exploring Ricoeur’s hermeneutic theory of interpretation as a method of analysing research texts Increasingly, researchers use hermeneutic philosophy to inform the conduct of interpretive research. Congruence between the philosophical foundations of a study, and the methodological processes through which study findings are actualised, obliges hermeneutic researchers to use (or develop) hermeneutic approaches to research interviewing and textual analysis. Paul Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation provides one approach through which researchers using hermeneutics can achieve congruence between philosophy, methodology (...) and method.Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation acknowledges the interrelationship between epistemology (interpretation) and ontology (interpreter). Also, Ricoeur notes the way interpretation moves forward from naive understanding, where the interpreter has a superficial grasp of the whole of the text, to deeper understanding, where the interpreter understands the parts of the text in relation to the whole and the whole of the text in relation to its parts (the hermeneutic circle). In this way, Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation provides researchers with a method of developing intersubjective knowledge.Through exposition of the concepts of Ricoeur’s theory, which include distanciation, appropriation, explanation and understanding, guess, and validation, a hermeneutic approach to textual analysis is presented, discussed and critiqued. Examples from nursing research are also used to demonstrate points under discussion. It is suggested that, in conjunction with Gadamer’s hermeneutic of understanding, Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation warrants consideration as a method of textual analysis. (shrink)

Constitutional Law has undergone many changes since post World War II and its reflex has been felt in all other legal areas. However, little attention has been given to Legal Theory after these constitutional transformations. The present study discusses multiple aspects of such implications. After presenting what is understood by neoconstitutionalism, a correlation is drawn with changes in constitutional interpretation. A new element – defeasibility – is then placed as a necessary counterpoint between deliber- ating constitutional principles and (...) the theory of norms. Only if we take defeasibility into account and understand that constitutional interpretation has undergone certain changes, one is able to grasp the important tenets of neoconstitutionalism.Resumen:El derecho constitucional ha sufrido muchos cambios después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y sus consecuencias se han manifestado en otras áreas del derecho. Sin embargo, poca atención se le ha dado a la teoría jurídica después de estos cambios constitucionales. Este estudio investiga varios descubrimientos de estas implicaciones. Después de presentar lo que se entiende por neoconstitucionalismo, se avanza una correlación con los cambios en la interpretación constitucional. Un nuevo elemento —derrotabilidad— se presenta como una contrapartida necesaria entre la deliberación de los principios constitucionales y las enseñanzas de la teoría de las normas. Sólo a través de la derrotabilidad y el entendimiento de que la interpretación constitucional ha sufrido ciertos cambios, puede uno entender uno de los grandes postulados del neoconstitucionalismo. (shrink)

This paper points to a more viable theory of interpretation on the basis of opposing the missteps in Arthur Danto’s theory. By noting the incongruities in Danto’s theories of art and interpretation, a theory of interpretation emerges which unifies its varieties on the basis of the view of the human person as a culturally embodied and enlanguaged primate. A feature notably absent from Danto’s own account.

INTRODUCTION The present volume is a study of the extant commentaries on a number of Plato's dialogues which were written by Neoplatonist philosophers of ...

In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the centre of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the foundation for (...) a coherent general theory of rational agency. The second part employs this account of rational agency as a key to understanding Kant's concept of moral agency and associated moral psychology. The third part focuses on Kant's attempt to ground both moral law and freedom in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. This is a major contribution to the interpretation of Kant which will be of special interest to scholars and graduate students of Kant's moral theory. (shrink)

Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation (...) is not thwarted by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Abstract Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between de re , de dicto , and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes thought to be ambiguous between the former and directly referential interpretations. I provide arguments to suggest that none of these interpretations are due to ambiguities (or indexicality). On the other hand, I argue that descriptions are ambiguous between the above family of interpretations and (...) what may be called ‘institutional’ as well as generic interpretations. My arguments suggest that an adequate theory of descriptions may require considerable rethinking. Most contemporary theories of descriptions appear to be committed to one or more claims about the ambiguity of descriptions that I reject in this paper. I suggest that my observations provide a reason to renew efforts to develop a theory of descriptions within a representationalist theory of interpretation. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-16 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9759-5 Authors Philipp Koralus, Philosophy Department, Princeton University, 212 1879 Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

This paper reexamines the central thesis of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as (...) insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections: that it conflates meaning and significance; and that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a (...) theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions. (shrink)

Within the caring science paradigm, variations of a method of interpretation inspired by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation are used. This method consists of several levels of interpretation: a naïve reading, a structural analysis, and a critical analysis and discussion. Within this paradigm, the aim of this article is to present and discuss a means of creating distance in the interpretation and the text structure by using narration in a poetic language linked (...) to the meaning of the text. Ricoeur's ‘Hermeneutical function of distanciation’ will be introduced, and this concept of distanciation will be illustrated with reference to narrations from a study of patient's life experiences living with chronic illness and home mechanical ventilation in Denmark. Distanciation in the interpretation objectifies the text, and narration in a poetic language creates a particular kind of mediation in the interpretation. That narration represents an interpreted understanding of the whole, which facilitates an appropriate and evocative presentation of the interpreted data. This way of objectifying the text through narration can contribute yet another perspective to Ricoeur's rich and varied theory of interpretation. (shrink)

Most philosophical decision theorists and philosophers of the social sciences believe that decision theory is and should be in the business of providing folk psychological explanations of choice behaviour, and that it can only do so if we understand the preferences, utilities and probabilities that feature in decision-theoretic models as ascriptions of mental states not reducible to choice. The behavioural interpretation of preference and related concepts, still common in economics, is consequently cast as misguided. This paper argues that (...) even those who strive to provide folk psychological explanations should side with the economists, and adopt a behavioural interpretation of the preferences featuring in decision-theoretic models. Under a mentalistic interpretation of preference, decision-theoretic models do not straightforwardly provide ordinary folk psychological explanations. Instead, they involve controversial enough commitments about the mental causes of choice to not only fail to adequately capture much unreflective decision-making, but also many intentional, reason-based and instrumentally rational choices. Satisfactory folk psychological explanation in fact only comes indirectly from inferring more fundamental conative attitudes from a pattern of decision-theoretic preferences. And the behavioural interpretation does a better job at facilitating such inferences. My argument extends to the related concepts of utility and probability. (shrink)

This is a book about Aristotle's philosophy of language, interpreted in a framework that provides a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and science. The aim of the book is to explicate the description of meaning contained in De Interpretatione and to show the relevance of that theory of meaning to much of the rest of Aristotle's philosophy. In the process Deborah Modrak reveals how that theory of meaning has been much maligned. This is (...) a major reassessment of an underestimated aspect of Aristotle that will be of particular interest to classical philosophers, classicists and historians of psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper I test major analytic theories of interpretation, including anti-intentionalism, the value-maximizing theory, actual intentionalism, and hypothetical intentionalism, against Li Shang-yin’s poem ‘The Ornamented Zither’. I argue that, based on the results of the test, all of these theories face grave difficulties. If their supporters want their accounts to be sustained in the debate over interpretation, they need to address the worries I raise.

The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. Game theory is viewed as an abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict and not as an attempt to predict behavior. The first half of the paper..

The author constructs a philosophy of nature dealing with being, identity, value, space, time, motion, and causality, and uses that as a basis for a theory of hermeneutics to address contemporary problems of interpretation.

Populism in politics and policy orientations in law have thrown the jurisdiction of the academy and the disciplines of interpretation into disarray. Critique flounders in abstraction and negativity, law loses itself in particularity. Administering Interpretation brings together philosophers, humanists, and jurists from both continental and Anglophone jurisdictions to reassess the status and trajectory of interpretative theory as applied in the art of law. Tracking the thread of philosophical influences upon the community of legal interpretation, the essays (...) move from the translation and wake of Derrida to the work of Agamben, from deconstruction to oikononmia. Sharing roots in the philological excavation of the political theology of modern law, contributors assess the failure of secularism and the continuing theological borrowings of juridical interpretation. The book brings contemporary critique to bear upon the interpretative apparatuses of exclusion, the law of spectacular sovereignty, and the bodies that lie in its wake. (shrink)

This essay investigates the Zhuangzian theory of the self, which has long been the subject of a heated and controversial debate in Chinese intellectual history. According to an interpretation that has been quite prominent since the 1990s, the self in the Zhuangzi is a substantial, persisting self; it is a simple, basic object that is distinct from its properties. A substance, generally speaking, is an object or entity that has properties. Substance metaphysicians claim that substances, as primary units (...) of reality, are unchanging entities in themselves that bear changing properties over time.Some scholars, such as Kuang-ming Wu, Yi Wu, and Leo K. C. Cheung, believe that the self in... (shrink)

In this paper I develop a new account of the philosophical motivations for Descartes’s theory of judgment. The theory needs explanation because the idea that judgment, or belief, is an operation of the will seems problematic at best, and Descartes does not make clear why he adopted what, at the time, was a novel view. I argue that attending to Descartes’s conception of the will as the active, free faculty of mind reveals that a general concern with responsibility (...) motivates his theory of judgment. My account avoids some unappealing features of the standard interpretation, renders the theory more plausible than many have suggested, and explains why his theory does not fall neatly into any current-day position on the issue of the control we have over belief. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay offers an interpretation of Hegel's theory of normativity according to which normative evaluation is primarily a matter of a thing's answerability to its own constitutive norms. I show that natural and spiritual norms correspond to two different species of normative evaluation for Hegel, two categorically distinct ways something can violate its own constitutive norms. I conclude with some general reflections on the relationship between normativity and ontology in Hegel's system.

Samantha Matherne defends a systematic interpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kants theory of imagination. In contrast with more traditional theories of imagination, as a kind of fantasy that we exercise only in relation to objects that are not real or not present, Matherne argues that Kant theorizes imagination as something that we exercise just as much in relation to objects that are real and present. In short, she attributes to Kant a view of imagining as something that pervades (...) our lives. In order to bring out this pervasiveness, Matherne offers an account of what kind of mental capacity Kant takes imagination to be in general. She then explores Kants picture of how we exercise our imagination in perception, ordinary experience, the appreciation of beauty and sublimity, the production of art, the pursuit of happiness, and the pursuit of morality. However, she makes the case that Kants analysis of this wide range of phenomena is underwritten by a unified theory of what imagination is, as a remarkably flexible cognitive capacity that we can exercise in constrained and creative, playful and serious ways. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theoretical approach to discuss the relations among reality, chemists’ interactions with it, and the resulting interpretation and representation of the acquired scientific knowledge. Taking into account that such relations are of semiotic nature, this paper aims at discussing in the light of Peirce’s theory of signs different descriptions of chemical activity and chemical education proposed by Alex Johnstone and elaborated by other science educators. In order to discuss the contributions and limitations of the proposed (...) theoretical framework, and considering its potential interest for chemical education, an example on the communication strategies for the content ‘vapour pressure’ found in twentieth-century general chemistry university textbooks is also presented. (shrink)

The unique problem of lost territory poses one of the most important and complex challenges of compensating for loss and damage due to anthropogenic climate change. Anthropogenic climate change will cause a significant increase in the sea level for centuries to come. A rising sea level endangers many low‐lying coastal areas but also entire states. However, the inundation of an entire state will remain a rare event. Partial loss of territory will be far more pervasive. As measured by the number (...) of states, the area of land, and, in particular, the number of people affected, the phenomenon of partial territorial loss is much more significant. I address this from the perspective of compensatory justice. In particular, I offer (i) background on basic concepts, (ii) an overview and critique of existing accounts, and propose (iii) a novel interpretation of territory as well as (iv) a corresponding criterion of a duty to compensate before (v) I flesh out the overall theory, (vi) take into consideration implications and details of application, and (vii) respond to potential objections. (shrink)

After the theory of evolution was put forward by Charles Darwin, it has been interpreted in terms of different philosophical paradigms. The most important of these interpretations stand out as the intelligent designers and the naturalist school, which represent two separate poles. The intelligent design school claims that the process of existence of living things depends on very special and sensitive variables, and that this sensitive process is too complex to be explained by naturalistic reasons, and that the (...) class='Hi'>theory of evolution was designed only by a supernatural, transcendent power. The naturalist school, on the other hand, claims that the evolution process can only be explained by natural causes and therefore there will be no need for a transcendental power. Biologist Richard Dawkins, one of the most important representatives of the naturalist school, tries to show how evolution can be explained by natural causes, based on the concept of natural selection introduced with the theory of evolution. In this research, we focused on how Dawkins explained the theory of evolution from a naturalistic perspective and examined the consistency of his conclusion on the axis of the naturalistic school paradigm that Dawkins followed. By presenting Dawkins' theory of evolution from a naturalist perspective, the position of the theory of evolution, which stands out as a scientific theory, on theological and metaphysical phenomena will be understood. At the same time, the way the naturalistic paradigm deals with scientific phenomena will be explained, based on the example of the theory of evolution. (shrink)

The study is carried out in five chapters, with the first two offering a reconsideration of the function of the imagination in the Transcendental Deduction and Schematism of the first Critique. The last three follow the order of topics discussed by Kant in the third Critique in regard to judgments of taste, the sublime, and teleology; they conclude with an interpretation of "productive imagination" as a "model for the ideal of intellectual intuition". The comparison between "human and divine spontaneity" (...) is introduced in the first chapter, where Gibbons notes that while we have "Kant's explicit and repeated emphasis on the difference" between these, "in considering the similarity of these types of spontaneity," she wishes "to correct a possible imbalance in Kant's exposition": there are, she suggests, "formal similarities between these types of spontaneity". The main thrust of the first chapter is to respond to a particular reading of Kant—namely, to those unsympathetic interpreters who see in the Deductions an "imaginary subject of transcendental psychology" and also to those who give a "sympathetic reading" but do so in terms of an identification of "all aspects of synthesis with concept application," thereby reducing the "role of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination to that of unifying a manifold of intuition under a concept". Gibbons holds instead that the "theory of synthesis... focuses on the nature of human cognition and what is required for us to know anything about objects" and, further, that it presupposes "the broader function of the imagination as grounding the possibility of concept-application in the first place". (shrink)

Cultural evolutionary theory has been alternatively compared to a theory of forces, such as Newtonian mechanics, or the kinetic theory of gases. In this article, I clarify the scope and significance of these metatheoretical characterisations. First, I discuss the kinetic analogy, which has been recently put forward by Tim Lewens. According to it, cultural evolutionary theory is grounded on a bottom-up methodology, which highlights the additive effects of social learning biases on the emergence of large-scale cultural (...) phenomena. Lewens supports this claim by arguing that it is a consequence of cultural evolutionists’ widespread commitment to population thinking. While I concur with Lewens that cultural evolutionists often actually conceive cultural change in aggregative terms, I think that the kinetic framework does not properly account for the explanatory import of population-level descriptions in cultural evolutionary theory. Starting from a criticism of Lewens’ interpretation of population thinking, I argue that the explanatory role of such descriptions is best understood within a dynamical framework—that is, a framework according to which cultural evolutionary theory is a theory of forces. After having spelled out the main features of this alternative interpretation, I elucidate in which respects it helps to outline a more accurate characterisation of the overarching structure of cultural evolutionary theory. (shrink)

Kant's theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self‐consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject's thinking. It expresses a kind of self‐consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational (...) contents are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Conceptual Issues of Art Interpretation Ontology of Interpretation Notes.

the ready availability of wittgenstein's previously unpublished writings from his so-called middle period of 1929 to 1936 has greatly enriched our understanding of the development of his thought. For obvious reasons, however, it has had little effect on the interpretation of Wittgenstein's contemporaries. At the time, few, even amongst those who had by then taken note of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, were apprised of the new avenues Wittgenstein's thought had begun to take. One such rare exception was Moritz Schlick, the (...) nominal head of the Vienna Circle and an eminent philosopher of science. Even before Wittgenstein's return to... (shrink)

I show explicitly how concerns about wave function collapse and ontology can be decoupled from the bulk of technical analysis necessary to recover localized, approximately Newtonian trajectories from quantum theory. In doing so, I demonstrate that the account of classical behavior provided by decoherence theory can be straightforwardly tailored to give accounts of classical behavior on multiple interpretations of quantum theory, including the Everett, de Broglie-Bohm and GRW interpretations. I further show that this interpretation-neutral, decoherence-based account (...) conforms to a general view of inter-theoretic reduction in physics that I have elaborated elsewhere, which differs from the oversimplified and often ambiguous picture that treats reduction simply as a matter of taking limits. This interpretation-neutral account rests on a general three-pronged strategy for reduction between quantum and classical theories that combines decoherence, an appropriate form of Ehrenfest's Theorem, and a decoherence-compatible mechanism for collapse. It also incorporates a novel argument as to why branch-relative trajectories should be approximately Newtonian, which is based on a little-discussed extension of Ehrenfest's Theorem to open systems, rather than on the more commonly cited but less germane closed-systems version. In the Conclusion, I briefly suggest how the strategy for quantum-classical reduction described here might be extended to reduction between other classical and quantum theories, including classical and quantum field theory and classical and quantum gravity. (shrink)

We prove that a variant of Robinson arithmetic $\mathsf{Q}$ with nontotal operations is interpretable in the theory of concatenation $\mathsf{TC}$ introduced by A. Grzegorczyk. Since $\mathsf{Q}$ is known to be interpretable in that nontotal variant, our result gives a positive answer to the problem whether $\mathsf{Q}$ is interpretable in $\mathsf{TC}$. An immediate consequence is essential undecidability of $\mathsf{TC}$.

Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not (...) explicitly invoke any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts. (shrink)

This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between (...) human and animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. (shrink)

Building on pragmatist uses of semiotics as a heuristic for understanding social interaction, this article argues that temporality is a significant and undertheorized component of signs and their interpretation. Using transcripts from the oral argumentation of a Supreme Court case, I examine how different interpretations of the same sign rely not only on differing understandings of the sign’s object and how that object is signified but also, more specifically, differing understandings of the sign’s relationship to the past, present, and (...) future. (shrink)

In The Practice of Political Theory, Clayton Chin puts Richard Rorty’s pragmatism in dialogue with a range of contemporary political theorists, particularly focusing on how his notion of cultural politics can speak to the ontological turn in political theory. This article focuses on Chin’s claim that Rorty’s cultural politics provides an ethos of inclusive and tolerant political engagement. After exploring the basis for Chin’s interpretation, it identifies three tensions in this ethos, in relation to character of its (...) demandingness, the fissure between ethnocentric and egalitarian engagement, and the relationship of this ethos to the virtues and procedures of democratic citizenship. (shrink)

This paper deals with the possibilities of using the ethical considerations of Baruch Spinoza in a psychotherapeutic context. I begin the interpretation by defining the basic features of Spinoza’s ethics and their connection with the whole of his philosophical system. The core of the study is the interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of affectivity and especially his concept of the transformation of passive affects into active, and what role philosophical knowledge plays in this transformation. The third part of (...) the study then tries to show how selected points of Spinoza’s introduced ideas can be useful for psychotherapeutic work. As much as the connection between philosophical ethics and psychotherapy seems obvious to many non-experts, most professionals on both sides are vehemently opposed to it. I believe that Spinoza’s thinking is an example of how the boundaries of these disciplines can be meaningfully bridged. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of reasoning with evidence in order to determine the facts in a criminal case. The focus is on the process of proof, in which the facts of the case are determined, rather than on related legal issues, such as the admissibility of evidence. In the literature, two approaches to reasoning with evidence can be distinguished, one argument-based and one story-based. In an argument-based approach to reasoning with evidence, the reasons for and against the occurrence (...) of an event, e.g., based on witness testimony, are central. In a story-based approach, evidence is evaluated and interpreted from the perspective of the factual stories as they may have occurred in a case, e.g., as they are defended by the prosecution. In this paper, we argue that both arguments and narratives are relevant and useful in the reasoning with and interpretation of evidence. Therefore, a hybrid approach is proposed and formally developed, doing justice to both the argument-based and the narrative-based perspective. By the formalization of the theory and the associated graphical representations, our proposal is the basis for the design of software developed as a tool to make sense of the evidence in complex cases. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.