In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to (...) grow during the 1970s and is rapidly expanding today. We review this recent literature and its implications for human evolutionary biology. We show that the rejection of group selection was based on a misplaced emphasis on genes as "replicators" which is in fact irrelevant to the question of whether groups can be like individuals in their functional organization. The fundamental question is whether social groups and other higher-level entities can be "vehicles" of selection. When this elementary fact is recognized, group selection emerges as an important force in nature and what seem to be competing theories, such as kin selection and reciprocity, reappear as special cases of group selection. The result is a unified theory of natural selection that operates on a nested hierarchy of units. The vehicle-based theory makes it clear that group selection is an important force to consider in human evolution. Humans can facultatively span the full range from self-interested individuals to "organs" of group-level "organisms." Human behavior not only reflects the balance between levels of selection but it can also alter the balance through the construction of social structures that have the effect of reducing fitness differences within groups, concentrating natural selection (and functional organization) at the group level. These social structures and the cognitive abilities that produce them allow group selection to be important even among large groups of unrelated individuals. (shrink)

Mathematicians often consider Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with Choice (ZFC) as the only foundation of Mathematics, and frequently don’t actually want to think much about foundations. We argue here that modern Type Theory, i.e. Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT), is a preferable and should be considered as an alternative.

Often cited quotation from the Communist Manifesto that capitalism can have an anti-racist, anti-sexist bourgeoisie is the starting point of this analysis. Deploying Žižek's work on the "rotary motion" in the Indivisible Remainder, along with aspects of Marx's analysis of Ideology in the German Ideology to give readers a deeper analysis of Trump's exploitation of white voter's 'new racism as the fear of the 'theft of enjoyment' pinned on the Other' who either threatens to snatch from "us" the treasure of (...) our 'way of life', which conceals a deeper ressentiment which exploded on January 6th, and circulates through the back corners of the internet in white supremacist chatrooms. While these reports have been widely covered in mainstream news sources, a psychoanalytical treatment of "Replacement Theory" through Žižek's work (alongside a deeper reading of Marx, which would take much further work beyond the scope of this paper) reveals that the ideology behind so-called "Replacement Theory" is grounded in a metaphysics of scarcity, which would not exist in a truly communist society of automatic production, plenitude, and common property rights. (shrink)

The conditions are examined under which one theory is said to be replaceable by another, while preserving those features of the original theory which made it serviceable for a given purpose. Among such replacements, special attention is given to ones which qualify as so-called reductions of a theory, and some theorems are proved concerning the notion of a reduction.

An examination of earlier views yields an account of theoretic change on which changes in theory which do involve changes in meanings of terms are classified as a special (and by no means exhaustive) case of theoretic change which, latter, is construed as a more general phenomenon. Only the general problem is given detailed consideration here. The account given considers the problem of how replacement of intensional theories by extensional ones may be treated within the general framework provided. (...) Among its results is the conclusion that rational changes in a scientific theory may be cogently construed as determined by warranted decisions that a new theory is more adequate (than the old one it replaces) with regard to purposes for which a theory is sought. (shrink)

The somatic mutation theory (SMT) of cancer has been and remains the prevalent theory attempting to explain how neoplasms arise and progress. This theory proposes that cancer is a clonal, cell‐based disease, and implicitly assumes that quiescence is the default state of cells in multicellular organisms. The SMT has not been rigorously tested, and several lines of evidence raise questions that are not addressed by this theory. Herein, we propose experimental strategies that may validate the SMT. (...) We also call attention to an alternative theory of carcinogenesis, the tissue organization field theory (TOFT), which posits that cancer is a tissue‐based disease and that proliferation is the default state of all cells. Based on epistemological and experimental evidence, we argue that the TOFT compellingly explains carcinogenesis, while placing it within an evolutionarily relevant context.magnified imagemagnified imageAna Soto and Carlos Sonnenschein are at Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA. (shrink)

While it is known that intuitionistic ZF set theory formulated with Replacement, IZFR, does not prove Collection, it is a longstanding open problem whether IZFR and intuitionistic set theory ZF formulated with Collection, IZF, have the same proof-theoretic strength. It has been conjectured that IZF proves the consistency of IZFR. This paper addresses similar questions but in respect of constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, CZF. It is shown that in the latter context the proof-theoretic strength of (...) class='Hi'>Replacement is the same as that of Strong Collection and also that the functional version of the Regular Extension Axiom is as strong as its relational version.Moreover, it is proved that, contrary to IZF, the strength of CZF increases if one adds an axiom asserting that the trichotomous ordinals form a set.Unlike IZF, constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory is amenable to ordinal analysis and the proofs in this paper make pivotal use thereof in the guise of well-ordering proofs for ordinal representation systems. (shrink)

Despite the persistence of the theoretical model of the cathartic theory in psychoanalysis, it is not what we practice clinically. Freud’s Other Theory of Psychoanalysis deals with eliciting that other unarticulated theory from the Freudian text to replace the catharsis theory and open the theoretical impasse it created.

This article examines Kevin Scharp’s formal solution to the alethic paradoxes, ADT, which stands for ascending and descending truth. One of the main supposed benefits of ADT over its competitors is that it alone can validate the uses of truth concepts in theoretical contexts, such as truth-theoretic semantics. The appendixes contain a new consistency proof for ADT, and additionally show that it is conservative. As a result of its conservativity, the article argues that ADT faces a problem in accounting for (...) certain mathematical uses of truth. Thus, Scharp’s theory needs to be amended in order to fulfill its aim of replicating all substantive uses of truth. (shrink)

This essay argues that the flaws of just war theory should lead us to develop a new approach to living with others. Danielle Poe begins her argument with a description of just war theory and its failures. In the next section, Poe discusses the philosophy of Bat-Ami Bar On and Luce Irigaray in order to construct ethical commitments between people. These ethical commitments come from concrete acts of empathy, such as relationships of compassion, kindness, and hospitality. Finally, Poe (...) considers how these concrete acts can create conditions to prevent war. (shrink)

Mitochondrial replacement technology (MRT) is an emerging and complex bioethical issue. This treatment aims to eliminate maternal inherited mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) disorders. For Muslims, its introduction affects every aspect of human life, especially the five essential interests of human beings—namely, religion, life, lineage, intellect, and property. Thus, this technology must be assessed using a comprehensive and holistic approach addressing these human essential interests. Consequently, this article analyses and assesses tri-parent baby technology from the perspective of Maqasidic bioethics—that is, Islamic (...) bioethics based on the framework of Maqasid al-Shariah. Using this analysis, this article suggests that tri-parent baby technology should not be permitted for Muslims due to the existence of third-party cell gametes which lead to lineage mixing and due to the uncertain safety of the therapy itself and because the major aim of the technology is to fulfil the affected couples interest to conceive their own genetically healthy child, not to treat and cure mtDNA disorders sufferers. (shrink)

This essay considers Brian Leiter’s arguments for ‘replacement naturalism’ in the domain of adjudication, his thesis being that we should reject as plausible the ‘normative theory of adjudication’ and replace it witha posterioritheory which best explains the causes of judicial decisions. My central claim is that his ‘naturalizing’ argument is incomplete in the following way: it is against a bad kind of philosophical theory and leaves scope for a better, non-naturalistic, account. Both Leiter’s original arguments for the (...) position and his more recent suggestions in response to critics are considered. (shrink)

In the domain of evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the early body ornaments from the Middle Stone Age/Palaeolithic are generally treated as mere by-products of an evolved brain-bound cognitive architecture selected to cope with looming social problems. Such adaptive artefacts are therefore taken to have been but passive means of broadcasting a priori envisaged meanings, essentially playing a neutral role for the human mind. In contrast to this epiphenomenalist view of material culture, postphenomenology and the Material Engagement Theory have been making (...) a case for the active role of artefacts on the count that they can actually shape and restructure the human mind. By bringing these dissenting voices together, the paper at hand employs an enactive way of thinking in order to challenge the epiphenomenalist take on early body ornaments. In fact, two variants of enactivism are presented, each advancing a unique explanation of how the engagement of early humans with body ornaments transformed their minds along the two postphenomenological categories of embodied and hermeneutic cognition. Our theoretical frameworks specifically seek to explore how early beadworks could have scaffolded the creation of semiotic categories and the development of cognitive processes. Despite relying on inherently different premises, both theories suggest that beads fostered the emergence of an epistemic apparatus which thoroughly transformed the way humans engaged with the world. Having concurred on the ornaments’ transformative effects, we ultimately conclude that the epiphenomenalist paradigm best be replaced with an enactive approach grounded on the dictates of postphenomenology and the MET. (shrink)

Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with ‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.

Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts (...) that can do truth's job without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. He goes to develop Davidson's idea that truth is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena, and offers a semantic theory that treats truth predicates as assessment-sensitive and solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes. (shrink)

Technological advances are making devices that functionally replace body parts—artificial organs and limbs—more widely used, and more capable of providing patients with lives that are close to “normal.” Some of the ethical issues this is likely to raise relate to how such prostheses are conceptualized. Prostheses are ambiguous between being inanimate objects and sharing in the status of human bodies—which already have an ambiguous status, as both objects and subjects. At the same time, the possibility of replacing body parts with (...) artificial objects puts pressure on the normative status typically accorded to human bodies, seemingly confirming that body parts are replaceable objects. The paper argues that bodies’ normative status relies on the relation of a body to a person and shows that persons could have similar relations to prostheses. This suggests that in approaching ethical issues surrounding prostheses, it is appropriate to regard them as more like body parts than like objects. (shrink)

Though the target article is not without fertile suggestions, at least two problems limit its overall validity: (1) the extended gene-culture coevolutionary framework is not an alternative to standard evolutionary theory; (2) the proposed model does not explain how much time is necessary for selective pressure to determine the stabilization of a new aspect of the genotype.

Actualist counterpart theory replaces David Lewis’s concrete possible worlds and individuals with ersatz worlds and individuals, but retains counterpart theory about de re modality. While intuitively attractive, this view has been rejected for two main reasons: the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. I argue that in insisting that ersatz individuals play the same role as Lewisian individuals, actualists commit the particularist fallacy. The actualist should not require stand-ins for every Lewisian individual. Ersatz individuals should instead be (...) construed as representations of actually existing qualitative ways for individuals to be, or qualitative properties individuals can instantiate. This necessitates changes elsewhere. Non-instrumental uses of Kripke semantics and standard counterpart semantics also require stand-ins for particular non-actual individuals. I argue that the actualist should instead adopt a non-standard counterpart semantics that more clearly illuminates the role that actual properties and relations play in explaining de re possibilities and necessities. The result is an intuitive and forceful reply to both the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with Brian Leiter’s so-called replacement naturalism, according to which the traditional methodology of conceptual jurisprudence ‘should be replaced by reliance on the best social scientific explanations of legal phenomena.’ I argue that, although the methodology of experimental jurisprudence is the only plausible replacement for the traditional methodology, it cannot can replace the philosophical methods traditionally used to address conceptual issues and, further, that experimental jurisprudence needs a theoretical foundation that properly locates its role relative (...) to that of conceptual theorising and clarifies its methodology. To this end, I discuss three recent studies that attempt to ascertain the intuitions of competent speakers on three longstanding conceptual disputes about law: two attempt to show our folk concept of law is antipositivist, whereas the other attempts to show our folk concept of law is consistent with the existence of sanction-less legal systems. I argue that all three studies suffer from defects indicating the empirical methodology of experimental jurisprudence can supplement, but cannot replace, the traditional philosophical methodology for addressing conceptual questions. I argue, finally and far more worrisomely, that the last study calls into question its usefulness even in supplementing the traditional philosophical methodology. (shrink)

The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality (...) and the extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans. (shrink)

In this paper I defend anti-realism about race and a new theory of racialization. I argue that there are no races, only racialized groups. Many social constructionists about race have adopted racial formation theory to explain how ‘races’ are formed. However, anti-realists about race cannot adopt racial formation theory, because it assumes the reality of race. I introduce interactive constructionism about racialized groups as a theory of racialization for anti-realists about race. Interactive constructionism moves the discussion (...) away from the dichotomous (social vs. biological) metaphysics that has marred this debate, and posits that racialized groups are the joint products of a broad range of non-racial factors, which interact. (shrink)

I argue that philosophical reflection on cognition and knowledge should not be shaped into an epistemological theory in a strict sense. It ought to be understood as a hermeneutic study of the social and dynamic (historical) nature of cognition.

ABSTRACTKevin Scharp’s ‘Replacing Truth’ is an ambitious and far reaching account of the semantic paradoxes. In this critical discussion we examine one the books central claims: to have provided a theory of truth that avoids the revenge paradoxes. In the first part we assess this claim, and in the second part we investigate some features of Scharp’s preferred theory of truth, ADT, and compare it with existing theories such as the Kripke–Feferman theory. In the appendix a simple (...) model of Scharp’s theory is presented, and some potential consistent ways to strengthen the theory are suggested. (shrink)

This article serves to present a large mathematical perspective and historical basis for the Axiom of Replacement as well as to affirm its importance as a central axiom of modern set theory.

Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in such theories is somewhat compromised. As is, consequently, their (...) position as an alternative to rights-based theories in animal ethics. Recognising this, some utilitarians tried to disassociate utilitarianism and replaceability. I will here add my voice to this project. However, instead of seeing the culprit in the usual suspects (hedonism, maximisation or the total view), I advance a new proposal. After identifying that the compensating value for a disvaluable action has to be its consequence, I present a restriction on consequences: consequences of sequences of actions cannot be consequences of the isolated actions in the sequences. Given this, the main argument is simple: killing an animal is permissible only if the the value of the new animal’s life is a consequence of the killing; but this value is a consequence of a sequence of actions which involves the killing plus some additional actions; therefore, since, via the restriction, such value is not a consequence of the killing, it is irrelevant to its normative status. I then present two further motivations for the restriction: firstly, it prevents the value of conditional actions from trivially influencing the value of the actions on which they are conditional; secondly, it is useful – even if not a complete solution – to reply other objections to consequentialism: the accordion effect of action and the cluelessness problem. I finally consider a couple of objections. (shrink)

Following Kuhn's main thesis according to which theory revision and acceptance is always paradigm relative, I propose to outline some possible consequences of such a view. First, asking the question in what sense Bayesian decision theory could serve as the appropriate (normative) theory of rationality examined from the point of view of the epistemology of theory acceptance, I argue that Bayesianism leads to a narrow conception of theory acceptance. Second, regarding the different types of (...) class='Hi'>theory revision, i.e. expansion, contraction, replacement and residuals shifts, I extract from Kuhn's view a series of indications showing that theory replacement cannot be rationalized within the framework of Bayesian decision theory, not even within a more sophisticated version of that model. Third, and finally, I will point to the need for a more comprehensive model of rationality than the Bayesian expected utility maximization model, the need for a model which could better deal with the different aspects of theory replacement. I will show that Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science gives us several hints for a more adequate theory of rationality in science. I will also show that Kuhn is not in a position to fully articulate his main ideas and that he well be confronted with a serious problem concerning collective choice of a paradigm. (shrink)

Many people are moved by the thought that if A is worse off than B, then if we can improve the condition of one or the other but not both that it is better to improve the condition of A. Egalitarians are buoyed by the prevalence of such thoughts. But something other than egalitarianism could be driving these thoughts. In particular, such thoughts could be motivated, instead, by a combination of the belief that desert should determine how people fare and (...) the belief that, for the most part, people are equally deserving. Shelly Kagan has pushed this line of argument, suggesting that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. He argues that desert theory and egalitarianism often agree, and when they don’t intuition favors desert theory. A number of authors have offered responses to Kagan, including Serena Olsaretti, Fred Feldman, and Richard Arneson. However, I maintain that their responses are inadequate, primarily because they simply fail to capture the compelling intuitions that Kagan appeals to in making his case. There are other responses, however, and I consider three, each of which offers an egalitarian position that is compatible with Kagan’s most compelling intuitions. Thus, I maintain that Kagan has not sufficiently established that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. There is still room for a genuinely egalitarian position, though Kagan’s reflections helpfully force egalitarians to further develop and refine their thinking. (shrink)

Discussing theories at length, including their origin, development, and replacement by other theories, can help students in understanding of both objective and subjective aspects of the scientific process. Presenting theories in the form of- models helps in this undertaking, and the history of science provides a number of suitable models. The paper describes specific examples that have been used in in-service courses for science teachers.

In the nineteenth century, there was substantial and sophisticated interest in neuroscience on the part of social theorists, including Comte and Spencer, and later Simon Patten and Charles Ellwood. This body of thinking faced a dead end: it could do little more than identify highly general mechanisms, and could not provide accounts of such questions as `why was there no proletarian revolution?' Psychologically dubious explanations, relying on neo-Kantian views of the mind, replaced them. With the rise of neuroscience, however, some (...) of the problems of concern to earlier thinkers, such as imitation, have revived because of the discovery of neuronal mechanisms, or through fMRI studies. The article reviews the history and discusses the implications of current work for the reconsideration of traditional social theory concepts. It is suggested that certain kinds of bridging work with neuroscience would enable us to answer many questions in social theory that empirical sociology has failed to answer. (shrink)

In this article, I consider whether there are values intrinsic to development theory and practice that are dubious in light of a characteristically African ethic. In particular, I focus on what a certain philosophical interpretation of the sub-Saharan value of communion entails for appraising development, drawing two major conclusions. One is that a majority of the criticisms that have been made of development by those sympathetic to African values are weak; I argue that, given the value of communion, development (...) should not be rejected because it is essentially, say, overly materialistic and scientistic, or insufficiently spiritual and local. The second conclusion, however, is that three criticisms of development are strong from the perspective of Afro-communalism and are particularly powerful when set in that context. I argue that development theory and practice are characteristically anthropocentric, individualist and technocratic, and that a reading of the sub-Saharan value of communion provides a unitary foundation for rejecting these features and for grounding an alternative, more relational approach to social progress and to what justice demands from the West in relation to Africa. (shrink)

This article addresses recent strains of white nationalism rooted within anxieties over demographic replacement (e.g., “the Great Replacement”). More broadly, the article argues that the contemporary politics of white grievance cannot be reduced to an ahistorical desire for racial supremacy. Rather, these anxieties represent the political reflex to perceptions of loss on the part of historical white majorities—a loss that takes a distinctly melancholic form in both discourse and practice. To understand white nationalism as a melancholic politics is (...) to recognize the pathologies that stem from its underlying psychodynamics. At the affectual level, for instance, the subject of white grievance is constituted as the subject of politicized rage through its organizing narratives. And ultimately, the politics of melancholic whiteness raises significant challenges for a democratic polity. Most fundamentally, the melancholic fixation upon loss forecloses the futurity required by a democratic politics. Upon diagnosing these destructive pathologies, the article goes on to propose alternatives to approach civic change in less destructive, more democratically generative fashion. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have offered different accounts of what it means for one scientific theory to reduce to another. I propose a more or less friendly amendment to Kenneth Schaffner’s “General Reduction-Replacement” model of scientific unification. Schaffner interprets scientific unification broadly in terms of a continuum from theory reduction to theory replacement. As such, his account leaves no place on its continuum for type irreducible and irreplaceable theories. The same is true for other accounts that (...) incorporate Schaffner's continuum, for example, those developed by Paul Churchland, Clifford Hooker, and John Bickle. Yet I believe a more general account of scientific unification should include type irreducible and irreplaceable theories in an account of their partial reduction, specifically, when there is a reduction of their tokens. Thus I propose a “Reduction-Reception-Replacement” model wherein type irreducible and irreplaceable theories are accepted or received for the purpose of unifying domains of particulars. I also suggest a link between this kind of token reduction and mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestion that seems to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of wellbeing above which (...) a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they have such counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them. (shrink)

Our modern scientific explanation of colour as a subjective impression has replaced a ‘pre-theoretical’ notion of colour as an intrinsic property of objects, which was mainstream in ancient thought. Why have we lost such pre-theoretical notion, and what have we lost by losing it? I argue that most ancient Greek philosophers exploited this pre-theoretical assumption – one that was obvious to them – in terms and ways that are still worthy of attention in the context of contemporary philosophy of colour. (...) I offer an in-depth analysis of the theories of a number of early Greek philosophers, as well as of Plato in the Timaeus, showing that they tend to share the idea that colour is an essential property of external bodies and therefore plays a causal role in perception. Then I focus on a comparison between Democritus’ stance and Aristotle’s in order to highlight a significant contrast between the two. Democritus' theory is an exception in ancient thought because it traces the colour phenomenon back to a refraction of atmospheric light through atomic aggregates. Aristotle, instead, posits the presence of colour and light in the bodies themselves. Finally, I interpret Aristotle's account as the most complex attempt in ancient thought to weld together what we call the ‘manifest image’ of colour and its ‘scientific image’. (shrink)

Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or its supplement. (...) I show that these are three very different options. While agreeing with the view that there may be good reasons for some revisions and supplements, I strongly disagree with Elgin and Goodman's replacement thesis. (shrink)

Quantum Theory, similar to Relativity Theory, requires a new concept of space-time, imposed by a universal constant. While velocity of lightcnot being infinite calls for a redefinition of space-time on large and cosmological scales, quantization of action in terms of a finite, i.e. non vanishing, universal constanthrequires a redefinition of space-time on very small scales. Most importantly, the classical notion of “time”, as one common continuous time variable and nature evolving continuously “in time”, has to be replaced by (...) an infinite manifold of transition rates for discontinuous quantum transitions. The fundamental laws of quantum physics, commutation relations and quantum equations of motion, resulted from Max Born’s recognition of the basic principle of quantum physics:To each change in nature corresponds an integer number of quanta of action. Action variables may only change by integer values ofh, requiring all other physical quantities to change by discrete steps, “quantum jumps”. The mathematical implementation of this principle led to commutation relations and quantum equations of motion. The notion of “point” in space-time looses its physical significance; quantum uncertainties of time, position, just as any other physical quantity, are necessary consequences of quantization of action. (shrink)

The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.

This paper traces the shift from the age of realism to the age of virtualism we are currently witnessing. To do so, I draw on older theories announcing this advent (mostly Baudrillard in Simulacra and simulation. Transl. Sheila Glaser. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994 [1981]; Serres in Atlas. Édition Julliard, Paris, 1994; Virilio in The vision machine. Transl. Rose J. Indiana UP, Bloomington, 1994). I will describe how AI destabilizes fundamental distinctions upon which reality is built—such as the difference (...) between truth and fiction, between existence and simulation, between the actual and the potential, between game and everyday life, between person and avatar. Against the backdrop of a broader notion of the virtual (drawing on Deleuze in The actual and the virtual. Transl. Eliot Ross Albert in Parnet C Dialogues. Bloomsbury, London, pp 148–152, 2006 [1996]), I will read current realist theories (Chalmers in Reality plus—virtual worlds and the problems of philosophy. Allen Lane, London in 2022; Gabriel in Why the world does not exist. Transl. Gregory S. Moss. Polity, Cambridge, 2015; Ferraris in Positive realism. Zero Books, Arlesford, 2015; Meillassoux in After finitude—an essay on the necessity of contingency. Transl. Brassler R. Bloomsbury, London, 2008) as symptoms of the ongoing shift (rather than countermeasures against it), because they result in an inability to do justice to the epistemic and existential changes resulting from the erosion of the foundations of reality. The consequences of this shift are hard to predict and can only partially be outlined in this paper, which will end in a cautious attempt to do so (chapters 5 and 6). Starting off with a brief overview on this topic (chapter 1), I will trace the reasons for my diagnosis focusing first on what I call the “age of reality” currently coming to an end (chapter 2), then on why virtuality cannot be subsumed under reality (chapter 3), then how virtuality is currently replacing reality (chapter 4). (shrink)

Three main versions of cognition-arousal theory are distinguished depending on how they interpret the theory’s basic postulate, that an emotion is a function of cognition and arousal: objectivist causal theories, attributional theories, and fusion theories. The objectivist causal and attributional theories each comprise a causal-functional and a part-whole version, and the fusion theory subsumes in particular a categorization and a perceptual integration version. In addition, the attributional version of cognition-arousal theory can be reinterpreted as a (...) class='Hi'>theory of emotion self-ascription. Although arousal may in fact not be necessary for emotions, a modified cognition-feeling theory that replaces arousal with intrinsically affective feelings, seems still viable. Arguments are presented why the objectivist causal-functional version of this theory should be preferred. (shrink)

A new gauge theory of gravity on flat spacetime has recently been developed by Lasenby, Doran, and Gull. Einstein’s principles of equivalence and general relativity are replaced by gauge principles asserting, respectively, local rotation and global displacement gauge invariance. A new unitary formulation of Einstein’s tensor illuminates long-standing problems with energy–momentum conservation in general relativity. Geometric calculus provides many simplifications and fresh insights in theoretical formulation and physical applications of the theory.

This article aims at linking empirical research to legal theories, in a way that could enhance the benefits of this synergy. Jurisprudence, until recently the usual term for theoretical approaches to law, is now often replaced by the term legal theory. Difference between legal theory and empirical research is reflected in their consideration of subject matters, aims, and methods of research. However, there also exist commonalities between the two, i.e. both aim at comprehending law and legal systems. While (...) legal theory uses philosophical tools, its subject matter still remains a social phenomenon, for social ends. And since empirical research is a means to gather information about law, it could act as a prime source of information for legal theory. While empirical research has its own end to follow, what is missing is, attention to some legal theory, not just general legal theory, but which can also critique philosophical discourses to legality. (shrink)